D. 16 - Creation of man in God’s image and likeness

Division of the text

Having considered the purely spiritual nature—that is, the angelic—and the purely bodily nature, here in the third place he pursues in many ways a treatment of that nature which is composed of the spiritual and bodily, namely, the human being.

So this part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the human being with regard to his first establishment.

In the second, he considers it with regard to his fall, at and so the devil, seeing that man was able to ascend by the humility of obedience to that from which he had fallen through pride, envied him. (Sent. II, 21.1(122).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the beginning of man’s creation.

In the second, he shows the state of the man so created, at it is usual to ask many things regarding the first state of man before sin. (Sent. II, 19.1(110).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the formation of the human as coming forth from his cause and after a likeness to it, and this in order to show how this action is in a certain way univocal.

In the second, he addresses the establishment of man as constituted by his parts, at here it is usual to ask many things concerning the origin of the soul. (Sent. II, 17.1(96).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows man as he was established according to the image and likeness of God.

In the second, he lays out an explanation of these things, at but image and likeness in this passage is understood either as uncreated . . . or created. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).1.)

In the third, he shows the part of man in accord with which it befits him to be according to the image of God, at hence man was made, in respect to his soul, according to the image and likeness . . . of the whole Trinity. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).5. The Silano translation has been slightly modified.)

The second part is divided into three parts.

In the first, he lays out his explanation.

In the second, he rules out the explanations of certain others, at the Son, however, is properly called the image of the Father. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).2.)

In the third, he supplies something with regard to his explanation that was touched on in other explanations, namely, in what respect “image” and “likeness” differ: but although this distinction does not seem entirely worthy of rejection . . . the image and likeness of God is more fittingly to be sought and considered in man himself. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).4.)

And so, man was made according to the image and likeness of God in respect to his mind. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).5. The Silano translation has been slightly modified.) Here he shows to what part of man the image should be assigned.

First, he shows that it is assigned to the soul.

Second, he shows how a sign of this is evident even in the body, at but also ‘in the body, he has some property which indicates this.’ (Sent. II, 16.4(95).2, quoting Bede, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 1:26 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:29).)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he sets down that man is according to the image of the Trinity, not only of the Father or the Son, as others said, and this with respect to the soul.

Second, he shows how “image” befits man in his soul and the Son of God differently, at and so man is said to be both image and according to the image; the Son, however, is image, but not according to the image. (Sent. II, 16.4(95).1. The Silano translation has been slightly modified.)

Question 1

The image of God

Here four questions are asked:

first, whether the image of God can be found in anything created;

second, in which created things it is found;

third, whether it is found equally in those in which it is found;

fourth, concerning the difference between image and likeness.

Article 1

Whether a created thing can be said to be according to the image of God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that nothing created can be said to be according to the image of God.

Obj. 1: For in the case of anything of which there is a created image, some image of it can be set up. But no image can be set up for God: to whom then will you liken God, or what image compare with him? (Isa 40:18). (RSV reads likeness instead of image.) Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the properties of one thing are not found in another. But “image” indicates a property of the Son, as was said in Book I, (See In I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. 2.) and the Son is uncreated. Therefore, it does not befit anything created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, “image” implies a kind of agreement in some one respect. Hence Hilary says that an image is not a different species than the thing that it images. (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis*, sect. 13 (PL 10:490). The reader should bear in mind the various meanings of the word species, which can simply mean “appearance,” in addition to having the more technical meaning of “species.”)* But whatever things agree in some one respect have something prior to and simpler than themselves, whether the agreement is analogous or univocal. For “being” is prior to “substance” and “accident,” just as “animal” is prior to “man” and “horse.” But there is nothing prior to and simpler than God. Therefore, there cannot be an image of him in a created thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, equality pertains to the account of image. For Hilary says (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis, sect. 13 (PL 10:490).) that an image is of a thing that is to be regarded as equal to another thing. But a created thing can have no equality with God. Therefore, neither can it be his image.

Obj. 5: Again, there cannot be non-distinction and union between infinitely distant things. But an image, as Hilary says, (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis, sect. 13 (PL 10:490).) is a united and non-distinguished likeness. Therefore, a created thing cannot be according to the image of God, from whom it stands at an infinite distance.

On the contrary, Genesis 1:26 says: let us make man according to our image and likeness.

Furthermore, for the perfection of a work, it must be brought to likeness with the agent. But his work is perfect (Deut 32:4). Therefore, there must be something among his works in which his image is represented.

I answer that “image” is properly said to be that which is according to the imitation of another. Yet not just any given imitation fulfills the account of image; for example, if this is white and that is white, we do not speak of an image on this basis. Rather, the account of image requires an imitation in some respect that expresses species and essence, which is why Hilary says that the species does not differ. (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis, sect. 13 (PL 10:490).) So it is that in bodily things “image” refers most especially to imitation of shape, since shape is, as it were, a sign that shows unity or difference of species.

But this imitation can take place in two ways. It is either with regard to species and the sign of the species at the same time, and in this way, the image of a man is in his son, who imitates him both in human species and shape—this is a perfect image. Or it is with regard to sign alone and not with regard to the truth of species, as the image of a man is in a stone statue. This is an imperfect image. In the first way, the Son is the image of the Father, as sharing in his nature. But in the second way the image of God is in created things. Thus, a created thing can be the image of God, though not the perfect image.

Reply Obj. 1: The prophet is speaking against idolaters, who attempted to make an image of God in bodily shapes. Thus, it does not apply to the case in question.

Reply Obj. 2: “Image” in its perfect account indicates a property of the Son. This does not belong to a creature, but is, rather, according to an imperfect signification, such that the name “image” descends from the Son to creatures, just as the name “fatherhood” descends from the Father (Eph 3:15). (RSV for Ephesians 3:14–15 reads I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named.)

Reply Obj. 3: There can be agreement in two ways. Either there is a single thing in which two participate—and there cannot be this type of agreement of Creator and what is created, as was objected. Or else there is agreement insofar as one is by itself simply, and the other participates in its likeness as far as it can, just as if we were to posit that heat exists without matter, and assert that fire agrees with it due to the fact that it has a participation in heat. There can be this kind of agreement of the creature with God. For God is called a “being” in such a way that he is his own to-be. But what is created is not its own to-be, but is, rather, called a “being” as participating in to-be. And this is sufficient for the account of an image.

Reply Obj. 4: The account of image does not require an equality of equivalency, since the image of a large man can be expressed in a small painting. Rather, what is required is an equality of proportion, namely, that the proportion of parts to one another be the same in the image as in what is imaged. This kind of equality is found in the soul with respect to God. For just as the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit is from both, so also knowledge is from the mind, and love proceeds from both.

Reply Obj. 5: Where there is the full account of image, there is perfect non-distinction and perfect unity, as is clear in the Son in relation to the Father. But the created, inasmuch as it imitates God, is not separated from him, but is in a certain way united to him by a unity of agreement, even though a greater difference always remains. And so, the account of image is not entirely lacking, but only that of perfect image.

Article 2

Whether the image of God is found only in rational creatures

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3; In III Sent., d. 10, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; ST I.35.2, ad 3; 45.7; 93.1‒2; SCG IV.26; On Truth, q. 10, a. 1; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 11, lect. 2.) It seems that the image of God is not only found in rational creatures.

Obj. 1: For the account of image as it can be found in the created does not require perfect likeness, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) but rather imperfect imitation suffices. But anything created has existence by imitating the divine perfection. Therefore, anything created should be said to be “according to the image of God.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius says, speaking of God: bearing the world in mind and in like image forming it. (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, poem 9 (CCSL 94; PL 63:759).) But anything created proceeds into existence from the fact that it was borne in the divine mind through its idea. Therefore, anything created can be said to have been made according to the image of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, where there is a more express likeness, the account of image is more preserved. But the perfection of the divine goodness is more expressly represented in the whole universe than in any part of it. Therefore, the whole universe should be said to be according to the image of God more than any given rational creature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Dionysius shows (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) that the likeness of the divine goodness is most apparent in the sun’s rays. But the expression of likeness causes an image. Therefore, the sun’s rays should be said to be according to the image of God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that which most of all expresses something’s property seems most of all to resemble it. But at the end of On the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15, para. 2 (PG 3:327–30).) Dionysius says that in fire the divine properties are shown forth most of all. Therefore, fire should most of all be said to be according to the image of God.

On the contrary, the soul is called the “image of God” by virtue of the fact that it is capable of knowing him, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1044).) But only a rational creature is capable of knowing God. Therefore, it alone is according to the image of God.

Furthermore, the more perfect a created thing is, the more it is like God. But among other created things, the rational nature holds the highest rank. Therefore, the image of God is chiefly found in it.

I answer that, as has been said, (Above: a. 1, resp.) the imitation which constitutes the account of image is in something pertaining to the species. But nothing is allotted its species on the basis of what is first and common, but rather on the basis of what is last and proper, such as is the constitutive difference.

Now, taking into consideration the processions of the divine goodness in created things, by which created natures are constituted in a likeness to the Uncreated nature, participation in the dignity of intellect is found to be the last, and that which presupposes all others. Thus, intellectual nature attains the imitation of God in that very respect in which the species of its nature in a certain way consists. This is why we hold that the intellectual creature finds its ultimate happiness in the same activity in which the happiness of God consists, namely, intellective contemplation. Thus, only the intellectual creature is reasonably said to be “according to the image of God.”

Reply Obj. 1: Even though anything created participates to some extent in the account of the divine likeness, it cannot be said to be its image for the aforementioned reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of a work to the worker can be spoken of in two ways: either with regard to what it has by nature, as when a man generates a man, or with regard to what it has in its intellect, as when an artifact proceeds from an artisan after the likeness of his art. A created thing proceeds from God after his likeness in both ways. In the first way, it proceeds because beings are from a being and living things from one who lives. The second way is because things proceed from the ideal accounts. Therefore, since each thing reaches the perfect imitation of that which is in the divine intellect, since it is as God has appointed it to be, with regard to this mode of likeness anything created can be called the “image” of the idea existing in the divine mind. Hence Boethius says (Boethius, De Trinitate, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) that the forms that are in matter can be called “images” due to the fact that they have come from those forms that are without matter. But with regard to the other mode of likeness, only an intellectual nature reaches the ultimate degree of imitation, as has been said, (Resp.) and thus it alone is called the “image of God.”

Reply Obj. 3: Likeness to the divine goodness, with regard to the most noble participations in it, is reflected in the universe only by reason of its noblest parts, which are intellectual natures. Nor can what does not befit the whole by reason of all its parts be said of the whole through itself and in a primary way, as is frequently said in the Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6, throughout; for example: 6.3, 234b5.) Thus, the universe cannot be called the “image of God,” but the intellectual nature can be called the “image of God.”

Reply Obj. 4: The entire likeness of the sun’s rays to the divine goodness has to do with causality, not with dignity of nature, which is what completes the account of image.

Reply Obj. 5: The divine properties are shown forth in created things in two ways. Either they are shown forth according to a likeness of analogy, as in the case of life, wisdom, and things of this sort, which analogically befit God and things created. And in this way, the divine properties are especially shown in the rational nature. Or they are shown forth according to a likeness of proportionality, insofar as spiritual properties are designated metaphorically by bodily things. In this way, the divine properties are shown forth in fire, as has been said. (See perhaps In I Sent., d. 33; d. 45, q. 1, a. 4.) But this likeness does not make the account of an image. Hence Dionysius calls it an unlike likeness. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2 (PG 3:135).)

Article 3

Whether the image of God is found more in angels than in men

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; ST I.93.3; Commentary on Psalms, Psalm 8.) It seems that the image is not found more in angels than in men.

Obj. 1: For what follows on nature is found equally in all that have that nature, such as “risible” in men. But to be according to the image of God follows on intellectual nature. Therefore, it exists equally in all who have an intellect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1044).) the soul is the image of God by the very fact that it can be capable of knowing him. But an angel is not more capable of knowing God than man, since in the enjoyment of divinity men are equal to the angels. Therefore, to be according to the image of God does not more befit the angels than it does men.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 51, para. 4 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:33).) between our mind and God there is no mean. But what imitates God more falls as a mean between him and that which imitates him less. Therefore, an angel is not more according to the image of God than the human mind.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Gloss on Hebrews 2:9 says that nothing after God is better than the nature of the human mind that Christ assumed. (Glossa ordinaria, at Hebrews 2:9, 6.813 (PL 114:647).) But Christ assumed a mind of the same nature as our minds. Since, then, each thing is better to the degree that it imitates God by a more express image, it seems that to be according to his image does not befit angels more than men.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, speaking of the Blessed Virgin, Jerome says that she has been exalted above the choirs of angels to the heavenly kingdom. (Jerome, Epistulae, letter 9, “To Paula,” para. 15 (PL 30:138).) But this could not be true if she were less according to the image of God than the angels. Therefore, since she truly and purely possesses human nature, it seems that the image is not more to be found in angels than in men.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 23 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:664).) that an angel is called a signet of likeness, since in it the likeness of the divine image is more expressly brought out. But something is said to be more according to the image the more expressly God’s image is reflected in it. Therefore, the angels are more according to the image of God than man.

Likewise, it seems that a man is more to the image of God than is a woman, based on what is said in 1 Corinthians 11:7; for a certain ranking is established between man and woman such that while the man is called the image of God, woman is called the “image of the man.” Thus, the image is not equally found in all those who have the image.

I answer that we can speak of the image in two ways: either with regard to that in which the account of an image properly consists, or with regard to that which is assigned the likeness of image in a secondary way. For properly and principally, the image follows on intellectual nature. Hence where intellectual nature is more perfectly found, there must also be a more express image.

And in this way, since intellectual nature is of much greater dignity in the angels than in man—due to the fact that man, because of the shadowing of his intellectual light, is called “rational,” with reason being a kind of shadowed intellect—the image of God in the angels must be more express than in the soul. Moreover, it must be more express in higher angels than in lower angels, and in man than in woman, even though this difference is less than the first since it does not follow on a difference of nature with respect to species.

The image of God is also attributed to man, though not properly, with regard to some consequent properties, such as the fact that man has dominion over lower creatures (just as God does in the whole universe) and is in a certain way their end. And this is indicated where, after it was said: let us make man according to our image and likeness, it is added: so that they might have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth (Gen 1:26). (In this quotation, Aquinas’s Latin differs from the Vulgate in reading ut instead of et at the beginning of the passage. This small variation has the effect of emphasizing the creation of man to God’s image and likeness for the purpose of or with the specific result of his having dominion. Nevertheless, in the context of the Genesis account, the thrust of either reading is the same: man, being to the image and likeness of God, therefore has dominion over visible creation.) Likewise, just as God is wholly in any given part of the universe, so also the soul is wholly in any given part of the body.

With reference to this and other such things, nothing prevents man from being more according to the image of God than an angel. But this is in a qualified sense and not simply. For a judgment of likeness or difference that is taken from the essential properties of a thing is much more well-grounded.

Reply Obj. 1: What follows on nature is found equally in everything possessing that nature equally. But intellectual nature is not equally found in angels and in men. Rather, in the angels it is much nobler.

Reply Obj. 2: The image is found in man and in the angels with regard to their natural properties, not with regard to the habit of grace or glory. But if we consider the natural properties of the angels and man, angels are more capable of divine knowledge than man. And the fact that man is brought into equality with the angels in the divine enjoyment is of grace, not of nature. Thus, the objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: Between our mind and God there is no mean in the sense of an object of beatitude. Rather, our mind tends immediately to God, by whom it is also immediately vivified through grace. And yet there is a mean with regard to the ranking of nature, namely, the angelic nature, as is clear from Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 6 (PG 3:178).)

Augustine also says (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 7 (CCSL 27; PL 32:828).) that angels are made close to God and matter is made close to nothing. Thus, the objection is null.

Reply Obj. 4: The human nature that Christ assumed is much nobler than any other thing created. But this is due to its union with the divinity and not from its essential principles. Thus, a similar argument concerning human minds that are not so united does not follow. For as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PG 94:1023).) the Son of God assumed a human nature as an atom, that is, as an individual, not as the species. The nature of the human mind in the aforementioned Gloss is taken in this way as well. (Glossa ordinaria, at Hebrews 2:9, 6.813 (PL 114:647).)

Reply Obj. 5: The exaltation of the Blessed Virgin above the choirs of angels was not a matter of nature but of grace. Thus, nothing is proved by this.

Article 4

Whether “image” and “likeness” are fittingly distinguished in the text

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.93.9.) It seems that “image” and “likeness” are unfittingly distinguished in the text. (See Genesis 1:26.)

Obj. 1: For that which is put in the definition of something as a genus is not distinguished from it, as, for example, “animal” is not distinguished from “man.” But according to Hilary, an image is the imaged likeness without discrepancy of a thing that is to be regarded as equal to another thing. (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis, sect. 13 (PL 10:490).) Therefore, “image” should not be distinguished from “likeness.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the opinion of some, man was not created in a state of grace. But innocence and justice pertain to grace. Therefore, the likeness in which man was made is unfittingly explained in the text (Sent. II, 16.3(94).5.) by reference to justice and innocence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, knowledge and love refer to an act or passion. But act and passion do not always remain in the soul. Therefore, since the image always remains, it seems that image is not fittingly attributed to man with reference to love or knowledge.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, love pertains to the will. But will is part of the image. Therefore, likeness is unfittingly distinguished from image on the basis that likeness consists in the love of virtue.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, will does not pertain to knowledge, yet it is included as part of the image by Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 11, cc. 3, 4; bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:988, 1044).) Therefore, the image is unfittingly said to pertain to knowledge of the truth.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, intellectual nature pertains to the essence of the soul. But the image follows on intellectual nature, as has been said. (Above: a. 2, resp.) Therefore, it seems that it is unfittingly said that likeness pertains to the essence whereas image pertains to other things that are in the soul.

I answer that likeness is included in the account of image, but the converse is not the case. Hence if “likeness” is distinguished over and against “image,” then likeness must be taken in a special sense that falls short of the account of image, as the proper is placed in a division alongside the definition, not with respect to the common name that is predicated of the definition, but rather with respect to that determinately considered account in which it falls short of the complete definition. Therefore, since image implies imitation in what pertains to manifesting the species, likeness must be understood as pertaining to that which falls short of manifesting the specific nature.

But this occurs in two ways. Either it is because it is prior to and more general than the nature of the species, as in the case of properties following on the nature of the genus. Or it is because it is posterior to what manifests the species, such as accidents following on the principles of the individual.

And so, if “falling short” is taken in the first way, then we have the last distinction assigned in the text. (Sent. II, 16.3(93).5.) For in this respect we speak of likeness with reference to agreement in what follows on the essence as essence, not as intellectual, such as “incorruptible,” “indivisible,” and things of this sort. But we take account of the image with reference to what follows properly on intellectual nature.

On the other hand, if it falls short because it is posterior, then this is in two ways. Either it is with respect to the order of natural power to power, and in this way, the first thing that manifests intellectual nature is the cognoscitive power and its act. Secondarily it will be the will and its act, since they follow on the apprehension of the cognoscitive power. This will lead to the second distinction, since image will pertain to the knowledge of truth, which is the first thing that manifests intellectual nature, whereas likeness will pertain to the love of virtue. Or it is with respect to the order of power to habit. This will lead to the first distinction, whereby image pertains to powers, namely, memory, intelligence, and will, but likeness pertains to the consequent habits, namely, innocence and justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Likeness taken generally is not divided over and against image, but rather likeness insofar as it falls short of the account of image, just as the proper is divided over and against the definition.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if we posit that man was not created in the habits of grace, it is still obvious that he was created in integral and perfect natural habits. And in this regard one would find likeness.

Reply Obj. 3: Powers come to be known by acts and passions. Thus, by “knowledge” and “love” should be understood the knowing power and the loving power, which is the will.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument is not valid since it proceeds from different distinctions. Nor is it unfitting that in accord with one distinction something pertains to image while according to another it pertains to likeness. For something can be taken as prior to another when compared in a certain way, and when compared in a different way, is taken as posterior to the other. Thus, the powers of an intellective nature can be compared to habits, compared to which they are found to be prior; or one can be compared to another, and in this case one is prior to the other. Thus, just as something is both prior and posterior when compared in different ways, so also it can pertain both to image and to likeness for the aforementioned reason.

Reply Obj. 5: And we should respond in like manner to the fifth objection.

Reply Obj. 6: Intellectuality, even though it pertains to the essence of intellectual nature, does not belong to the account of essence as essence. Thus, it does not pertain to likeness, which is assigned based on the common differences of being, namely, “simple” and “composite,” “corruptible” and “incorruptible,” and things of this sort.

Exposition of the text

Why man was created, that is, the final cause of man, and how he was established, (Sent. II, 16.1(92).1.) since he was constituted of soul and body. These two things were discussed in Distinction 1 of this Book. With what qualities and in what manner he was made. (Sent. II, 16.1(92).1.) Here he begins to pursue it. Then, how he fell. (Sent. II, 16.1(92).1.) He pursues this in Distinction 21 and following. Finally how and by what means he was restored. (Sent. II, 16.1(92).1.) He pursues this in Books III and IV.

Which are naturally in the rational mind. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).5.) This can also be understood of the habits of grace, to which the soul is naturally ordered, not that they are caused by the principles of nature. Or it may be understood of innate habits, as the Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 6.11.) also posits certain natural virtues.

And so image pertains to form, that is, the specific form*, likeness to nature*, that is, the common form. (Sent. II, 16.3(94).5.) This is in accord with the last distinction that he laid out.

And so man is said to be both image and according to the image. (Sent. II, 16.4(95).1; here and throughout, Silano translates ad imaginem as “in the image,” but Aquinas’s point depends on the meaning of ad (which we have translated as “according to the image”), so we have modified the Silano translation accordingly.) The reason for this is that the preposition “to” indicates distance. For, as Augustine says, the Son is the image of the Father and is in no respect dissimilar to him. Thus, for this reason he is said to be the image but not to the image. But man, since he imitates God in intellectual nature and yet is distant from the Son’s perfect imitation, to which he nevertheless tends as much as possible, is said to be the image and according to the image.