D. 17 - Creation of man in regard to the constitution of his parts

Division of the text

Having shown that man proceeded from God in his likeness, just as from a cause in a certain way univocal, here he addresses the production of man in himself as constituted by his parts. This part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the production of man.

In the second, he addresses the production of woman, at and in the same paradise, God formed a woman from the substance of the man. (Sent. II, 18.1(103).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the constitution of man.

In the second, he addresses the place that was assigned to the one so constituted in being, as even in natural things some place is due to a thing generated, at as Scripture teaches, ‘God took man,’ who had been so formed, ‘and placed him in the paradise of delights.’ (Sent. II, 17.4(99).1, quoting Genesis 2:15.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the production of man on the side of his soul.

In the second, he addresses this on the side of his body, at it is also usual to ask whether God made man immediately of a fully mature age. (Sent. II, 17.3(98).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he addresses the production of the soul by God.

Second, he rules out the errors of some concerning this, one on the side of the Creator, at ‘therefore, let us not carnally hold that God formed the body with bodily hands;’ (Sent. II, 17.1(96).3, quoting Bede, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 2:7 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:42).) the other on the side of the created, at for some heretics held that God created the soul from his own substance. (Sent. II, 17.1(96).4.)

Third, he addresses a particular doubt, at but whether it was made in the body or outside of the body is also a tangled question among the learned. (Sent. II, 17.2(97).1.)

As Scripture teaches, ‘God took man,’ who had been so formed, ‘and placed him in the paradise of delights.’ (Sent. II, 17.4(99).1, quoting Genesis 2:15.) Here he addresses the place that was assigned to man thus created, namely, paradise.

And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he describes paradise.

In the second, he describes the trees of paradise, at and in this paradise, there were trees of different kinds. (Sent. II, 17.6(101).1.)

Here two questions are asked.

The first concerns the creation of man on the side of the soul. (Q. 1–2.)

The second concerns his formation on the side of the body. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The constitution of the human soul

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether the human soul is of the divine essence;

second, if not, whether it was created from some matter;

third, whether the soul was created outside the body. (Q. 2.)

Article 1

Whether the human soul is of the divine essence (ST I.90.1.)

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the soul is of the divine essence.

Obj. 1: For it is related: he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (Gen 2:7). But that which breathes something emits breath from itself. Therefore, the soul is of the essence of God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said: for we are indeed his offspring (Acts 17:28). But this is only true of man with respect to his soul, by which he is set apart from other sensible things. Therefore, it seems that the soul is of the offspring of the divine nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since natural activity follows on nature, things that agree in activity must agree in nature or essence. But the rational soul agrees with God in intellectual activity, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1179a25.) Therefore, it has an essence in common with him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is understood is understood through likeness or identity. For the intellect in act must be the understood in act, which only occurs either because they are the same essentially, as when God understands himself, or because a likeness of the thing understood is received in the one who understands as his perfection. But our intellect understands God, and likewise prime matter. Therefore, this occurs either through likeness or through identity. But it cannot be through a likeness abstracted from them, since nothing can be abstracted from what is most simple. Therefore, it must understand them through identity. And so, God, prime matter, and the intellective soul are the same essentially.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whatever things exist and in no way differ are thoroughly the same. But the intellect, prime matter, and God exist and in no way differ. Therefore, they are thoroughly the same. Proof of the middle premise, with regard to the second part, since the first part is obvious: any things that differ, differ by some difference. But everything that differs from another by a difference is composed of the difference and something else. Therefore, since the aforementioned three things are thoroughly simple, it seems that they differ in no way.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, that which is participated in by the being of any given thing pertains to the essence of each and every reality. But, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) it is by a participation in the divine goodness that the soul and all other realities exist and are good. Therefore, it seems that the divine goodness is the essence of any soul and any reality. But the divine goodness is its essence. Therefore, the divine essence is the very essence of the soul or something belonging to it.

On the contrary, that which in itself is only act is not in potentiality to another species or to another being. But the divine essence is pure act, with which no potency is mixed. Therefore, it does not have the possibility of being transformed into the nature of the soul or of any other thing, or of receiving any addition.

Furthermore, that which is pure act does not have any admixture of privation. For a privation is of something made to be possessed but is not yet possessed. But many defects or privations are present in the soul, such as ignorance, malice, and things of this sort. Therefore, the soul is not of the divine essence.

I answer that it was the error of certain philosophers of old that God is of the essence of all things. For they held that all things are simply one and do not differ, except perhaps in sense appearance or in our estimation, as Parmenides said. And some moderns, too, have followed those ancient philosophers, such as David of Dinant. (David of Dinant was a pantheistic philosopher at the University of Paris whose writings were condemned in 1210; none of his works are extant.) For he divided things into three parts: bodies, souls, and eternal separated substances. The primary-indivisible by which bodies are constituted, he called hule (“matter”). (Gk. ὕλη.) But the primary-indivisible by which souls are constituted, he called nous or “mind.” (Gk. νοῦς.) And the primary-indivisible in eternal substances, he called “God.” These three are one and the same thing, from which again it follows that all things are essentially one. In point of fact, this position both contradicts the senses and has been sufficiently disproved by philosophers.

Others, erring less, said that God is not the essence of all things, but rather of intellective substances, in regard to the likeness of the activity of intellect, its dignity, and its immateriality. This could have its origin from the opinion of Anaxagoras, who posited an intellect that moves all things. And it could have garnered some support from the text of Genesis 1, poorly understood. This too is contrary to the faith as well as to the statements of philosophers, who classify intellectual substances into different orders and place the human intellect as last in the order of all intellectual things, among which they place the divine intellect as first. Faith holds and reason demonstrates that the divine intellect is altogether unmovable. However, the human soul is in a way variable, namely, with respect to virtue and vice, as well as knowledge and ignorance.

Now, all these errors and many others of this kind seem to have a single principle and foundation. Once this is destroyed, no probability remains. For many of the ancients wished to judge natural things from intellectual concepts. Hence they supposed that, wherever things are found to agree in an intellectual concept, they share in a single reality. Hence there arose the error of Parmenides and Melissus. For they observed that “being” is predicated of all things and so spoke of being as if speaking of some single reality, showing that being is one and not many, as their arguments indicate, which are recounted in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 186a5–187a10.)

From this, too, followed the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato, who posited mathematical and intelligible principles for sensible things in such a way that, because number is found in these and those that share in number, they are one as in some essence. Likewise, because Socrates and Plato are man, there is one man essentially that is predicated of all.

From this, too, proceed several arguments of Avicebron in The Fountain of Life, who is always hunting for unity of matter based on equal commonality of predication. (Avicebron, The Fountain of Life 2.6–7; 2.9.)

From this, too, is derived the opinion that says that the single essence of a genus is in all its species in reality, not only in account.

But this foundation is exceedingly weak. For it is not necessary that, if this is a man and that is a man, then both must have the same humanity numerically, just as in two white things there is not the same whiteness numerically. Rather, this is likened to that in the fact that it possesses humanity just as that does. And the intellect, taking humanity not insofar as it belongs to this man but precisely as humanity, forms a single concept for all men. Thus, it is not necessary that if there is intellectual nature in the soul and in God, then both must have the same intellectuality essentially, or that through this same essence both are called a “being.”

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 2 (CSEL 28.1:202; PL 34:356).) this text does not compel us to hold that the soul is of the substance of God. This first because that which a man emits by breathing is from the external air that he drew in by breathing, not from his substance. The second is because even if it were of the substance of the breather, it would in no way be of the substance of the soul, even if we said it was from the substance of the body. But God is related to the whole universe as the soul is to the body, namely, by ruling it. Hence it does not follow that the soul of man is of the substance of God. The third is because the soul only has dominion over the body, for which reason it can only produce breath from the body. But God is above all nature. Hence it is not necessary for him to produce the soul from bodily elements. Rather, he creates it from nothing by the immensity of his power. Hence he is figuratively said to breathe, as the one who made breath: I have made the breath of life (Isa 57:16).

Reply Obj. 2: We are said to be the offspring of God with regard to the soul, not in such a way that the soul is of the divine essence, but rather because it participates in intellectual nature, which is also in God. In this respect, it is also said to be according to the image of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the soul does not have the same activity numerically that God has, but rather an activity similar to his, it does not follow that it has the same nature as God, but rather a nature similar to his. Nor can we draw the conclusion of unity of essence from such likeness, as has been said. (Above: resp.; d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.)

Reply Obj. 4: The created intellect understands God not through identity of nature, but through union to him. This union is either through a likeness—not one abstracted, but instead infused by God into the intellect, a mode of understanding that Avicenna (Avicenna (attributed), De intelligentiis, ch. 4, pt. 2.) calls “through impression,” saying that intelligences are in us from the fact that their impressions are in us—or it is through union to the very essence of the uncreated light, as it will be in our homeland. However, prime matter is knowable, not through a species received from it, but rather by analogy with form, as is said in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 191a9–11.) Thus, it is among those things that cannot be perfectly understood by reason of a deficiency on their part, as Boethius says in On the Two Natures. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 1 (PL 64:1337).)

Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.9, 1057b35–1058a30.) to be “other than” and to be “different” are not the same. For “different” is said in reference to something, so everything that differs, properly speaking, must differ in something. But “other than” is said absolutely, so things that are other than one another need not be other than one another by anything except themselves. For if all things that are other than one another had to differ in something, this would go back to infinity. Thus, we must arrive at primary simple things that are other by themselves, as is clear in the case of the differences by which species are distinguished.

Therefore, if “different” is taken strictly in keeping with the aforementioned manner of understanding, then the first proposition is false, because some things that are other than one another do not differ. But “same” is not opposed to “different,” but to “other than.” However, if “different” is taken broadly for both “other than” and “different,” then in this case the first proposition is true, but the middle is false, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 6: Created things are not said to participate in the divine goodness as part of its essence, but rather because they are constituted in being by a likeness to the divine goodness, according to which they imitate the divine goodness, not perfectly, but in part.

Article 2

Whether the human soul is constituted of any matter

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.75.5.) It seems that the soul is constituted of some matter.

Obj. 1: For everything that is a this-something (“This-something” (hoc aliquid) is a quasi-technical name for an individual subsisting substance; the term corresponds to “primary substance” in Aristotle’s Categories.) in nature is composed of matter, as is clear in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a11–15.) But the rational soul is such a thing. For it is a thing existing on its own without the body, and is distinct numerically from another soul of the same species. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter must be found, since the properties of a thing are not separated from the thing. But certain properties of matter are found in the soul, such as to underlie, to receive, to undergo, and things of this sort. Therefore, it seems that the soul is composed of matter.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 2, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b25.) it is necessary to imagine matter in a thing that is moved. But the mutability of the soul is shown from the fact that it becomes deformed by vices and fallacies, whereas it is formed by virtues and learning the truth, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CSEL 28.1:205; PL 34:359).) Therefore, there is matter in the soul.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.1, 1042a25–30.) no agent’s action is terminated except in a composite. But God’s creative action is terminated in the soul, which he brings into being. Therefore, it is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing lives by itself except God. But the soul not only gives life to the body but also lives. Therefore, it lives not by itself, but by something belonging to it. But everything in which there is a principle of life and something that receives life is composed of matter and form. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in every created thing, what works and that by which it works differ. For it belongs only to the first agent to act by its essence, whereas others act by participation in something that is added to the essence. But the soul has proper activities, and so it is the thing that works by these activities. Therefore, it is not that by which it works. Thus, it does not seem to be a simple form, but rather one possessing matter. For form is the principle by which an activity is produced.

On the contrary, the closer something is to the one first and simple being, the more it is one and simple, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, props. 17, 31.) But among natural forms, the soul is closer to God. Therefore, since other forms are simple, all the more so is the soul.

Furthermore, there is not a substantial form of a substantial form, just as there is not a quality of a quality. But everything that has matter also has a substantial form giving being to the matter. Therefore, since the soul is a substantial form, it seems that it is not composed of matter.

Furthermore, Augustine, by considering all the individual possibilities, shows that the soul is not made from matter. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CSEL 28.1:205; PL 34:358).) For it could not have been made from rational spiritual matter, since if the rational nature from which it is made had been blessed, it would not have been changed for the worse, because matter, when it is formed by God, is formed for the better. But if it was wretched, then a fault would have had to precede, which is contrary to the Apostle: when they had not yet done any good or evil, etc. (Rom 9:11). But if it was neither blessed nor wretched, then it did not yet have the use of reason, as occurs in childhood, and so was inactive.

Likewise, it could not have been made from irrational spiritual matter. For this would be close to the opinion that posits the passage of souls from body to body—and worse still, since this position does not say that the soul of a beast passes into a man, but rather the converse.

Likewise, it could not have been made from bodily matter. For the soul was not made from the same thing as that from which the flesh was made. Moreover, when the soul understands something, it withdraws itself from all bodily conditions, which would not occur if it had the nature of a body.

Now from all the aforementioned the following argument can be made. Everything that has matter, according to Augustine, is said to be made from matter, even if matter did not precede it in time. Therefore, if the soul cannot be said to be made from matter, as has been proved, then the soul does not have matter.

I answer that it does not seem to me that there is matter in the soul or in any spiritual substance in any way. Rather, it seems they are simple forms and natures, even though some say otherwise. Besides the other reasons for which this seems impossible in the case of the angels, as has been said above, (Above: d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.) matter is also excluded from the account of the soul for a special reason.

For since the soul is the form of the body, it must be the form of the body either with respect to its whole essence or with respect to part of its essence. If it is with respect to its whole essence, then it is impossible that part of its essence is matter. For that which in itself is pure potency cannot be the form or act of something. But every potency in the genus of substance is pure potency, since it is the immediate subject of substantial form and generation, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 320a2–5.)

However, if it is with respect to one part of its substance that it is the form of the body, through which it exists actually, and not with respect to another part that is its matter, then two unsuitable consequences follow. One is that one act numerically is the form of different matters, namely, bodily matter and spiritual matter, of which the essence of the soul is constituted. The other is that there is a single perfecting act of potencies that do not belong to a single genus. For bodily matter and spiritual matter cannot have a single account. And, moreover, only what is the act of a living body is that which we call a soul. By a similar argument, Avicenna shows in his Metaphysics (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 4.) that the intelligences are simple.

Despite all this, we do not deny that the rational soul has a certain kind of composition, namely, the composition of being and what-is, as has been explained above regarding the angels (See above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.) and regarding the soul itself—which mode of composition is, nonetheless, not found in other forms, because they cannot be subsistent as if in their own being, but rather exist through the being of the composite. In this the soul falls short of the divine simplicity. This, too, has been more fully explained. (See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: One can speak of a this-something in nature on the basis of two things. One way is because it has being subsisting in a nature, and in this way, the rational soul is a this-something. But it does not follow that it is composed of matter, for to be composed of matter is incidental to what subsists. The other way in which one can speak of a given something is through the fact of a part of its essence being individuated. In this way, the soul is not a this-something, for the principle of individuation for souls is on the side of the body, and yet even after separation from the body they remain individuated and distinct, as has been said. (Above: d. 3, q. 1, a. 2; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6.) This is the way the Philosopher takes a “this-something” in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a5–10.) Hence there he expressly denies that the soul is a this-something.

Reply Obj. 2: To undergo, to receive, and all such things are said of the soul and of material things equivocally, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.2, 426a1–25.) and from the Commentator on the same passage. Hence it is not necessary for matter to be found in the soul. Rather, it suffices that there be some potentiality there. But what sort it is has been said above in the discussion on the angels. (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: Matter of the same account is not required for all motions. Local motion does not require matter in potency with regard to being, but only matter in potency with regard to place. Likewise, a change from vice to virtue or vice versa does not require matter that is in potency with regard to being as part of the essence of the movable thing itself. Rather, it only requires matter that is in potency with regard to virtue, and this is the very substance of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher is speaking of a natural agent that works with matter, as his arguments show, since they proceed from the principle that in every bringing-into-being there must be three things: that from which something comes to be, that in which the bringing-into-being is terminated, and that which brings into being. From this he concludes that coming-into-being belongs to forms only incidentally. But we do not concede these principles in the case of the divine action by which God creates the soul. Thus, it is not necessary for the soul or another spiritual substance created by God to be composed of matter. For, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, cc. 1, 4.) too, the divine agent does not act through motion in such a way that it needs matter. The Commentator also says on the Metaphysics 11 (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 30.) that action is said equivocally of the action by which God acts and of natural action.

Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b12.) to live is nothing other than the being of living things. Hence just as the rational soul exists, but is not that by which it exists, so also it lives, but is not that by which it lives. Now, just as that by which it exists formally is not a form that is part of its essence, but rather its very being, so also that by which it lives formally is not a form that is part of its essence, but rather its very living. But that by which it exists and by which it lives efficiently is God himself, who infuses being and life. He does this in composite things by the mediation of form, which is part of their essence, whereas in simple substances he does this through their whole essence. But God neither exists nor lives from an efficient principle. Rather, he himself is also his own living and his own being. In both respects the soul falls short of the perfection of the divine life.

Reply Obj. 6: That by which the soul works, taken in either of two ways, differs from it. For the soul works by another’s infusing into it being, living, and working—namely, God, who works all things in all. These things obviously differ from the soul. It also works by its own natural power, which is the principle of its activity, namely, by the senses and the intellect. This is not its essence, but rather a power flowing from the essence. But in neither way does God work by something other than himself, since he has his activity from himself and is himself his own power. But the soul is not said to work by something that is not itself, but is a part of its essence, as natural bodies work by a form that is part of their essence, granted that this is by the mediation of a power as a kind of instrument, as fire works by the mediation of heat.

Question 2

The creation of the human soul

Third, the question is asked whether the soul was created outside the body.

Two questions are asked concerning this:

first, whether there is a single soul or intellect of all men, as a kind of separated substance exercising an influence on all bodies;

second, if there is more than one, whether they were created in the body or outside the body.

Article 1

Whether the rational soul or intellect is numerically one in all men

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6; ST I.76.2; SCG II.73–75; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 9; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 85; On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists, throughout.) It seems that the rational soul or the intellect is numerically one in all men.

Obj. 1: For no form is multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter except a material form. But the intellect, as is proved in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a25.) is not a material form, since it is not the act of a body. This is proved from its very act, since it knows all material forms, which could not be the case if it had one of them in its own nature or were determined to it from the body whose act it were, just as the power of sight would not know all colors if the pupil, which is its organ, had a determinate color. Therefore, the intellect is not multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter. Thus, it remains one in all individuals of the human species, which are only divided through matter.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is impossible for the principle to be more material than what flows from the principle, since the principle must be more simple. But, as everyone concedes, there are some powers of the rational soul that are not acts of a body and are not connected to organs, and the principle and root of these powers is the very essence of the soul. Therefore, it seems that neither is the rational soul itself in its essence united to the body as its act. Thus, it seems to follow that the rational soul is not distinguished on the basis of the division of bodies.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is received in another is received in it after the mode of the receiver and not after its own mode, as we find in Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694); Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 9 (PG 3:259).) and the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, props. 20, 24.) Therefore, if the intellect is individuated on the basis of the division of the body such that there would be a different one for different bodies, then the intellectual forms received in it would also have to be individuated. But from this there seem to follow two unsuitable consequences.

One is that, since no particular is understood actually, but rather potentially, species of this sort will not be intelligible actually, but they will stand in need of being understood through other species, leading to an infinite regress.

The other is that there will be the same mode of receiving forms in prime matter and in the potential intellect, since in either case they are received as these forms and not as forms simply. Thus, just as prime matter does not know the forms it receives, so it seems neither will the potential intellect be knowable through the forms it receives.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are distinguished from each other must have something in the nature of each that is different. But since the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, it seems that we can find something different in it only according to a diversity of the species being understood. Therefore, the intellect of this and that person do not differ essentially, but only through the intellect’s species.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in all substances that exist by themselves and are immaterial, numerical differentiation results in differentiation of species. For if they have their own absolute subsisting being, they cannot be distinguished essentially through something that is outside their essence on which they are overlaid, as bodily forms are overlaid on matter. However, in their essence there is only form, the diversity of which leads to differentiation of the species. But we cannot say that the intellects of different men differ specifically, because then men themselves would differ in species on the basis of the differences of their forms. Therefore, since the rational soul is a substance subsisting in itself (otherwise it would not remain after the body) and is immaterial, it seems that it does not differ even numerically in different men.

On the contrary, it is impossible for more than one individual to have a single form numerically. But the rational soul is the form of a given man. For if man had being from the substance of a sensitive or nutritive soul, then nothing could be found in man with regard to his primary being whereby he would surpass the animals, which is unfitting. Therefore, it is impossible that there is only a single rational soul of all men.

Furthermore, it is impossible for differences regarding secondary being to be found in things that have no differences regarding primary being. For differentiation of secondary perfections and contrariety cannot exist simultaneously with unity of primary perfection, since then there would be contraries in the same thing. But we find that the last perfections with regard to secondary being are different and contrary in different men, of whom some are foolish and some wise, some are vicious and some virtuous. Therefore, the primary perfection, namely, the soul, must be varied in different individuals with regard to primary being.

Furthermore, the soul is the form of the body and its mover. But in the heavenly bodies, according to the position of philosophers, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.8, 1074a30.) different movers are assigned to different bodies. Therefore, it seems that all the more are there different souls in different men.

I answer that there are several opinions among philosophers concerning the unity and differentiation of the rational soul, even setting aside those who posit that there is a single intellect in all of intellectual nature, or those who posit that the intellect is the same thing as the divine essence.

To understand these positions, we have to understand that philosophers distinguish “intellect” into three types: there is the potential intellect, the agent intellect, and the intellect in habit. The intellect which can potentially receive all intelligible forms is called the “potential intellect.” (Throughout this translation, we have translated intellectus possibilis as “potential intellect” rather than as “possible intellect” or “passive intellect.” While “possible intellect” is a common and more direct transliteration of the Latin, the term in English might confusingly suggest the opposite of impossibility rather than the intellect’s potency to the intelligible. As for “passive intellect,” this term has been reserved for the intellectus passivus that Aquinas identifies with the bodily cogitative power.) It is like the eye, which can potentially receive all colors. The intellect that actualizes potentially intelligible things is called the “agent intellect.” It is like light, which makes potentially visible colors actually visible. Finally, they refer to the “habitual” or “formal” intellect when the potential intellect is already perfected by an intelligible species such that it is able to work. For no passive potency has an activity unless it has been perfected through the species of its object, just as sight does not see before it receives the species of color.

Therefore, with these things in mind, one should know that in this matter nearly all philosophers after Aristotle (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a17.) agree that the agent and potential intellects differ substantially, and that the agent intellect is a certain separated substance, the last among the separated intelligences, and stands to the potential intellect whereby we understand just as the higher intelligences stand to the souls of the heavenly spheres.

But this cannot be maintained, according to the faith. For if, as Anselm proves, (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. 1, ch. 5 (PL 158:365).) God did not will that the reparation of man take place through an angel, lest the parity of man and angels in glory be taken away—since then an angel would become the cause of salvation for man. Likewise, if we posit that our soul in its natural activity depends on another intelligence or an angel, then we could not reasonably maintain that the soul is equal to the angels in future glory; for the ultimate perfection of each substance lies in the completion of its activity. Thus, the aforementioned philosophers posit that the ultimate happiness of man is union with the agent intelligence. Therefore, some Catholic doctors, partially correcting and partially following this opinion, have posited with sufficient probability that God himself is the agent intellect, since our soul is blessed through attachment to him. They confirm this through what John 1:9 says, the true light that enlightens every man was coming into the world.

Moreover there was likewise a great diversity among the philosophers following Aristotle concerning the potential intellect. For some said that the potential intellect is different in different individuals, while others said that it is one in all individuals.

Among those who posited that it is different in different individuals, there are three opinions.

Some say that the potential intellect is nothing other than human nature’s preparation to receive an impression of the agent intellect, and that this is a bodily power of man’s constitution. This was Alexander’s opinion. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, 3rd century commentator on Aristotle. See Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5, and throughout.)

But this cannot stand even according to the intention of Aristotle, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a15.) who is of the opinion that the potential intellect is receptive of intelligible species. Moreover, preparation is not receptive; rather, it is preparatory, and what is prepared by this preparation is the body or a power in the body. Thus, that which receives intelligible forms would be the body or a power in the body, which the Philosopher disproves.

Moreover, it would follow that the potential intellect is not a cognitive power. For no power caused by the combining of elements is cognitive, since in this case the quality of the elements would act beyond its species, which is impossible.

Thus, others have said that the potential intellect is nothing other than the imaginative power insofar as it is naturally receptive of forms that have been actually understood. This is Avempace’s opinion. (No work is named here as Avempace or Abubacher (Ibn Bajja, c. 1085–1138 AD) would have been known to Aquinas primarily through Averroes. See Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5.)

But this, too, is impossible. For, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a14–19.) phantasms that are in the imaginative power are related to the human intellect as colors are to sight. Thus, phantasms must be movers of the potential intellect, just as color moves sight. Hence the aptitude that is in the potential intellect for understanding is like the aptitude that is in a potential patient to be a patient actually. But the aptitude that is in the imaginative power is like the aptitude of a potential agent to be an agent actually. But it is impossible that the same thing be both mover and moved, agent and patient. Therefore, it is impossible that the imaginative power be the potential intellect.

Besides, it would still follow that the power that receives intelligible things actually, which is called the “potential intellect,” would be using a bodily organ, since the imaginative power has a determinate organ.

As well, it should be known that, according to these opinions, the potential intellect is generated when the body is generated and corrupted when the body is corrupted. Since there is no difference of intellect in different men except the potential intellect, given that the agent intellect is one, it would follow that what remains of the intellect from all men after death would be one numerically, namely, the agent intellect. This is exceedingly heretical, since it would do away with all recompense for merits after death.

Thus, the third opinion is that of Avicenna, (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 7.) who posits that the potential intellect is different in different individuals, founded in the essence of the rational soul, and that it is not a bodily power, and that it begins with the body but is not ended with the body. Hence, with regard to the potential intellect, his opinion is what we hold according to the Catholic faith, (The fifth Lateran council (the 18th ecumenical council, 1512–1517 AD) confirmed this teaching: “we condemn and reject all those who insist that the intellectual soul is mortal, or that it is only one among all human beings, and those who suggest doubts on this topic.”) even though he errs with the others concerning the agent intellect, as has been said.

Now, in the case of those who posit a single potential intellect in all, there are two opinions. One is that of Themistius and Theophrastus, as attributed to them by the Commentator, commenting on On the Soul 3. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5.) For they say that the habitual intellect, which is the third, is one in all, eternal, and is, as it were, a composite of the agent and potential intellect in such a way that the agent intellect is as its form and so, through its connection with the potential intellect, the agent intellect is also connected with us. Thus, the agent intellect is of the substance of the speculative intellect, which is also called the “habitual intellect,” through which we understand. They cite, as a sign of such a thing, that the action of the intellect within our power pertains to the habitual intellect. Therefore, since it is in our power to abstract species from phantasms, the agent intellect must be the habitual intellect as its form.

We can include under this position those who, based on Aristotle’s demonstration, hold that the potential intellect is one in all, since it is not a this-something nor a power in the body and, consequently, is eternal. Again, they say that the agent intellect is likewise eternal and that it is impossible for an effect to be generable and corruptible if the agent and receiver are eternal. Hence they posited that species understood are eternal. Thus, the fact that the intellect sometimes understands and sometimes does not occurs because new intelligible species come to be that earlier did not exist. Rather, it occurs from the conjunction of the agent intellect with the potential as connected in us through its impression.

But the Commentator disproves this opinion. For it would follow that the forms of natural things that are understood would exist from eternity without matter and outside the soul, on which basis these species are not placed in the potential intellect as its form; for they posit that the form of the potential intellect is the agent intellect. It would follow, too, since the ultimate perfection of man is with respect to the habitual intellect, and the first perfection with respect to the potential intellect, that one man would not differ from another either with respect to ultimate perfection or with respect to first perfection. In this case, all men would have a single being and a single activity, which is impossible.

Thus, he holds to another approach, that both the agent intellect and the potential are eternal and one in all, but that intelligible species are not eternal. He posits that the agent intellect is not related to the potential as its form, but rather as an artisan to matter. He also posits that species, when understood and abstracted from phantasms, are as though the form of the potential intellect, and that the habitual intellect arises from these two.

Through this position he endeavors to avoid all the impossibilities that befall Themistius. This is first because he shows that, if the agent intellect is eternal, as is the recipient, that is, the potential intellect, it is not necessary that forms—the intelligible species—be eternal. For just as a visible species has two subjects, one in which it has spiritual being, sight, and the other in which it has material being, the colored body, so also the intelligible species has two subjects. One of these is that in which it has material being, namely, the phantasms themselves that are in the imagination; and with respect to this being these species are not eternal. The other is that in which it has immaterial being, namely, the potential intellect. With respect to this subject the species do not have the property of being generable and corruptible.

But this seems to be no response at all. For just as it is not the same species of color numerically that is in a wall and that is in the eye, so also it is not the same species numerically that is in the imagination and in the potential intellect. Hence the problem still remains that the species that is in the potential intellect has only one subject, and that which is in the imagination as generable and corruptible is numerically other—unless, perhaps, it is said that they are eternal simply speaking, but not as regards that in which the phantasms do not exist from eternity, whose likenesses are within the potential intellect. But even so, since no phantasm is eternal, it would still follow that the species that are from eternity in the potential intellect would not be abstracted from any phantasms. This is contrary to the intention and words of the Philosopher.

Second, he endeavors to show that from this position it does not follow that all men have a single being and a single activity in accord with which all are equally wise. For he says that, because a species understood stands to the potential intellect in a certain way as form to matter, in such a way that a single complete thing in a certain way arises from them, its union with us is through what is formal in the aforementioned joining—namely, through the species understood, one of whose subjects he says is a phantasm, which is in us, and the other the potential intellect itself. Hence since in different individuals there are different phantasms, the potential intellect is joined to different men by different joinings. From this, men have different being. Also from this, one man knows what another does not know, since through a single understood species it is joined to one man while not being joined to another. However, there are certain understood concepts, such as the first conceptions of the intellect, through which it is joined to all. The potential intellect is never divested of these, with men existing from eternity, as he says. Hence he concludes that what there is of the intellect in us is in a certain way corruptible and in a certain way incorruptible, since on the side where the phantasms are multiplied corruption occurs; but on the side where there is unity, namely, on the side of the potential intellect, there is incorruptibility. Hence it also follows from this that no differentiation among souls remains once their bodies have corrupted.

But this argument is shown to be senseless in many ways. The first is because, as has been said, the species that is the form of the potential intellect is not numerically the same in a phantasm and in the subject. Rather, one is a likeness of the other. Hence it follows that the potential intellect is in no way joined to us, and so we would not understand through it.

The second is because the joining of the potential intellect with the species understood is through the activity of the intellect, which pertains to secondary perfection. Hence it is impossible that man would acquire his primary perfection and substantial being through the mediation of such a union. In this way, since man has an intellect from such a union, on their account, man would not be man in a determinate species through the fact that he has an intellect. For that medium, namely, the species understood, is joined to each of the extremes, namely, to the imaginative power and to the potential intellect, after the manner of an accident to its subject. This is contrary to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a7–b20.) where he says that the soul is united to the body without the mediation of anything, not even the mediation of knowledge, as Lycophron said, to whose position this one seems to be a return. (Lycophron was a Greek sophist, whose works are known primarily through references found in Aristotle. See Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045b10. The Lycophron referred to here should not be confused with the 3rd century BC Greek grammarian and tragic poet, to whom authorship of the poem Alexandra was attributed, though perhaps incorrectly.)

The third is because an activity does not proceed from its object but from the power. For it is not the visible that sees, but rather sight. Therefore, if the intellect is only joined with us through the fact that a species understood has a subject in us in some way, it follows that this man Socrates does not understand, but rather a separated intellect understands what Socrates himself imagines. And it is not difficult to adduce several other absurd consequences.

Thus, having removed all the aforementioned errors, I say with Avicenna (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 7.) that the potential intellect does indeed begin to exist with the body, but it does not come to an end with the body, that it is different in different individuals, and that it is multiplied according to the division of matter in different individuals, as are other substantial forms. Furthermore, I add over and above this that the agent intellect is different in different individuals. For it does not seem probable that in the rational soul there is not a principle by which it can fulfill its natural activity, which follows if we posit a single agent intellect, whether we say it is God or an intelligence. Nor again do I say that these two things—that is, the agent and potential intellect—are a single power named in different ways in accord with different activities. For whatever actions are traced back to contrary principles cannot possibly be traced back to the same power. This is why memory is distinguished from the senses, since to receive the species of sensible things, which belongs to the senses, and to hold them, which belongs to the memory, are traced back to contrary principles even in bodies, that is, moist and dry. Now, to receive understood species, which belongs to the potential intellect, and to render them actually intelligible, which belongs to the agent intellect, cannot belong to something in the same respect; rather, to receive belongs to something insofar as it is in potency, while to render belongs to something insofar as it is in act. Therefore, it is impossible for the agent and the potential intellect not to be different powers.

But it is difficult to see how they can be rooted in a single substance. For it does not seem that a single substance can be in potency with respect to all intelligible forms, which belongs to the potential intellect, and yet be in act with respect to all of them, which belongs to the agent intellect—since otherwise it could not render all forms intelligible, since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Nonetheless, one should know that it is not unfitting for there to be two things which are both in potency with respect to the other in different respects. For example, fire is potentially cold, which water is actually; and water is potentially hot, which is in fire actually. Hence they are active and passive with respect to each other. I say that a sensible reality stands to the intellective soul in a similar way. For a sensible reality is potentially intelligible and actually has a distinct nature, whereas in the soul there is actual intellectual light, but its determination of knowledge with respect to this or that nature is potential, just as the pupil is in potency with respect to this or that color. Thus, the soul has a power through which it makes sensible species to be actually intelligible, which is the agent intellect; and it has a power through which it is in potency to be brought into a determinate act of knowledge by the species of a sensible reality, the latter having been made actually intelligible. This power or potency is called the “potential intellect.” And all our understanding follows on the activities of these two powers, both of principles and of conclusions. Hence what some say, that the habit of principles is the agent intellect, is apparently false.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not denied that the intellect is a material form since it gives being to matter as a substantial form does with regard to primary being. Thus, even the multiplication of the intellect, that is, of the intellective soul, follows on the division of matter, which causes diverse individuals. But it is called immaterial with respect to secondary act, which is activity. For understanding is not accomplished through the mediation of a bodily organ, and this happens because an activity only proceeds from the essence of the soul through the mediation of its power or potency. Hence since it has certain powers that are not the acts of any organs of the body, certain activities of the soul must not exist through the mediation of the body.

Reply Obj. 2: Whenever two things are joined together, of which one is more potent than the other and attracts it to itself, it has a power apart from what is subject to it, as is clear in the case of flame. For fire prevailing over the vapor to which it is joined has a power of illuminating, beyond which the action of the vapor that is lit up can extend by heating. Therefore, since in the joining together of form to matter, form is found to be dominant, the more noble a form is and the more it prevails over matter, the more it can have power apart from the condition of the matter. Hence some mixed bodies, apart from the powers of the active and passive qualities, which are present on the side of the matter, have some powers that follow on the species, such as that a magnet attracts iron. We find this even more in plants, as is clear in growth, which is something brought to completion through the power of the soul and which could not be accomplished through the power of fire, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a1–20.) This is found even more in animals, since to sense is altogether above the power of elemental qualities. It is found most perfectly of all in the rational soul, which is the most noble of forms. Thus, it has certain powers in which the body in no way shares, as well as others in which it does share.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 7.) an understood species can be considered in two ways: either with reference to the being that it has in the intellect, and in this case it has a singular being; or as the likeness of a certain sort of thing understood, leading to knowledge of it. In this latter regard it possesses a universality. For it is not the likeness of this thing precisely as this thing, but rather with respect to the nature in which it agrees with others of its species. Nor is it necessary for every singular to be intelligible only in potency (as is clear in the case of separated substances), but rather in those things that are individuated through matter, such as bodily things. But these species are individuated through the individuation of the intellect. Hence they do not lose actually intelligible being. For example, I understand that I understand, even though that I understand is a singular activity. It is also evident through itself that the second unsuitable consequence does not follow, since there is one mode of individuation through the intellect and another through prime matter.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Commentator also says on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5.) what is receptive of things need not be deprived of any determinate nature, but instead must be divested of the nature of the things received, as the pupil is divested of the nature of colors. Thus, the potential intellect must necessarily have a determinate nature. But before understanding, which happens through the reception of a species, it does not have in its nature anything of what it receives from sensible things. This is what it means when it says that it is nothing of what exists.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though the soul does not have matter as part of itself from which it has existence, it does have matter in which it exists, of which it is the perfection. For on the basis of the division of this matter, it is multiplied numerically, not specifically. But the case is otherwise in those immaterial substances that do not also have matter of which to be the forms. For in them there can be no material multiplication, but only formal multiplication, which leads to differentiation of species.

Article 2

Whether souls were created outside bodies

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.90.4; 91.4, ad 3, 5; 118.3; SCG II.83–84; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 10.) It seems that souls were created outside bodies.

Obj. 1: For Genesis 2:2 says that on the seventh day God . . . rested from all his work which he had done, that is, he ceased doing any new work. But a new work is one that has never existed, either in itself or in preceding matter. Therefore, since the soul is immaterial, and one cannot say that it already existed in its matter in the works of the six days, it seems that it already existed in itself. Otherwise, God would be doing a new work in the creation of the soul. Therefore, it seems that souls were created outside bodies, since individual bodies have not existed from the beginning.

Obj. 2: You might say that even though the soul did not previously exist in matter in the works of the six days yet still was present as regards a seedlike principle.

On the contrary, if the seedlike principle of the soul was already there, then it must have been there in a creature, either bodily or spiritual. But that which contains the seedlike principle of a thing is effective of that thing; hence the Philosopher in the Physics 2 (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a20.) places seed in the genus of efficient cause. Therefore, either an angel would be the maker of the soul, as some philosophers posited, which is false; or a bodily creature would be, which is even more false. Therefore, the premise is impossible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the work of creation preceded distinction and adornment. But the soul is brought into being through creation. Therefore, it does not begin to exist after the works of the six days, during which things were distinguished and adorned. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that does not depend on another with respect to its being can begin without the other’s beginning. But the rational soul does not depend on the body with respect to its being, since it remains when the body is destroyed. Therefore, it does not seem unfitting to posit that souls were previously created outside the body.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the soul and angels have intellectual nature in common. Therefore, since immateriality is the condition for intellectual nature, it seems that just as angels from their creation have the property of not being united to a body, likewise rational souls were not united to the body at their creation.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, spiritual nature has more to do with the perfection of the universe than bodily nature. Therefore, if rational souls are newly created every day, it seems that the universe was not perfect from the beginning, and that its perfection is added to daily. But the contrary to this is found in Genesis 2:1: thus the heavens and the earth were perfected, and all the adornment of them. (RSV reads thus, the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them.)

On the contrary, a proper act is in a proper potency. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 430b26–431a4.) But the rational soul is the proper act of the body. Therefore, it seems that it only exists in the body.

Furthermore, the term of a motion never precedes the motion, especially in generation. But the soul is the term of human generation, as is any other substantial form of a generated thing. Therefore, the soul could not exist before the generation of the body.

I answer that it was the opinion of some ancients that souls were created from the beginning outside bodies. The occasion for this error was that they held that the soul is united to the body as if incidentally, like a sailor to a ship or like a man to a garment, as Gregory of Nyssa (Rather: Nemesius of Emesa (fl. ca. 390 AD), On the Nature of Man, ch. 3.) recounts concerning Plato. Hence he said that man is a soul clothed with a body. Consequently, according to the Pythagoreans, the soul passed from body to body.

But Aristotle rejects this, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.3, 407b20–25; 2.2, 414a20–27.) showing that the soul, since it gives substantial and specific being to a certain sort of body, has an essential relationship to the body in that the soul that gives being to one body cannot perfect another. Likewise, Avicenna (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 4.) rejects this error through a rather effective argument, supposing the immateriality of the soul. For it is impossible for differentiation numerically under the same species to be caused except from differentiation of matter, since what follows on the differentiation of formal principles is diversity of species. Therefore, if the soul, as was claimed, does not have matter from which it exists, more than one soul of a single species cannot be distinct numerically except through differentiation of the matter in which they exist. Hence if they had been created before the body, then either they would have had to differ specifically, and in this case all men would differ in species due to the differentiation of forms, or else there would be only a single soul numerically, and this would bring back the error dealt with in the preceding article.

Still, Augustine says in On Genesis (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:222; PL 34:368).) that the soul of the first man was created before the formation of the body, though he does not assert this.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have ceased from work on the seventh day in that he made nothing afterwards that did not in some way come before in the first works, either with respect to matter and seedlike principle, as in the case of newly generated bodies, or with respect to likeness, as in the case of newly created souls.

But it should be known that the likeness of the soul was also in a way present before in the work of creation, since we read that all things were created at the same time, as is said in Sirach 18:1. But this likeness was in the common nature in which the soul and angels agree, namely, intellectual nature. A likeness in species of this soul that is now created also came before in the works of the six days, for among the other works of the six days, man, too, was created and, according to other saints, perfected by a rational soul—although according to Augustine man was made in those six days with regard to matter and seedlike principle on the part of the body, while on the part of the soul, the soul of the first man was made by itself.

Reply Obj. 2: And in this way, the reply to the second objection is clear, since we concede that the seedlike principle of the soul did not precede its creation in anything created.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a kind of creation that does not presuppose matter, either from which or in which what is created comes to be. Such is the creation that preceded distinction and adornment. But the creation of the soul, although it is not from matter, nevertheless requires in advance the matter in which it is created. Because this matter can only be disposed as to be rendered proper through the action of nature, such creation follows distinction and adornment, in accord with which active principles were constituted in nature, as was said before. (Above: d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, resp.)

Reply Obj. 4: As Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 1, ch. 1.) the soul, even though it does not depend on the body with regard to its being or with regard to its end, does depend on it in a certain way with regard to its beginning. The reason for this is that since universals only have any being in the soul, whatever is brought into natural being must be brought into being as individuated. Therefore, since the soul can only have individuated being through union with a body as its form, as has been proved, it must only begin to exist in the body. But even so, it acquires in the body absolute being, which is not confined or bound to the body. Thus, even after the destruction of the body it remains individuated and distinct from other souls with respect to its being. And this was also discussed in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, especially ad 6.)

Reply Obj. 5: The soul and the angels have in common the fact that both are subsisting substances, having absolute being, and that they do not have matter as part of themselves, all of which results in intellectuality in both. Still, they differ in the fact that, since the angelic nature is more sublime and closer to God, it is endowed with a higher being, in which a body can in no way be brought to participate, and so for this reason neither can an angel be the form of a body. But the soul is endowed with a lower and less noble being, in which a body is united to it such that the soul and the body have one being, which is the being of them as joined together. Thus, it is the form of the body, and its individuation is from its union to the body. This was also discussed in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, especially ad 6.)

Reply Obj. 6: The essential perfection of the universe consists in species, whereas its incidental perfection consists in individuals. Therefore, since the multiplication of souls is not a multiplication of specific differences, but rather a numerical multiplication, it remains that the creation of many souls each day adds nothing to the essential perfection of the universe, but only to its incidental perfection. And this is not unfitting.

Question 3

The formation of the human body

Then the question is asked regarding the formation of man with respect to the body. Two questions are asked concerning this:

first, of what nature man’s body is composed;

second, concerning the bodily place in which he was placed, namely, in paradise.

Article 1

Whether in the composition of man there is something that has the nature of a heavenly body

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.91.1, ad 2.) It seems that in the composition of the human body there is some part that has the nature of a heavenly body.

Obj. 1: For the same form requires the same perfectible matter. But the form of the human body agrees in intellectual nature with the separated form that moves the body of heaven. Therefore, it seems that something that has the nature of a heavenly body enters into the composition of the human body.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is impossible for contraries to arrive at maximum equality unless they are reconciled through something. But only what is free from contrariety can reconcile contraries, and among bodies only a heavenly body is this kind of thing. Therefore, the composition of the human body, in which elements arrive at a maximum equality, must include something that has the nature of a heavenly body.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Avicenna says (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 3, ch. 8; pt. 5, ch. 8.) that the spirits that are diffused throughout the members have the nature of light. But this is the nature of the fifth body; hence the Philosopher also says in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7, 418b10–15.) that “bright” and “transparent” are found in lower bodies insofar as they have something in common with a higher body. Therefore, it seems that in the human body there is something that has the essence of a heavenly body.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 726b35–737a5.) in the seed there must be three kinds of heat: elemental heat, that is, fiery heat; the heavenly heat; (By calor caelestis (“heavenly heat”), Aristotle means primarily the heat that comes from the sun, which obviously has a role in seasonal life cycles.) and vital heat, which is the heat of the soul. But accidents indicate the nature, as is said in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 402a17.) Therefore, it seems that besides elemental nature there is also in man’s body a heavenly nature and the nature of the soul.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, man is called a “microcosm,” because the natures of all created things come together in him. But a heavenly body is most of all a part of the universe. Therefore, it seems that something that has the nature of this body enters into the composition of the human body.

On the contrary, whatever enters into the composition of the human body is in some way perfected by the soul. But whatever begins to exist under a substantial form is generable and corruptible, and the soul is a substantial form. Therefore, since the nature of a heavenly body is incorruptible and ungenerable, it seems that it does not enter into the composition of the human body.

Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3, 270a5.) the natural place of the entire body is the same as the natural place of a part of it. But the place of a heavenly body is above the elements. Therefore, nothing that has the nature of this body can be here except as in an unnatural place and through violent motion. But this body cannot have a violent motion, since its circular motion does not have a contrary, as is proved in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3, 270a20; proved in 1.4, 270b31–271a35.) whereas violent motion must be the contrary to natural motion. Therefore, nothing that has the nature of a heavenly body enters into the composition of man.

I answer that there are two ways something can enter into the composition of something else. One way is through its essence, after the manner of a material or formal principle, and in this regard something that has the nature of a heavenly body in no way enters into the composition of the human body. This is because there are only three ways in which more than one body can enter into the constitution of a single thing. The first is through simple aggregation, as when a heap is made of stones. The second is through composition, which is with a determinate ordering of parts that are bound together, as when a house is made from wood and stones. The third is through mixing, as when a mixed body is made out of elements. But in none of these ways can a part that has the nature of a heavenly body enter into the composition of the human body. For in the first two ways each of the parts must be distinct from the others with respect to position. But in the composition of the human body, we do not see that there is something that has the nature of a heavenly body there distinct from the other parts, namely, the elements, with respect to position. But the third way requires an alteration of the components, since a mixture is the union of mixable altered things, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 328a20.) whereas heavenly nature is unalterable.

The other way in which something enters into composition with something else is through an effect of its power. In this way, the nature of a heavenly body enters into the composition of the human body and indeed of all mixed bodies. For nothing obtains substantial form except through heavenly power, because the body of the heavens is the first principle of alteration, by whose power all alterations are regulated and brought to their proper ends.

Even so, some say that something of the nature of a heavenly body enters into the composition of the human body essentially, as reconciling the elements. They say that this is light, which they hold is a body. But this position relies on a false foundation when it posits that light is a body, as was said (Above: d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.) above—though if this error were removed, the position would be true in a certain way. For, as was said above, the lower bodies partake of the power of the heavenly bodies by the mediation of light. Yet a body of the heavenly nature would still not belong to the composition of the human body, since that light is not the substantial form of the human body, but rather is in a certain way a cause of it. And we spoke of this above. (See above, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: The soul that moves a human body does not belong to the same species as the nature that moves a heavenly body, though they are the most similar to one another among all natural forms. Hence it is not necessary for something of a heavenly body to be essentially part of the human body, but rather for the human body to be most of all like heaven, which happens inasmuch as it has the most moderate constitution and is the most withdrawn from contrariety when it reaches a mean, which is neither of the contraries.

Reply Obj. 2: For the reconciliation of the elements, the effect of a celestial power suffices. Hence it is not necessary for the celestial body to enter into the composition of the human body essentially.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary for everything that is bright to pertain to the nature of the fifth essence, except by way of likeness and a certain agreement. Hence the more noble a body is, the more it participates in its properties. Hence in fire there is more of light than in air, and so forth. Therefore, Avicenna does not intend to say (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 3, ch. 8; pt. 5, ch. 8.) that spirits have the nature of the fifth essence, since he afterwards says that more subtle and clearer spirits are generated from certain foods or drinks.

Reply Obj. 4: The heat of a heavenly body in seed is not the heat found in the heavenly body as in a subject. For in this case it would follow that the heavenly body is in the seed. Rather, the power of the heavenly body works in the seed, just as the power of the prime mover remains in its instrument.

Reply Obj. 5: All things enter into the composition of the human body, not essentially, but instead by way of likeness and a certain agreement, as when Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 29 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1214).) that man understands with the angels, lives with the trees, and so forth.

Article 2

Whether the paradise in which Adam was can be a bodily place

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.102.1.) It seems that the paradise mentioned here cannot be a bodily place.

Obj. 1: For man is not distinguished by bodily things from other animals, with which he shares in life and the senses. Rather, he is distinguished by a spiritual thing, namely, the intellect. Therefore, since he is said to be distinguished in paradise from other animals because other animals were not placed there, it seems that paradise is only a spiritual place.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no earthly place reaches all the way to the lunar sphere, since around the moon there is the most active fire, which consumes foreign bodies. But in the text (Sent. II, 17.5(100).1.) it is said that paradise reaches all the way to the lunar sphere. Therefore, it seems that it is not an earthly place, but a heavenly one.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, philosophers and historians are found to have written about different places on earth. But no one has ever written about this place. Therefore, it seems probable that it is not a bodily place.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 9 (PG 94:903).) that the spring whence flows the rivers of paradise is the ocean itself. But the ocean surrounds the entire earth, not a determinate place. Therefore, it seems that no determinate place on earth is paradise.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the four rivers that Scripture mentions as coming out from paradise flow out of different springs. Therefore, since Scripture says that a single spring in paradise is the origin of these rivers, it seems that this cannot be understood of a bodily spring and rivers, just as other things that are said of paradise cannot be so understood.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the tree of life is wisdom, as Proverbs 3:18 says. Therefore, since wisdom is not a bodily thing, it seems that neither this nor other things that are said of paradise are to be taken in a bodily sense.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, what is due to man as condemned does not befit a properly established nature. But agriculture was given as a punishment to man after his condemnation: in the sweat of your face you shall eat bread (Gen 3:19). Therefore, it seems that it is only said mystically that man was placed in paradise to work it.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, where no intruder is feared, there is no need to guard. But no one could have intruded into paradise. Therefore, it cannot be understood literally that man was placed in paradise to guard it.

On the contrary, there is what is determined in the text (Sent. II, 17.5(100).1.) and what the common tradition of the Church holds.

I answer that Origen held that paradise is not a bodily place, but rather that everything said of paradise should be interpreted allegorically of a spiritual paradise. Epiphanius, the bishop of Cyprus, rejects this as an error in an epistle of his translated by Jerome. (Epiphanius of Salamis (4th cent. AD), Opera Epiphanii, sect. 5 (PG 43:385).) Hence it should be conceded simply that paradise is a bodily place located in a determinate part of the earth, exceedingly mild and beautiful, so that man would enjoy spiritual delights in peace, unimpeded by any distresses. They reckon this place to be under the equator facing toward the east on the basis that some philosophers assert that that place is exceedingly mild; and also, the Nile, which is one of the four rivers of paradise, seems to flow from that location.

Reply Obj. 1: Even in sensitive power man exceeds other animals, since he is endowed also with a better sense of touch and the lower senses are stronger in him, so that through their mediation, the intellect can better accomplish its work. Thus, too, in order to be more peacefully free to devote himself to intellectual activity, he received a tranquil place apart from other animals. For it is not probable that other animals could have reached that place on their own, except either temporarily and by divine power, as when the animals were led to Adam to see what he would call them, as we read in Genesis 2:19—unless, perhaps, this event is explained as taking place through an interior revelation—or even by the working of a demon, as is clear in the case of the serpent.

Reply Obj. 2: The earthly paradise cannot be understood to extend all the way to the lunar sphere with respect to position, but rather with respect to a certain likeness on account of the mildness and incorruption that were due to that place and its inhabitants. For from the moon and beyond there is neither contrariety nor corruption.

Reply Obj. 3: As is said in the text, (Sent. II, 17.5(100).4.) that place is also separated from where we live by certain obstacles such that no one can go there, either mountains, or waters, or even intemperate weather in some place in between. Consequently, one could only know about it through Scripture’s revelation.

Reply Obj. 4: The first source of these rivers, like other waters, is the ocean. But the proximate source is the spring that rises up in that part of the earth.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as it happens with some rivers that the springs from which they originate go underground after they have flowed for some distance and then emerge again in other places, so also Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CSEL 28.1:241; PL 34:378).) that with these rivers it happens that their first source is the spring of paradise, which goes under the earth at some place unknown to us and then the water emerges in other places, where it seems to be the source of these rivers.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as Jerusalem signifies the present Church as well as our heavenly homeland, though in the literal sense Jerusalem was a definite city, so also, even though wisdom is signified by the tree of life, this does not prevent the tree of life from being understood literally as a definite tree.

Reply Obj. 7: In the state of innocence there would not have been laborious agriculture as there is in the state of sin. Rather, it would have been delightful from the consideration of divine providence and natural virtue.

Reply Obj. 8: Man was placed in paradise to guard it for himself, not against any intruder—that is, he was to guard it lest he lose it through sin.

Or we may say that this is not to be understood as if man would have to work paradise or guard it, but rather that he was placed in paradise so that God would work on man there and guard him. For just as a man works the earth to make it fruitful, so also God works on man to make him just and guards him, since without his assistance he cannot be safe, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:245; PL 34:381).)

Exposition of the text

That the soul was created with the angels and without a body. (Sent. II, 17.2(97).2, referring to Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:222; PL 34:368).) This position seems irrational. For things that are of a single species also have a single manner of origin. Hence if other souls are created in the body, it cannot be reasonably maintained that the soul of the first man was created outside the body. Though Augustine, without asserting it, says this in On Genesis 7. (That is, in the quote from the Sentences above. See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:222; PL 34:368).)

‘For God, however, nature is what he does.’ (Sent. II, 17.3(98).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 6, ch. 13 (CSEL 28.1:188; PL 34:348).) For he is omnipotent through his nature, and he is also the establisher and Creator of natures. For just as artificial forms come forth from the working of man, so also natural forms flowed forth from the intellect of God. Hence that which is made by him has the account of nature.

‘But if they are going to be otherwise in his foreknowledge, then they are going to be as they are there, where he who cannot be deceived foreknows them.’ (Sent. II, 17.3(98).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 6, ch. 17 (CSEL 28.1:191; PL 34:350).) This is because lower causes can be impeded such that not every contingent thing in them will actually occur. But the knowledge of God cannot be mistaken. Thus, it cannot be that he knows that something is going to be that is not.

So it was that the waters of the Flood did not reach there. (Sent. II, 17.5(100).4.) This was not so much because of the altitude of the place as because of the purity of the place, which did not need purgation.