D. 14 - Work of distinction of the second and third days

Division of the text

Having addressed the first work of distinction, whereby the light was formed, here he addresses the work of the second distinction, which belongs to the second day, on which the firmament is described as having been made. Now, this part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the distinction made on the second day.

In the second, he raises certain questions, at ‘it is also usual to ask what the shape of the heavens is.’ (Sent. II, 14.5(75).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 9 (CSEL 28.1:45; PL 34:270).)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he addresses the work of the second distinction according to the position of some who say that the firmament was made out of the waters.

Second, he addresses it according to the explanation of those who say that the firmament is of the nature of fire, at but some say that the heavens which is beyond the expanse of the earth’s atmosphere is of a fiery nature. (Sent. II, 14.4(74).2.)

It is also usual to ask what the shape of the heavens is. (Sent. II, 14.5(75).1.) Here he raises three questions.

The first concerns the shape of heaven.

The second concerns its motion, at ‘it is also asked whether the heavens are fixed or move.’ (Sent. II, 14.5(75).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:47; PL 34:271). The Silano translation has been slightly modified.)

The third is why the blessing of this day is omitted, at after these matters, it is usual to ask why it is not said here, as it was for the works of the other days: ‘God saw that it was good.’ (Sent. II, 14.6(76).1.)

Next: God said, ‘Let the waters be gathered in one place.’ (Sent. II, 14.7(77).1, quoting Genesis 1:9.) Here he lays out the work of the third distinction to which the third day is devoted.

And concerning this he does two things.

First, he describes the work of the third day.

Second, he raises certain questions concerning this, at ‘but if it is asked where the waters . . . were gathered, it could be that the earth subsided and provided concave parts in which to receive the flowing waters.’ (Sent. II, 14.8(78).1, quoting Bede, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 1:9 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:20).)

There the question is first raised concerning the gathering together of the waters.

Second, the question is raised concerning their unity or plurality, at ‘and although it is clear that there are many seas and rivers, nevertheless it says that the waters were gathered in one place due to the interconnectedness of all the waters.’ (Sent. II, 14.8(78).2, quoting Bede, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 1:9 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:20).)

Question 1

The work of the second and third days

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether there are any waters above the firmament;

second, what is the nature of the firmament;

third, by what is it moved;

fourth, on the number of the heavens;

fifth, on the work of the third day.

Article 1

Whether there are waters above the heavens

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.68.2; On the Power of God, q. 4, a. 1, ad 5; Quodl. IV, q. 2, a. 2.) It seems that there are waters above the heavens.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CSEL 28.1:39; PL 34:267).) the authority of Sacred Scripture is greater than all the perspicacity of human intelligence. But Scripture mentions that there are waters above the heavens in several places. Therefore, it seems that there can be no reason to deny it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, man is called a “microcosm,” since in him there is a likeness to the whole universe. But in the human body, the brain, where according to the Philosopher coldness resides, (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 2.7, 652a27.) is situated higher than the heart, which is the source of all the heat. Therefore, it seems that in the universe water is located higher than fire and thus above the sun.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.7, 289a20.) the heavenly bodies generate heat in the lower bodies through the swiftness of their motion. But out of all the other planets, Saturn moves in its diurnal motion the most swiftly, since among the parts of a sphere, the more distant a part is from the center, the more swiftly it moves. Therefore, in keeping with this, Saturn would have to have the hottest effect. But astronomers indicate the contrary. Therefore, there must be waters there whose proximity lessens the heat of Saturn.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every continuum is divisible to infinity. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1, 268a5.) But water divided somehow through rarefaction ascends to a certain space in the air, as when vapors rise up. Therefore, it can be divided to such an extent that it ascends above heaven. Thus, it seems that there are waters above heaven.

On the contrary, to a body of the same species, there is due a natural place that is numerically one. Hence it says in the Physics 3 (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 205a10.) that a part of the earth and the whole earth are moved to the same place. But every water is the same in species as every water, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b35.) Therefore, since the natural place of this water is under the air and above the earth, as its motion shows, it seems that the natural place of water cannot be above heaven.

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, a containing body is related to the contained body as whole to part and as form to matter. (Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b35.) For the thing containing is found to partake more of species than does the thing contained. Hence in On Generation and Corruption 2 (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.8, 335a20: now, the form and species of everything are at the terms; Mandonnet cites Aristotle, Topics 1.6, 102b28–103a4.) it is said that species is in the boundaries. But water partakes less of species than air and fire, as its grossness shows. Therefore, it seems that in no way can water naturally be above fire and air.

I answer that concerning this various things have been said.

Ambrose in his book On the Holy Spirit (Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, ch. 20 (CSEL 79; PL 16:846).) seems to say that by the waters that are above the heavens we are to understand the Holy Spirit. But this pertains more to an anagogical explanation than to a literal one, whether referred to the Holy Spirit or to the angels.

But others say that waters of the same nature as the element we are accustomed to are contained above the heavens by divine power. But Augustine excludes this in the place cited above, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CSEL 28.1:39; PL 34:267).) since in the works of the six days, by which nature was established, the question is not what God can do by his power but rather what is compatible with the nature of things.

Augustine in his inquiry also touches on another approach, namely, that of calling “the firmament” the air above which the waters ascend as vapors. But this does not seem to agree with Sacred Scripture, which says that the stars were placed in the firmament of heaven, unless perhaps “firmament” is being taken equivocally, as Rabbi Moses says, who also suggests this explanation. (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, ch. 31.)

Even so, we can better say that it should be understood of the firmament that is the starry heaven, above which there are waters, not waters of the nature of the water we are accustomed to, but rather of the nature of the fifth essence, (On “fifth essence,” see note in d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 8.) having a likeness to our water, for which reason Scripture attributes to them the name “water,” in this way making manifest what is hidden through what is known sensibly. Now, this likeness only holds with respect to the bright and transparent, in which the lower bodies agree with the heavenly, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7, 418b8.) Thus, just as the heaven that is like fire is called “empyrean” by the fact that it is wholly bright, so also this heaven is called “crystalline” or “watery” inasmuch as it agrees with water by the fact that it is transparent, but without there being a part of it that shines brightly, as is the case in the starry heaven, of which certain parts, namely, the stars, shine brightly, and another part is transparent. What the Master said above also seems to harmonize with this, namely, that by “waters” is understood the first matter, from the more subtle part of which the waters above the heavens were made, so that in this way, we are not compelled to posit that waters as an element are above the heavens. Now, this watery heaven is the ninth sphere, to which astronomers first trace back the motion of the sphere of the zodiacal signs common to all stars, which is from west to east; and again, the tenth sphere, to which they reduce diurnal motion, which is from east to west.

Reply Obj. 1: It takes nothing away from Scripture’s authority if it is explained in different ways, so long as it is firmly held that Sacred Scripture contains nothing false. Nonetheless, it is obvious that in Sacred Scripture many things are handed down metaphorically, which things cannot be understood at the level of the plain surface of the text.

Reply Obj. 2: There need not be the same location for the parts in the universe as there is in man. For in the universe bodies are ordered above us insofar as they are less material. But in man, they are ordered as expedient for the preservation of life and the fitting activity of the soul. For this reason, that which is the principle of life in man, namely, the heart, is placed in the middle, so that it may be preserved from all harm and diffuse life proportionately to all parts of the body. But heaven, which because of its impassibility preserves and is not preserved by another body, is placed at the far ends, as if containing. But its motion has a kind of nature like life for all existing things, as is said in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b9.) after the likeness of the motion of the heart in an animal, as Rabbi Moses says in the place cited above. (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, ch. 31.)

Reply Obj. 3: Saturn possesses the ability to cool by its proper nature and by the power following on its species. Hence it is not necessary to posit waters above the heavens for its cooling. For, if they were there, they would not cool it, since they are of the nature of the fifth essence, which is not susceptible to a foreign impression. Again, if it were possible, even more would they cool the stars of the eighth sphere, being closer to them, though some of these are found to have a very hot effect.

Reply Obj. 4: Natural bodies cannot be divided to infinity, since the nature of all compound things, as is said in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a16.) limits their size, not only in growth but also in diminution. This is why we find a least quantity of flesh and a least quantity of water, as is said in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b14–21.) Thus, in any species, there must be some limit of rarefaction beyond which the species is no longer preserved. Hence the ultimate rarity that can be reached is to the extent that the matter lies under the form of fire, as the Commentator says on the Physics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 36, commenting on 4.4, 211b14–29.) Hence water could only be rarefied if it were already not water or vapor at all, but rather air or fire.

Moreover, since fire is most active, that vapor cannot pass through an area of fire without being consumed. And it would be still less possible for it to penetrate the substance of the spheres, which, according to all, are indivisible, unless they are said to be divided metaphorically.

Article 2

Whether the firmament is of the nature of the lower bodies

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the firmament has the same nature as the lower bodies.

Obj. 1: For Basil says (Basil the Great, Homiliae in Hexaemeron, homily 3 (PG 29:51).) that it has the nature of fire. In the text, (Sent. II, 14.3(73).1, 4(74).1.) it is also said that it is water frozen together after the manner of crystal. It is obvious that these two things have the nature of the lower bodies. Therefore, so does the firmament.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, fire is the most noble of bodies among the elements. But it is not probable that the most noble body would be passed over in the works of creation. Therefore, since Scripture does not make special mention of fire, it seems that it is understood by the name “firmament.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every agent enacts something like itself. But higher bodies cause hotness and moisture in lower bodies. Therefore, it seems that they have an affinity to these qualities and, thus, seem to be of the nature of the lower bodies.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 405a25–30.) it is proper to fire to be the most subtle of bodies in species. But nothing bodily is more subtle and noble than heaven. Therefore, it seems that the heavens are fire. And so, the same follows as before.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) that the heavens and stars have an ungenerable and invariable substance. But lower bodies are generable and variable. Therefore, the firmament is not of the nature of the lower bodies.

Furthermore, since nature is the principle of motion and rest, we must form our judgment of the nature of a body on the basis of motion. But circular motion is natural to heaven, since it is the primary motion, whereas a violent motion cannot be primary. Now, circular motion is not natural to any of the lower bodies. Therefore, the heavens must not be of the nature of the lower bodies, and it must not have a contrary, just as its motion does not.

I answer that there were different positions among the philosophers concerning this question. For all before Aristotle posited that the heavens are of the same nature as the four elements. But Aristotle was the first to disprove this approach, and held that the heavens are the fifth essence without heaviness and lightness, and other contraries, as is clear in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 268b10‒4, 271a35.) Because of the strength of his arguments, subsequent philosophers agreed with him. Hence all now follow his opinion.

In a similar way, the expositors of Sacred Scripture also held different opinions insofar as they were followers of different philosophers by whom they were educated in philosophical matters. For Basil and Augustine and several of the saints follow the opinions of Plato in philosophical matters not pertaining to the faith, and thus they posit that the heavens are of the nature of the four elements. But Dionysius follows Aristotle nearly everywhere, as is clear to one who diligently examines his books. (Aquinas later tempered this opinion that Dionysius follows Aristotle so thoroughly. See Aquinas’s Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, prologue; and On Evil, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1.) Hence he separates the heavenly bodies from other bodies. And so, following this position, I say that the heavens are not of the nature of the four elements but is, rather, a fifth body.

Reply Obj. 1: Other saints handed this on, not as though making an assertion, but rather as making use of the things they learned in philosophy. Hence they do not have greater authority than the statements of the philosophers they follow, except in the fact that they are free from all suspicion of infidelity.

Or it may be said that they take “fire” and “water” after the likeness of light and transparency.

Reply Obj. 2: Rabbi Moses says (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, ch. 29.) that fire is understood by the darkness mentioned at the beginning of creation, so that the number and order of the elements is designated thus: water is described as above the earth; spirit (That is, air.) over the water; and darkness over spirit, that is, over the face of the abyss, because of the fact that fire in its own sphere does not shine brightly, as has been proved by philosophers.

But because this explanation seems too far-fetched, it can better be said that in that passage only those created things are touched on that have a manifest appearance and usefulness for all of us. This is also why it made no mention of air, since it is not commonly perceived that air is a body. Hence some said that a vacuum is full of air. Similarly, the element of fire as it is in its own sphere is apprehended not by the senses but by reason. Thus, the creation of these things is not set forth explicitly to an uneducated people. Rather, all three are understood by “water”—it being the body that is a mean between heaven and earth.

Or we can say, following Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 13 (CSEL 28.1:52; PL 34:273).) that with regard to its higher part, air is reckoned together, due to its tranquility, with heaven, which, according to its position is fire. We can say the same of fire, since we do not hold that the heavens are of the nature of the four elements.

Reply Obj. 3: When matter is proportionate to the reception of an action in keeping with the power of the agent, then the agent produces something like itself in species and is called a “univocal agent.” But when the matter is not proportionate to the reception of an action in keeping with the power of the agent, a likeness of effect to agent is still preserved, according to what Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, paras. 6–8 (PG 3:643–46).) that caused things possess contingent images of their causes. And yet, it is not necessary that something be found in the cause in the same way as it is in the effect, but rather in a more eminent way. Thus, too, heat is in a way in the sun, designating it “hot” not formally but efficiently, with reference to the power of heating that is in it.

Reply Obj. 4: Subtlety and rarity are not found univocally in heavenly bodies and lower ones, as the Commentator says in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere. (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 2.) Hence fire is said to be the most subtle of bodies, if we take “subtlety” in the way in which it is found in lower bodies. Still, the authorities taken from the examples are not very compelling.

Article 3

Whether the motion of the heavens is from an intelligence

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the motion of the heavens is not from a soul or intelligence.

Obj. 1: For the motion of the heavens is a natural motion, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.8, 276b5.) But that motion is natural whose principle is the form of a natural body. Therefore, it seems that the motion of the heavens is from its natural form and not from something that moves it through an apprehension.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, all motion from the soul comes with effort and pain, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1, 284a26–35.) But the motion of the heavens is not of this sort, since then it could not be continuous and uniform. Therefore, it is not moved by a soul.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an intellective soul is only joined with a body by means of the sensitive and nutritive, as is clear from the comparison of the parts of the soul to the species of shapes in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 414b28.) But heavenly bodies cannot have a sensitive or nutritive soul, since they do not have a body put together in the way necessary to serve as an instrument of the activities of a vegetative or sensitive soul. Therefore, it seems that neither can it be moved by an intellective soul.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every body moved by a soul has a right and left as well as other differences of position. But a heavenly body, since it is wholly uniform, does not have differentiation of this sort among its parts. Therefore, it seems that it cannot be moved by a soul.

On the contrary, it is proved in the Physics 7 (Aristotle, Physics 7.1, 242a50–243a30.) that everything that moves locally must be reduced back to a first, which is moved from itself. But what is moved from itself, as is proved in the same place, can only be that of which one part moves and the other is moved. And every such motion is the motion of an apprehending power. Therefore, the motion of the heavens must be from an apprehending power.

Furthermore, all natural motion belongs to a body that is outside its own place. But it is impossible to posit this in the case of heaven. Therefore, the motion of the heavens comes from a certain apprehension.

I answer that there are many opinions concerning this.

Some say that just as the motion of other simple bodies is from their bodily natures, so also is the motion of a heavenly body. But this does not seem true. For every motion is from a mover. Now, in the motion of simple bodies, even though the natural form is the principle of motion, it is still not the mover. But the essential mover is the generator that gave the form, while an incidental mover is one that removes an obstacle, as is proved in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 255b25.) These in no way belong to a heavenly body. Besides, natural motion regards one part alone, is perfected by natural rest, and belongs to a body existing outside its natural place. All of these, too, are foreign to a heavenly body.

Thus, others say that the motion of a heavenly body must be from some intellect and will, though not immediately from God himself. For this is incongruous with the order of the divine wisdom, whose effects come down to last things through intermediate things, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9 (PG 3:911).) Thus, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 6 (PL 77:328).) that bodily creation is administered through spiritual creation. Thus, it is probable that a created intellect is the proximate mover of the heavens.

Nevertheless, it should be known that philosophers posited different movers for the different motions and movable things. Hence their proofs of the number of moving intelligences were based on the number of these. Yet they assigned two movers to each sphere: one joined to it, which they called the soul of the sphere, the other separated, which they called an intelligence. The argument for this position was that an intelligence, according to them, possesses universal forms, and it is not fitting for them to be immediately directive in the different rotations of the motion of the heavens and in the things that are brought about through the motion of the heavens. Thus, it must have a mover in which there are particular forms that give direction in the motion, and this they say is the soul of the sphere.

Now, this position is partly heretical and partly able to be maintained by Catholics. For they hold that things proceed in order from God in such a way that the intelligence is created immediately by the first cause, which is God, and from the intelligence in turn proceeds the soul of the sphere, and the substance of the sphere is produced by the soul. To that extent, the proximate mover can be called its “form” or “soul,” because it gives it being as the cause proportionate to it. But our faith cannot accommodate this, since it asserts that God alone is the Creator of things, as has been said. (Above: d. 1, q. 1, a. 3.) Thus, the angels, who move the spheres proximately, we can call movers, but not forms or souls, since the spheres receive from them only motion, not being.

However, in this regard it is possible to maintain a position saying that the higher angels, who possess more universal forms, are separate and remote movers, whereas the lower angels, who possess more particular forms, as has been said before, (Above: d. 10, q. 1, a. 2.) are proximate movers. Hence Avicenna also says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 10, ch. 1.) that what are intelligences to the philosophers are in the law called “higher angels,” such as cherubim and seraphim, while those they call the “souls of the spheres” are in the law referred to as the “angels of ministry.”

Reply Obj. 1: As the Commentator says on On the Heavens 1, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, ch. 8, commenting on 1.8, 276b5.) the motion of the heavens is called “natural,” not because its active principle is a natural form, but rather because the heavenly body itself is of such a nature that it was made to receive such motion from an intellect, not having a nature incompatible with this kind of voluntary motion as there is in us. For nature is said not only of form, but also of matter.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking against those who posited that the heavens are of the nature of lower bodies. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1, 284a26–35.) For then that motion would be from a soul against the nature of the moved body. Thus, there would have to be effort and pain in moving. But if the motion is posited as being from an intellect in accord with the condition of the moved body, there is neither violence nor effort there.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Commentator says, (Averroes, On the Substance of the Heavenly Sphere, ch. 1.) a heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible like our body. Thus, it does not require a vegetative form. Likewise, its mover does not acquire knowledge from things, but rather has knowledge that is, as it were, active. Thus, it does not need a sensitive soul. And thus, according to philosophers, “soul” is not said univocally of the heavens and man.

Reply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 284b6–286a1.) we must assign differences of position in a heavenly body such that its right is called “east,” whence its motion begins, and its left “west.” Its higher pole is called the “southern,” and its lower pole the “northern.” Its anterior pole is called the “upper hemisphere,” and its posterior pole the “lower hemisphere.” Even so, as the Commentator also says, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 2, comm. 8, commenting on 2.2, 284b6–286a1.) these parts are assigned differently in a heavenly body and in our bodies, in two respects. The first is because in us these parts are differentiated in shape and power, but not in a heavenly body, since it is a sphere on all sides. The second is because in us the right is a determinate part, which never becomes the left, whereas in a heavenly body the part of the sphere that is now right later becomes left, since the part that is now in the east is later in the west. This is because the power accomplishing motion in us is the act of a particular body connected with the organs, namely, muscles and nerves, which does not occur in a heavenly body.

Article 4

Whether the number of heavens is fittingly assigned by Rabanus

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.68.4; Commentary on John, ch. 6, lect. 4; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 12, lect. 1.) It seems that the number of heavens is unfittingly assigned by Rabanus. (Bede cites Rabanus in his Commentarii in Pentateuchum, On Genesis, tr. 2 (PL 91:192); Glossa ordinaria, at Genesis 1:1, 1.4–5 (PL 113:68–69), but Peter Lombard gathers the number of the heavens from multiple sources.)

Obj. 1: For he posits seven heavens: the empyrean, the crystalline, the starry, the fiery, the Olympian, the aethereal, and the airy. But there is the heaven of the holy Trinity, into which Lucifer wished to ascend, as was said above, (Above: d. 2, exposition of the text; cf. Sent. II, 2.6(12).1.) and this differs from all those listed. Therefore, it seems that the heavens are insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as convex and concave differ in the spheres of air and fire, so also they differ in the spheres of the empyrean and crystalline heavens. But convex and concave give rise to two heavens in the case of fire and air, as will be said below. Therefore, in the empyrean heaven two heavens should likewise be assigned.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, besides the starry heaven, in which the stars are fixed, there are also the spheres of the seven planets, which are also given the name “heaven.” Therefore, since he does not mention these, he does not seem give a sufficient list of the heavens.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as air and fire have light and transparency in common with heaven, so too does water. But by reason of this agreement, air and fire are called “heaven.” Therefore, it seems that it would have been necessary to reckon the element of water among the heavens as well.

On the contrary (5), it seems that there are not so many heavens, but rather only three, because we read that Paul was caught up to the third heaven (2 Cor 12:2).

I answer that a heaven can take its name either from a heavenly property alone or from a property and nature together. For the nature of a heavenly body is to be separated from corruption and contraries. But its properties are especially observed in height of location and participation in clarity. Therefore, if we assign the name “heaven” based on a heavenly nature and property, there are three heavens. One of these is uniform and unmovable: the empyrean. The second is uniform and movable: the crystalline heaven. The third is non-uniform in its parts and movable: the starry. However, if “heaven” is so called based on heavenly properties alone, then there will be four heavens. For there are two elements that at the same time participate in clarity of light and height of location, namely, air and fire. In both of these the higher part with regard to the convex aspect of the sphere and the lower part with regard to the concave aspect of the sphere are distinguished. The higher part of the sphere of fire is called the “fiery heaven” by the fact that the fire there is the most pure, preserving its proper nature. Its lower part is called the “Olympian heaven” after a certain mountain in Macedonia that is named Olympus, which is said to stretch up to a height beyond the clouds. The higher part of the air is called the “aethereal heaven” on account of the inflammation of that part due to the proximity of the fire, since, as is said in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3, 270b20–25.) the name “aether” designates a body of swift motion that catches fire or causes fire quickly. Finally, the lower part of the air, wherein is the air that preserves the property of air as known and useful to us, is called the “airy heaven.”

Reply Obj. 1: It is the loftiness of the divine majesty itself that is metaphorically named the “heaven of the Holy Trinity,” by a metaphorical likeness, the sort that can belong to bodily and spiritual things by reason of proportionality. Thus, it was not necessary for it to fall within the same division as the bodily heavens.

Reply Obj. 2: A body that is called a “heaven” by nature is not alterable by contact with another body. Thus, it retains the same nature in any of its extremities. Thus, in such bodies two heavens are not distinguished with reference to the higher and lower part, as is done in the case of air and fire, whose extremities are disposed to different properties by the alteration of the bodies in contact with them.

Reply Obj. 3: The heavens of the seven planets are included under the starry heaven, since they all have in common with the sphere of fixed stars that their parts are non-uniform, inasmuch as one part, such as a star, is bright, while another part, namely, the other remaining parts of the sphere, is transparent.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though water participates in transparency, it does not participate in height of location, since in more cases it is heavy rather than light. For it is heavy in a place of fire and air and light only in a place of earth, whereas fire is light simply. As well, air is in more cases light rather than heavy, as is said in On the Heavens 4. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 4.4, 311b5–10.) Thus, the element of water does not warrant the name “heaven.”

Reply Sed Contra 5: According to the Gloss, the three heavens indicate the three genera of vision or the three hierarchies. (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Corinthians 12:2, 6.447 (PL 114:568); cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, cc. 3–7 (CSEL 28.1:382–89; PL 34:455–60).)

Or it may be said that the empyrean heaven is here referred to as the third, by taking as the three heavens only those that possess the nature of heaven, as has been said. (Above, resp.)

Article 5

Whether the work of the third day is fittingly described

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.69.1; On the Power of God, q. 4, a. 1, ad 17 and following.) It seems that the work of the third day is unfittingly described.

Obj. 1: For on the third day the distinction of the middle element from the last was made. But under this middle element is included fire, air, and water, as has been said. (Above: d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, since fire and air are more noble than water, it seems unfitting to omit mentioning them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a natural place is due to any body in accord with the requirements of its form. Hence the Commentator says in the Physics 8 (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 4.) that the more fire receives of species in generation, the more it partakes of place. But water had its natural form even before the third day, as is clear from Scripture, which mentions water at the beginning. Therefore, from the beginning of its creation it tended toward its place. Therefore, the gathering together of the waters into one place does not seem to be the work of the third day.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among the elements there is the kind of order in which the more subtle is related to the less subtle as containing to contained. Hence fire contains air, and air contains water. But water is more subtle than earth. Therefore, water should contain the whole earth and not be gathered together into a single part of it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as is related in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.8, 276a21–29.) only by violence can a body be moved from the place to which it moves naturally. Therefore, if water is naturally gathered together into a single part of the earth, it seems that it could only flow out to other parts by violence. But no violent motion is perpetual, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a17.) Therefore, since water is unceasingly drawn from the sea, which is said to be the place where the waters are gathered together, to the remaining parts of the earth, as the perennial nature of rivers shows, it seems that the waters are not naturally gathered together into one place. Thus, it is not fitting to mention such a gathering together in the establishment of nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in its natural place, each element is pure and simple. But water in the sea does not seem to be a pure element, as even its saltiness shows, since water is of its nature without taste. Therefore, it seems that the waters are not gathered together into one place, namely, into the sea, by nature. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, plants seem to pertain to the adornment of the earth. But it is the last three days that are dedicated to adornment. Therefore, in the work of the third day, no mention should have been made of the production of plants.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, certain herbs or plants seem not to have been produced on the third day but rather after the sin of man, as Genesis 3:18 relates: thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you. Therefore, it seems unfitting to say that on the third day the earth brought forth green herbage, since this is not universally true.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as plants are generated in the earth, so also are mineral bodies. Therefore, it seems that Scripture does not sufficiently addresses the production of things, since it does not mention minerals on this day.

I answer that the work of distinction consists of the conferral of powers that universally move to natural effects on the bodies that are the elements of the world. The active and passive qualities of the elements are powers of this sort; thus, such qualities are understood to have been conferred on the lower elements on the third day. Such qualities separate the elements from one another with regard to property and location because the elemental qualities also include heaviness and lightness, which are the principles of the motion of the elements to their proper places as well as of their natural rest in those places, just as hotness and coldness are principles of alteration. Thus, due to the conferral of such power, the waters are said to have been gathered together into one place on the third day.

Reply Obj. 1: Fire and air are the most hidden elements because they are not perceived sensibly as well as water is. Thus, the law-giver, proposing the law to an uneducated people, left the hidden things to be understood from the manifest things he mentioned.

Or we may say, as has been said before, (Above: aa. 1, 4.) that air is included under the name “heaven” with regard to its higher part and, with regard to its lower part, under the name “water,” on account of the likeness of the humidity it possesses to water. For when water’s vapors are released, the air is in a certain way condensed.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as heat and cold are not substantial forms of elements, neither are heaviness and lightness. For then they could not be incidental to other bodies. Hence just as substance is only the principle of alteration through the mediation of heat or cold, so it is only the principle of local motion or rest through the mediation of heaviness and lightness. Thus, even though water had its substantial form by the work of creation, it was not on this account gathered together into its proper place. Rather, these works are understood to be ordered with reference to time or with reference to nature by the work of their distinction. But the statement of the Commentator should be understood of bodies as they exist in their completion with regard to primary and secondary being.

Reply Obj. 3: The more subtle an element is, the greater it is in quantity. Thus, air is greater than water, and water than earth. And thus, air surrounds these two on either side, having formed the complete shape of a sphere. But water falls short of this shape. It does form a belt around the earth, but without covering all of it, and so it forms a circle, but fails to complete a sphere. This also follows from the necessity of the end, namely, so that on the earth there can be habitat for animals that breath air, and the generation of plants. But earth, as the least, is confined to the center.

Reply Obj. 4: Lower bodies, besides their proper motions, also in a certain way follow the motion of higher bodies. The more perfect a lower body is, the more it follows the motion of a higher body. This is clear from the fact that among the heavenly bodies a lower sphere retains, besides its proper motion, the motion of the higher sphere by which it is borne. So it is also the case among the elements that from the motion of the heavenly bodies they obtain something of circular motion, besides their own proper natural motions. This is most evidently apparent in the sea’s tide, which follows the motion of the moon. Even so, this does not occur by way of violent motion. For the Commentator says in On the Heavens 4 (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 4.) that the motions by which the elements follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies are not violent, since it is in accord with the natural order of bodies that the lower follow the impression of the higher, and the more perfect a lower body is in nature, the more it does this. And in this way, water enters in under the earth from an impression of the heavens moving the elements to mix, in order that it may be apt for the generation of minerals, animals, and plants. It returns from there to its proper place by natural motion, as it is said: to the place where the streams flow, there they flow again (Eccl 1:7).

Reply Obj. 5: All the elements, in a place where they come into contact with one another, are altered by their nature such that there is a kind of motion of fusion between them. This causes saltiness in the sea, by the admixture of earthy vapor together with the burning of the sun’s rays. This occurs especially near the earth and on a thing’s surface. For in the depth of the sea, fresh water is found, as is clear from the words of the Philosopher, who says in his book the History of Animals (See Aristotle, The History of Animals 8.13, 598a30.) that a certain kind of fish, which is called a “malakie,” (Perhaps derived from the obscure Greek word malachios, μαλάχιος, which refers to a type of fish (see Hesychius of Alexandria, Alphabetical Collection of All Words); interestingly, however, the Hebrew name Malachi, מַלְאָכִי, means “my messenger” or “God’s messenger,” so it’s tempting to wonder if there is some association of a particular large fish with the story of Jonah.) is found to be quite large in places in the sea in which fresh waters abound.

Reply Obj. 6: Concerning the production of plants there seems to be a difference between Augustine and other saints. For Augustine seems to be of the opinion (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 13 (CSEL 28.1:52; PL 34:274).) that when it says, let the earth bring forth vegetation, plants yielding seed (Gen 1:11), we are not to understand that at that time plants were produced in their proper nature. Rather, at that time the earth was given the germinative power for the production of plants in the work of propagation. But to others it seems that at that time plants themselves were produced as well. Now, in either of these approaches the production of plants fittingly pertains to the work of distinction. For it is sufficient for their sprouting that they have the power of the heavens in place of a father, and the power of earth in place of a mother, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 1.2, 716a13–16.) In this way, common active principles, which pertain to the work of distinction, are sufficient for the generation of plants, though not the production of animals, which requires the formative power that exists in the seed. Or else it is fitting because any thing pertains to the adornment of the place in which it moves, not that in which it rests. But plants adhere as fixed in the earth at the roots. Thus, they do not pertain to its adornment but are, rather, reckoned together with it, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 13 (CSEL 28.1:52; PL 34:274).)

Reply Obj. 7: Harmful plants were also produced together with the others, though they would not have been harmful to man prior to sin, due to his being protected by divine providence. But after sin they began to be harmful to man. Hence signifying this, it is said: thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you (Gen 3:18).

Reply Obj. 8: The generation of minerals is hidden in the bowels of the earth, and so there was no need to mention them to the people, but only things that were manifest. Moreover, minerals do not participate in a rank of dignity among beings higher than the elements since they lack life. So it was not necessary to make special mention of them.

Exposition of the text

‘This can be believed to be made of waters.’ (Sent. II, 14.3(73), quoting Bede, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 1:6–8 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:18–20).) This should be understood with regard to the property of translucency and not with regard to the nature of the elemental body. But even the latter may be believed, since it is not contrary to the faith.

‘But although our authors knew it, the Holy Spirit did not wish to say more through them than is profitable for our salvation.’ (Sent. II, 14.5(75).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 9 (CSEL 28.1:45; PL 34:270).) It should be noted that here he refers to “our authors” as those who published the canonical books, namely, the apostles and prophets, who did not trouble about writing these things. But it is asserted by other saints and proved by philosophers that the heavens is of a spherical shape, which is demonstrated by natural as well as mathematical arguments.

‘It is also asked whether the heavens are fixed or move.’ (Sent. II, 14.5(75).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:47; PL 34:271). The Silano translation has been slightly modified.) On this matter, too, the philosophers have two opinions. For Aristotle is of the opinion that only the spheres and not the stars as such are moved. But Ptolemy (Ptolemy, Almagest, bk. 7, cc. 1–2.) is of the opinion that the stars have their own proper motion besides the motion of the sphere. But even though local motion is ascribed in either way to the heavenly spheres, motion that varies anything in its substance is still excluded from it, and the firmament takes its name from this privation.

After these matters, it is usual to ask why it is not said here . . . ‘God saw that it was good.’ (Sent. II, 14.6(76).1.) Besides the mystical reason touched on in the text, the Master of Histories (That is, Peter Comestor, who was taught by Peter Lombard himself, and who was the teacher of Gilbert Prevostin (Praepositinus or Prevostinus) of Cremona; Peter Comestor, Historia libri Genesis, ch. 4 (PL 198:1058–59).) assigns another literal reason, one which Rabbi Moses touches on as well, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, ch. 30.) namely, that on the second day the middle element was distinguished from the highest, and thus the middle element was not perfectly distinguished, which would only happen when it was distinguished from the lowest element. And so, it is clear that the work of the second day was brought to completion on the third day. Thus, the blessing of the third day refers to both.