D. 18 - Creation of woman

Division of the text

After addressing the origin of humanity on the part of man, here he addresses the origin of woman. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses her origin with respect to the body.

In the second, he addresses her origin with respect to the soul, at as the body of the woman was derived from the body of the man, so some believed that her soul was propagated from the man’s soul. (Sent. II, 18.7(109).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the manner of the production of woman on the part of the body.

In the second, he inquires about the principle of the body so produced, at it is also usual to ask whether the woman was made from that rib, without the addition of anything extrinsic. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he sets out the manner of origin.

Second, he assigns reasons for what he has set out.

There he first shows why woman was formed from man, at here we must attend to why he did not create man and woman at the same time. (Sent. II, 18.1(103).2.)

Second, he shows why woman was formed from the part that she was, at but although woman was made from man for these reasons, nevertheless she was formed not from just any part of his body, but from his side. (Sent. II, 18.2(104).1.)

Third, he shows why woman was formed from man as he slept, at it was also not without cause that the rib was taken from the man while asleep rather than while awake. (Sent. II, 18.3(105).1.)

It is also usual to ask whether the woman was made from that rib, without the addition of anything extrinsic. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).1.) Here he inquires about the principles of the body produced.

First, he inquires about the material principle.

Second, he inquires about the active principle, at it is also fitting to know that, although the formation of woman was done with the service of angels, yet the power of creation is not to be attributed to them. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).2.)

There he first inquires whether the body of woman was produced through the action of an angel.

Second, he inquires whether it was through the action of nature, at but it is asked whether the order which God created with the first works arranged it that, in accordance with itself, the woman must necessarily be made from the side of man. (Sent. II, 18.5(107).1.)

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he sets down as a preface certain matters needed for the manifestation of the solution.

Second, he pursues the solution of the question, at and so the causes of all things are in God. (Sent. II, 18.6(108).1.)

As the body of the woman was derived from the body of the man, so some believed that her soul was propagated from the man’s soul. (Sent. II, 18.7(109).1.) Here he inquires about the manner of the origin of woman on the part of the soul, where he rules out two heresies and affirms Catholic truth, as is clear through itself in the text.

Here there are two questions.

The first concerns the production of woman on the part of the body. (Q. 1.)

The second concerns the origin of her soul. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The creation of woman’s body

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether the woman’s body was made from the rib of man;

and, because it is said that this was not done actively through seedlike principles, but rather primordial ones,

a second question arises concerning the difference between these principles; and because things that are made apart from seedlike principles are said in the text to be made miraculously,

a third question arises, what sort of works should be called “miraculous.”

Article 1

Whether the body of woman should have been made from the rib of man

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.92.3; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 7, lect. 1.) It seems that the body of woman should not have been made from the rib of man.

Obj. 1: For the distinction of sex is common to man and other animals. But in other animals male and female were produced at the same time, and neither was taken from the other. Therefore, it seems that neither in humankind should woman have been taken from man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, matter cannot be transmuted from a small quantity into a large one except either through rarefaction, just as from one cup of water ten cups of air are generated, or through the addition of something else. Hence Augustine says: what is more absurd than for there to be any body with the quantity of its nature remaining, that is, without addition, that grows on all sides, unless it becomes rarefied? (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 26 (CSEL 28.1:331; PL 34:428).) But it could not be the case that through rarefaction a single rib would grow to the quantity of a woman, since then the body of the woman would be found to be even more rare than air itself. Therefore, this must have come about through the addition of something external, which must have been much larger than the rib. Therefore, since each thing should be named after the greater part, it seems that one should not say that the body of woman was formed from the rib of man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since in divine works nothing is superfluous, the rib must have pertained to the perfection of Adam’s body. But when what pertains to the perfection of a thing is subtracted, diminution follows. Therefore, since every diminution will be restored in the resurrection, it seems that that rib will rise again in the body of Adam. Therefore, if the body of Eve was made from this rib then it seems that Eve will not rise again, which is unfitting. Therefore, woman was not made from the rib of man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in a body capable of sensation one cannot divide the continuous without pain. But the body of Adam, on account of the integrity of his nature as established, was exceedingly capable of sensation. Therefore, since he experienced no pain before his fault, it seems that woman was not formed from his rib.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 1 (CSEL 28.1:32; PL 34:263).) in all works of creation, we ask not what God can do, but what the nature of things can undergo. Therefore, since the natural manner of the propagation of woman is not from the rib of man, but rather from the man’s seed (for to things that are of the same species, a single mode of origin is due), it seems unfittingly asserted that woman was made from the rib of man.

On the contrary, Boethius says, it is necessary for the imperfect to take its origin from the perfect. (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 10 (CCSL 94; PL 63:763).) But woman is an imperfect or misbegotten man, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 16. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 737a25.) Therefore, it was appropriate for the body of woman to be taken from the body of man.

Furthermore, the first principle and the end are traced back to the same thing; hence we posit the same thing as end and principle of the universe. But woman was made for man, since we read that she was made for the help of man (Gen 2:20). Therefore, it was appropriate that man would also be the principle of woman. And so, the same follows as before.

I answer that, for Catholics, there should be no doubt that woman was formed from the rib of man, even though the Jews tell many fables about this matter. For that woman is taken from the body of man does not present any more difficulty for reason or the divine power than that the body of man should be formed from the slime of the earth, since both are apart from the power of nature.

However, not all agree on the way it happened. For some, such as the Master in the text (Sent. II, 18.4(106).1.) and Hugh of Saint Victor, (Hugh of Saint Victor (ca. 1096–1141 AD), De sacramentis fidei, bk. 1, pt. 6, ch. 36 (PL 176:284).) are of the opinion that woman was formed from the rib of man without the addition of anything external or the creation of new matter. But this does not seem intelligible. For if they say that this came about through the multiplication of matter, then we must understand this multiplication either with respect to quantity alone or with respect to the essence of the matter. If respect to quantity alone, then in this case the same matter numerically that was first under small dimensions must later receive greater dimensions. But this is the same as to be rarefied, as is clear from the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.8–9, 216a10–217b25.) Thus, it would follow that the body of the woman was formed from the rib of the man by way of rarefaction, which is obviously impossible.

However, if the multiplication reaches even to the essence of the matter, then, since to be multiplied is nothing other than for something to come to be that previously was not, there must be some matter under the form of the woman’s body that previously was not under the form of the rib. But this can only be either through the conversion of another body into the woman’s body, whose matter remains under its form, or through the fact that some matter is newly created. Thus, the body of the woman must be formed from the rib of the man through the addition of some matter, either newly created or under the form of another preexisting body. And one can also understand the multiplication of bread this way.

Yet it seems truer that this came about through the addition of preexisting matter, since the saints commonly hand on that all things were created at the same time, at least as regards matter.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Economics 1.3, 1343b5–1344a7.) male and female in mankind are joined together not only for the generation of offspring, as in other animals, but also for the sake of sharing activities in a common life, that in this way they may attain sufficiency by conferring on each other their proper activities. Hence it is apparent that the activities of man and woman are different. Therefore, because in the sharing of life and management of the house the man is the head of the woman, the male in mankind has more the account of a principle with respect to the female than in other animals. For this reason it was more becoming in the case of mankind for woman to be taken from man than in the case of other animals. Moreover, two reasons are assigned in the text that are self-evident. (Sent. II, 18.1(103).2–3.)

Reply Obj. 2: It was through the addition of an external thing that the body of woman was made from a rib. Still, it is not necessary to say that the body of woman was made from what was added, even if it is larger in quantity. For that addition only came into the matter of the woman through the mediation of the rib. So, too, the matter of the menses is said to be that of an embryo, even though the embryo’s body must also take on a greater quantity from the conversion of food. So, too, water is transubstantiated into the blood of Christ by the mediation of wine, even if the quantity of water were greater, as long as the nature of the water can be absorbed by the strength of more potent wine.

Reply Obj. 3: Something is said to pertain to the perfection of something else in two ways: either because it is necessary for the being of the individual, and in this way, the rib did not pertain to the perfection of Adam’s body; or because it is necessary for the preservation of the species, just as seed is said, in On the Generation of Animals 15, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 1.18, 724b25–726a25.) to be an excess with respect to the individual, and yet is needed for the preservation of the species. In this way, the rib did pertain to the perfection of Adam’s body, inasmuch as Adam was the principle of the human race. From this it is clear that the rib will rise again in Eve and not in Adam, since it pertains to the perfection of Eve’s body even with regard to the being of the individual, and thus it pertains more to her.

Reply Obj. 4: That which has been ordered to the preservation of the species is cut off not only without pain, but even with delight. Thus, it is not necessary for him to have felt pain in the separation of the rib.

Or we may say, as the Master says, (Sent. II, 18.3(105).1.) that this was done by divine power and miraculously in such a way that he would not feel the pain of the wound.

Reply Obj. 5: The establishment of natural things can be considered in two ways: either with regard to the manner of coming-to-be, or with regard to the properties following on things thus established. Now the manner of coming-to-be could not have been natural, since no natural principles already existed whose actions and passions would suffice to produce the effects naturally. Thus, it was necessary to constitute the first principles in natures through supernatural power, such that the body of man was formed from earth, the body of woman from a rib, and so forth. But the properties following on the established natures do not have to be attributed to a miracle in such a way that, for example, the waters would miraculously remain stable over the heavens.

Article 2

Whether God fittingly implanted seedlike principles in matter

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.115.2; I.105.2; On Truth, q. 5, a. 9, ad 8.) It seems unfittingly said that God implanted seedlike principles in matter.

Obj. 1: For what is received in sensible matter is in it through the natural being and not through conceptual being, since cognoscitive matter does not belong to the forms that it receives but is, rather, perfected in specific being through them. But “principle” does not name a form with respect to natural being, but rather after the manner of a concept. Therefore, the powers implanted in sensible things should not be called “principles.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “seed,” as related in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a20.) names an active principle. Now, the potency of matter is not active, but passive, since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore, no seedlike principle has been granted to matter.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is in something is only brought forth by it after the manner of a going-out. Therefore, if God previously placed the seeds of all things in nature, it seems that things are generated by one thing going out from another, and this will bring back the error of Anaxagoras, who posited that any given being is in anything, and that nothing is purely this or that, such as bone or flesh, but rather that each thing is named after what predominates in it, which is disproved in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a20–188a15.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, for the generation of natural things, not only active powers, but also passive powers are necessary. Therefore, since passive powers are not included among seedlike principles, it seems that other principles implanted in things should be mentioned besides seedlike principles.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in lower nature effects do not proceed from their causes always or necessarily, but frequently. Therefore, since the text (Sent. II, 18.6(108).2.) describes seedlike principles on the basis of which something necessarily happens, it seems that seedlike accounts have at least not been placed in lower nature.

On the contrary, as Gregory says, God’s blessing is said to be his conferral and multiplication of his goods. Therefore, since we read in Genesis 1:31 that God blessed his works, it seems that he gave them the powers by which they would be multiplied. But this is what “seedlike principles” implies. Therefore, seedlike principles were implanted by God in things.

Furthermore, Deuteronomy 32:4 says, his works are perfect. But each thing is perfect, as is said in Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 380a15.) when it can produce another of its own kind. Therefore, the powers by which this can be done have been granted to things, and these are the seedlike principles. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that the emanation of created things from God is like the procession of artifacts from an artisan. Hence just as artificial forms in matter flow forth from the art of an artisan, so also all natural forms and powers flow from the ideas existing in the divine mind.

But because, as Dionysius says, things that are caused preexist in their causes abundantly, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2 (PG 3:635).) forms received in matter are not equal to the uncreated power or art from which they proceed. Hence from his art, an artisan still has the power to do something in some other way to what he has made, to which thing the power of his art has not been bound. Similarly, it is within God’s power to add, change, or remove something from created things.

However, God’s activity differs from an artisan’s activity in two ways.

The first way is on the part of the matter. For since an artisan does not produce matter but rather works with a given matter, he does not confer on the matter the potency to receive the forms that he introduces to the matter, nor can he put this into the matter. But God, who is the author of the entire thing, conferred not only natural forms and powers on things but also the potency for receiving that which he would make in the matter.

The second way is on the part of the form, because the forms that the artisan introduces do not reproduce themselves; for a couch that putrefies does not sprout into a couch but into a plant, as is clear from the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193a13.) But natural forms can reproduce themselves. Thus, they have the property of a seed and are called “seedlike.” Now, the forms of things as existing in the divine art are called “primordial” because they are, simply speaking, the first principles of things to be produced. The potency that has been implanted in things for receiving into themselves that which the will of God decrees is called “obediential principles” by some, based on which matter has the ability to become what God wills it to be. Finally, the actual powers placed in matter, which give rise to natural effects, are called “seedlike principles.”

But different people hold different views about what “seedlike principles” are in reality. For some say that the form of a species is only received in matter through the mediation of the form of the genus, even going so far as to say that the forms through which fire is fire and through which fire is a body differ numerically. Therefore, the incomplete general form is called a “seedlike principle,” since on account of such a form there is in matter a certain inclination to receive specific forms. But this does not seem to be true, because every form that comes after a substantial being is an accidental form. For if it comes after being that is constituted in the genus of substance, then, when it withdraws, the individual still remains in the genus of substance—which is contrary to the account of substantial form, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b25–413a3.) Moreover, since every form gives some being, and it is impossible for a single thing to have two substantial beings, if the first substantial form coming to matter gives it substantial being, then the second coming on top of the first must give incidental being. Thus, there are not different forms by which fire is fire and by which it is a body, which is Avicenna’s opinion. (Avicenna, Sufficentia, bk. 2, ch. 3.) And if the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 2 (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 3.) that genus is not matter but rather an intermediate form between matter and the final form, this is not meant to signify the order of forms in reality but rather conceptually. For genus, although it does signify the whole, as Avicenna says, nevertheless signifies it as indistinct, and is thus closely related to the account of matter. Besides, it would follow that the thing designated through the genus would be part of a species constituted through a superadded form, and thus it could not be predicated of the species. Nor does this fit with Augustine’s intention, since the specific form does not necessarily follow from the power of a general form. Hence it is not the sort of power from which a thing must necessarily come about, but rather from which it is able to come about.

Thus, others say that since all forms, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 726a25–30.) are brought forth from the potency of matter, the forms themselves must preexist in matter in an incomplete manner, with reference to a kind of inception, as it were. Because they are not complete in their being, they do not have a complete, but rather an incomplete, power of acting. Thus, they cannot emerge into act by themselves, unless there is an external agent that stirs up the incomplete form to act such that in this way it works together with the external agent. For otherwise generation would not be natural change but instead violent. For, as is said in the Ethics 3, the violent is that whose principle is from without, without any concurrence from the one undergoing it. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b1–5.) Therefore, they call these incomplete powers preexisting in matter “seedlike principles,” since they are in matter as regards their complete being as the formative power is in a seed.

But this does not seem to be true. For even though forms are brought forth from the potency of matter, nevertheless this potency of matter is not active but only passive. For, as the Commentator says on the Physics 8, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 9, 23.) just as in local motion the mover and the moved must be different, so it is in the motion of alteration. He gives the example that when a body is naturally healed the heart is the healer and the other members are the healed. Thus, just as in simple bodies we do not say that they are moved locally of themselves, since fire cannot be divided into mover and moved, so also it cannot be altered of itself, as if a potency existing in matter in some way would act on the very matter in which it is, reducing it to act. But both occur in animate things, since they are moved locally of themselves, as well as altered, due to the distinction between organs or parts, of which one is what moves or alters while the others are moved or altered. Thus, a seedlike principle cannot exist in other things in the same way as it does in things that have a soul.

Even so, it does not follow that, if in matter there is passive potency alone, then there is not natural generation. For matter cooperates in generation, not by acting, but inasmuch as it is apt to receive such an action. This aptitude is also called the “appetite” of matter and the beginning of form. For not all natural motions are called “natural” in the same way, as the Commentator says on Physics 2 and On the Heavens 1. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 2, comm. 1–3, and Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, comm. 3.) Rather, some are called “natural” on account of an active principle existing within, such as the local motion of heavy and light things, while others are called “natural” on account of a passive principle that exists with respect to a potency made such as to be reduced to act by a natural agent, as in the generation and alteration of simple bodies. Hence “nature,” too, is divided into matter and form.

Thus, I concede that in matter there is no active potency, but rather purely passive potency, and that what are called “seedlike principles” are active powers complete in nature with their proper passive powers, such as hot and cold, the form of fire, the power of the sun, and things of this sort. They are called “seedlike” not because of the imperfect being they have, like the formative power in a seed, but rather because such powers were conferred on first individuals created in the works of the six days so that from them, as from seeds, natural things would be produced and multiplied.

Reply Obj. 1: Active powers of this sort in nature are called “principles” not because they are in matter after the manner of a concept, but because they are produced by the divine art and there remains in them the order and direction of the divine intellect, just as in a thing made by artifice there remains the direction of the artisan to the determined end.

Reply Obj. 2: Seedlike principles are said to be implanted in matter not because they should be understood as preexisting in matter before the arrival of the complete form, as if pertaining to the essence of the matter or to its account precisely as matter, but rather after the manner by which complete forms are also said to be in matter.

Reply Obj. 3: Anaxagoras held that in air, from which fire is generated, there preexist some hidden actual parts of fire, through whose coming out and being gathered together fire appeared to be generated. Now, we do not hold this, but instead that there preexists in the matter of air an aptitude for the form of fire, and in the fire that generates there preexists an active power through which this aptitude is reduced to act. And this is not unfitting.

Reply Obj. 4: “Seedlike principles” include both active and passive powers that can be perfected through natural agents, just as in the generation of an animal not only sperm, but also menses are called “seed” by extension of the name.

Reply Obj. 5: When all the natural causes of which one perfect cause consists come together, it is necessary for the effect to follow unless something impedes it. This is how Augustine is speaking.

Article 3

Whether the things that come about apart from seedlike principles are miracles

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.105.7; SCG III.101; On the Power of God, q. 6, a. 2; Commentary on 2 Thessalonians, ch. 2, lect. 2.) It seems that things that come about apart from seedlike principles are not all miracles.

Obj. 1: For a seedlike principle of nature is not capable of the work of creation and yet the work of creation is not called “miraculous,” since miracles are for the manifestation of grace, as is said in the text, (Sent. II, 18.6(108).2.) to which creation is not ordered, being instead ordered to the establishment of nature. Therefore, it seems that the fact that something comes about apart from seedlike causes does not have the account of a miracle.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the creation of souls and the justification of the wicked, since they happen frequently, are not miraculous. For the miraculous is something difficult and unusual, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ch. 16, para. 34 (CSEL 25:43; PL 42:90).) Yet, these effects are produced apart from seedlike principles. Therefore, the same follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the resurrection of the dead, since it lies within the hope of the faithful, is not miraculous, because the miraculous is what appears beyond the hope of one who then wonders at it, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ch. 16, para. 34 (CSEL 25:43; PL 42:90): miraculum voco quicquid arduum aut insolitum supra spem vel facultatem mirantis apparet.) Yet, the resurrection of the dead cannot come about through nature. Therefore, not all things that come about apart from the power of nature are called “miracles.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, some things sometimes come about apart from seedlike principles that do not exceed the capability of nature, such as the conversion of water into wine, as we read about in John 2:1–11. But a miracle is what appears above the capability of nature, as Augustine says. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 8, para. 1 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1450).) Therefore, it seems that not all things that come about apart from seedlike principles are miracles.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, all the active powers conferred on created things can be called “seedlike principles.” But angels and men are said to work miracles. Therefore, it seems that not all miracles come about apart from seedlike principles.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, monsters occur in nature apart from the intention of the natural agent, and yet they are not called “miracles.” Therefore, the account of miracle does not consist in what comes about apart from seedlike principles.

On the contrary, we call those works miraculous that lead to wonderment at the divine power. But to change the usual course of nature belongs only to that power that established nature. Therefore, things should be called properly “miraculous” that occur apart from the active powers in nature.

I answer that, as related in the words of the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b10–25.) wonder is caused by two things: by the fact that the cause of some effect is hidden, and by the fact that there is something in the thing that makes it seem as if it should be otherwise. Hence the fact that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with its side arouses wonder because its cause is unknown and because, since lines can be so small, it seems that one should be commensurable with the other. And so it happens that in one case something is wondrous simply speaking and in another it is wondrous to a given person. The wondrous to a given person is everything whose cause is hidden to him and which, to his perception, seems opposed to something on account of which it should not be that way, though in reality nothing stands in the way and the cause is not exceedingly hidden in itself. Such a thing can be said to be a wonder to that person. On the other hand, the wondrous in itself is that whose cause is simply hidden, and such that the thing itself really and truly has a power through which the outcome should be otherwise. Now, things of this sort are those that are immediately caused by divine power, which is the most hidden cause, in a way different than the order of natural causes is disposed—for example, a blind person’s seeing again, a dead person’s rising again, and things of this sort. These are properly called “miracles,” being wonders in themselves and simply.

Now, these are sometimes above nature, sometimes apart from nature, and sometimes against nature. A miracle is said to be “above nature” when nature does not have the power for the substance of the act, as in the case of the parting of the Red Sea, the raising of a dead person, and things of this sort. However, they are said to come about “apart from nature” when nature does have power for them with regard to the substance of the act, but by divine command they come about apart from the activity of the nature. These are called “miracles” on the basis of three things.

The first is on the basis of excess and a certain kind of unique mode, as when the frogs were produced in Egypt in such a great multitude as had not been seen before.

The second is on the basis of their occurring at a determined time at the invocation of the divine name, as when Jeroboam’s hand, stretched forth against the prophet, was withered and his altar rent in two (1 Kgs 13:4).

The third is when something occurs in a universal manner, as in the Old Law concerning the water of jealousy (Num 5:27) that, after being drunk, would turn bitter in the belly of an adulteress by a divine miracle.

Finally, a miracle is said to occur “against nature” when there is in the thing something contrary to what happens, as for example if something heavy were to move upwards, the fact that a virgin gave birth, or something of this sort, such that the act follows miraculously while the contrary nature remains intact, namely, that which is the principle of the contrary act.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation, properly speaking, is not a miraculous work, since it lacks one criterion for a miracle. For even though it has a hidden cause, there is no principle in the thing whereby it should be otherwise. Rather, the being of things is by a certain natural order produced from the first being, though not by a necessity of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Not even the creation of souls or the justification of the impious should properly be called “miracles.” For even though they exist apart from seedlike principles acting to complete the effect, they do not exist apart from them disposing the effect. For the body is disposed for the reception of the soul and the will prepared for the reception of grace through a power conferred on the creature. But if the soul were infused or grace conferred without such a preceding preparation, then both could be called a “miracle,” as is clear in the formation of the first man and in the conversion of Paul. Nor does it follow from the force of the argument cited, since “unusual,” which is included in the definition of “miracle,” does not refer to the rarity of the act, but rather excludes the usual course of nature. Hence if the blind came to see the light every single day, it would still be a miracle, since it would occur apart from the course of nature that is customary for us.

Reply Obj. 3: The resurrection will be miraculous. For even though it is in keeping with the hope of grace, it is still above the hope of nature. These two kinds of hope are distinguished in the Gloss on the passage: in hope he believed against hope (Rom 4:18). (Glossa interlinearis and Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 4:18, 6.61 (PL 114:483).)

Reply Obj. 4: Even though the conversion of water into wine was not above the capability of nature with regard to the substance of the act, it was above its capability with regard to the mode of acting. For nature cannot convert water contained in a vessel into wine at once, but rather does this through the processing and maturation of the grape.

Reply Obj. 5: Men and angels do not bring about miracles as if the effect were accomplished by their power. Rather, men do it by the impetration of their prayers, and angels do it through their ministry.

Reply Obj. 6: Even though monsters occur in nature apart from the intention of the formative power that acts in the seed, they are still traced back to particular natural causes. For they occur from an indisposition of matter as from a proximate principle, or from the impression of some heavenly sign as from a remote principle.

Question 2

The creation of woman’s soul

Then a question is asked about the formation of woman on the part of the soul. Three questions are asked concerning this:

first, whether the rational soul comes from someone who passes it on or through creation.

If it does not come from someone who passes it on, the question is asked:

second, whether it is created immediately by God or through the mediation of angels;

and third, whether the sensible or vegetative soul comes from something that passes it on.

Article 1

Whether the human soul is passed on by the parents

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.118.2; SCG II.86; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 2; Quodl. IX, q. 5, a. 1.) It seems that the human soul is also passed on by the parents.

Obj. 1: For it is said: all the souls that came out of the thigh of Jacob . . . were sixty-six (Gen 46:26). (RSV reads all the persons belonging to Jacob who came into Egypt, who were his own offspring . . . were sixty-six persons in all.) But a child only comes out of the father’s thigh through the passing on of seed. Therefore, it seems that the soul of the child comes from the parents in this way.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that gives completion to an activity cooperates with the one who acts. Therefore, if God, through the fact that he infuses the soul, were to complete the activity of adulterers, it seems that he would be cooperating with adulterers. This seems unfitting, since he who cooperates with a wicked person is not clean from iniquity himself. Therefore, it seems that the rational soul is not infused by God, but rather passed on by the father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, children contract original sin from their parents, as the Apostle teaches (Rom 5:12). But an accident cannot be passed on unless its subject is passed on. Therefore, it seems that the rational soul, which is the subject of original fault, is passed on by the parents.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in every univocal generation the generator gives its species to the generated. For the agent and the end of generation are the same in species, as is said in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a20–25.) But since a man proceeds from a man, there is univocal generation. Therefore, since a man has his species on the basis of the rational soul, it seems that he receives the rational soul from his parents.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 2, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, comm. 7.) it is impossible for there to be different agents, one of whose action terminates in the subject of a form and the other’s in the form. For an agent’s action is only terminated in the subject of a form according as it receives the form. For it would follow, as he says, that the subject and the form would be two distinct things from which a single thing would not arise if they were the terms of different actions. But an organic body is the subject of the form that is the rational soul. Therefore, since the body is furnished with organs through the action of the formative power, it seems that the action of the formative power extends even to the rational soul. And so the rational soul is passed on.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as is said in Meteorology 4, (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 380a15.) each thing is perfect when it can produce something like itself. Therefore, since the rational soul is more perfect than all natural forms, and since by the power of other forms, like forms are reduced to act, it seems all the more that the rational soul can do this.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, God ceased to create new creatures on the seventh day. But the new is that which in no way pre-existed in preexisting things. Therefore, the souls of individual men who are newly generated must have pre-existed in the works of the six days. Therefore, since they did not preexist in first nature, as the heretics say, it seems that all souls existed in the soul of the first man. Therefore, it seems that from his soul all souls are passed on, just as from his flesh all human flesh is passed on.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 16 (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b29.) that the intellect is from without, and in On the Properties of the Elements (A work formerly attributed to Aristotle; see note above at d. 15, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1.) he says that in a child the spirit of life is made at the command of God. Thus, it seems that it is not passed on by the father.

This is also shown by the authority of Sacred Scripture, since Genesis 2:23 says: this at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. But it would be much more affectionate and loving to say, “soul of my soul,” if indeed soul were from soul as flesh is from flesh and bone is from bone.

Furthermore, it is said in the person of the Lord: I have made the breath of life (Isa 57:16), that is, the soul. And so, it seems that the soul exists not from being passed on but from creation.

Furthermore, Ecclesiastes 12:7 says, the spirit returns to God who gave it. So it seems that the human soul is created by God. Augustine cites this as an argument in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CSEL 28.1:308; PL 34:415).)

I answer that “passing on” implies two things: origin and division. For a fire generated by a fire is not properly said to be passed on. Likewise, it is not said of wood divided into parts that one part of it is passed on by another. Hence “passing on” is said properly in the generation of animate things, which happens through the division of seed from the father. Thus, what does not have an origin from something and does not undergo a division from it cannot be said to be passed on by it.

Now, something can be divided in two ways: through itself, the way a body is, and incidentally, like a bodily form impressed on matter. But the rational soul is neither a body nor a bodily power, as its very activity shows, since it exists without the body. Thus, it cannot be passed on by way of division. This is the substance of Aristotle’s argument in On the Generation of Animals 16. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b29.) For he is of the opinion that the principles whose activities exist without the body are not passed on through seed.

It is likewise clear that there is no other way in which the soul of a child can take its origin from the soul of the father. For this would happen either because the intellect of the child would arise from the intellect of the father through the mediation of the generative and formative power, or else it would occur immediately. The first is impossible, since an effect cannot be more immaterial than its cause. Hence since the generative power is a material potency, its action cannot be terminated in an immaterial form.

The second also cannot be the case. For there are two kinds of agent according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 4.) one kind that has causality with respect to the entire species, as in the case of the sun, which is the cause of generable and corruptible things, and another kind that is a cause with respect to one individual alone, as when this fire is the cause of that fire; but in neither way can the soul of one man be the cause of the soul of another. For in causes that essentially have an order to the entire species, cause and caused must not be of the same order nor of the same species, since they have their causality directly over the essence of the species as such. Hence according to this position, not all rational souls would be of the same species. And similarly, it cannot happen the other way, in which something in one species is the cause of another in the same species. For this only occurs inasmuch as the agent moves the matter to such a form. But the rational soul is not something composed of matter (at least preexisting matter) and form. Nor is it a material form that could be educed from the potency of matter like other material forms, as has been said. (Above: q. 1, a. 2.) Hence it remains that the principle of the origin of the rational soul itself is a separated principle. This is commonly conceded both by theologians and philosophers.

Reply Obj. 1: This expression employs synecdoche. For the principal part, namely, the soul, is set down as standing for the whole man. This manner of speaking is customary in Sacred Scripture as well as among philosophers. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b29–34.) that the “intellect” is said to be the whole man in the way a ruler is said to be the whole city.

Reply Obj. 2: An adulterer’s activity can be considered in two ways. Either it can be considered with respect to its moral being, and in this way, insofar as it is deformed, God does not cooperate with it, but rather prohibits it. Or it can be considered insofar as it is in a natural species, and in this respect it is a good. Hence it is not unfitting that God should supply completion to such an activity inasmuch as it is good.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though original sin is in the soul as in its subject, nevertheless it is caused in the soul due to a tainting of the seed and is in it, that is, in the seed, though not as in a subject, but as in a cause. Thus, it is through the passing on of seed, not of the soul, that original sin is passed on.

Reply Obj. 4: An agent’s causing something like itself occurs in two ways: either because the form with respect to which the likeness exists is reduced from potency to act through the action, or because the matter is disposed through the action in such a way as to necessitate the reception of the form. The first is the way for all accidental forms, whereas the second is, according to Avicenna, also the way for all substantial forms, since he is of the opinion that all substantial forms are from a separate principle. But, according to Aristotle and the Commentator, material substantial forms pertain to the first way while the rational soul pertains to the second. And this way suffices for the fact that an agent causes something like itself, since what is properly generated is not the form, but the composite.

Reply Obj. 5: This argument works for different agents that are not ordered, that is, where one of them does not work in the other. But God works in the very working of nature. Hence it is not unfitting that his action should reach a term to which the action of the formative power does not extend. For this is how God, working in nature, also effects the furnishing of the body’s organs. Hence it is, as it were, a continuous action traced back to a single agent, which is both terminated at the final disposition of the subject and terminated at the form, even though nature cooperates with him with regard to the first and not with regard to the second.

Reply Obj. 6: The rational soul is neither composed of matter nor is it a material form, as if impressed in matter. Thus, it cannot be produced by an agent that has incidental causality with regard to it on the part of the matter that is induced to the form, as is the case in other material forms. Rather, it must be produced by a principle that has essential causality with respect to its essence. And this cannot be of the same species.

Reply Obj. 7: The souls that are now created are of the same species as Adam’s soul, which was created among the works of the six days. Thus, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 3 (CSEL 28.1:299; PL 34:410).) he had already then made the kind of soul that he now makes. Thus, he does not now make a new genus of creature that he did not create then among his completed works, namely, one that, with regard to likeness of species, did not even preexist in a certain manner among those first works even with respect to causal principles. For, as Augustine adds in the same place, it was appropriate that in human bodies, whose propagation is carried forward by a continued succession beginning from those works, such souls be implanted as he now makes and implants.

Article 2

Whether the rational soul is from God by the mediation of angels

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.90.3; Quodl. III, q. 3, a. 1; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 3, 5.) It seems that the rational soul proceeds from God by the mediation of angels.

Obj. 1: This seems to be, first, from what is related in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 5.) namely, that the first intelligences infuse stable fixed forms, such as the soul is. But “intelligences” are what we call the angels. Therefore, it seems that it is produced by God through the mediation of angels.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a finite effect cannot proceed immediately from an infinite cause, as can be proved by the Philosopher’s demonstrations in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.7, 275a1–15.) where he proves that an infinite body cannot act. But God is a cause of infinite power. Therefore, since the soul is something finite, it cannot be produced immediately by God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is not less of an order among spiritual things than among bodily things, but we see that among bodily things the higher things are the causes of lower things. Therefore, all the more should this be the case among spiritual substances. Therefore, since angels are of a higher nature than souls, it seems that souls are produced by angels.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a return to the last end and a procession from the first principle take place by the same means. But the rational soul is led back to God through angels, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:179).) Therefore, it seems that it also proceeds from God by the mediation of angels.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, since every activity follows on the nature of a thing, a thing has being from that by whose power it participates in its proper activity. But the proper activity of the rational soul is intellectual activity. Therefore, since this activity befits it due to the power of an intelligence, as is said in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 3.) it seems that it is produced with respect to its being by the mediation of angels.

On the contrary, Genesis 2:7 says: God . . . breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. But this is the rational soul, by which man lives. Therefore, it seems that the soul comes immediately from God.

Furthermore, all those who say that angels have created anything, Damascene calls accursed with their father the devil. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:874).) But the soul can only be brought into being through creation, since it is not brought out from the potency of matter, as has been said, (Above: q. 1, a. 2; q. 2, a. 1.) nor composed of matter such that it could be generable either through itself or incidentally. Therefore, it seems that it was not produced by the mediation of angels.

I answer that, as has been said above, (Above: q. 1, a. 2.) some philosophers were of the opinion that things proceeded from the first principle in a certain order.

For they posited that more than one thing could not have proceeded immediately from the first principle, which is God, due to the fact that he is one and simple, and the same is naturally apt to make the same. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a27–28.) Thus, from the first principal there immediately proceeds the first intelligence, into which there comes—due to the fact that it has being from another—a certain composition of potency and act. They say that, insofar as this first intelligence understands the first principle, a second intelligence flows out from it, which possesses less actuality than the first, since the one caused falls away more than its essential cause.

But insofar as it understands itself as being in act, there flows forth from it the soul of the sphere, which it moves; while insofar as it considers itself with regard to the potency in it, the substance of the sphere flows from it. And so it goes, down to the last intelligence, which moves the last sphere, which they call the agent intelligence. Avicenna says, (Avicenna (attributed), De intelligentiis, ch. 4, pt. 3.) that from this there flow human souls and all other material substantial forms in these lower bodies. They trace the matter of generable and corruptible things back to the substance of the sphere as to its cause. As for the different variations that happen to matter incidentally, they trace these back to the heavenly motions as to their cause. They posit that all these intermediate causes, like the first cause, are essential agents that supply being and cause the essence of a thing without motion and are not only the cause of coming-to-be through motion as in the case of causes that are natural agents. Thus, they attribute to all the intelligences a certain mode of creation insofar as their action presupposes nothing on the part of the thing that is produced, but only on the part of the agent, whose action is founded on the action of a higher cause, such that in this way only the action of the first principle can be truly called “creation,” since it is not founded on the action of another, but the other actions are instead founded on it.

But this position has a weak foundation, as the Commentator also shows, commenting on the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 30.) For when “action” is said of God and of natural things, this is kind of an equivocal statement. For in natural agents action follows from a necessity of form, and hence as there is a unity of form so there must be a unity in the effect. But in divine matters, action follows intellect. Thus, inasmuch as one intellect can understand different things, different effects can proceed immediately from one agent. Accordingly, a multitude has proceeded from God insofar as he understands himself as the idea of more than one thing, that is, as able to be participated in in diverse ways.

Moreover, this position does not agree with the truth of the faith, which proclaims that God alone is the Creator—a truth that does away with all idolatry, to which the aforementioned opinion without a doubt provides a great enticement. Hence one cannot hold in accord with the faith that something after God is the cause of another, except by way of motion and generation. Thus, we must assert that God is the immediate cause of all things that did not begin through generation, such as angels, souls, the substances of the heavens, the matter of the elements, and the first hypostases in all species.

The aforementioned position also does away with the honor of the holy souls, to which equality with the angels is promised (Matt 22:30) in their attainment of the last end, which could not happen if an angel were the essential cause of the soul, since the being of the caused always depends on its essential cause, just as Anselm proves (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. 1, ch. 5 (PL 158:365); cf. bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 158:364).) that the reparation of the human race should not have taken place through an angel lest it detract from the dignity of the souls.

Another unsuitable consequence would also follow, that the ultimate beatitude of souls would not be in the enjoyment of God but instead in the enjoyment of the angels. For the ultimate perfection at which a thing can arrive is that it be joined with its principle. Thus, many philosophers hold that the ultimate happiness of man is found in the joining of the potential intellect, by which we understand, to the agent intellect, whether such a joining together is this life, according to some, or after this life, according to others.

Reply Obj. 1: In this matter, the passages of On Causes are not to be accepted. For the one (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, prologue. Note that, while in the first book of the Sentences commentary, Aquinas referred to this work as authored by Aristotle, he here seems to reserve judgment about the identity of the author. In later works (and especially in his commentary on the Book of Causes), Aquinas consistently rejects the ascription of it to Aristotle and attributes it (correctly) to Proclus, based on its content.) who composed that book is found to have been the author of this error—unless perhaps someone wishes to give some explanation for it, which is not part of our task at hand.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument, if it has any force, concludes that nothing is immediately caused by God. For everything besides him is finite, unless perhaps we posit in a certain way that separate substances are infinite, not simply, but in a qualified sense, namely, in reference to what is lower, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 16.) This is insofar as their power is not limited to determinate effects in what is subject to their activity. In this manner, even the rational soul possesses infinity, both on the part of the agent intellect, by which it can make all things, and on the part of the potential intellect, by which it can become all things, and to which it belongs to receive a universal form in which there are infinite individual singulars. This is also an evident argument for the immateriality of the soul and the fact that its being is not something passed on to it, since every material form is finite, as is proved in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 204b29–205a33.)

Thus, we should say to this argument that even though God is, simply speaking infinite, his effect is still limited in two ways.

First and principally, it is limited by the order of his wisdom, which establishes definite limits for any given thing.

Second, it is limited on the part of the receiver, since a patient receives the influence of an agent after the mode of its own power and not after the mode of the agent’s power.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in bodily things we only hold that the higher is the cause of the lower in the manner of one who moves and generates. We do not hold that these things are true among spiritual substances, since they are not brought into being through generation and motion. But even so, just as higher bodies move lower bodies to generation, so also higher spiritual substances move lower ones to their proper activity, in keeping with what Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13 (PG 3:299).) that lower angels are illuminated by higher ones and men are illuminated by angels.

Reply Obj. 4: Any thing tends to its last end through its proper activity. Thus, insofar as the lower are illuminated through the illumination of the higher for their proper activities, they are said to be led back to God through them. For it is not unfitting that one created thing be posited as the cause of the motion or activity of another. But one cannot make a similar argument concerning the procession of things from the first principle, since a thing does not proceed from its principle through doing something, but only through receiving something from the principle.

Reply Obj. 5: If the soul is understood to participate in intellectual activity from an intelligence in such a manner that the power to understand is present in the soul through the power of the intelligence, then this is heretical and amounts to the aforementioned error, since the power to understand follows on the nature of the soul. But if it is understood in such a manner that the soul is assisted in its activity by the illumination of angels, then it cannot be concluded from this that the soul is created by angels with respect to its nature. For a thing does not have being from each and every thing that assists it or moves it to work.

Article 3

Whether the sensible soul comes from someone who passes it on

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.118.1; SCG II.86; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 2; Quodl. IX, q. 5, a. 1.) It seems that not even the sensible soul comes from someone who passes it on.

Obj. 1: For a simple substance complete in being as a this-something is only brought into being through creation. But the sensible soul is such a substance. Therefore, and so on. Proof of the middle premise: that which is only a form and not a this-something cannot be a mover. Hence in the Physics 8 (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 255a25–30.) the Philosopher is of the opinion that the form of fire is not a mover in its natural motion. For it cannot have the complete and absolute action that is due to a mover when it does not have complete being. But the sensitive soul is the mover in an animal. Therefore, it is a this-something having complete being. That it is simple is self-evident.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Commentator says on On the Soul 3 (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 4, 5.) that a cognoscitive power cannot arise from a combination of elements. But things that are produced through the action of nature on lower elements are produced through the action of active and passive qualities of combined elements, since no active power is in these lower bodies except through elemental qualities, as the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 31.) Therefore, since the sensible soul is a cognoscitive power, it seems that it cannot be passed on through the activity of nature but is, rather, brought into being through creation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every activity of lower nature is traced back to a heavenly power as to the power of the first principle of alteration. But the power of the heavens cannot bring forth a sensible soul, since a heavenly body is inanimate and nothing acts beyond its species. For the effect cannot be greater than the agent cause. Therefore, it seems that it is brought into being not through an activity of nature, but through creation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the case of things that are substantially the same, one cannot be created while the other is not. But in man the sensible soul and the rational soul are essentially the same. Therefore, it seems that, since the rational soul is not passed on, but rather created, the sensible soul is similarly not passed on. But with respect to the sensible soul, man does not differ from a brute. Therefore, it seems that even in brutes the sensible soul exists through creation.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more noble something is, the more noble is the cause it has, or at least its cause is not less noble. But the sensible soul in perfect animals is nobler than the soul in animals generated from putrefaction. Therefore, since with regard to those generated by putrefaction one cannot hold that the sensible soul is produced by a natural principle, since they are not generated from things like themselves and must thus be allotted a soul from a supernatural principle, it seems that all the more is this necessary in perfect animals.

On the contrary, Genesis 1:20 says, let the waters bring forth swarms of living creatures. But waters only produce that which is produced by the power of nature. Therefore, it seems that sensible souls are produced through the seminal power conferred on things.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 16 (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b29.) that the intellect alone is from without. Therefore, it seems that the sensible soul is not from without.

I answer that concerning this question there are found different opinions among both philosophers and teachers.

Some philosophers, such as Plato, Avicenna, and Themistius, held that all souls are from a separate principle, which Plato posited was an idea, Avicenna posited was the agent intelligence, and the theologians who hold to this approach posit that it is God himself. Now, the argument that moved the aforementioned philosophers, as the Commentator relates on the Metaphysics 7 and 11, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 7; bk. 11, comm. 5.) was drawn from putrefied animals, which was touched on also as an objection. Likewise, they hold this from the fact that in natural things the only agent we find is an accidental form, such as heat and cold, whose action cannot produce a soul, since nothing acts beyond its own species. But even so we should take note that no philosopher distinguished between the sensible soul and other substantial forms with regard to origin. For the aforementioned philosophers posited that all substantial forms are from a separate principle, the sensible soul just as much as the form of a stone or fire.

But others, such as Aristotle and his Commentator, who hold that other material forms are brought forth from the potency of matter by the power of natural agents, also hold that sensible and vegetative souls are passed on due to the fact that the being of material forms does not belong to them absolutely, but rather belongs to the composites. For these forms cannot subsist by themselves and thus do not acquire being, strictly speaking, but rather the composite substances do. Hence a form, in the strict sense, is neither made nor generated, but rather the composite is. Because everything that is generated is generated from something like itself, what generates or induces to form must be a composite of matter and form, not a form alone or a separated substance. Aristotle is supported in this in the Metaphysics 7 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045b19–25.) and by the same argument shows in On the Generation of Animals 16 (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b29.) that the vegetative and sensible souls are not from without, showing that they are material forms based on the fact that they carry out their activities through the mediation of the body. For what has absolute being from matter also has an activity that is absolute (Absolutum might also be translated as “independent of,” or “free from,” as in our expression “absolved from.”) from matter. Thus, he is of the opinion that all principles or powers whose activities are not exercised without the body are not from without, but rather from a bodily agent, and that the intellect alone is from without, since its activity is without the body and its being is also absolute. Hence it must be made not only incidentally, but also through itself, in order for it to begin to be, and then this must also be in accord with the mode belonging to it and from a separate principle.

But other philosophers considered the forms themselves as if coming-to-be were owed to them through themselves. Thus, they posited that all forms are from a separate formal principle.

But the position of Aristotle is much more reasonable. For nothing begins or comes to be or is generated except according to the manner in which it has being. Thus, we concede that the sensible and vegetative souls are passed on from another.

Now, the way it is passed on is as follows. Since every univocal and proximate agent introduces its own species in the patient, and food, as undergoing and altered, yields nourishment to the body (for it nourishes insofar as it is potentially flesh, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1 and On the Soul), (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 322a5; On the Soul 2.4, 416b10–14.) it must in the end receive the species and power of the one nourished. So before the final assimilation, when it becomes an actual and determinate part, such as flesh or bone, the power of the species resides in it indeterminately with regard to this or that, for determination to this or that happens through the proper power of a determinate part. Thus, since seed is the remainder of the last food closest to the last conversion, the whole is in it potentially and not any part actually. But before it is resolved through the act of the generative power as separate from the rest of its kind, this potency in it is indistinct, just as the form of the whole is only in the part potentially. However, when it is separated, it is made to have such a potential or form actually, as we also see in ringed animals, in which, according to the Philosopher, there is one soul actually and more than one potentially. Hence when they are divided, each part becomes animated with a distinct soul. Yet these animals are different, since on account of the small difference among organs in these animals a part is almost just like the whole. Thus, a complete soul remains in the part as it was in the whole. But extracted seed is not yet actually like the whole, but rather only in proximate potency. Thus, after the separation the soul does not remain actually, but rather potentially. This is why it says in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b25; On the Parts of Animals 1.1, 645b35.) that seed is alive potentially, not actually.

However, this potency is not passive in the male’s seed in the way we say that wood and stones are potentially a house (for the potency in the menses of the woman is like this). Rather, it is an active potency, as when we say that the form of a house in the mind of the artisan is potentially a house. Hence the Philosopher compares it to art in On the Generation of Animals 17. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.1, 734a30–735a5.) Avicenna and the Commentator on the Metaphysics 7 (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 23; Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, bk. 4, ch. 2.) call this potency the “formative power,” a power that, with regard to its mode of activity, is a mean between the intellect and the other powers of the soul. For the other powers use determinate organs in their activities, whereas the intellect uses none. But this power uses something bodily in its activity that does not yet have a determinate species. The subject and organ of this power is the vital spirit enclosed in the seed. Hence in order to contain this sort of spirit, seed is frothy, and this is why it is white. But the formative power is joined to this spirit more after the manner of a mover than after the manner of a form, even if it is in a way its form. Hence the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 7 (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 3.) that this power is enclosed in the seed in a certain way like the movers are united to the spheres.

Now, three kinds of heat are joined to this bodily spirit: elemental heat, which is like the instrument resolving, consuming, and so on; the heat of the soul, which is what vivifies; and the heat of heaven, by whose power it moves to a determinate species. And by the power of these three kinds of heat the formative power converts the matter prepared by the woman into the substance of members the way there is transmutation of the body in growth, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 15. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b30–737a15.) Insofar as progress is made in the perfection of its organs, the soul, which previously was potential, begins to be more and more actual in the seed, such that what is conceived first participates in the works of nutritive life and is at that time said to live with the life of a plant, and so forth, until it arrives at the complete likeness of the generator.

Reply Obj. 1: The sensible soul is in no way a this-something. For it does not have some part that individuates it, nor does it have subsisting and absolute existence, since all its activities happen through the mediation of the body. It does not even move by a progressive motion without a bodily organ. For there are two kinds of motive power: one commanding and the other commanded. The one commanding the motion is the sensitive appetitive power, whose act is obviously not without a bodily organ. But the commanded power that causes the motion is a kind of force affixed to muscles and tendons by whose motion the whole body is moved. And so, it is clear that in the motion of an animal the activity of moving does not belong to the sensitive soul according to itself, but rather belongs to it through the mediation of a bodily organ. Hence it does not follow that it has an absolute existence.

Reply Obj. 2: Something follows from the action of elemental qualities in two ways. One way is from them as such, as in the case of flavor and odor, hard and soft, and the other things determined in Meteorology 4. (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.2–7.) And in this way, neither the sensible soul nor a substantial form follows from their actions. For it would follow that substantial forms would be introduced due to a necessity of the matter, as Empedocles said. But in the other way, something follows from them as from instruments, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a13–18.) that in the motion of growth fire is like a regulated instrument, while what principally acts and regulates is the power of the soul directing the growth to a determinate quantity. Likewise, I say that the sensible soul and other substantial forms follow from the actions of active qualities insofar as the power of the soul or of another substantial form as well as that of the heavens itself abides in them as in instruments. Thus, since they do not act by their own power alone, it is not necessary that nothing beyond their species follow from their actions, since the effect arising from the motion of an instrument is according to the account of the principal agent.

Reply Obj. 3: Supposing, in accord with our faith, that the heavens are an inanimate body, we nevertheless hold that its motion is from a spiritual substance as its mover. Since motion is an act of the mover and of the moved, in motion there must be not only a bodily power on the part of the moved, but also a certain spiritual power on the part of the mover. Because the mover is alive with the noblest sort of life, it is not unfitting if the heavenly motion, inasmuch as the mover’s aim and power reside in it after the manner in which the power of a principal agent resides in its instrument, is the cause of material life of the kind that exists through the sensible and vegetative soul.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though man and horse have in common that they are sensible, it is not thereby necessary for the sensible soul to have the same account in a man and a horse. For man and horse are not a single species of animal. Hence in man the sensible soul is much nobler than in other animals with regard to its principal acts, as is clear in the acts of the internal senses and in the act of touch, which is the principal sense. For in every potestative whole, (A potestative (or potential) whole is a whole whose account is found essentially in one of its parts, but found in the other parts by participation. See above, d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; d. 8, q. 5, a. 3; In III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 2; ST 1.77.1, ad 1; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 11, ad 2.) a lower power is found to be more perfect when joined with what is higher, just as the power of preeminence is much more excellent in a king. But the sensible soul in man is essentially joined with the rational soul, and thus the whole gets its existence through creation. But even so, the seed’s manner of passing on life is similar in man and in other animals. For the formative power is present in man’s seed as in animals. But because the action of this power is material, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) its action cannot attain to an immaterial essence. Still, through the action of this power the offspring conceived first obtains nutritive life and then later sensitive life. But as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, De animalibus, ch. 9; Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 7.) in this process there are many generations and corruptions, such as the fact that seed is converted into blood and so forth; consequently, when the process reaches the secondary perfection, the primary perfection does not remain the same numerically, but rather is acquired together with the acquisition of the secondary. And so, it is clear that with the infusion of the rational soul man simultaneously obtains in the single essence of the soul a sensitive and vegetative soul, and the earlier perfections do not remain the same numerically.

Reply Obj. 5: In animals generated from putrefaction, as the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 7, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 31.) the power of the heavens takes the place of the formative power in the seed. For animals of this sort, due to their imperfection, do not require as many things for their generation as do more perfect animals, in which together with the heavenly power there must also be present in the seed the power of the soul derived from the father. For the heavenly power is present in all lower bodies as the power of the mover in the moved, such that it brings each thing into its species in accordance with the disposition of the matter. These heavenly powers received in the elements are called “the powers of the soul” by the Philosopher in On the Generation of Animals 16, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b30.) and he says that all the elements are full of these powers, since powers of this sort are sufficient for the animation of matter if they reach an equality of constitution.

Exposition of the text

Or if from his feet, as if subject to him in servitude. (Sent. II, 18.2(104).1.) This does not seem to be true, because Genesis 3:16 says: and he shall rule over you.

And it should be said that this was introduced as a punishment for the woman since she disobeyed. Or we may say that it refers not to being under the husband’s power after the manner of servitude, but rather after the manner of governance.

And so the woman should rather be said to have been made from that from which she had received the greater part of her substance than from the rib. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).1.) This conclusion does not follow—its argument was given in the objections.

By that very same miracle by which Jesus would later multiply the five loaves of bread with a heavenly blessing, and five thousand men were filled. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).1, referring to Matthew 14:15–20.) This likeness is also not strong enough to prove his position. For Augustine says in his Commentary on John (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tr. 24, para. 1 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1593).) that that multiplication took place the way many crops grow from a few grains, which indeed happens through drawing moisture from the earth.

Although the formation of woman was done with the service of angels, yet the power of creation is not to be attributed to them. (Sent. II, 18.4(106).2.) This ministry could have consisted of the separation of the rib and the gathering together of the matter, from whose arrangement the body of woman was formed.

Yet, because of its different effects, Augustine says in the plural that the primordial causes of all things are in God. (Sent. II, 18.5(107).2.) And this is insofar as ideas are said to be many in virtue of the diverse references to created things, as was said above in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.)