D. 7 - Power of the angels

Division of the text

Having determined what pertains to the condition of nature with regard to the good and wicked angels alike, here he subsequently treats of what pertains to their power and strength. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he discusses their power with respect to the activities they have in themselves.

In the second, he discusses their power with respect to the activities they carry out on other things, at it is also by the knowledge and power of these evil spirits that the magical arts are practiced. (Sent. II, 7.6(38).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows their power with respect to the activities of will or free decision.

In the second, he shows their power with respect to the activity of their intellect, at and although the evil angels are so obstinate through wickedness, nevertheless they are not wholly deprived of their acuity of perception. (Sent. II, 7.5(37).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he determines the truth.

Second, he introduces a question.

First, he raises it, at but since the good ones are not able to sin, and the evil ones are not able to will well or to work well, it seems that they no longer have free decision. (Sent. II, 7.2(34).1.)

Second, he settles it, at to this we say. (Sent. II, 7.2(34).2.)

Concerning this he first confirms the truth supposed by the objection, namely, that the good and wicked angels have free will.

Second, he responds to the objection, at and so what Jerome says . . . ought to be taken in reference to the state in which creatures were created. (Sent. II, 7.4(36).2.)

It is also by the knowledge and power of these evil spirits that the magical arts are practiced. (Sent. II, 7.6(38).1.) Here he shows their power in the activities they carry out on matter subject to them. And concerning this he does three things.

First, he sets out the principle that confers this power and its end.

Second, he shows its manner of working, at ‘and it is not to be thought that the matter of visible things serves the transgressing angels at their bidding.’ (Sent. II, 7.7(39).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875).)

Third, he shows an impediment to their using their power, at it is also to be known that the evil angels have the potential to do some things by the fineness of their nature, which they nevertheless cannot do because of the prohibition of God or of the good angels. (Sent. II, 7.10(42).1.)

Concerning the second, he does three things.

First, he rules out two false manners.

Second, he shows the true manner, at ‘in truth, some hidden seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visibly are concealed in the bodily elements of this world.’ (Sent. II, 7.8(40).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875).)

Third, he proposes an example.

First, there is the example in bodily acts, at ‘and just as we do not call parents the creators of men . . . so also it is not right to hold that not only the evil angels, but even the good ones, are creators.’ (Sent. II, 7.8(40).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875).)

Second, there is the example in spiritual acts, at ‘none but God can form our mind by justifying it . . . in the same way, it is God who interiorly works the creation of visible things.’ (Sent. II, 7.9(41).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875).)

Here there are three questions.

The first question concerns the state of free will in the good and wicked angels. (Q. 1.)

The second question concerns the wicked angels’ knowledge. (Q. 2.)

The third question concerns their strength. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

Free will in the angels

Concerning the first, two questions arise:

first, on the confirmation of the good angels;

second, on the obstinacy of the wicked.

Article 1

Whether the good angels can sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I. 62.8; On Truth, q. 24, a. 8.) It seems that the good angels can sin.

Obj. 1: For, according to the Philosopher, rational powers are powers for opposites. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b5.) But free will, which remains in the good angels, is a rational power, since it is a faculty of reason and will according to Augustine. (Rather: Peter Lombard, Sent. II, 24.3(142).1.) Therefore, it seems that if they can will the good, they can also sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as what is corruptible never changes to become eternal, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 282a25.) so also it seems that what is movable never becomes immovable. But the free will of an angel in the state of its creation could be moved toward sin. Therefore, it has never become immovable.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more a power is determined to one thing, the less free it is, as is clear in natural powers that act by necessity. But the will of an angel is more free after its confirmation than before, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 7.3(35).1.) Therefore, it seems that it is not determined only to the good, but could also be turned to sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no reason for praiseworthiness should be taken away from the good angels. But among men it is a reason for praise that they do not sin when they could sin. For example, it is said in praise of a good man: who has had the power to transgress and did not transgress (Sir 31:10). Therefore, it seems that this is also the case in the angels.

On the contrary, immovability pertains to the account of happiness, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1100b4.) For we should not regard one who is happy as being a sort of chameleon. But if they were to sin, they would be moved from the state of uprightness. Therefore, the blessed angels cannot sin.

Furthermore, motion does not take place at the terminus, but rather on the way to the terminus. But the angels are not wayfarers. Therefore, they cannot be moved to sin.

I answer that just as God by his nature cannot sin, so also the angels cannot through the grace of confirmation, as is clear in the following way. The principle and cause of change is the potentiality of a thing, and there can only be failure through uncompleted potency. Therefore, that in which there can be no admixture of potency by its nature can neither be changed nor fail. But that in which there is an admixture of potency, though wholly completed by act, in and of itself can fail and be changed insofar as it has being and completion only from another. But by reason of a perfect reception that leaves nothing in the potency uncompleted, it has immovability and immunity from failure.

Examples of this sort of thing can be drawn from natural things and from intellectual things. Among natural things, we find in some a natural potency altogether complete both through its being and through its form. Thus, it has unfailing being, as is clear in the case of the heavenly bodies, whose potency is not receptive of any other being or form, so that they are far removed from alteration and, consequently, from corruption. But the matter of water is not wholly completed through the form of water in such a way that it is brought to every possible perfection through it. Hence together with the form of water there remains a privation of the form of air, and as a result these things are corruptible.

This is likewise clear among intellectual things. For an immediate principle naturally known is what determines the whole potential of reason. Before arriving at this principle by an analytical inquiry, reason holds to one side in such a way that a certain inclination to the other side remains by way of doubt. But when by analysis it arrives at a first principle known through itself, it is confirmed in one side with no possibility of turning to the other.

The situation is similar with the will of the blessed angels, to which the light of grace or glory and virtue is related like a form or act among natural things, like the last end in moral matters, and like a first principle in speculative matters. For, according to the Philosopher, the end in voluntary activities is like the principle in speculative ones. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a16–17; Physics 2.9, 200a15–30.) Hence since through the light of glory they are perfectly joined to the last end by way of full enjoyment, wholly enamored of its goodness, they cannot be turned away from it toward its contrary.

Reply Obj. 1: A rational power is said to be a power for opposites that fall under choice, to which free will properly pertains. But choice does not concern the end, but rather what is directed to the end. These are only chosen in accord with the rule of the end that lies in the estimation. Thus, the will cannot relate to the end in a contrary manner. For the will cannot be for wretchedness or for evil precisely as evil. Rather, it is always for the good and beatitude. Yet to obtain this, men can choose different paths, namely, insofar as they judge that by them they can better obtain happiness. Consequently, there can be an error in the choice of what is directed toward the end. Thus, among those who possess an unfailingly correct estimation of the end, as among the angels who are perfected in the end itself, it is impossible for them to will anything that would disorder them from the end, such as the will to sin. But when neither this nor that disorders them from the end, they can still will this or that. In this way, the property of a rational power is preserved, inasmuch as they can do this or not do this, even though they do not have the capability to choose between the opposites of good and evil.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not possible in the same subject for corruptibility and incorruptibility, or movability and immovability, to follow each other in such a manner that both are traced back to its natural principles. And so we also say that the free will of an angel, which was movable by nature, is not made immovable by nature but by glory.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel’s power is only determined to a single thing in acts that join it to the end, so it can do this or not do it, or do this or that. Even so, it cannot for this reason sin. For according to Anselm in the Proslogion, (Anselm of Canterbury (ca. 1033–1109 AD), De libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 158:489).) to be able to sin is not free will nor part of freedom. For free will is the freedom of choosing this or that means to the end.

Reply Obj. 4: Praiseworthiness does not depend essentially on the power to sin, but rather on a will that clings to the good. Otherwise a virtuous person, who does not move as easily to sin, would be less praiseworthy in his act than someone lacking virtue and yet doing a good work. But the power to sin is a sign of praiseworthiness for those who give the praise, inasmuch as it manifests a will that does not cling to the good by compulsion.

Article 2

Whether the demons can do good

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.64.2; On Truth, q. 24, a. 10; On Evil, q. 16, a. 5.) It seems that the demons can do good and are not obstinate in evil.

Obj. 1: For the intellectual nature is ordered to beatitude, of which it was made capable. But nature remains in the demons after sin. Therefore, they are not obstinate to the point that they cannot will good and obtain beatitude.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) that the demons desire the good of being, of living, and of understanding. But by desiring good things, one has a good will. Therefore, it seems that the demons can have a good will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, synderesis (See In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3.) is not extinguished in the demons, or else they would not have the worm of conscience. But the act of synderesis is to object to evil, which is a good. Therefore, not every act of theirs is evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is said (Jas 2:19) that even the demons believe, and shudder. But both of these are good. Therefore, some act of theirs is good.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, by every act of sin, one grows in malice and merits greater punishment. Therefore, if the demons sin by every act, then it seems that their punishment would grow to infinity, since obstinacy does not take away liability to punishment—for otherwise they would gain an advantage from their malice. Therefore, their punishment grows to infinity, which is unfitting.

On the contrary, Augustine says: the demons can lack neither evil will nor punishment. (Rather: Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 3 (PL 40:687).) But nothing proceeds from an evil will except an evil act. Therefore, it seems that every act of theirs is evil.

Furthermore, just as the blessed angels became good by conversion, so also the demons were made wicked by defection. But the blessed angels cannot do evil, as has been said before. (Above: d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, neither can the demons do good.

I answer that in the demons there is a good nature created by God, but an evil will. They themselves are the cause of its malice. Thus, every act of their nature is good, but the act of their will is evil. Now, an act can turn out to be evil in two ways: either as regards to the substance of the act, as it is evil to commit fornication or to lie; or as regards the manner of the agent, as when someone gives alms out of a desire for praise. Therefore, the demons can perform an act that is generically good, and yet not at all with a good will.

Now, different reasons are given for this obstinacy. Some say that the free will of an angel is as a mean between the divine and human in the fact that the divine free will is immovable before and after choosing, the human movable before and after choosing, and the angelic free will is movable before choosing, but immovable afterwards. But this argument supposes what it needs to explain, namely, immovability after the angels’ choice. And besides, based on this argument no reason could be given for the confirmation or obstinacy in choice of deceased men.

Another reason given is that, since an angel is indivisible, then to whatever it turns itself, it is turned completely. But this seems insufficient. For even though it is indivisible in essence, it is still divisible in power insofar as its power extends to many things, and this is with respect to the objects, and so too according as it applies itself more or less to something, and this regards the intensifying or relaxing of the act. So it is not necessary for its activity to proceed from it with all its strength, since it is master of its own act.

Another reason is taken from the fact that man fell through another, so it was fitting that he should have a restorer through whom to rise again. The angels, however, fell through themselves, and so it is impossible for their ruin to be repaired, since they could not rise again by themselves and it was not fitting for them to have another as restorer. Yet this, too, does not seem sufficient, since to fall through oneself or through another are circumstances of sin, which cannot make a sin infinitely more serious such that the sin would have no possibility of repair. Besides, even if man had never been restored, he would still not for this reason have been obstinate, as is clear in the case of non-believers: they do not obtain the benefit of restoration, and yet their acts are not all sins, as will be said below in Distinction 41. (See Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 41, q.1, a. 2.) Thus, even if the fall of a demon is irreparable, this does not necessitate an obstinacy of the will in evil such as we find in them.

Another reason given is that the angels sinned against a God-like intellect, whereas man sinned against the dictate of reason, as is clear from Dionysius; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) and thus, the sin of the angels was much more grave and irreparable. For reason is like a shadowed intellect, in keeping with what Isaac says in the Book of Definitions, (Isaac Israeli, Liber de definitionibus.) that reason arises in the shadow of intelligence. But this, too, does not seem sufficient. For the angelic intellect and human reason are not separated by a distance without proportion, as are “reparable” and “irreparable,” since both are finite.

Another reason given is that the whole original nature of man was corrupted through its sin, but not the whole angelic nature. Hence human nature stood in greater need of restoration than angelic nature. But this does not seem sufficient. For, according to this, if the first man had not sinned, but some of his children had, their sin would have been irremediable. Moreover, in any angel there is a nature differing specifically from the others, and so its sin vitiates the whole nature of its species. Therefore, we must say otherwise, that the same reason for obstinacy is found in men who are damned and in the angels who sinned. For according to Damascene, what the fall is to the angels, death is to men. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 94:878).)

Therefore, we must say that just as it is impossible for a sinful work to proceed from a will adhering infallibly to an upright end, so also, conversely, it is impossible for an upright work to proceed from a will adhering fixedly to a perverse end. But a sin of the will regarding the end can arise in two ways. It arises either by a passion that leads the reason away from actual consideration of the upright end, and such a sinner is penitent when the passion ceases. Or it arises by malice, which, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a15.) corrupts the end. For one is said to sin by malice when he sins by the choice of a depraved end, due to the fact that the sort of habit he has dictates how the end appears to him; as, for example, one who has the habit of lust proposes for himself venereal pleasure as an end. Since an error concerning the end in practical matters is like an error concerning first principles in speculative matters—for one who errs about first principles cannot be directed to such principles from others that are better known—one who sins in this way must be impenitent, as the Philosopher says in the same place. Therefore, no one can repent of sin except by cessation of passion or by loss of the habit from which he chose an evil end.

Yet the loss of a habit is only possible for someone in the wayfaring state, a state of mutability. Hence whenever someone arrives at the end point of the path, he cannot be turned away from the end to which he has clung, whether it be good or evil. But the end of man’s path is his death, whereas the end of an angel’s path is the terminus of its choice whereby it has clung to good or to evil. Hence just as men after death are confirmed in good or in evil, so also angels are confirmed in good or evil after conversion or defection. Now, a longer path is granted to man than to angels, since man was more distant from God and it was necessary that he arrive at the knowledge of him by inquiry. However, the angels were able to arrive immediately and without inquiry at knowledge of God by their God-like intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: A natural power for the good remains in the demons, though remote, indisposed, and depraved by contrary habit. By this power they could do the good if they so willed. But they cannot will it, since the habit of malice cannot be removed from their will, since it is no longer in the wayfaring state.

Reply Obj. 2: Since in the angels, nature is good, their natural appetite must be good. Yet it is depraved by circumstances, which the deliberate will applies inasmuch as they will to be and to live under such a deformity of sin, as when a lustful man desires to live in his shameful delight.

Reply Obj. 3: According to some, synderesis in the demons objects not to their fault, but to the punishment, and that they sin more in this by resisting the decree of the divine justice. Yet this does not seem true, since it is impossible for something not to resist its contrary. But in synderesis are found the universal principles of the natural law. Hence it must object to everything that is contrary to the natural law. Nonetheless, this objection is an act of nature. For the demons’ perverse will is resistant, and following it they close off their powers of examination from consideration of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:723).)

Reply Obj. 4: Even though these acts are good in themselves, they do not perform them in a good manner. For any good work they do is under compulsion and not by choice.

Reply Obj. 5: Some say that their fault and punishment can increase until judgment day. But this does not seem true. For, since they are not in the wayfaring state, just as they cannot be changed for the good, so also they cannot be changed for the worse. Hence we must say that their fault or pride is said to grow, not with regard to the intensity of malice, but rather with regard to the multiplication of the act. The essential punishment does not grow, but rather the incidental punishment, which is based on the multitude of the damned, in like manner to the reward of the good angels.

Question 2

The knowledge of the fallen angels

Now we ask about the demons’ knowledge. And concerning this two questions arise:

first, whether the demons retain their acuity of knowledge;

second, on divination performed through them.

Article 1

Whether the demons possess acute knowledge

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.64.1.) It seems that the demons are not sharp in knowledge, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 7.5(37).)

Obj. 1: For as Dionysius says, the evil of a demon is irrational fury, senseless concupiscence, and wanton fantasy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) But all these things imply a relation to understanding. Therefore, it seems that they do not have acuity of knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to philosophers, the nature of intellective substances is perfected by intellect and will. But just as the will is perfected through an appetite for the good, so also the intellect is perfected through knowledge of the truth. Therefore, since their will is not capable of the good, it seems that neither is their intellect capable of the truth.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the heavenly angels reveal things by way of illumination. But since the demons are in perpetual darkness, they cannot be illuminated. Therefore, they cannot know anything by the good angels’ revealing it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, knowledge through experience takes longer to acquire for one who receives knowledge from things, since one experience comes from many memories, as is said at the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980b25–981a1.) But memory arises from the senses. However, the angels’ knowledge is not received from things. Therefore, they do not possess acuity of knowledge through long experience.

On the contrary, it is proved in the text from the writings of the saints. (Sent. II, 7.5(37), in reference to Isidore and Augustine specifically.) Even their name shows the same thing, since they are called “demons” as though being “wise.” Again, Dionysius says, we say that the angelic gifts were given and have not been changed at all but rather remain intact and most splendid. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) But among the other natural attributes of the angels one was perspicacity of intelligence. Therefore, this still remains in them.

I answer that, since sin does not take away nature, but only lessens its aptitude for the good insofar as it makes it more distant from grace, a perspicuous intellectual light must remain in the demons because their nature is intellectual. But their knowledge of things is of two kinds. For the knowledge of some things through natural causes or signs cannot be had, and they only know such things if heavenly spirits reveal them. But the knowledge of other things can be had through nature, and this occurs in two ways. It occurs either through causes determined to natural effects, and they know such things by the subtlety of their nature, inasmuch as the likenesses of the whole order of the universe are reflected in them. Or it occurs through certain signs from which one can know that something occurs in more cases than not, as when physicians predict health or death. And they know such things by their experience over time, insofar as such-and-such effects have more frequently occurred together with such-and-such signs.

Reply Obj. 1: Fury, concupiscence, and fantasy are not in the demons in the proper sense, but rather metaphorically, since these things pertain to the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. For every defect of soul that occurs in us either is due to imagination, with regard to knowledge, whose property is falsity, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.5, 1010b1–15.) or is due to the irascible and concupiscible passions, with regard to affection. Thus, the will of the demons inordinately detesting or desiring something is called “fury” and “concupiscence,” and their disordered intellect is called “fantasy.” But this disordering of the intellect is from a perverse will, and thus it is called a “wanton fantasy,” since he is wanton who vehemently resists the truth. But irrationality and senselessness, fury and concupiscence imply that the will has gone astray from the right judgment of intellect or reason. And they imply ignorance not of speculation but of choice, in respect of which every wicked person is ignorant.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is master of its own act more than is the intellect, which is compelled by the very truth of the thing. Thus, a man is called “wicked” or “good” in reference to an act of the will, since the act of the will is the act of the man, as being in his power. But he is not so called in reference to an act of the intellect, of which he is not the master.

Reply Obj. 3: The highest spirits’ revelation to the demons is not made by way of illumination such that the intellectual light of a demon would be strengthened through the application of the clarity of angelic light. Rather, it is made by way of locution, such that they express to one another knowable things in a way they did not express before, as will be clear below in Distinction 11. (Sent. II, 10.2(55).3; 11.2(57).2–10; and Aquinas’s commentary thereon.)

Reply Obj. 4: Even though a demon does not receive knowledge from things, its knowledge still grows more acute over a length of time. For through the innate species it possesses of a thing, it knows the thing and what is in the thing. But before a contingent cause is determined, especially one that can go either way, its effect is not in it. Hence the effect cannot be known in it. But by knowing the cause, the demon knows the effect once the cause has been determined to its effect.

Article 2

Whether divination can be performed through demons

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that divination cannot be performed through demons.

Obj. 1: For to foretell future things is a sign of divinity. Hence it is said: tell us what is to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods (Isa 41:23). But the demons are altogether devoid of divinity. Therefore, divination of future things cannot be performed through them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it belongs to good prophets to predict the truth of future things, as when it is said (Jer 28:9) that the prophet whom the Lord has sent is the one whose word comes to pass. Therefore, if men foretell the truth about the future by divining by the power of demons, it seems that those who prophesy by the revelation of demons should be called “true prophets.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, knowledge of a thing comes only through its species. But the species of a future event cannot come to the soul through a demon, unless the demon causes the species. Therefore, it seems that divination cannot be performed through them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one but God alone can form the mind of a man, as Augustine says in the text. (Sent. II, 7.9(41), quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875): sicut ergo in ipsa vita nostra mentem iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus.) But knowledge of something cannot be received if one’s mind is not formed by some light. Therefore, it seems that it cannot receive foreknowledge of future things through demons.

On the contrary (5), there is stronger intellective power in demons than in men. But one man can tell another what he knows is going to happen. Therefore, demons can too. Now, they do know some future things, since even men—such as astronomers or physicians—can have knowledge of some future things. Therefore, divination can be performed through demons.

Furthermore (6), when the soul is withdrawn from external movements of the body, such as in sleep, it receives foreknowledge of certain future things. For we must not altogether deny that divination can take place in dreams, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On Divination in Sleep (De divinatione per somnum) 1, 462b13.) But the demons are not occupied with governing a body. Therefore, it seems that they can also have knowledge of future things and confer it on others.

I answer that some future things are determined in their causes whereas others do not have determinate causes, such as things that can go either way.

But any effect, insofar as it is determined in its cause, can be known in it. For if the effect is determined in it as that from which it necessarily arises, then it will be known with certitude, such as in things that happen concerning the motion of heaven, for example, the rising and setting of the sun, eclipses, and conjunctions of the stars. The demons know all of these much better through innate species of the causes than an astronomer does through his art. On the other hand, if they are determined in their causes as that from which they frequently arise, though with the possibility of failure in a minority of cases due to an impediment on the part of the agent or on the part of the recipient of the action, then one cannot have certain foreknowledge, but rather conjectural foreknowledge. In this way, an astronomer predicts that certain things will happen in the lower bodies based on the motions of heaven, and yet they can be impeded because of a defect in lower causes. This foreknowledge approaches greater certitude to the degree that one knows multiple causes converging on one effect, and to the degree one better knows the power of the cause. Consequently, the demons are most subtle in their foreknowledge of such future things.

But they cannot know in their causes things that do not have determinate causes, such as things that can go either way or that occur in the minority of cases. Rather, they can know them only in themselves as present things. Hence foreknowledge of these things belongs to God alone, to whom from eternity they are present, and to those to whom God wishes to reveal them. Of such future things, neither men nor demons can have knowledge, except by a revelation from heavenly spirits.

Now, the things the demons foreknow they can reveal, but not by putting themselves before the soul as a mirror in which the things reflected in the mirror are seen, as some say. For the human soul, at least in the wayfaring state, does not see things that are separated from matter, except insofar as it arrives at knowledge of them from phantasms. Nor, again, are the species in the angelic intellect proportionate to the human intellect, since they are much simpler and more universal. Hence just as imagination cannot comprehend the species in the intellect, and the senses cannot comprehend the species in the imagination, so also the human intellect in the wayfaring state cannot comprehend the species in the angelic intellect. But a good or wicked angel can reveal the things it knows in another way, namely, through the application of its light to the phantasms, just as the light of the agent intellect is applied so that certain concepts are elicited in the intellect from them. The stronger and more perfect the light is, the greater the multiplicity and certainty of the knowledge elicited. Thus, from the phantasms illuminated by angelic light a knowledge of some things is reflected in man’s potential intellect, a knowledge that the human agent intellect’s illumination would not suffice to elicit, since its light is weaker than the angelic light.

Reply Obj. 1: Future things, insofar as they have a determination in their causes, approach the account of present things to the degree that they already exist in a way determinately in their causes. Thus, foreknowing them is not properly called “divination,” such as when a physician predicts future health, and an astronomer predicts an eclipse or rain, and such things—except perhaps to one ignorant of the order of cause to caused. Hence no one says that there is divination regarding things that are known to all, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow. Rather, divination is properly of things that do not have determinate causes. For to know these things belongs to God alone. And it is by a usurpation of his act that those who intend to announce future things in advance are called “divines.”

Reply Obj. 2: False prophets are distinguished from true prophets in at least three ways. The first way is with regard to the author of the revelation. For the good prophets predict future things by divine light and are inspired by the mediation of the good angels. But false prophets either follow their own spirit, seeing nothing and concocting lies, or they follow the revelation of an unclean spirit. The second is with regard to the intention behind their prediction. For the false prophets aim at some temporal gain. Hence it is said: you have profaned me among my people for handfuls of barley and for pieces of bread (Ezek 13:19). Or at least the intention of the demon who gives the revelation is perverse, intending deceit. But the whole intention of the good prophets is ordered to an upright end. The third way is with regard to the certitude of the predictions. For the prophecy of the good rests on the divine prescience, which perceives all future outcomes, but the wicked prophets’ advance announcements rest on the prescience of demons, which is conjectural.

Reply Obj. 3: A demon can manifest something unknown without causing a new species in two ways: either by eliciting other intentions (On intentio, the note accompanying d. 3, q. 1, a. 4. The sense here seems close to “concept.”) from the species that are kept in the imagination composed and divided in different ways, as well as enlightened by a stronger light, or even by forming new species in the imagination through a transmutation of the bodily organ.

Reply Obj. 4: Only God forms the mind of a man by justification. Yet he is not the only one who immediately enlightens it with intellectual light, unless by this we understand connatural light, which is from God alone.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The astronomers cannot announce occurrences in advance unless they are traced back to the motion of heaven as to a cause—either a cause through itself, as in the case of transmutations that take place in bodily things, such as storms, blights, pestilences, and things of this sort, which can still be impeded by the intervention of stronger motions, as the Philosopher says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness (Rather: Aristotle, On Divination in Sleep 2, 463b25.)—or a cause incidentally, as when one’s temper is disposed to some acts more than to others on the basis of a transmutation of the body. An example is when some, due to their natural makeup, are prone to lust or wrath and things of this sort, though such a disposition of the body does not impose a necessity on the soul. Hence in matters depending on free will, their judgments are more often deceived. Likewise, too, physicians know lower causes by signs that appear outwardly, from which health or death follow, either always or for the most part. All these things the demons can foreknow, but not all future things are of this kind.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Divinations, even those in dreams, are traced back to certain signs or natural causes.

This occurs in two ways.

In one way, it occurs in those things whose cause is in the dreamer himself. And this occurs in two ways: either such that the dream itself is the cause of the future event, as when someone is moved to do something because he sees it in a dream, or such that it is the sign of a future thing whose cause is in him, as when someone dreams of eating sweets and this signifies that sweet phlegm is dominating in him. Based on this a physician can form a hypothesis about a future outcome such as disease or health. However, if the future event is not related in either of these ways, then it is only incidental, such as when it occurs incidentally that someone arrives just when I am thinking about his arrival.

In the other way, it occurs in things that have a cause outside the one dreaming. And in these the occurrence of the matter dreamed of is frequently only incidentally related to the dream, though sometimes the dream is the sign of a future event.

This occurs in two ways.

In one way, it occurs on the part of what receives knowledge from the body inasmuch as the power of a heavenly body is impressed on it. For the motions of the heavenly bodies leave certain impressions and motions which are signs of the motions of the heavens in lower bodies. Insofar as these motions reach the imagination, they shape images of the effects to which the heavenly motions tend with a more or less definite likeness, according as the power making the impression is stronger or weaker, and to the extent the power that receives is more or less disposed and more at rest from other occupations. This is why things of this sort are sensed while sleeping, since the soul is freed from external motions, especially at night and around the time digestion completes. In this manner certain animals foreknow certain future things insofar as it is necessary for their sustenance, as when fish herald a future storm by their movements from place to place. This is also the case in ants and in many other animals, as is clear to the senses, whose imaginations are more at rest than human imaginations due to the complex motions of reason.

In the other way, it occurs insofar as the soul receives knowledge from the influx of the light of a separated substance, either God or an angel, to which it is more strongly joined the more it ceases from being occupied with the things of the body. For this reason revelations take place in dreams, especially in those whose soul is not subject to the affections of the body. The more their imagination obeys the intellect, the more distinct are the likenesses shaped in it. For this reason the moral virtues do much for science, especially the virtue of chastity, as the Commentator says on the Physics 7. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 2, comm. 20.) For among the moral virtues, chastity in particular renders the body obedient to the soul.

Question 3

The agency of the fallen angels

Next we inquire about the demons’ power for acting. And concerning this two questions arise:

first, whether they can work some true effects in bodily matter;

second, whether it is permissible to use their help and council.

Article 1

Whether the demons can introduce a true bodily effect in bodily matter

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the demons cannot bring about a true bodily effect.

Obj. 1: For it is said that the Antichrist will come with false signs (2 Thess 2:9). But that is the time when the demons will have the greatest power. Therefore, it seems that in no way can they bring about a true effect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which is given for the manifestation and confirmation of the faith should not be granted to the adversaries of the faith. But the working of signs was given for the confirmation of the faith, as is related at the end of Mark: and they went forth and preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that attended it (Mark 16:20). Therefore, it seems that working miracles does not fall under the power of demons.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is proved in the Physics 8, every alteration is traced back to local motion, the first of which is the motion of heaven. (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 260a26–b26.) But the demons cannot vary the motion of heaven, since this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says in his Letter to Polycarp. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Letters, 8, “To Polycarp” (PG 3:1079).) Therefore, it seems that they cannot effect a transmutation from form to form in lower bodies.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is subject to a bodily power does not have the power to make an impression on bodies. But the demons are subject to the powers of the stars; this is why sorcerers take note of specific constellations when invoking demons. Therefore, it seems that they do not have the power of making an impression on bodies.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the demons only work by way of artifice. But artifice cannot give substantial form. Hence it says in the chapter on minerals: the practitioners of alchemy should know that species cannot be transformed. (See Avicenna, De mineralibus. The De mineralibus was initially attributed to Aristotle and appended to the end of his Meteorology. The work is now recognized to be partly a translation and partly a summary of chapters from Avicenna’s Book of Healing, complied by Alfred of Sareshel. Roger Bacon critiques these very words in his Communia naturalium, stating that these are not the words of Aristotle.) Therefore, neither can the demons introduce substantial forms.

On the contrary, it is said (Exod 7:11–12) that the magicians of Pharaoh, working by the power of demons, changed staves into serpents.

Furthermore, what is stronger acts on what is less strong. But the power of the demons is stronger than bodily power. Therefore, they can transmute bodies by the power proper to them.

I answer that there can be two errors concerning this. One was that of the pagans who believed that the demons, by whose power the magicians worked, were gods. Thus, they believed that they could produce new effects after the manner of creation. This is the second way that the Master lays out in the text. (Sent. II, 7.10(42).1.) The other is that of Avicenna, who posits that bodily matter much more strongly obeys the thought of a separated substance than contrary qualities acting in nature, since natural agents only dispose to the form, which is infused by a separated substance. Hence on the basis of what the separated substance conceives of, even apart from the order of the motion of heaven, an effect follows in lower things. And he gives the example of the human soul, at whose conception the whole body moves, whether to lust at the imagining of a beloved woman, or to stumbling due to one’s imagination and fear of stumbling. This is the first way that is touched on in the text, (Sent. II, 7.8(40).3.) that bodily matter serves the demons at their whim.

But this position is contradicted both by philosophers and by theologians. It is contradicted by philosophers, since they say that the motion of heaven is the instrument of the moving intelligence. Hence only by its mediation can an effect come to lower things from the intelligence. It is contradicted also by theologians, since bodily forms are not infused by demons, but rather are infused by God, who placed them in the potency of matter and who can reduce them to act without the assistance of a lower agent, insofar as they are reduced to act following the course of nature on the basis of determinate natural agents. Hence this position rests on a false foundation.

Thus, we must say that the demons, by the power proper to them, cannot infuse any form into matter, either accidental or substantial. Nor can they reduce it to act, except with the assistance of the proper natural agent. For just as a craftsman heats something not by his own proper power, but by the power of a fire that is applied, so also the demons can join determinate active qualities to determinate passive qualities in such a way that an effect follows from the natural causes, though apart from the usual course of nature, on account of the multitude and strength of the active power of the things brought together, and on account of the aptitude of the passive qualities. Thus, they cannot produce effects that are not in the power of a natural active power, such as truly raising a dead person or anything of this sort, but only as an illusion, as will be said below.

Reply Obj. 1: At the time of the Antichrist some true miracles will be done by the power of demons, with divine permission, though in things to which the power of the demons extends. Even so, they are all called “false” from the perspective of the end, since they are done in order to deceive.

Reply Obj. 2: Signs done through the good can be distinguished from those done through the wicked in at least three ways. The first difference is from the efficacy of the operating power. For signs done through the good by the divine power include things to which the active power of nature in no way extends, such as raising the dead and things of this sort. Demons cannot do such things truly, but only as illusions, which cannot last for a long time. The second difference is from the benefit of the signs. For signs done through the good concern beneficial things, such as the curing of the sick and things of this sort. But signs done through the wicked concern harmful or vain things, such as flying through the air or rendering the limbs of men senseless and things of this sort. Blessed Peter gives this difference in the Journey of Clement. (See The Recognitions of Clement (also known as the Journey of Clement), ch. 66; this early apocryphal work likely dates from the third century and presents a narrative of St. Peter’s journeys; it was translated into Latin by Rufinus of Aquileia in 406 AD.) The third difference is with regard to the end. For the signs of the good are ordered to the edification of faith and good character. But the signs of the wicked are a manifest harm to faith and upright living. And they differ with regard to mode. For the good work miracles by piously and reverently invoking the divine name, but the wicked do so by deranged methods, such as by slashing themselves with knives and shameful things of this sort. Thus, the signs done through the good can manifestly be discerned from those done by the power of demons.

Reply Obj. 3: A local motion precedes such an alteration inasmuch as they gather active powers and apply them to determined passive powers. But such a local motion is not traced back to a heavenly motion, since it does not follow a natural moving power, but rather exists inasmuch as it obeys the demon’s power for local motion. This derives from the power of its nature, which has a capability over bodies not to infuse a form, but to move them locally. For local motion does not regard the acquisition of something else in the thing that is moved, since place is extrinsic to what is placed.

Reply Obj. 4: The heavenly bodies do not make an impression on demons that might render them subject. Rather, the demons come when invoked under a given constellation because they know that the power of that constellation aids the required effect, or in order to lead men to venerate some divinity in the stars, which gives rise to idolatrous rituals.

Reply Obj. 5: Artifice cannot confer substantial form by its own power, though it can do it by the power of a natural agent, as is clear when the form of fire is introduced in wood by artifice. But there are some substantial forms that artifice cannot in any way introduce, since it cannot find proper active and passive principles. However, it can make something similar to these things, as when alchemists make something similar to gold with respect to its outward accidents, though they do not make true gold. For the substantial form of gold is not introduced by the heat of the fire that the alchemists use, but through the heat of the sun on a specific place where there is an apt mineral power. Thus, such gold does not possess the activity following on the species. It is likewise in other things that are produced by their activity.

Article 2

Whether it is evil to use the help of a demon for bodily effects

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that it is not evil to use the help of the demons in such activities.

Obj. 1: For Paul himself handed the Corinthian fornicator over to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, as it is said (1 Cor 5:5). But he is not said to have sinned by so doing. Therefore it is permissible to use the assistance of the demons.

Obj. 2: Besides, it is permissible to accept help even from sinners, such as alms or things of this sort. But in demons we find nothing but nature—which is good—and sin. Therefore, it seems that it is permissible to use their help.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God conferred powers on words and things. But demons are invoked and, as it were, constrained by the power of certain words and things. Therefore, it seems that it is permissible to use their help.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which tends to a benefit and detracts from nothing does not seem to be a sin. But many beneficial things often come about by the invocation of demons, as is clear in the finding of lost articles. Therefore, it seems that in such cases it is permissible to use their help.

On the contrary, the Lord commanded that all practitioners of sorcery and magic be put to death (Deut 18:10). But bodily death is only inflicted for grave sin. Therefore, it seems that they who undertake such practices sin gravely.

Furthermore, Augustine says that all forms of divination are to be avoided and warned against. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 17 (CCSL 28.1:61; PL 34:278).) Therefore, and so on.

I answer that things that are above human capability and nature should be sought from God alone. Thus, just as someone sins gravely by giving to a created thing, through idolatrous worship, what is due to God, so too do those who implore from the help of demons what should be besought from God. Soothsaying about the future is this sort of thing. Hence it is said: should not a people consult their God? Should they consult the dead on behalf of the living? (Isa 8:19) The case is similar with other works of magic in which the work is expected to be accomplished by the power of demons. For in all these things there is apostasy from the faith through a pact entered into with a demon, either verbally, if an invocation is part of it, or by some deed, even if there are no sacrifices. For man cannot serve two masters (Matt 6:24).

Reply Obj. 1: Paul and certain other saints are read to have done things through demons, not by entering into a pact with them, but rather as exercising divine power over them, as the heavenly powers are said to have the task of constraining demons.

Reply Obj. 2: Sinners, for as long as they are living in this life, can become members of Christ, no matter how obstinate in malice they seem to be. Thus, they must be loved out of charity, and good things can be received and entreated from them, as long as they are not contrary to charity. But after they descend from the body to damnation, our judgment concerning them must be the same as that concerning the demons.

Reply Obj. 3: We must not believe that the demons are subject to any bodily powers. Thus, they are not compelled by invocations and certain magical deeds, except inasmuch as by them one enters into a covenant with them, as it is said: we have made a covenant with death, and with Sheol we have an agreement (Isa 28:15).

Reply Obj. 4: There can be no benefit for which we should do something that wrongs God. But this is what happens when we do not ask of him that which belongs to him, and instead enter into a covenant with his adversary.

Exposition of the text

But the good angels have a much freer choice after their confirmation than before. (Sent. II, 7.3(35).1.) On the contrary, free will is what cannot be compelled. But negations do not receive more or less. Therefore neither does free will.

To this we must say that even though a negation as such does not receive more or less, nevertheless it is said to be intensified or relaxed insofar as it has a cause in the subject. As, for example, one who lacks the substance of an eye is said to be more blind than someone whose vision is said to be impeded by a humor flowing to the pupil. Thus, the freedom of the will can be called “greater” or “less” in accord with the mode of the nature in which it exists.

‘In truth, some hidden seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visible are concealed in the bodily elements of this world.’ (Sent. II, 7.8(40).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:875).) By these “seeds” are understood the active powers existing in things from the heavenly power and from the active and passive qualities. For a seed is reckoned among active causes in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a21.)