D. 20 - Generation of children in the original state of man

Division of the text

After the Master has addressed Adam’s immortality, through which the being of the individual was preserved perpetual, here he addresses the generation of children, through which the species is multiplied in individuals.

This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses what pertains to the state of generation.

In the second, he shows into what state man was going to be transferred after this, at such was man’s establishment before sin according to the condition of his body. (Sent. II, 20.6(121).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the conditions of generation on the part of the generator.

In the second, he addresses the qualities of the generated, at but if it is asked what kind of children man would have begotten, if he had not sinned . . . it may be answered that it was required that the children be born small because of the needs of the maternal womb. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows the manner of generation, that it was through intercourse without the itch of lust.

Second, he shows when generation began, since in paradise they were not joined together for generation before sin, at ‘and so why did they not have sexual intercourse in paradise?’ (Sent. II, 20.2(117).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 4 (CSEL 28.1:272; PL 34:395–96).)

Third, he inquires about generation’s end, at but as to the end of time at which they would have been transferred to a spiritual and celestial life, Scripture does not teach anything certain. (Sent. II, 20.3(118).1.)

But if it is asked what kind of children man would have begotten, if he had not sinned. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).1.) Here he inquires about the qualities of those generated.

First, he inquires with regard to the body.

Second, he inquires with regard to the soul, at and since it is not absurd or unsuitable to hold this view concerning the human body, it is usual to ask whether the same is to be thought concerning the sense of the soul and the knowledge of truth. (Sent. II, 20.5(120).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he addresses the qualities of children in the first state.

Second, he raises certain objections, at but the following objection is made to this. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).5.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he raises the question.

Second, he shows that it is a doubtful question, from the words of Augustine, at Augustine speaks ambiguously concerning this matter. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).3.)

Third, he addresses it, agreeing with the second part, at but since Augustine does not firmly assert anything concerning these matters, it has not unreasonably pleased some that the children of the first parents would have been born small. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).4.)

But the following objection is made to this. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).5.) Here he raises objections against what was determined.

First, by showing that they did not need to eat.

Second, by showing that they did not take food because it would have been superfluous, at an objection is also made as follows. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).6.)

And the solution of both is clear in the text.

And since it is not absurd or unsuitable to hold this view concerning the human body, it is usual to ask whether the same is to be thought concerning the sense of the soul and the knowledge of truth. (Sent. II, 20.5(120).1.) Here he shows the children’s qualities on the part of the soul.

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he raises the question.

Second, he addresses it, at those who think that, after being born small in bodily stature and in the use of their members, they would progress with the passage of time, do not deny that they would also be imperfect in sense at the moment of their birth. (Sent. II, 20.5(120).2.)

Third, he raises an objection to the contrary and resolves it, at some make objection to this. (Sent. II, 20.5(120).3.)

Here two questions are asked.

The first concerns the generation of our first parents. (Q. 1.)

The second concerns the children’s qualities. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The generation of our first parents

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether there would have been generation in the first state;

second, what manner of generation would there have been.

Article 1

Whether there would have been generation in the state of innocence

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.98.1.) It seems that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation.

Obj. 1: For generation is only for the sake of the multiplication of individuals. But, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 24 (PG 94:1207).) God was able to multiply this race, namely, the human race, without generation. Therefore, since the more expedient way should always be chosen, it seems that there would not have been generation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, every generable thing is corruptible, and vice versa, as he proves in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 282a21–25.) But human bodies in the first state were incorruptible. Therefore, it seems that they would not have been brought into being through generation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the end of generation, as the Philosopher shows in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a26–b8.) is that what cannot be preserved in perpetual being as numerically the same may be perpetuated in being as specifically the same. But the human body could have been preserved numerically the same in perpetual life in the state of innocence. Therefore, it seems that there would not have been generation, since in the workings of God nothing is without purpose.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are the same in species also have a single mode of origin. But our first parents were not brought into being through natural generation, but rather through a divine activity. Therefore, their posterity also would have been propagated without natural generation.

On the contrary, Genesis 1:28 says: be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth. But a command given to people only pertains to acts which they themselves cause. Therefore, our first parents would have been the cause of the multiplication of the human race by natural generation.

Furthermore, the image of divinity in man through innocence would not have been diminished in any respect. But man bears in a certain way the likeness of the divine image in the fact that he is the principle of all those of his own race. Therefore, in the state of innocence he would have been the principle of his posterity through natural generation.

I answer that nature did not change species as a result of sin. Hence whatever pertains to the perfection of the human species must be attributed to man in the state of innocence. But in all things naturally generable and corruptible, it pertains to perfection that each is able to make another of the same sort as it is, as the Philosopher says in Meteorology 4. (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 380a15; On the Soul 2.4, 415a26–b8.) Thus, even if there had never been sin in it, we must posit in human nature a state of natural generation. This is the state of innocence, after which men were to be transferred into the state of glory, where the task of generation altogether ceases, as Matthew 22:30 says: in the resurrection, they neither marry nor are given in marriage.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though he could have multiplied the human race without the activity of a natural principle, in his ordering wisdom he decreed it more appropriate to confer on all things their own proper activities, in which their perfection consists. For the more perfect things are, the more the divine goodness shines forth in them.

Reply Obj. 2: The body of man, though in the state of innocence it was incorruptible through the grace of innocence, was still corruptible by nature. Thus, he was not deprived of his natural power for generation. For even if he was in a certain way immortal, such that he was able not to die, in another way he was mortal, since he was also able to die.

Reply Obj. 3: Every perpetual thing in nature is intended through itself. Hence things pertain to nature’s intention insofar as they are related to perpetuity. Now, there are some things that only possess perpetuity by reason of the species. Nature does not intend in these the multiplication of individuals through itself, but rather incidentally—namely, insofar as in such a multiplication the perpetuity of the species is preserved. Hence generation in these is only to preserve the same thing specifically, since it cannot be preserved the same numerically. But with human beings the case is otherwise. For with regard to part of them, namely, the soul, they possess incorruptibility even by nature. Thus, the multiplication of men is intended through itself, even apart from the fact that it pertains to the preservation of the species.

Reply Obj. 4: In the first works, nature was to be established, and thus those works had to flow immediately from a supernatural principle. But afterwards, established nature was able to arrive at its proper effects through natural activity. And this pertained to its perfection.

Article 2

Whether in the state of innocence generation would have been through sexual intercourse

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.98.2.) It seems that in the first state there would not have been generation through sexual intercourse.

Obj. 1: For there cannot be intercourse without the corruption of virginity. But in the first state it would have been unbecoming for virginity to be corrupted, when human nature was altogether integral and not to be deprived of any dignity. Therefore, it seems that there would not have been generation through intercourse there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in a better nature there is greater delight, since there is also a greater sensation of the fitting thing joined to it, which causes delight. But human nature in the first state was more pure than after sin. Therefore, since after sin the delight that arises in intercourse swallows up the use of reason on account of its greatness, it seems that it would have been much greater in the state of innocence. Thus, there would have been a perversity of order among the parts of the soul, which original justice did not allow.

Obj. 3: One might say that reason could have suppressed that delight.

On the contrary, the generative and nutritive powers as well as the augmentative are traced back to the same part of the soul, since they are powers of the vegetative soul. But reason could not have commanded the nutritive and augmentative powers in such a way that man could be nourished and grow without food. Therefore, neither could it have commanded the generative power in such a way that the delight belonging to its act would be forgone.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, generation through intercourse is completed through the separation of the seed. But in natural bodies, separation introduces corruption. Therefore, since the human body in the first state was incorruptible, there could not have been such a mode of generation there.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Generation of Animals 15, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b3.) seed is an excess from nourishment. But every excess in consuming nourishment evidences a disorder that could not have existed in the first state. Therefore, neither could there have been such a mode of generation.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems that other excesses in nutrition, such as waste, urine, and things of this sort, would not have existed in the first state, since they have a certain shamefulness, which cannot exist without punishment. Therefore, since the same reasoning applies to one excess and to the others, it seems that neither would there have been generation there through the separation of seed, since seed is an excess, as has been said. (Obj. 5.)

On the contrary, Genesis 1:27 says: male and female he created them. But the distinction of the sexes is ordered in animals to generation through intercourse. Therefore, such a mode of generation would have existed there.

Furthermore, with respect to what is common, we do not find differences between things. But man has the generative power in common with other animals. Therefore, since there is generation through intercourse in perfect animals, and man is yet more perfect than animals, it seems that such a mode of generation is also connatural to men.

I answer that for any generation two things must come together: the agent that introduces the form and the patient that provides the matter. And these two cannot be identical, since nothing undergoes or is moved by itself. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 7.1, 241b33–242a17; On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 323a13–35; 1.7, 324a10–b23.) For in all perfect living things in which there is a distinction of sex, the female is the patient and provides the matter, while the male is the agent and introduces the form, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 15. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 1.19–21.) Hence human generation could not have been completed except through the coming together of male and female. For this reason woman is said to have been made for the help of man (Gen 2:18, 21–25).

Reply Obj. 1: For the perfection of virginity two things come together: integrity of flesh with integrity of mind. One of these, namely, integrity of mind, is more honorable, while the other is more essential to virginity. Therefore, it should be said that in every act of intercourse virginity is lost with regard to the integrity of the flesh, even in the first state. But integrity of the mind can be lost in two ways: either with regard to habit, and in this way, it is lost through illicit intercourse, which takes away the habit of chastity; or with regard to act, and so, in the state after sin, it is also lost through matrimonial intercourse. This is due to the fact that on account of the vehemence of delight, reason is swallowed up in the act itself. However, in the first state the integrity of mind would have been lost in neither way, but rather only the integrity of the flesh, which would have been outweighed by the fruitfulness of offspring.

Reply Obj. 2: The quantity of something can be considered two ways, either absolutely or proportionately. Therefore, it should be said that, absolutely speaking, the delight of intercourse would have been greater in the first state even than it is now. But in proportion to reason, it would have been much less. For reason persisting strongly in its act would have thoroughly dominated delight. Thus, there would not have been an overabundant or fervent delight as there now is. For, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a25–b5, 1107a1.) abundance and defect in human works are judged according to proportion, such that a given food is moderate for one that would be excessive for another.

Reply Obj. 3: The powers of the vegetable soul do not obey reason in their proper acts, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102a34–b10.) But some acts of the sensitive part or motive part are ordered to acts of the vegetative part, and these acts are subject to the command of reason. Now, delight does not pertain to the generative part through itself, but rather to the sensitive part. For, according to Plato’s definition, delight is a sensible generation in a nature, that is, agreeable to the nature. (Plato, Philebus 31e–32b; 42c–d; Timaeus 65b.)

Reply Obj. 4: The emission of seed is not through the extraction of something that was actually a part of the body. For in this case it would be corrupted and would not have the power of the species, as is said in On the Generation of Animals 15. (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 1.18, 724b22–726a27.) Rather, it exists through the resolution of a certain moistness exceedingly close to final conversion, which is not a part actually, but rather potentially the whole. Hence through this nothing belonging to the human body was corrupted.

Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 15, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b3.) seed is an excess that is needed. For it is an excess from that which is converted into the substance of the members through the act of the nutritive part—this is why it is called an “excess.” And yet it is needed for generation. Hence such an excess does not show a disordered consumption of food. For man was able to take as much food ordinately as was necessary for the act of the nutritive, augmentative, and generative parts.

Reply Obj. 6: There are some excesses that attest to a deficiency of nature, such as rotting, sweat, and things of this sort. There could not have been such excesses in the first state. But other excesses show the perfection of nature, such as seed, waste, and things of this sort, which in accord with the course of nature become better the more robust the nature is. Hence, too, they are traced back to a natural power, namely the expulsive power. And there would have been such excesses in the first state, although they would have existed without any foulness.

Question 2

The qualities of the children of our first parents

Then a question is asked concerning the qualities of the children. Three questions are asked concerning this:

first, what qualities they would have had with respect to the body;

second, what qualities they would have had with respect to the intellect in its knowledge of truth;

third, what qualities they would have had with respect to affection in the love of virtue.

Article 1

Whether in the state of innocence men would have had every perfection of body as regards strength, stature, and sex immediately after birth

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.99.1; On Truth, q. 18, a. 8.) It seems that in the state of innocence, human beings would have had, immediately after being born, a perfect body both with regard to stature and with regard to sex.

Obj. 1: For as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 16, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 2.3, 737a25.) woman is an anomalous man. But something is called “anomalous” which is not intended through itself, but rather comes about due to a corruption or defect. Therefore, since in the first state there would have been no defect of natural activity, it seems that all would have been born in the perfect sex, namely, the male.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a perfect agent introduces its own likeness in the patient, unless there is a defect on the part of the receiver. But in the generation of men, the male’s seed is the agent and the woman’s blood is the matter and patient. Therefore, since there would have been a defect on neither part in the state of innocence, it seems that the offspring would always have been produced as a likeness of the father in the male sex.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the slime of the earth is further from the human body than the matter provided by the woman for the formation of offspring conceived by natural generation. But the first man formed from the slime of the earth was produced immediately in perfect quantity and strength of members. Therefore, all the more would the children born from him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, bk. 1, ch. 38 (PL 44:150).) in the text (Sent. II, 20.4(119).3.) that the infirmity of the flesh in children is appropriate to their infirmity of mind. But in the state of innocence there would have been no infirmity of mind. Therefore, neither would children have been born in such infirmity of flesh.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, man is the most noble of all animals. But the offspring of some animals naturally have the functionality of their members immediately after birth. Therefore, the deficiency that is now seen to occur in children is not natural, but rather was introduced due to sin. Therefore, it would not have existed before sin.

On the contrary, every natural power, when matter is multiplied, is strengthened in due proportion, since in a greater quantity the power is greater. But children would have to have been born small on account of the requirements of the mother’s womb, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 20.4(199).3.) Therefore, it was necessary for their motive power, which is material, to be imperfect.

Furthermore, in children the time for generating offspring is delayed until they are finished growing. For as long as growth is vigorous, as it is in the first fourteen years, the generative power does not have its function. This is both because food is not so thoroughly digested that the seed can mature in due manner, and also because what is left over after the work of the nutritive power falls to the use of the augmentative power. But just as there are some members that serve the generative power, so there are others that serve the other powers of the soul. Therefore, for the same reason they would not have had the use of other members either, since for their acts a strengthening and completion of some members is required.

I answer that there is a certain cycle in the life of man: he begins from deficiency, arrives at a state of due perfection, and from there he arrives again at deficiency in the end. Hence some deficiencies follow on man’s beginning in childhood and likewise some follow on his end in old age. Now, before sin, even if man would have lacked an end of life, he would still have had a beginning of life through birth. Hence he would not have had those deficiencies that are ordained for the end of life, such as illnesses and the deficiencies of old age. But there is nothing to prevent his having had those deficiencies that follow on his original beginning, as the Master says in the text. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).4.) Nor would this have been as a punishment, since he would have felt no disadvantage from this, with divine providence governing him. However, there are some who say otherwise, relying on the words of Augustine given in the text. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).3.) But since Augustine asserts nothing on these things, it is more probable to maintain that the course of nature holds wherever that does not conflict with the text of Scripture.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though woman is apart from the intention of the particular nature that acts in this seed, which intends to bring the offspring into perfect likeness to the begetter, she is not apart from the intention of universal nature, just as corruption is not. For without the female there could be no generation to perpetuate the species. Thus, through divine providence some women had to be born for the task of generation, and in equal number with men so that there would be one for one.

Reply Obj. 2: As is said in On the Generation of Animals 18, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 4.1, 766a16–24.) the generation of a woman occurs when the man’s seed cannot prevail over the woman’s matter so as to process it to the final stage and thus bring it into the perfect sex. Now, there can be three causes of such an inability. One is from a weakness of the natural principle of the agent in the seed, which means that the seed lacks heat because it is not fully processed. Hence before their twenty-first year, as the Philosopher says, men for the most part generate females. Such a cause would not have made much difference in the first state, since there coition would not have occurred before the time when perfect generation occurs. Another cause is from the imaginative power, which bodily powers also follow, as is clear from the fact that after imagining something terrible the whole body shakes and trembles. Thus, we see that children are frequently born like those whom the parents imagine in the act of conception, as Jerome also relates about a certain woman who bore a black son due to the fact that at the time of intercourse she saw a black image. And this sort of cause of the generation of a female could have existed in the state of innocence, such that children would be born in this or that sex according to the will of the parents, especially due to the great obedience of the body to the soul in that state. The third cause is from an external principle. For, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 18, (Aristotle, The Generation of Animals 4.1, 766a16–24.) a small change of wind, or of time, or such things, produces a variation in sex. Hence he says that the experience of shepherds is that when the north wind blows males are conceived, and when the south wind blows females are conceived on account of the abundance of moisture. Even if at the time of coition they look to the north or to the south, the aforementioned difference frequently follows. And there could have been such a cause in that first state.

Reply Obj. 3: The body of the first man was formed from the slime of the earth by divine power, to which it belonged to bring him immediately to perfection when it willed. But the propagation of children would have been through the power of nature, to which it does not belong to work suddenly. Thus, offspring would have been brought to the final state of perfection through the succession of time.

Reply Obj. 4: The infirmity of the flesh now found in children includes two things. The first is deficiency of the use of the members. And this is appropriate to their natural infirmity of mind, inasmuch as it still has not arrived at the final completion of knowledge or virtue, which could have been the case even in the first state. Second, it includes also a kind of punishment in hunger and crying. And such infirmity fits with the infirmity of fault. Hence there would have been neither of these in the first state, that is, neither punishment nor fault.

Reply Obj. 5: It is due to man’s noble constitution that he undergoes such deficiency in childhood more than some animals. For because it has a soft constitution, the members of a child are, due to their softness, impotent to carry out their acts. This is also because of the moistness that abounds in childhood, which occurs in human beings more than some animals both due to largeness of the brain, since man has a larger brain in proportion to his body in comparison to other animals, and also on account of the equality of his constitution, since if it is drawn back from it toward a constitution that is more moist, on account of the constitution of his age, then an excessive moistness will arise that especially impedes the movement of the nerves. Hence animals of dry constitution, such as goats, are born with members capable of motion.

Article 2

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been perfect in knowledge immediately upon birth

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.101.1; On Truth, q. 18, a. 7.) It seems that children would have been perfect in knowledge immediately upon birth.

Obj. 1: For every power whose act is impeded by bodily imperfection is a material power. But the intellect is not a bodily act, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a25.) Therefore, it is not naturally impeded from its act due to a deficiency of the body. Therefore, it seems that in the state of integral nature, children would have had perfect knowledge, even if they endured deficiency in their members.

Obj. 2: One might say that the intellect is impeded incidentally by an impediment of the body, inasmuch as it needs to receive from bodily powers.

On the contrary, it seems a perversity of order for the higher powers to receive from the lower ones. But in the first state there was no disorder among the parts of the soul. Therefore, the intellect would not have received its perfection from the sensible powers.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the intellect only needs the senses to acquire knowledge. Hence one who is deprived of sight retains the knowledge of colors received through sight. But in the first state man would have had the habit of knowledge immediately from divine infusion and, perhaps, through the ministry of the angels. Therefore, he did not need the senses to understand and know actually. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the senses of children in the first state would not have been more imperfect than they are now. But now children can perfectly see and hear, and so forth. Therefore, they also could at that time. Thus, the act of the intellect would not have been impeded by a deficiency in the sensible powers.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, man naturally possesses more perfect knowledge than other animals. But immediately upon birth other animals have knowledge of certain things that are beneficial or harmful to them. Hence a lamb follows its mother and flees a wolf. Therefore, all the more should man possess this by his nature. Thus, it seems that the deficiency of knowledge that is in children is not natural, but rather was introduced due to sin. Thus, it seems that before sin they would have had perfect knowledge.

On the contrary, as the Philosopher says in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 247b10.) the soul becomes knowledgeable and prudent by resting. But the body cannot have perfect rest in childhood, on account of its many motions, and especially on account of growth. Therefore, neither can it possess perfect knowledge by nature.

Furthermore, the soul was infused into the body in order that it might acquire in the body the perfection of knowledge and virtue. But this would not be the case if it had on its own the perfect knowledge that it would acquire in the body through the succession of time. Therefore, it does not have perfect knowledge immediately upon being infused into the body. Rather, intellectual virtue needs experience and time, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a16.)

I answer that, as the Master says in the text, (Sent. II, 20.5(120).1.) our position on the perfection of the intellect must agree with our position on the perfection of the body. Hence, since we posited that children in the beginning would not have had the use of their members, we must posit that neither would they have had the use of perfect knowledge. But those who concede the perfection of members can also concede the perfect use of reason. For the brain is the moistest of the members of the body. Hence, if, due to the moistness of that age, children could not have possessed the functionality of the other members, all the less could they have had the full use of the imaginative power, whose organ is in the anterior part of the brain. For abundance of moistness creates a certain confusion of phantasms, as is clear in those who are drunk, due to the large amount of vapor ascending to the head. But phantasms, as is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15–20.) are related to the intellect just as colors are to sight. Hence, just as indetermination and confusion in the act of the power of sight follow on the confusion of colors, so also a certain confusion in the act of the intellective power follows on the confusion of phantasms. And so it is that children in the beginning possess a confused knowledge of some universals and afterwards through the succession of time come to know each thing distinctly. Hence in the Physics 1 (Aristotle, Physics 1.1, 184b12.) it is said that children in the beginning call every man “father,” but later designate each individual.

Reply Obj. 1: The activity of the intellect is not impeded on account of a deficiency of the body through itself, but rather incidentally, as has been said, namely, due to the deficiency of the powers from which the intellect receives.

Reply Obj. 2: The potential intellect reaches its perfection through the reception of its object, which is an actually intelligible species. But just as in the object of sight there is something quasi material that is received on the part of the colored thing, but the formal completion of the visible as such is on the part of light, which makes the potentially visible to be actually visible, so also the object of the intellect is provided or offered quasi materially by the imaginative power. Yet it is completed in formal intelligible being by the light of the agent intellect, and on the basis of this form it is the actual perfection of the potential intellect. Thus, no disorder follows among the parts of the soul if the potential intellect is perfected through species received from phantasms insofar as they are illuminated by the light of the agent intellect, which is a higher power than the potential intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Since a phantasm is the object of the potential intellect, as has been said, (Resp., ad 2.) the soul needs phantasms for its act during its wayfaring state. This is not only that it may receive knowledge from them by motion from the senses to the soul, but also to bring up the habit of knowledge that it has concerning the species of the phantasms by motion from the soul to the senses. Thus, in this way, it may behold actually what it holds in mind through a habit of knowledge. Hence, too, Dionysius says in the Letter to Titus (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistles 9, “To Titus” (PG 3:1103).) that those who receive intellectual revelations surround them with certain figures. Hence when the imagination is injured through injury to the organ, as in the case of the feverish, the intellect is impeded from actual consideration even of what it used to know previously.

Reply Obj. 4: The acts of the external senses in children are distinct, but the imagination is confused on account of the exceeding moistness of the brain. Thus, the activity of the intellect must also be confused. For the intellect does not receive from the external senses immediately, but rather from the internal senses.

Reply Obj. 5: Other animals do not pursue the agreeable and flee the harmful through the deliberation of reason, but rather through a natural instinct of the power of estimation. And such natural instinct also exists in children. Hence they accept nipples and other things agreeable to them, even without being taught by others.

Article 3

Whether in the state of innocence children would be born in grace

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.100.1–2; I-II.81.2; On Truth, q. 18, a. 7; On Evil, q. 4, a. 8; q. 5, a. 7, ad 8; Quodl. V, q. 5, a. 1.) It seems that in the state of innocence children would have been born in grace.

Obj. 1: For according to the Philosopher’s view, as the proposed thing is in the proposed situation, so the opposed thing is in the opposed situation. (From Aristotle’s Topics 2.4, 111b16–23. In this objection, the maxim is being applied to argue that if a man infected with original sin transmits sin, then a just man transmits justice.) But man corrupted through sin transmits sin to his descendants. Therefore, he would also have transmitted to his descendants the grace and justice that he had.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, good is more potent than evil. For evil only acts by the power of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:731).) Therefore, if the evil of the first man was potent enough to infect the whole human race, much more would his grace have justified the whole human race.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Adam demerited not only for himself, but also for us. For through one man sin and death entered the world (Rom 5:12). But merit and demerit proceed from the same power. Therefore, if he had stood firm, he could also have merited for all. Thus, all would have obtained the first grace through his merit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible for there to be punishment without fault. But the punishment of original sin is the lack of the divine vision. Therefore, since in the state of innocence men would have been born without original sin, they would have possessed the merit for the divine vision. But this can only be had through grace. Therefore, they would have been born in gratuitous justice.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, through sin man incurred the necessity of sinning. Therefore, if he had stood firm he would have been confirmed in justice. But, according to Anselm, (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, ch. 10 (PL 158:443).) he would have had to beget children such as he himself was. Therefore, they would all have been confirmed in grace immediately after their birth such that they would not have been able to sin.

On the contrary (6), that which is infused immediately by God, such as the rational soul, is not transfused by the parents. But grace is such a thing, as was proved in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 14, q. 3, a. 1.) Therefore, he would not have transmitted grace or justice to his descendants.

Furthermore (7), Hugh of Saint Victor says (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis fidei, bk. 1, pt. 6, ch. 24 (PL 176:277).) that man, if he had stood firm, would have generated children without sin, though not necessarily heirs to their father’s justice. Thus, it seems that he would not have transmitted justice or grace.

I answer that, as the Philosopher says in On Generation and Corruption 2, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.11, 338b6–19.) there is a certain cycle in generation, though it does not return to the same thing numerically, but rather to the same specifically. For a man generates a man; Socrates does not generate Socrates. So it is that the generated becomes like its generator in everything that pertains to the nature of the species, unless an impediment arises, as is apparent in the case of monsters. But it is not necessary for it to become like its generator in properties that follow on the individual as individual. And if it sometimes occurs that even in some personal properties the child is like the father, this only happens with bodily accidents, such as that a white person generates a white person and someone with gout generates someone with gout. But in perfections of the soul one does not generate one like himself actually; for example, a grammarian does not generate a grammarian—except perhaps with respect to mere aptitude, insofar as, from the body’s makeup, one is more suited than another for knowledge or virtue.

Therefore, it should be known that two kinds of justice could have befitted the first man. One is original, which had to do with the due order of the body under the soul, and of the lower powers under the higher, and of the higher under God. This justice ordered human nature itself in its origin by a divine gift. Thus, he would have transmitted such justice to his children. But there is also another justice that is gratuitous, which elicits meritorious acts. On this there are two opinions. Some say that the first man was created with only natural endowments and not gratuitous ones. And on this position it seems that a certain preparation through personal acts was required for such justice. Hence according to this position, such grace was a personal property on the part of the soul. Thus, it would in no way have been transmitted except by way of a mere aptitude. But others say that man was created in grace. And on this position it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself. Hence grace would also have been infused at the same time as the transmission of the nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Original sin is primarily and through itself a sin of the nature and secondarily of the person, whereas actual sin is properly a sin of the person that is incurred through a personal act. Thus, just as original sin is transmitted and not actual sin, so also original natural justice would have been transmitted and, perhaps, not gratuitous justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The reply to the second objection is the same as to the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Sin does not pass into the descendants from the first parent by way of demerit, as if he merited death for all as well as the infection of sin. Rather, it is by way of a transmission that follows on the transmission of the nature. For the act of a single person cannot merit or demerit for the entire nature, unless it transcends the limits of human nature, as is clear in Christ, who is God and man. Hence children of grace are born from Christ, not through transmission of the flesh, but through the merit of action, whereas from Adam we are born children of wrath through propagation, not through demerit.

Reply Obj. 4: Lack of the divine vision can be understood in two ways: either by negation, and in this way, it is not a punishment, but rather a natural deficiency. For no created nature has of itself the ability to ascend to the vision of God. Or it is by privation, and in this way, it is a punishment, insofar as it implies a certain liability not to see God.

Reply Obj. 5: It seems probable that Adam, even if he had stood firm in the first temptation, would not yet have immediately obtained confirmation in justice. Rather, whenever he was transferred into spiritual life, he would have at the same time received immortality in the body and the confirmation of justice in the soul. So where it says that because he succumbed to temptation he incurred the necessity of sinning, this is true of venial sin, which is not opposed to grace but instead to a certain accident of grace, namely, intensity. But even man existing in a state of sin is not under a necessity of sinning mortally, unless “to sin” is understood as meaning “to be in sin,” just as “to see” is spoken of as “having sight.” For one who is in sin cannot by himself not be in sin such that he can rise out of sin by himself without the infusion of grace. Yet it does not follow that if man after sin cannot not be in sin then a man existing in grace cannot not be in grace. For man by himself can sin, but he cannot rise up by himself. However, if it is conceded that Adam would have been confirmed immediately after overcoming temptation, it still does not follow that he would have begotten children confirmed in justice. For this followed on his personal acts and thus was a perfection pertaining to the person, which does not have to be propagated to the children. So too, if Adam had the gift of prophecy or of working miracles, it would not have been necessary for his children to have had these.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The solution to the other argument is plainly clear as well. For grace is not understood to be propagated to the descendants by the parents as if the children would obtain grace through the seed’s power. Rather, with the transmission of the nature to which, by divine provision, grace was due, grace would have at the same time been infused, according to one opinion.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The other authority cited refers to gratuitous justice, not original justice, according to one opinion. Or it can be understood as referring to works of justice. For even if they had been born with grace, they still could have deviated from the justice of their parents through free will.

Exposition of the text

‘The infirmity . . . is relieved by the decency of marriage,’ (Sent. II, 20.1(116).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 7 (CSEL 28.1:275; PL 34:397).) namely, in such a way that, without marriage, it would have had the shamefulness of fault and punishment, whereas through the nobility of matrimony, with the shamefulness of punishment remaining, the shamefulness of fault is removed.

‘But it was possible for them to have honorable nuptials in paradise.’ (Sent. II, 20.1(116).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 3 (CSEL 28.1:271; PL 34:395).) For in that state marriage would have been more noble than virginity simply due to the fact that, integrity of mind suffering no injury, the fruitfulness of the flesh in matrimony would have taken precedence over the sterility of virginity.

‘Or because God had not yet ordered.’ (Sent. II, 20.2(117).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 4 (CSEL 28.1:272; PL 34:396).) This seems to be false. For God had decreed the marriage act, saying: be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). But what is said here can be understood of a special command relating to a determinate time.

It may be answered that it was required that the children be born small because of the needs of the maternal womb. (Sent. II, 20.4(119).1.) In this reply the Master asserts one thing—namely, that children at the beginning of birth must be small in quantity—but he leaves three things in doubt. One of these is whether they would have been transformed immediately after birth into their perfect quantity. But this could not have taken place by the activity of nature but only by a divine miracle. The second is whether they would be small for a time in such a way that they would have a deficiency of quantity but not a deficiency of strength with regard to the functionality of their members. The third is whether they would have been imperfect in both, namely in quantity and in strength, for a time.