D. 15 - Work of adornment of the fourth, fifth, and sixth days, and the seventh day’s rest

Division of the text

After the work of creation and distinction, here the Master begins to pursue the work of adornment. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the works of the last three days, which are dedicated to adornment.

In the second, he addresses the seventh day’s rest, in which the consummation of the whole work is set forth, at it is now suitable that we say something about resting on the seventh day. (Sent. II, 15.7(88).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues the work of adornment according to the opinion of some saints.

In the second, he pursues Augustine’s opinion concerning the works of the six days, at but before we treat the creation of man, let us make clearer, by a fuller examination, what we briefly touched upon earlier. (Sent. II, 15.5(86).2.)

The first is divided into three parts in accord with the three days during which the work of adornment is brought to perfection.

In the first part, he addresses the work of the fourth day.

In the second, he addresses the work of the fifth, at and God said, ‘Let the waters bring forth the crawling creature of living spirit.’ (Sent. II, 15.1(82).1, quoting Genesis 1:20.)

In the third, he addresses the work of the sixth day, at next: God said, ‘Let the earth bring forth living creatures.’ (Sent. II, 15.2(83).1, quoting Genesis 1:24.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he distinguishes the works of adornment from one another and from the works of distinction.

Second, he pursues the work of the fourth day specifically, at and because heaven excels the other elements in its beauty . . . so it was adorned before the others, on the fourth day. (Sent. II, 14.9(79).3.)

Third, he raises a doubt and resolves it, at but it is usual to ask how the phrase that follows is to be taken: ‘to be as signs and for the fixing of times and days and years.’ (Sent. II, 14.11(81).1, quoting Genesis 1:14.)

Next: God said, ‘Let the earth bring forth living creatures.’ (Sent. II, 15.2(83).1, quoting Genesis 1:24.) Here the work of the sixth day is described. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he lays out the work that was done on the sixth day.

Second, he raises two questions concerning it.

One concerns harmful animals, at it is usual to ask, concerning poisonous and dangerous animals. (Sent. II, 15.3(84).1.)

The other concerns animals generated by putrefaction, at there is also the question about some very small animals. (Sent. II, 15.4(85).1.)

Third, he assigns to the preceding works the reason for the order of what was made last, at when all things had been created and properly ordered, man was made last of all. (Sent. II, 15.5(86).1.)

It is now suitable that we say something about resting on the seventh day. (Sent. II, 15.7(88).1.) Here the Master pursues what pertains to the seventh day. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows how the author’s rest should be understood.

Second, how the consummation of the work should be understood, at but it is asked how God is said to have completed his work on the seventh day. (Sent. II, 15.8(89).1.)

Third, he shows how the sanctification of the day should be understood, at but he is said to have sanctified and blessed that day. (Sent. II, 15.10(91).1.)

Here three questions are asked.

The first concerns the production of the stars, which pertains to the fourth day. (Q. 1.)

The second concerns the production of animals, which pertains to the fifth and sixth. (Q. 2.)

The third concerns the worker’s rest, which pertains to the seventh. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The work of the fourth day

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, concerning the production of the stars itself;

second, concerning their effect on lower bodies;

third, concerning their effect on things that have free will.

Article 1

Whether the production of the stars is fittingly described

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.70.1–2.) It seems that the production of the stars is inadequately described.

Obj. 1: For from that author of utmost order, things that are prior according to nature have proceeded forth as prior in time. But the sun and the other stars precede the lower bodies by nature, as mover precedes what is moved and an agent its patient. Therefore, the production of the sun and the other stars is unfittingly described as being after the distinction of the lower elements.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Heavens 2, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.8, 289b33.) the stars are unmovable parts of the spheres, which remain in the spheres and are borne by their motion. But plants are said not to pertain to adornment because they are fixed to the earth. Therefore, it seems that neither do the stars.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as astronomers prove, (Ptolemy, Almagest, bk. 5, ch. 16.) many stars are larger than the moon. But when it is said that there are two great luminaries, exceeding greatness is understood as something distinctive. Therefore, it seems that these things are not fittingly said of the moon.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that something is called a “luminary” because it is a vessel of light. But the body that is called a “vessel of light” is one that has light from itself, which is not true of the moon, because eclipses of the moon as well as its waxing and waning show that it is illuminated by the sun. Therefore, it seems unfitting for the moon to be called a “luminary.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, each luminary seems to rule that time in which it appears. But the moon sometimes appears even in the day. Therefore, it should not be said only to rule the night.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the more noble never exists for the sake of what is baser than itself. But it would be nothing but absurd to say that the tiny animals that cannot bear sunlight are of greater dignity than the moon and stars. Therefore, it seems unfittingly said in the text (Sent. II, 14.10(80).1.) that the moon and stars were made in order to shine for the sake of such animals.

I answer that, as has been said above, (Above: d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) besides the active principles common in all nature, determinate powers moving to determinate species are required. Powers of this sort were bestowed on things through the work of adornment. But just as the action of lower powers acting in a common manner is traced back to the active heavenly power in a universal manner, so also the powers that are in lower things, moving them to determinate species, are traced back to determinate heavenly powers. Determinate powers of this sort are found especially in the stars, which impress determinate species on things in accord with different appearances and conjunctions, as the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 31.) Hence lower powers are like instruments of higher powers, as the Commentator says on the Physics 8. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 43.) Thus, for the order of adornment to correspond to the order of distinction, the adornment of the highest element is put first, with reference to the production of the luminaries, in which the determinate powers consist. Second, the adornment of the middle element is given by the formation of fish and birds. Third, the adornment of the lowest element is given in the production of the land animals.

Reply Obj. 1: By let there be lights in the firmament of the heavens (Gen 1:14), we are not to understand that such bodies of luminaries were made from preexisting matter with respect to their specific being. Rather, with their substance previously existing, determinate powers were first conferred on them at that time, due to which they acquired their final completion. Now, these determinate powers of the heavenly bodies do not correspond to the common powers in the elements, but rather to the proper powers in determinate things, so that just as the production of light preceded the distinction of the elements, so also the establishment of the luminaries would precede the differentiation of natural species.

Reply Obj. 2: The common powers of the elements suffice for the production of plants, which are allotted species differently on the basis of different combinations of the elements. But this cannot happen in perfect animals, even though some philosophers have posited this. This is the reason why plants pertain to the work of distinction. Hence it is not necessary for the stars to pertain to the work of distinction, for in them are the powers that move to determinate species.

Or it may be said that the stars, even if they do not move in heaven through themselves, still move together with their spheres. But plants move neither through themselves nor together with another.

Reply Obj. 3: The sun is called a “great” luminary both because of its quantity and because of its power. But the moon is called “great” not so much because of its true size as because of its apparent size and exceeding brightness in comparison to other stars by reason of its nearness to us, and also because of the obvious effect it has on moist things.

Reply Obj. 4: As philosophers prove and Dionysius also asserts, not only the moon, but all bodies, both higher and lower, are illuminated by the sun. Even so, this does not prevent other bodies from being called “luminaries.” For, although the light of the sun, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:698).) is received differently in different bodies according to their proportion, certain bodies receive the aforementioned light as giving off light and emitting rays, such as the moon and the stars. Such bodies can be called “luminaries” and “vessels of light.” But others receive light, though not as emitting rays from themselves, and this in two ways: either in their depth, as in the case of air, or on their surface, as in the case of opaque bodies. Neither of these can be called a “luminary.”

Reply Obj. 5: Even though the moon appears during the day, its light does not predominate in the day because of the presence of a greater light. Thus, it is said to rule the night, not the day.

Reply Obj. 6: One thing can be said to be for the sake of another in two ways. Either it is because it is ordered to it as to its proper and principal end, and in this way, it is unfitting to say that something exists on account of something baser than itself—as if we were to say that the moon and stars exist on account of night owls and bats—since the end is more important than what is directed toward the end. Or, in another way, it can be said that something exists for the sake of another when some benefit comes to the latter from the former. In this way, a king could be said to exist for the sake of a peasant, since the king’s rule brings peace to the peasant. This is how we should understand what is said in the text. (Genesis 1:14; Sent. II, 14.10(80)‒11(81).) For all the benefits that come from the heavenly bodies to the lower are provided for by God, who established those bodies.

Article 2

Whether heavenly bodies have an effect on lower bodies

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.115.3; SCG III.82; On Truth, q. 5, a. 9; Compendium theologiae, ch. 127.) It seems that heavenly bodies do not have an effect on lower bodies.

Obj. 1: First, this is because of what the text says, (Sent. II, 14.11; cf. Glossa ordinaria at Genesis 1:14, 1.18–19 (PL 113:87).) that bodies of this sort were made to exist as signs. But sign is contradistinguished from cause. Therefore, it seems that they are not the causes of things that occur in lower bodies.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 7 (PG 94:894).) but we say that they, namely, the heavenly bodies, are not the cause of the generation of things that are generated, nor are they the cause of the corruption of things that are corrupted. But generation and corruption pertain to bodily things. Therefore, it seems that they do not have an effect on bodily things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the necessity of the effect follows from the necessity of the cause, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015b10.) But the motion of the heavenly bodies and their dispositions pertain to necessary and invariable things, as Dionysius also says in his 7th Letter to Polycarp. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistles 7, “To Polycarp” (PG 3:1079).) Therefore, if the alterations and motions of lower bodies were caused by heavenly bodies, all things in lower bodies would have to occur out of necessity. But this appears to be false. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every agent brings about something like itself. But higher bodies are not affected by the qualities of lower bodies, namely, heat and cold, as the Philosopher proves. Therefore, it seems they cannot be the cause of motions and alterations with regard to these forms.

Obj. 5: One might say that they cause heat through motion and through the nature of light.

On the contrary, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But all the heavenly bodies are in agreement in the motions and light they possess. Therefore, they would all have the same effect. But this is contrary to all those who posit the causality of heavenly bodies on the lower, since some of them, such as the sun, are said to be hot in their effect while others, such as Saturn and the moon, are cold.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, since the mover and the moved must be together, as well as the agent and the patient, as is proved in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b20–30.) an action cannot reach from one extreme to another except through making an impression in the middle. But between the higher stars and lower bodies there are the spheres of the planets in the middle. Therefore, since these spheres do not receive any impression of heat or cold, it does not seem that an impression is made on lower bodies, at least by the higher stars, nor even by any of the planets, except perhaps by the moon.

On the contrary, Augustine says, it is not altogether absurd to say that certain astral influences have some power to cause differences in bodies alone. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 6 (CCSL 48; PL 41:146).) Dionysius also says, treating of the solar ray, that it confers generation on visible bodies and moves even to life, which it grows, nourishes, and perfects. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:699).)

Also, the senses themselves show this, especially with regard to the effect of the sun and moon.

I answer that there were many errors concerning this question.

Some ancient natural philosophers, not understanding that there is any substance besides bodies, posited that the most noble things among bodies are also the most noble among beings. Hence they also said natural science is the first of the sciences, as it says in the Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005a32.) For this reason they referred to the heavenly bodies as gods, believing as well that they were animated, since they said that the soul itself is a body, as is clear in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 405a4–b30.) Thus, it followed that heavenly bodies had the first influence on lower bodies of themselves and not from another. This was what led them into idolatry. But this position is shown to be erroneous, not only through the holy Scriptures, but also through the arguments of philosophers who proved that intellectual substances are first. And they show that one of these, namely, God, is the first cause of all things.

Another position is that of some philosophers who, though they concede with us that heavenly bodies are not the first causes of lower bodies but rather have their being and power of acting from another, nevertheless say that the being of lower bodies proceeds from God by the mediation of the heavenly bodies. Hence Avicenna even says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, ch. 4; tract. 9, ch. 4.) that the matter of the elements is caused by the substance of heaven. He does this in order to show that all things have proceeded from God in order: souls by the mediation of intelligences, bodily things by the mediation of spiritual things, and corruptible things by the mediation of incorruptible things. But this position is erroneous and contrary to the faith, for the faith asserts that God alone is the Creator of matter and of all things, as has been said above. (Above: d. 1, q. 1, a. 3.)

The position of others is that they have no effect whatsoever on bodies. But this is altogether contrary to the senses and the authorities of the saints.

Thus, we must say otherwise, that, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, ch. 4.) there are two kinds of agent: a divine agent, which gives being, and a natural agent, which transmutes. Therefore, I say that the first mode of action belongs to God alone, but that the second mode can also belong to others. This is how we must say that heavenly bodies cause generation and corruption in lower bodies, inasmuch as their motion is the cause of all lower changes. But since every motion is an act of mover and moved, the power of the mover and the power of the movable must remain in the motion. Hence from the movable thing itself, which is a body, the motion has the power of moving lower bodies with regard to bodily dispositions. But on the part of the mover, which is a spiritual substance, whatever it may be, the motion has the power of moving things to substantial forms, in accord with which there is specific being, which is called “divine being.” But the power of the spiritual substance remains in the motion of a heavenly body in the way that the power of the mover remains in the instrument. In this way, all natural forms derive from the forms that are without matter, as Boethius says, (Boethius, De Trinitate, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) and also the Commentator, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 18, 51.) just as the forms of artifacts derive from the artisan.

Reply Obj. 1: It occurs sometimes that the same thing is both sign and cause: cause inasmuch as it works to produce the effect, and sign inasmuch as it leads to knowledge of the effect by being represented to the senses. Hence the fact that they are called “signs” does not exclude their causality, though Scripture does pass over this in silence in order to avoid giving an occasion for idolatry, to which the men of that time were prone.

Reply Obj. 2: Damascene intends to deny to heavenly bodies the causality that led to idolatry, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: The impression of an agent is only received in something after the mode of the receiver. Because lower nature is such as can be impeded and can fail in the minority of cases, the impressions of heavenly bodies are not received in lower bodies by necessity in such a way that things always come to pass in accord with them, but rather such that this happens in the majority of cases, as is expressly related by the Philosopher at the end of On Sleep and Sleeplessness. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 2, 463b23–33.)

Reply Obj. 4: Things that share in the same form are alike. But it happens that certain things do not participate in that form in a uniform manner, since what is in one deficiently is in another more eminently. And we must find this, according to Dionysius, in all essential causes. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:699).) Thus, he says that the sun uniformly has in advance within itself all the things that are caused in other things separately by its action. In accord with this I say that heat, cold, and things of this sort are found in heavenly bodies in a nobler manner than in the elements, not that they are affected or named by these qualities, but rather that they are in them as in an active power. Such likeness is sufficient for the action of an agent that does not act univocally.

Reply Obj. 5: As far as light itself is concerned, it always produces heat, even the light of the moon. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Parts of Animals (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 4.5, 680a30–35.) that the nights of the full moon are hotter. But besides the nature of light that is common to all heavenly bodies, any given star has a determinate power following on its species, by reason of which its light and motion has the property either of cooling or of making moist and so forth, just as besides common motion, which is diurnal motion, any given sphere also has its own proper motion.

Reply Obj. 6: In the case of any agent that has location, its action is received in the middle before it is received in the term, yet it need not be received in both in the same manner. Rather, it is received in accord with what the disposition of each requires. The Commentator, on the Physics 8, (It is actually Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 7, comm. 11.) gives the example of a fish caught in a net: it stuns one’s hand without stunning the net, which is not capable of being stunned, and yet in a certain manner the net is altered by the power of the fish. So, too, the powers of the higher stars must be received in the middle spheres prior to being received in the lower bodies, though they do not have the same effects on each.

Article 3

Whether higher bodies have causality over the motions of free will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5; ST I.115.4; II-II.95.5; SCG III.84–87; On Truth, q. 5, a. 10; Compendium theologiae, cc. 127–28; Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 4; Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 6, lect. 3; Commentary on Matthew, ch. 2, lect. 1.) It seems that higher bodies have causality even over the motions of free will.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius says, treating of the heavenly bodies, they determine, number, order, and contain the things that are in time. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:698).) But the works that proceed from free will are in time. Therefore, they are determined and ordered by the power of the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is not always the same must be traced back to a cause that is always the same. For contingent things proceed from necessary things, and non-uniform from uniform things. But the acts flowing from free will are variable above all. Therefore, they must be traced back to the heavenly motions as to uniform causes.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as mover and movable relate to another mover and movable, so also motion relates to motion. But the mover of a heavenly body is more noble than the mover of the human body and able to make an impression on it. Likewise, a heavenly body can make an impression on a human body. Therefore, too, heavenly motion is in a way the cause of human works that flow from free will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one can gain foreknowledge of future events only from things in which these future events exist in a way as in their causes. This is true whether those causes are known in themselves or are known through certain effects, which are called “signs” of them and, consequently, of their other effects. But foreknowledge of human works flowing from free will is gained from heavenly motions, as is clear in the case of astrologers, who predict many things concerning them by divination. Therefore, it seems that heavenly bodies have causality over what depends on free will.

On the contrary, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a19.) the agent must be superior to the patient. But a heavenly body is greatly inferior to the rational soul in the order of beings. Therefore, it cannot act on it in such a manner as to cause one of its acts.

Furthermore, as the Philosopher proves in Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1114b16–25, and Great Ethics (Magna Moralia) 1.9, 1187a5–30 (the authenticity of the Great Ethics is disputed).) to be good or wicked lies within us. But we become good or wicked through our acts. Therefore, to perform or not perform our actions lies within us. Therefore, they are not caused by a power or impression of a heavenly power.

I answer that, since the proper activity of a thing follows its nature, only that which in a way brings the nature into being can be a cause of its activity. Thus, the acts proceeding from the freedom of the will, by virtue of the fact that they are voluntary and within our power, are properly called “human” acts. They cannot be directly traced back to a cause that is not the cause of the soul itself. Thus, in accord with the different positions on the causality of the rational soul, different opinions on human works followed.

For some ancient philosophers said that the senses and the intellect are the same insomuch as a sense is transmuted due to the transmutation of the body, and so, too, the intellect would be transmuted, as the Philosopher relates of Democritus. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.3, 406b16–25; Metaphysics 4.5, 1009b12–20.) Since all bodily powers depending on the body are traced back to the powers of the first bodies as to their causes, it followed that the heavenly bodies would directly have causality over the rational soul and, consequently, over its activities. Hence they posited that, as a man was based on the disposition that was his lot at birth according to the impression of the higher bodies, so did the end seem to him. And the choices of men were differentiated on this basis, with some choosing this and others choosing that. But this position has been rejected by philosophers both with regard to the cause, since they proved that the intellect is not a bodily power and its proper act is not carried out by a bodily organ, and also with regard to that which follows, since they showed that a good or bad choice is in our power. Otherwise, punishments or rewards would be given unjustly. This has likewise been condemned by the saints as contrary to the faith.

But other philosophers, holding that the intellect differs from the senses in the fact that it does not depend on the body and does not carry out its act by a bodily organ, said that no bodily power has causality over the human intellect. Rather, it is altogether from without. Thus, they also said that human choice does not depend on the heavenly bodies except incidentally, that is, inasmuch as from the disposition of the body that a heavenly impression leaves, the soul is in a way inclined to follow the affections of the body after the manner in which bodily passions incline the reason and sometimes lead it. But even so, because they posit that human souls are caused by God by the mediation of the intelligences, they posit that the movers of the spheres cause the very motions of the will apart from the order of motion, as Avicenna says at the end of his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 10, ch. 1.) stating that the various works of the will are traced back to the uniform conceptions of the heavenly movers as to their cause. Yet, they do not posit that freedom of choice is taken away, since the impression is received after the mode of the receiver. But this position, too, is false and contrary to the faith, since the faith asserts that human souls are created immediately by God.

Hence we are left with the conclusion that there is no cause, speaking essentially, of human choice—neither a heavenly body, nor the heavenly body’s soul, nor the intelligence that moves it—but God alone, who works all things in all.

Reply Obj. 1: Acts of free will are only incidentally temporal, namely inasmuch as they have an ordering toward bodily powers, from which the reason receives knowledge and the will is inclined by their passions.

Reply Obj. 2: The motion of wills is traced back to a single uniform cause. But this cause is not the heavenly motion or any created power, but rather the divine will itself.

Reply Obj. 3: Of acts that depend on free will, some consist in choice alone, such as interior acts. Heavenly bodies do not have causality over these—except, perhaps, by way of disposition, insofar as from the quality of the body the soul is inclined to this or that choice. Even if it were posited that they would be from the impression of higher movers, this would be apart from the order of motion. Still, this is false, unless we say that God immediately moves the heavens. But other motions are completed through bodily organs, such as walking and things of this sort. There is no doubt that the motions of heavenly bodies have causality over these acts, not on the side of their having been commanded by the will, but rather according as they consist of the body’s activity, since every motion of lower things is traced back to higher motions as to its causes.

Reply Obj. 4: As has been said, (Above: resp; d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, ad sed contra 5.) the body’s makeup greatly inclines the soul to its choice. Hence even physicians judge someone to be envious, sad, lascivious, or some such thing. Their judgments are frequently true, because in many cases reason succumbs to the passions and is led by them, although not necessarily, since reason has command over the passions. In this way, too, one can foreknow certain things about human works from the motions of the heavenly bodies, since there is no doubt that the dispositions of the human body follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies. Yet it is not safe to be too intent on such predictions, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 17 (CSEL 28.1:59; PL 34:278).) since frequently astronomers make true predictions concerning future things, not so much from heavenly signs as from the occult influence of a demon, which human minds sometimes undergo even unknowingly. And so with divinations of this sort, a pact is in a certain way entered into.

Question 2

The work of the fifth and sixth days

Next we raise the question of the production of animals, which pertains to the fifth and sixth days. Concerning this, two questions are asked:

first, concerning their matter;

second, concerning the places that are said to be adorned with them.

Article 1

Whether some animals took their matter from the waters and some from the earth

To the first we proceed as follows. What is said, that some animals took their matter from the waters and some from the earth, seems to be false.

Obj. 1: For the body of any animal must be sensible. But nothing is sensitive without heat, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1, 425a3.) Therefore, fire, which is the fount of heat, should be especially predominant in the bodies of animals.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among all lower bodies, the bodies of animals are the most noble. This is clear from the fact that they share in the most noble perfection, namely, the soul. Since, therefore, rarer bodies, namely, fire and air, are more noble, as partaking more of species and less of matter, it seems that the bodies of animals should consist especially of them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.6, 383a25–35.) things that are condensed from heat consist more of earth, while those that are condensed from cold consist more of water. But the bodies of all animals are thickened by heat that distributes and converts humors into the members. Therefore, there does not seem to be an animal in which water predominates.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to each mixed body a place is due according to the element that predominates in it, as is said in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 269a29.) But the place of birds is the air, as is said in the text. (Genesis 1:20; Sent. II, 15.1(82).1.) Therefore, it seems that not water but air especially predominates in birds.

On the contrary, it says in the text *(Genesis 1:20: *let the waters bring forth the crawling creature . . .) that fish and birds are produced from water while the other animals are produced from earth.

I answer that an element’s predominance in a body can be understood in two ways: either according to its genus, or with regard to that which is proper to the body in the genus. For although a certain constitution is appointed for a genus, this is not as a grade that does not admit of division, but rather with a certain latitude such that we can find limits beyond which the constitution of the genus is not preserved. But within those limits there is much diversity, insofar as one or the other of the limits is approached. For example, the constitution due to the human body is a very moderate constitution. Yet, even so, there are many grades of temperament, in accord with which some are called “melancholic,” others “choleric,” and so forth, with respect to their nearness to the limits of the constitution of the human species either in heat or in cold. Still, there is a grade of heat or cold that the human constitution does not cross.

Therefore, I say that if we are speaking of the predominant element in the body of an animal with regard to the constitution following on the genus, then the grosser lower elements must exceed the more subtle elements in quantity. Yet the more subtle elements exceed them in power, namely, with respect to cold and hot, in which life consists, as these are principal qualities of fire and air. For since the bodies of animals should be more moderate than others, as being further removed from contraries and more likened to the nature of a heavenly body by equality of constitution, they share in a perfection more like the power that moves the heavens. The lower elements, which are less active due to the fact that they partake more of matter and less of form, must exceed the more subtle in quantity, so that their abundance of quantity might make up for their lack of power. But even so, the constitution in which the animal nature is preserved has many differences. Insofar as it approaches one extreme or the other, this or that element is said to predominate in a thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Fire predominates in a sensitive body with respect to power, because heat is the instrument of the soul. Yet it cannot be that fire predominates with respect to quantity of matter because, since it is the most active, it would consume the other elements. Thus, the body of an animal is not said to be formed materially from fire.

Reply Obj. 2: In any genus, the more noble something is, the more it approaches what is most noble in the genus. Thus, speaking simply, with respect to its ultimate perfection, a body of equal constitution in which grosser bodies exceed others in quantity is more noble than a body of fire or air, since nothing is more like a heavenly body. But nothing prevents more subtle bodies from being more noble with regard to other bodily powers, such as hot, cold, and things of this sort.

Reply Obj. 3: In the bodies of all animals, earth predominates in quantity simply, by the fact that water continues, so to speak, the parts of earth, so that they mix together rather than crumbling apart. But those animals that partake more of water than other animals are said to consist of water, after considering their proper constitution, by comparison to the constitution due to the common genus. In accord with this, fish are said to be of water as regards what is more gross in it, whereas birds are said to be of water as regards what is more subtle in it, which is released as vapor, like a mean between air and water. For this reason birds are lifted up to the air and fish are consigned to the sea.

Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher is speaking of natural place, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 269a29.) which is the term of natural motion, and is where a body is naturally at rest. But in this way, air is not the place of birds, since they rest not in air, but on the earth, though it is their place with respect to animal motion, whose principle is not heaviness but lightness.

Article 2

Whether the adornment of the elements is fittingly described with reference to three genera

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the adornment of three elements with reference to the three genera of animals is unfittingly described.

Obj. 1: For fire is more chief among the elements, but no adornment is assigned to it. Therefore, it seems that the adornment of the elements is not adequately set out.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the natural place is the place of rest. But birds do not rest in the air, as has been said. (Above: a. 1, ad 4.) Therefore, it seems that the air is not adorned with birds.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, reptile is a genus of terrestrial animal. But there are different adornments for different elements. Therefore, it seems unfitting that reptiles are mentioned in the adornment of water.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to a more noble body, a more noble place is due. But animals that can walk are more noble than birds or fish, since they are more complete, as their generation and the arrangement of their members shows. Therefore, since air and water are more noble elements than earth, it seems unfitting that birds and fish are assigned to water while animals that can walk are assigned to earth.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, The History of Animals 1.1, 487a15–28.) some animals are a mean between terrestrial and aquatic and spend time in both realms. But no mention was made of these. Therefore, it seems that the adornment of the elements is insufficiently described by reference to animals.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, man is at a greater distance from animals that can walk than a walking animal is from one that flies, since he is in another rank of beings, namely, the rational, whereas all brutes are reckoned in a single rank of beings, namely, the sensible. But walking and flying animals were not produced on the same day. Therefore, it seems that neither should man have been made on the same day as other animals.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, things that are more like each other are also more continuous with each other. But, as Avicenna says, the human body is the most like the heavenly bodies. Therefore, it seems that the human body should have been formed immediately after the adornment of the heavens, before the other animals.

I answer that animals are only called the “adornments of the elements” when they are related to the elements as the thing located to its place. But a body relates to its place through motion and rest. Now an animal has two kinds of motion. One follows on the nature of its body in accord with the power of the element that dominates in it. The other follows on apprehension and appetite, and this is the motion proper to an animal as animal. Thus, an animal pertains to the adornment of that element in which it has proper animal motion, not to that to which it is borne by a motion following on the nature of its body. For a motion of this sort does not follow on an animal precisely as an animal, but rather as composed of what is heavy and of what is light. Thus, animals that can walk are said to pertain to the adornment of the earth, since they have their animal motion on it. By the same reasoning, animals that can swim pertain to the adornment of the water, and animals that can fly pertain to the adornment of the air.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though some combined things can be preserved for a time in fire without harm, still there is no thing that is not eventually consumed by fire if it remains in it long enough, as Galen says in On the Powers of Simple Remedies. Thus, it is not possible for an animal to live in fire, as is said in On the Properties of the Elements, unless perhaps for a short time, as is said of the salamander. (In fact, Aristotle asserts that some animals do live in fire: Aristotle, The History of Animals 5.19, 552b15. Regarding the work On the Properties of the Elements, Nicolaï writes that “it exists under the Philosopher’s name in the old Latin editions, but it is wholly spurious, as Conrad Gessner notes in his Bibliotecha [1545], and the facts themselves testify; hence, the claim is contradicted by the citations which we have set down from the Philosopher.” The work On the Properties of the Elements is now thought to be a ninth- or tenth-century Arabic composition.)

Reply Obj. 2: The soul of a bird in animal motion is moving the body contrary to the nature of the body. Thus, such motion is with effort and pain, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1, 284a15.) Thus, the rest by which it is aided in this effort must be in a place befitting the nature of the body. Yet this fact does not establish that the earth is the proper place of a bird precisely as an animal.

Reply Obj. 3: Some genera of reptiles are terrestrial, some aquatic. Thus, the reptile is mentioned with both. For a “reptile” is so called because it drags itself along. But this occurs in many ways. For some drag themselves by the power of their bellies, such as serpents; some by force of certain rings, such as ringed animals; some by force of their mouth, such as certain worms who by affixing their mouth to the earth drag their whole body behind themselves. Finally, some move themselves by force of fins, such as fish. And in a general way every animal whose body is not much raised up from the ground by instruments of motion seems to be called a reptile.

Reply Obj. 4: A more noble place is due to more noble animals by comparison to the animals themselves. Now even though air is more noble than earth in its nature, earth, inasmuch as it agrees with the dispositions of animals, is more noble than water or air, since in it nourishment for animals is more abundant, and as a place it agrees more with equality of constitution.

Reply Obj. 5: The middle animals are reckoned with that of the extremes in which they have a greater share. For an animal cannot be found that does not more strongly resemble the nature of one or the other.

Reply Obj. 6: The property of man by which he is set over other animals is not anything bodily or a bodily form, but rather the intellect. But with regard to the nature of his body, it is not unfitting that he agree more with some animals than some animals do with others with respect to matter. For animals are appointed to different days or to the same day in accord with the matter from which their body is produced, whereas they are attributed to different elements as their adornment in accord with their different motions, which are also accomplished via bodily organs.

Reply Obj. 7: In the process of generation the more perfect and similar to the agent something is, the later in time it is, though by nature it is prior. Thus, since man is the most perfect of animals, he should have been made last among animals and not immediately after the heavenly bodies, which are not ordered together with the lower bodies with respect to the process of generation, since they do not have a matter in common with them.

Question 3

The seventh day

Next the question is asked about the things pertaining to the seventh day. Concerning this there are three questions:

first, concerning the consummation of the divine works;

second, concerning God’s rest;

third, concerning the sanctification of the seventh day.

Article 1

Whether God completed his work on the seventh day

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.73.1–2; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 4, lect. 1.) It seems that God did not consummate his work on the seventh day.

Obj. 1: For a perfect number befits the consummation of the divine works. But the number six is perfect, not seven. Therefore, God should have consummated his work on the sixth day, not the seventh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, for a work to be consummated means that a perfection is added to the work. But perfection can accrue to a thing worked only by the act of the worker. Therefore, since God rested on the seventh day, as Scripture says, it does not seem that he consummated his work on that day.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, so long as an artisan does not cease from his work, he does not consummate his work. But God never ceases from his activity, since his activity is his essence, which is eternal. Therefore, God did not consummate his work on the seventh day.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna (attributed), De intelligentiis, ch. 4.) every agent that does not act through motion has an action in the effect not only for as long as it is coming to be, but for as long as it continues in being, since it is not only the cause of its coming to be, but of its being. But God is the cause of a thing, not acting through motion, since he does not require matter from which to act, which would have to be there as the subject of motion. Therefore, it seems that, for as long as the world endures, God infuses being into the world by his action. Thus, it seems that he did not cease from work on the seventh day. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, God is not only the maker of things, but also their preserver. But it cannot be said that he preserves except through some action on things. Therefore, it seems that for as long as things are preserved in being, God works on things. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the seventh day is a certain created thing. But everything created comes from the divine activity, and he did not make the seventh day prior to when it was, since the being of successive things is in coming-to-be. Therefore, it seems that he made a new creation on the seventh day. Thus, he did not cease from all work. Hence, the same follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 17, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 3.11, 761a12–763b15.) new species of animals frequently appear that never appeared before, as is clear in those that are generated by putrefaction. Therefore, it seems that God did not even cease from establishing new species on the seventh day. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, there are some things in which only the divine power works, as in the creation of souls, in the infusion of grace, and the working of miracles. Therefore, it seems that he did not cease at that time from working and establishing new creatures. Therefore, and so on.

On the contrary, Genesis 2:2 says that God consummated his work on the seventh day.

Furthermore, in the perfection of any given day’s work the Holy Spirit is signified, when it says: God saw that it was good, as Augustine says in On Genesis 1. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 6 (CSEL 28.1:10; PL 34:251).) But the number seven is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who is said to have a seven-fold gift. Therefore, the consummation of the works is fittingly ascribed to the seventh day.

I answer that, as the Master says in the text, (Sent. II, 15.8(89).2.) in this matter our translation disagrees with the other one on which Augustine bases his explanation. For in our translation the consummation of works is ascribed to the seventh day, while in the other it is ascribed to the sixth day. But both convey truth, whether the seventh day is understood to follow the other six by succession of time, as other saints would have it, or the seven days are posited to be one day—the angelic knowledge—presented by way of a seven-fold correspondence to things, as is Augustine’s opinion. For, speaking on the basis of Augustine’s position, we must distinguish two perfections in a thing.

One is the perfection of totality, which a thing has by virtue of the fact that it has been integrated from all its essential parts. Such perfection in the case of the world belongs to the sixth day. For after the first six days nothing created was added to the world that was not in some way among the works of the six days, as will be clear.

But the other perfection in a thing is that which it has by reason of its end, which is its ultimate perfection. Such perfection in the case of the world is due to the seventh day, on which from all his works, God rested in himself as in the end.

On the other hand, following other saints, we must again distinguish two perfections.

One is primary perfection, namely, that which a thing has with respect to its being. This perfection in the case of the world was completed on the sixth day, since no part of the world was later added that did not in some way come before in the first six days.

The other is secondary perfection, namely, the thing’s activity, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417a–b15.) Such perfection in the case of the world was on the seventh day. For from that time, with the cessation of the activity by which God established nature, the activity of propagation in the whole universe began, insofar as other things are produced from the natures already created. This is the working in all things that God even now performs: my Father is working still, and I am working (John 5:17).

Reply Obj. 1: The number six is called “perfect” by reason of its parts, since when all its proper divisors are added together, this comes up to the number itself. Thus, the perfection of six agrees with that perfection of the world that consists in the totality of parts with regard to primary being. Just as the proper divisors of six, namely, one, two, and three, succeed one another in order and continuously without the interposition of another number, so also in the production of the parts of the universe, order was preserved such that after the production of the first part the production of the second part was related at once, and so forth up to the sixth.

Reply Obj. 2: The consummation of works is understood with reference to the aspect of perfection conferred on things that is their activity itself, namely, that through which nature is propagated. But this activity is from God as well as from the power of the created thing. Thus, God is said to have consummated the work by whose power nature was moved to proceed into its own activity. Even so, it is not that something new is effected in nature, since the activity follows from the power of nature previously conferred on things. But the consummation that is on the part of the end is not with respect to anything added in the thing.

Reply Obj. 3: God is not said to cease from working except from the perspective of the subsequent effect. For he does not act by means of some activity, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, that is not his essence: his willing is his making, and his willing is his being. Even so, from an eternal activity the effect only follows according to the determination of his will, as was said before. (Above: d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 12.) Hence he is said to begin to work or to cease from working from the perspective of the effect.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as the influence of the sun by way of irradiation always exists, for as long as the air is illuminated, such that it can be said that the sun always produces luminosity in the air, so also the divine goodness is always infusing being into things, not different beings, but one and the same. Even so, we do not say that things are always coming to be or always being created or always being established. Rather, we say this of the time when they first received being. Thus, it is said that he ceases to create or make the world.

Reply Obj. 5: The preservation of things in being is nothing other than the infusion of a thing’s being, as we have said, namely, that God causes and brings about the thing’s being for as long as the thing exists. Nor is such a preservation incompatible with the aforementioned cessation, since the being of the thing follows on its essential principles, just as activity follows on power.

Reply Obj. 6: That seventh day had come before, at least by way of likeness, in the first six days. Moreover, the being of a day is caused by natural principles previously conferred on nature, since motion is the cause of time.

Reply Obj. 7: Those new species are produced by the power of the heavens, which takes the place of the formative power in animals generated by putrefaction. Thus, these species were produced in the works of the six days in their principles, namely, in matter and in seedlike principles, even as other things are produced through the activity of nature.

Reply Obj. 8: God does nothing in a created thing that did not in some way precede in the first days, though in different ways. For some were in the works of the six days as in active and material principles and after a likeness of species, such as things that are generated from things like themselves in nature. But others were in the works of the six days as in active and material principles, but not after a likeness of species, such as certain animals generated from putrefaction. Still others were in these works as from disposing non-active principles and after a likeness of species, such as the rational soul. Finally, others were in these works as in the obediential potency alone, such as things that are done by a miracle.

Article 2

Whether God is fittingly said to have rested on the seventh day

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.73.1–2; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 4, lect. 1.) It seems that God is unfittingly said to have rested on the seventh day.

Obj. 1: For opposites naturally come about in the same subject. But rest is opposed to motion. Therefore, since God is not moved—with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change (Jas 1:17)—it seems that neither can he be said to rest.

Obj. 2: One might say that we speak of rest in God not as opposed to motion, but as opposed to effort.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in Books 7 and 10 of the Ethics, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26; 10.4, 1174a20.) activity to which motion is not joined is pleasant by itself and in no way requires effort. For effort in activity is caused by unnatural motion. But God’s activity is altogether without motion, for remaining unmovable, he makes all things to be moved, as Boethius says. (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, poem 9 (CCSL 94; PL 63:758).) Therefore, the fact that he has created things entails no effort for him. Therefore, neither does he have any rest, which is opposed to effort.

Obj. 3: One might say that God rested inasmuch as he makes us to rest in him, even as he is said to know something when he makes us know it, as in the case where he says to Abraham: now I know that you fear God (Gen 22:12).

On the contrary, the rest of the seventh day is distinguished over and against the work of the six days. But during those six days God is said to have made because he himself made, not because he made us make. Therefore, he himself also rested on the seventh day and did not just make us rest.

Obj. 4: One might say that God is said to have rested as the will rests in the end.

On the contrary, just as the body’s rest is opposed to its motion, so also the will’s rest is opposed to its motion such that both are said of the will by way of likeness. But there can only be a motion of the will insofar as it proceeds from what is directed toward the end to the end itself. Therefore, since such motion does not befit God, who does not arrive at knowledge or love of himself from other things, it seems that neither can rest of the will befit him.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, things that are eternal are not fittingly enumerated among things that began in time. But the rest of the divine will in its end is eternal. Therefore, the day of the divine rest is unfittingly enumerated together with the days of the creation of things that began in time.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the divine will’s end is not something other than God. So, if on account of his will he is understood as resting in the end, it seems that he is unfittingly said to have rested on the seventh day, since the seventh day is a created thing.

Obj. 7: One might say that he did not rest on the seventh day as in the object of rest, but rather as in the time of rest.

On the contrary, that which is eternal is not in time, but above time. But the rest of the divine will is eternal. Therefore, it is not on the seventh day as in time.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as God’s rest by which he rests in himself does not have an end, so also it does not have a beginning. But just as evening is the end of a day, so also morning is its beginning. Therefore, if “rest” is taken in the aforementioned way, the seventh day should not have a morning just as it does not have an evening. Therefore, since morning is attributed to it, it cannot be said that God rested on the seventh day in the aforementioned manner.

On the contrary, his works are perfect (Deut 32:4). But every artisan rests when his work is perfected. Therefore, after the establishment of nature which took place over the six days, it befits God to rest on the seventh day.

Furthermore, a well disposed man is said to rest in God from his works since he refers his works to God’s goodness. Therefore, since God works all things on account of his goodness, as Augustine says, and as was said in the first Distinction, (Above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.) it seems that it befits him to rest in himself from the things he made.

I answer that rest, properly speaking, is opposed to motion. Now because motion causes effort in our activities, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1, 284a19.) rest as a consequence has come to be opposed to effort. From these two meanings of rest, two others are taken. For because motion is joined to our activities, the practice of calling every activity “motion,” though improperly, came into use. Accordingly, all cessation from any sort of activity is called “rest,” and this meaning is drawn from the first. But because nothing exerts effort except from the fact that it is at a distance from the perfection of its proper nature, as is clear in violent motions, consequently a thing is said to rest in that in which it finds sufficiency. And this is how the will rests in its last end. This meaning of rest is drawn from the second.

Therefore, it is obvious that rest cannot be attributed to God with regard to the first or second meaning, but it can be with regard to the third or fourth.

But with regard to the third, it should be known that, as is clear from the preceding article, God is not said to cease from activity as if the very activity by which he works would come to an end, since his activity is his essence. Rather, this is said by reason of the effect, since by an eternal activity he brings it about that an effect exists in time. Even so, from the perspective of the effect, his activity is not said to cease on the seventh day in such a way that he did nothing in things afterwards, or at least on the seventh day. For if his activity in a created thing were to cease even for a moment, the created thing would cease to exist, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 12 (CSEL 28.1:109; PL 34:304).) Rather, he is said to have ceased from work on the seventh day because from the seventh day onward he did not make a new created thing that did not in some way precede in the works of the six days, as has been said above. (Above: a. 1.)

But with regard to the fourth, it should be noted that the rest of the divine will in its end can be taken in two ways. Either it is taken absolutely, as finding sufficiency in itself, and in this way, the rest is eternal. Or in another way it can be understood in relation to a thing created, insofar as the thing created is pleasing to God—not that he needs it, as if he found in it the sufficiency of his beatitude, but rather that, ordering it to himself, he finds sufficiency in himself. In this way, God is properly said to rest from the things he created. This only makes sense when things are already created, which is after the course of the six days.

Thus, God’s rest, according to the last two ways of understanding it, is fittingly ascribed to the seventh day.

Reply Obj. 1–2: We concede the first and second objection. For what we attribute to God is not the rest opposed to motion or effort.

Reply Obj. 3: We likewise concede the third objection. For God is not only said to have rested on the seventh day in that way, but, as has been said, (Resp.) in other ways.

Reply Obj. 4: The motion of the divine will is spoken of metaphorically, not from the will’s obtaining its end through any means, but rather because it orders to itself the things that are from it.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though God rested in himself from eternity, he did not rest in himself from the things he created. Rather, he only rested in this way, once created things had already been created.

Reply Obj. 6: The seventh day is in no way set down as the object of rest. Rather, either God is said, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 35 (CSEL 28.1:368; PL 34:320).) to have rested on the seventh day inasmuch as he manifested to the angels his proper rest by which he rests in himself from the things he created, and he calls the knowledge of this rest a day. Or, according to other saints, the seventh day signifies a certain time, not in such a way that the divine rest is measured by time, but rather because it is together with time, which is how temporal words are said of God.

Reply Obj. 7: Hence the reply to the seventh objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 8: Even though God’s rest does not have a beginning, the rest of a creature in God, as receiving stability in him, does have a beginning, though not an end. For no matter how a created thing is changed, it never falls into non-being simply, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 18 (CSEL 28.1:118; PL 34:309).)

Or we may say otherwise that even the very rest by which God rests does have, in a certain way, a beginning, not insofar as he rests in himself absolutely, but insofar as he rests in himself from the things he created by not needing them. This does not have an end, since he will never need them. And this is why the seventh day has a morning, but not an evening.

Article 3

Whether God should have sanctified the seventh day above the others

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.73.3.) It seems that God should not have sanctified the seventh day above the others.

Obj. 1: For activity is more noble than idleness, as is said in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1180a15.) Hence happiness consists not in idleness, but in activity. But God was active for six days, whereas he ceased from work on the seventh day. Therefore, he should have sanctified the sixth day rather than the seventh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sanctification and blessing appropriately correspond to goodness. But the good is communicative of itself, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) Therefore, since God communicated his goodness on the six days by bringing things into being, it seems that sanctification befits these same six days more than the seventh.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, ch. 32.) the observance of the Sabbath was instituted in the law so that the finite age of the world would remain firmly in the people’s faith, from which is drawn the easiest proof of the existence of God, his omnipotence, and things of this sort. But according to the Apostle (Rom 1:20), we arrive at the invisible things of God from the things that have been made. Therefore, the six days on which created things were made should have been sanctified rather than the seventh day.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to one who loses nothing in working something externally, rest is not more welcome than activity. But God loses nothing in making created things. For by making he experiences no effort, as has been said. (Above: a. 2, obj. 2.) Nor is his strength sapped so that it does not remain capable of infinite things. Nor is his intellect distracted so that it does not continue in perfect contemplation of itself. Therefore, he should not have sanctified the day of rest any more than he sanctified the days on which he worked.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the activity by which God works in establishing nature points to the divine power more than that by which he works in nature’s working for the propagation of nature. But on the first six days God worked by establishing nature without the mediation of anything. However, on the seventh day and onward he worked by preserving and moving nature in the motions and principles of nature. Therefore, the course of the six days manifests the divine power more than the seventh day, and, thus, it should have been sanctified instead.

On the contrary, sanctification and blessing are due to goodness. But the good, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 3, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996b12.) is spoken of by reason of the end. Therefore, since the perfection of things that is from their order toward the end is due to the seventh day, that day should have been sanctified and blessed above the others.

Furthermore, the contemplative life is preferred over the active life. Hence: Mary has chosen the best part (Luke 10:42), (RSV reads good portion instead of best part.) which signifies the contemplative life. But the course of the six days is attributed to the action by which God produced things, while the seventh is attributed to the rest of divine contemplation, by which God enjoys himself. Therefore, sanctification and blessing are especially due to the seventh day.

I answer that two things are attributed to the seventh day: the consummation of works and the rest of the worker.

With regard to the first, blessing is due to the seventh day. For, according to Gregory, the blessing of God signifies the conferral and multiplication of his gifts. But the multiplication of created things presupposes two kinds of perfection in things. One is that by which the universe is perfect as consisting of all its essential parts. Hence the Philosopher says in the Meteorology 4 (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 380a15.) that each thing is perfect when it can make another of the sort that it is. The other is that by which the universe is perfect from its order toward the end. For the multiplication of creatures through generation is for the sake of their participating as much as they are able in the divine being, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 2. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.1, 731b25–732a1.) For the natural activity of everything created is ordered toward the end. Thus, blessing is due to the seventh day, on which, after the first perfection of the universe, which was completed on the sixth day, the universe was also perfected in its order toward the end.

But with regard to the second, which is the rest of the worker, sanctification is due to the seventh day. For in Sacred Scripture sanctification is sometimes spoken of in virtue of the fact that something is dedicated to the worship of God. For in this way, the tabernacle is said to be sanctified, as well as its vessels and ministers. Thus, too, the seventh day was sanctified, that is, it was dedicated to the worship of God, namely, in such a way that God, who created things, rested not in the things themselves so created as in the end, but rather rested from created things in himself in whom his beatitude consists. Indeed, he is not blessed by virtue of the fact that he made things, but because he does not need things, having sufficiency in himself.

And so, we too should learn to rest as in the end, not in his or our works, but rather to rest from works in God himself, in whom our beatitude consists. For this is why it was established that man, laboring at his proper works for six days, should rest on the seventh day, devoting his time to the worship of God. Now for Christians this rest in God is appointed not for a time, but perpetually, for they are told to pray without ceasing (1 Thess 5:17). Thus, that temporal observance ceased in the New Law.

Reply Obj. 1: The happiness of God does not consist in the activity by which he made created things, but in the activity by which he enjoys himself, having no need of the things created. This activity pertains to the rest of the seventh day.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though God’s goodness is manifested in the fact that he communicated being to things by creation, the perfection of his goodness is shown by the fact that God does not need created things, but rather is sufficient in himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Created things are like the path through which we arrive at knowledge of the Creator. But perfection does not consist in the path, but rather in the end of the path. Hence the day on which created things were created should not be sanctified, but rather the day devoted to rest as in an end.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though God loses nothing by the activity through which he brings things into being, with him it is more excellent that he does not need others, resting in himself, than that he makes other things. Thus, a day of rest is more blessed than a day of creation’s production.

Reply Obj. 5: God, by the same power by which he granted being to things, also preserves them in their proper being. Hence the production of created things does not show the divine power any more than their preservation.

Exposition of the text

‘Beasts of burden, and crawling creatures, and the wild animals.’ (Sent. II, 15.2(83).1, quoting Genesis 1:24.) What a “crawling creature,” or reptile, is has been said earlier. (Above: q. 2, a. 2.) Now, those animals that provide assistance to man, especially by transporting him, such as horses, donkeys, and animals of this sort, are called “beasts of burden.” “Wild animals” are so called on account of cruelty, being savage, such as lions and bears and animals of this sort.

Those . . . were not created with the animals, except potentially and materially. (Sent. II, 15.4(85).1.) So one may understand this both of active potency and of material potency.

‘What could be done by God simultaneously could not be said by man simultaneously.’ (Sent. II, 15.6(87).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 15 (CSEL 28.1:21; PL 34:257).) This seems to amount to nothing. For, granted that he could not have spoken all the words at the same time, he still could have said that the things he related successively were made all at once.

But we should say that he is affirmed as unable to say this, not because he could not have said that they were made all at once simply, but rather because he was unable to say this with fitting pedagogy, in such a way that what was said would be grasped easily by the uneducated, as when geometers in their descriptions draw out a figure line by line, even though these lines constitute the figure all at once.

Another translation has: God completed his work on the sixth day. (Sent. II, 15.8(89).1.) Both translations contain truth, if, as has been said before, (Above: q. 3, a. 1.) we distinguish between two kinds of completion.