D. 19 - Immortality in the original state of man

Division of the text

Having addressed the establishment of human nature with regard to both sexes, here he pursues the conditions of the established nature with regard to its first state.

This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses what pertains to the preservation of the individual in being through immortality.

In the second, he addresses what pertains to the multiplication of the species through generation, at after these matters, it is to be seen how our first parents, if they had not sinned, would have procreated children. (Sent. II, 20.1(116).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the immortality of man with regard to his first state.

In the second, he inquires about its cause and mode, at it is usual to ask here, since the first man had a mortal and immortal body, whether he had both from the condition of the nature of the body itself, or whether the latter was a benefit of grace. (Sent. II, 19.4(113).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he manifests his intention.

Second, he sets out man’s immortality, at and so the first man, with regard to the nature of his earthly body, was immortal in some respect. (Sent. II, 19.1(110).3.)

Third, he manifests the difference between this first state and the two states that followed, at in the first state, the human body was animal. (Sent. II, 19.2(111).1.)

It is usual to ask here. (Sent. II, 19.4(113).1.) Here he inquires as to the cause and manner of immortality, namely, whether it was through grace or through nature. And concerning this he does three things.

First, he raises the question.

Second, he addresses it using the words of Augustine, at to this it may be said. (Sent. II, 19.4(113).2.)

Third, he cites the discussion of some on this position, at because of this, some say that, unless he made use of that tree, he would not live forever, because he would have sinned. (Sent. II, 19.4(113).3.)

And concerning this he does two things.

First, he lays out the opinion of some, who hold to the aforementioned position simply, saying that grace alone is the cause of immortality.

Second, he objects to the contrary and lays out the contrary opinion, at but at this point it is asked. (Sent. II, 19.5(114).1.)

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he lays out the objection against the first opinion.

Second, from this he cites the contrary opinion, at some say that, if he had not been commanded to nourish himself from that tree, and he fed on the others and not on that one, he would live forever. (Sent. II, 19.5(114).2.)

Third, he puts forth some words of Augustine, (Or rather: Bede.) on whose basis the second opinion seems to have a foundation, at but concerning this immortality of man and what it was like, Augustine (Rather: Bede.) . . . raises a question in the following terms. (Sent. II, 19.6(115).1.)

There he first sets down the words of Augustine, expressing the quality of the power of immortality.

Second, from these he concludes with the second opinion. To strengthen this, he cites another text of Augustine, at and so some say that he had immortality from nature. (Sent. II, 19.6(115).4.)

Question 1

Immortality in the original state of man

Here five questions are asked:

first, concerning the immortality of man with respect to the soul;

second, whether man in the state of innocence was immortal with respect to the body;

third, whether he was impassible;

fourth, on the supposition that he was, whether this immortality and impassibility were through nature or through grace;

fifth, whether this immortality is the same as the immortality of the resurrected.

Article 1

Whether the soul of man is corrupted at the corruption of the body

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.75.6; SCG II.79–84; Quodl. X, q. 3, a. 2; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 14; Compendium theologiae, ch. 84.) It seems that the soul of man is corrupted when the body is corrupted.

Obj. 1: This is first because Ecclesiastes 3:19 says, the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the beasts. But beasts die in body and soul at the same time. Therefore, it seems that man does as well.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, higher differences are participated in uniformly by things that agree in something lower, just as every animal has equal standing to be called “corporeal.” But “incorruptible” and “corruptible” are differences of beings. Therefore, they befit everything in a given genus in the same way. But in all animals corruption occurs through the fact that their form withdraws into non-being. Therefore, it seems that the case is similar in men.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever things possess a single being, one cannot be corrupted without the corruption of the other, since corruption is the change from being to non-being. But form and matter have a single being, since being belongs to the composite, which results from both. Therefore, there cannot be a corruption of matter without corruption of form. But the soul is the form of the body, as is related in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b5.) Therefore, when the body is corrupted, the soul too is corrupted.

Obj. 4: One might say that the soul is both a form and a substance, and that after death it does not remain inasmuch as it is a form, but rather inasmuch as it is a substance.

On the contrary, either the soul is a form through its essence or through some accident in it. If in the first way, then since nothing has more than one essence, and if the soul does not remain after death inasmuch as it is a form, then its essence will be thoroughly annihilated. But if in the second way, then since from the soul and the body a single thing, that is, man, is only constituted inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it would follow that “man” is a being incidentally and does not signify something in the category of substance, which is quite absurd. Therefore, it seems that after death the soul in no way remains.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Philosopher proves in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 281a30–283b20.) it is impossible for something to have the power to exist always that has not always been. For the power for it to exist is always determined to infinite time. Because it can exist for an infinite time, it does not have a power determined to sometimes being and sometimes not being, which is found in everything that begins to be. But the rational soul has not always been, but rather began with the body. Therefore, neither will it always exist, but will instead be ended with the body.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, since no substance lacks a proper activity, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950).) it is impossible for the soul to be separated from the body if it needs the body in each of its activities. But in understanding it needs the body, since it cannot understand without a phantasm, as is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15.) and understanding of this sort is corrupted when the body is corrupted, as is said in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b23.) With respect to its other activities, too, it is plain that they are not carried out without the body. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to remain separate from the body.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, everything that comes from nothing, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:867).) can turn back to nothing. But the soul, since it is a thing created, comes from nothing. Therefore, it seems that it can turn back to nothing. And thus, it is corruptible.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b26.) that the remaining kind of soul, namely, the intellect, is separated from the other parts of the soul as perpetual from corruptible. And in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b19.) he says that the intellect seems to be a kind of substance and is not corrupted. For it is not corrupted through itself, since even lower powers such as the sensitive powers, where the point is less evident, are weakened only due to indisposition of organs. Nor is it corrupted incidentally, since it is not a form superimposed on another, but rather a kind of substance subsisting through itself.

Furthermore, in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a10–1178a8.) the Philosopher proves that contemplative happiness is more worthy than active happiness, since it is more prolonged. But active happiness extends up to the limit of this bodily life. Therefore, contemplative happiness remains even after this life. But it does not remain in the body. Therefore, it is in the soul.

Furthermore, it pertains to God to have care and providence for everything that happens in the world, and especially for what happens concerning men, especially concerning the good and those who are most like God, as can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7,1177b26–1178a8.) that a wise man is most like God and most loving to him. But without injustice on the part of the one who provides and governs, it cannot be that the wicked are not punished and the good not rewarded. Therefore, since injustice cannot have any place in God, every wicked person must be punished and every good person rewarded. But this does not occur in this life, since good things frequently happen to the wicked, and vice versa. Therefore, it seems that this will take place after this life.

Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a27.) the soul is the “place” where species reside. But a place preserves what is placed there. So if the likeness is a good one, then in the intellective soul—which is what he is speaking about—intelligible species must be preserved. But the intellect can understand present intelligible things, just as the senses sense present sensible things. Therefore, the soul has the capability by itself for the act of understanding without receiving something from the body. Thus, it seems that it can exist without the body, on the basis of the rule that Aristotle posits in the beginning of On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a11.) that if the soul has a proper activity without the body then it is separable.

I answer that concerning this there are four positions.

The first is that of the ancient natural philosophers, who did not distinguish the intellect from the senses. Hence just as the activity of the senses depends on the body, so also they held that the activity of the intellect depends on the body, and that the intellective soul follows on a bodily nature. Hence some posited that the soul is fire, some vapor, others harmony, and so forth, insofar as they considered only the senses and motions of animals. Thus, according to them, it was necessary to hold that the soul does not remain after the body.

Now, Aristotle (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a10–b5.) sufficiently demolishes this opinion, showing that the intellect has absolute being independent of the body. This is the reason why it is not called an “act of the body,” why Avicenna says (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 1.) it is not a form submerged in matter, and why the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 27.) says it is not superimposed on the body.

The middle premise for a proof of this is drawn from its activity. For since an activity can only belong to a thing existing through itself, that which has absolute activity through itself must also have absolute existence through itself.

But the activity of the intellect belongs to it absolutely, without a bodily organ’s sharing in this activity, which is clear especially from three reasons.

The first is because this activity has all bodily forms as its objects. Hence the principle of this activity must not be entangled with any bodily form.

The second is because what is understood are universals, but a bodily organ can only receive individuated intentions. (On intentio, see the notes accompanying d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, and d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.)

The third is because the intellect understands itself, which does not occur in a power whose activity is through a bodily organ. The reason for this is that, in keeping with Avicenna, (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 2, ch. 2.) for any power that operates through a bodily organ, the organ must stand as a medium between it and its object. For sight knows nothing except that whose species can be made present in the pupil. Hence, since it is not possible for a bodily organ to stand as a medium between a power and the very essence of the power, it will not be possible for a power that operates by the mediation of a bodily organ to know itself. This proof is touched on in the Book of Causes: every knower who knows his essence returns to his essence by a complete returning. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 15.) As the Commentator explains, that one is said to return completely to his essence whose essence is fixed and stable, not superimposed on another. From all these arguments it is clear that the intellective soul has absolute being independent of the body. Hence, when the body is corrupted, the soul is not corrupted.

The second position was that of Pythagoras and Plato, who, perceiving the incorruption of the soul, erred in holding that souls pass from body to body. The Philosopher disproves this position in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 407b20–26.) showing that the soul is the form of the body and its mover. But a determinate form must have determinate matter and a determinate mover must have a determinate organ, just as any art in an agent uses its proper instruments. Hence this soul can only be the form and mover of this body.

The third position is that of those who say that the intellective soul is corruptible in one qualified sense and incorruptible in another qualified sense. For as regards what in the soul is proper to this body, it is corrupted when the body is corrupted. But as regards what is common to all, it is incorruptible. For they posit that there is a single intellect in the substance of all: some say it is the agent intellect and others the potential intellect, as has been said above. (Above, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.) They hold that this is an incorruptible substance, and that in us there are only the phantasms enlightened by the light of the agent intellect, which move the potential intellect, by which we have understanding insofar as through them we are connected to that separated intellect. From this it follows that if that which is proper is destroyed, with only what is common remaining, then, at the dissolution of bodies, only one single substance remains from all human souls.

The arguments supporting this position and how it can be disproved have been explained above. (Above, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.)

The fourth position is that which our faith holds: that the intellective soul is a substance that does not depend on the body, that there is more than one intellective substance corresponding to the multitude of bodies, and that they remain separate when bodies are destroyed, not passing into other bodies. Rather, in the resurrection each soul assumes the same body numerically that it had laid aside.

Reply Obj. 1: In that passage Solomon is speaking in the customary manner of an orator, appropriating the opinions of different men, both the wise and the foolish, so that in the end it may be apparent to all which is the truer opinion. Hence he concludes as though pronouncing his own opinion: let us all hear together the conclusion of the discourse: fear God, and keep his commandments (Eccl 12:13). (RSV reads the end of the matter; all has been heard. Fear God, and keep his commandments.) This is one of those things that are cited by him in the person of the foolish.

Reply Obj. 2: The same account of corruption is found in all corruptible things as regards what belongs to corruption through itself, but not as regards what is incidental to it. For since corruption is properly the transmutation from being into non-being of the composite, it pertains to corruption through itself that the composite cease to be. Because the composite has being from the union of form with matter, the separation of form from such matter is found in any corruption. But whether the form falls into nothing or not happens to accompany corruption due to the proper account of this or that form. For if it is the sort of form whose being is absolute and independent, into whose being matter is brought to participate due to the fact that it is perfected by such a form, it happens that due to a defect in the matter this sort of composite loses being, inasmuch as the matter is rendered disproportionate to it. Yet the form itself remains in its own being, and so the destruction is of the composite while the form remains. However, if the form does not have an absolute being in which to subsist, but rather exists through the being of the composite, then from the fact that the composite ceases to be, the form also must lose being and is corrupted incidentally.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Commentator says on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5.) the intellect is not called a “form” in the same way as other material forms. And I say that this is true in the following respect (granted that he himself intends something else): namely, that the soul, since it has absolute existence, as its activity shows, does not have existence through the existence of the composite, but rather it is the composite that has its existence through the soul’s existence. Thus, when the body is corrupted, the soul is not incidentally corrupted, like other forms that only exist through the existence of the composite and only have an activity by the mediation of matter.

Reply Obj. 4: More than other forms, the rational soul is said to be a substance and a this-something because it has absolute being. And there is a distinction because the soul can be considered in two ways, namely, as a substance and as a form, and this should not be understood to refer to different things within the soul itself, as if its essence were one thing and the fact that it is a form another, so that being a form would be incidental to it as color is to a body. Rather, the distinction is made with reference to different considerations of the soul. For the fact that it remains after the body is not due to its being a form, but rather to its having absolute being as a subsisting substance, just as man does not have understanding from the fact that he is an animal, but rather from the fact that he is rational, even though both are essential to him.

Reply Obj. 5: From this argument nothing more than this is proved: that what has the power to exist always, while it has this power, does not terminate its being at a given time before or after, as if through this power it could not endure for more than a certain time. And this is also true in the soul, since through the power that it now has, it would have been able to endure for a million years. But because it does not have this power from itself, but rather from another, its duration by this power began when the power was given to it.

Reply Obj. 6: To understand with or without something is spoken of in two ways. Either it is in such a way that the thing is also understood to be a participant in the work, as the organ of the power of sight sees together with the power of sight, since to see belongs to the composite. In this way, the intellect understands altogether without the body, since this activity is not perfected by the mediation of a bodily organ. Or it is such that the thing is the object of the activity, as sight cannot see without color. In this way, even the intellect in the wayfaring state cannot understand without a phantasm, which is related to the intellect as color is to sight, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15–19.) This does not show that the intellective soul has being that depends on the body, since its activity proceeds from it absolutely. Rather, after death it will have another mode of understanding, about which there will be a place for inquiry at the end of Book IV. (In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2; d. 50, q. 1.)

Reply Obj. 7: The ability to turn back into nothing posits nothing in the created thing other than that it possesses a dependency on the principle from which it has being; this is to such an extent that anything created would cease to be if that principle’s influence ceased. But a created thing cannot be called “corruptible” on this basis, as has been said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 2.)

Article 2

Whether man in his first state had the necessity of dying

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; ST I.76.5, ad 1; 97.1; On Truth, q. 24, a. 9; On Evil, q. 5, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, ch. 152; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that in his first state man had the necessity of dying with respect to the body.

Obj. 1: For whatever follows from a necessity of matter is necessary by an absolute necessity, as we find in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 200a1–15.) But the corruption of what is composed of contraries follows from a necessity of matter. Therefore, it was simply and absolutely necessary for the body of man, which was composed of contraries, to be corrupted.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is corruptible with respect to a part is also dissoluble with respect to the whole. But the body of man in his first state was dissoluble with respect to a part. Otherwise it would not have used food (especially because it was formed in perfect quantity), since nourishment is for the restoration of what has been lost. Therefore, it seems also that his whole body was dissoluble.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said in the Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a20.) the need for food is one of those things without which there can be no life. But man in his first state had a life that needed food, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 19.2(111).1.) Therefore, without food he would not have been able to live. Thus, it seems that, in and of himself, he had the necessity of death.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that differ with respect to genus cannot be changed into one another. But the corruptible and incorruptible are this kind of thing, as is said in the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26.) Therefore, it cannot be that man, who is now corruptible, was previously incorruptible.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, “mortal” is one of the constitutive differences of man. But, as is said in the Metaphysics 8, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b33–1044a15.) the addition or removal of any difference gives rise to another species, as occurs in number through addition and subtraction of the unit. Therefore, if man had been immortal before sin, he would have been of another species, which is unfitting.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: the wages of sin is death (Rom 6:23). Therefore, before sin man would not have died. The same can be gleaned from the fact that Wisdom 1:13, 16 says: God did not make death. . . . But ungodly men by their words and deeds summoned death.

Furthermore, punishment does not come before fault. But death is the greatest of punishments. Hence the Philosopher calls it the utmost among terrible things in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117b6–15.) Therefore, before sin there would have been no death.

I answer that, as is related in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 200a10–15.) things that are directed toward an end are established in accordance with the account of the end, as is clear especially in artificial things. Therefore, since man had been established for the end of a beatitude exceeding all the capability of human nature, in his very establishment something had to be conferred on him above the capability of natural principles. Now, from his natural principles man cannot have perpetual being because he is composed of contraries, which is the cause of corruption in things, since form perfects matter in accord with its capacity. Hence it was conferred on him above the condition of his nature that his soul—which was ordered to so noble an end, according to its power above the common order of nature whereby matter receives being in accord with its condition—would communicate perpetual being to matter. Because this power of the soul over the body followed from its being ordered to the end, its effect could only be impeded by the loss of its ordering to the end, which could only happen through sin. And because he was able to sin, his free decision not yet being confirmed in justice, its effect was able to be impeded such that his perpetual being would be interrupted by death. Thus, he was in a certain way mortal, inasmuch as he was able to die, and in a certain way immortal, inasmuch as he was able not to die. But the potential to die could not be reduced to act immediately, without a preceding change of the soul with respect to the act of sin. Thus, it should be said simply that man in that state was immortal and that he was mortal only in a qualified sense, namely, if he were to sin. For, as is said in the Metaphysics 9, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7, 1049a19–25.) a thing is said simply to be in potency to something that can at once be reduced to act by a single mover, just as we do not say that a statue can be made from the earth, but rather from copper, even though the copper comes from the earth.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would follow if the composite had received being in accordance with the condition of the matter and not in accordance with the power of the form, whose being is perpetual. This very thing was conferred on the soul at the beginning above the common course of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that no dissolution or destruction would have taken place in Adam’s body and that he would not have taken food for the restoration of something expended, but instead against the deficiency common to everything created, which is its ability to turn back into nothing. But this seems ridiculous. For on this view heavenly bodies would also need food, and even incorporeal substances. Nor does food even offer any support against this deficiency such that either the dependency of a thing’s being would be taken away or at least diminished. But it is unreasonable that man would need something due to a deficiency which can supply no support against that deficiency.

Thus, it should be said that food was taken for the restoration of what was lost, for the growth of the body to its perfect quantity, and for the multiplication of the species by way of the seed, insofar as the nutritive part is said to serve the augmentative and vegetative parts. And thus, we must hold that a particular loss happened in Adam’s body. Even so, a dissolution of the whole could not have followed, due to the regulative power of the body, which was on the part of the soul, as has been said; so too we find corruption of parts of the elements in parts of the world while the elements are not corrupted in the whole, due to the fact that the order of the lower bodies is preserved by the power of the higher.

Reply Obj. 3: If Adam had not eaten, he would have died. Even so, he could not have died before sin, since this very thing—not eating at the determined time—would have been a sin for him, both because it was against the divinely promulgated precept, by which it was prescribed for him that he should eat from every tree of paradise (Gen 2:17), and because, even without the existence of the precept, it would have been against the law naturally implanted in him. But he would have known the determined time for eating not through the experience of deficiency, but by a judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 4: It is impossible for the corruptible to be changed into the incorruptible, or vice versa, if they are taken as opposed, that is, as founded on the same principles. But the incorruptibility that the first man had was not founded on the principles of nature, but rather on a power divinely granted to the soul. Thus, when he was left to his nature, the mortality that he had in his nature necessarily had to proceed into act, and this death was not opposed to the aforementioned immortality.

Reply Obj. 5: Hence the reply to this is clear. For that immortality did not do away with the principles of nature, in which mortality consists. Hence no constitutive difference is diminished. For man is called “mortal” insofar as “mortal” is his difference, according as he had mortality from the condition of his nature.

Article 3

Whether Adam’s body was passible

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 1; ST I.97.2.) It seems that Adam’s body was passible. (Passibilis does not easily translate into English by means of a single word; the sense here is “able to undergo,” or more generally, “capable of being changed.”)

Obj. 1: For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.11, 424a1.) sensing is a sort of undergoing. But Adam’s body had sensation. Therefore, it was also passible.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, higher bodies are a cause of motions in lower bodies. But Adam’s body was in a way changeable, at least with respect to growth. Therefore, it was receptive to the impressions of higher bodies. But to receive the impression of an agent is to undergo. Therefore, he had a passible body.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sleep is a kind of passion and an immobilization of the sense organs, as the Philosopher shows. (Aristotle, On Sleeping and Sleeplessness 1, 454b10.) But Adam in his first state would have slept. Hence Genesis 2:21 says that a deep sleep was cast on him by the Lord. Therefore, he had a passible body.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there cannot be growth without alteration, nor alteration without passion, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 320a5–322a35.) But Adam’s body was capable of growth. Therefore, it was also alterable and passible.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, when any soft thing comes up against a hard thing, it must yield. But Adam’s flesh was soft. Therefore, he could have been cut by a hard body such as an ax. Similarly, he could have been burned, as it seems, by something extremely hot. And so on for all other bodily passions.

On the contrary, any passion, if increased more and more, breaks down the substance, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Topics 6.6, 145a4.) But the breakdown of substance is the path to corruption. Therefore, since Adam’s body was incorruptible, it could not at the same time have been passible.

Furthermore, since the patient is always less noble than the agent, passion implies a deficiency in the patient. But Adam’s body could not have been subject to any deficiency. Therefore, it was not passible.

I answer that “to undergo” (pati) is spoken of in two ways: in one way commonly, and in another way properly. Commonly, whatever receives something in any way whatsoever is said to “undergo.” In this way, since every receiver lacks that which it receives and is in potency to it and, vice versa, everything that is in potency to something is receptive of something, nothing is excepted from such passibility except that which is pure act, namely, God. For everything created can be called passible insofar as it is able to receive some perfection. But because that which receives a perfection is not properly said to have “undergone” or been “altered” but rather “perfected,” as is said in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a1–b3.) therefore “to undergo” is said properly insofar as “undergoing” follows on an alteration by which something is changed away from what belongs to it by nature, such as if water is heated or air is condensed, and if the body of an animal grows ill, but not if it is healed. Therefore, if “undergoing” is taken in the first sense, Adam’s body was passible. But if it is taken in the second sense, then it should be said that his body was passible in a qualified sense—namely, if he should sin—and that it was impassible simply, just as was said above of “mortal” and “immortal.” (Above, a. 2, resp.)

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of undergoing. One kind follows an action of nature, namely, when the species of the agent is received in the patient with respect to material being, as when water is heated by fire. The other kind follows an action that is after the manner of the soul, namely, when the species of the agent is received in the patient with respect to a spiritual being, as a kind of intention, (On the translation of the word intentio, see notes in d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, and d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.) which is the way a thing has being in the soul, as when the species of a stone is received in the pupil. Such undergoing always contributes to the patient’s perfection. Hence we do not exclude such undergoing from Adam’s body.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the motion of the higher bodies is like a sort of life for all things existing by nature, as is said in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b14.) the undergoing with reference to which lower bodies receive the impression of higher bodies is for their perfection and preservation. Hence neither is such undergoing excluded from Adam’s body.

Reply Obj. 3: According to some, man in his first state would not have slept. But because this cannot be confirmed either by reason or authority, it seems more probable that due to the fact that he had animal life, he would not lack what follows on such life. Now sleep sometimes arises from a natural cause, such as the fomentation of nutrition or moistness of the brain, as in infancy. In this way, it seems that due to both causes there could have been sleep in the first state. But sleep sometimes arises from an unnatural cause, such as fatigue and sickness. And in this way, there would not have been sleep. For sleep in and of itself is an undergoing pertaining to the perfection of the whole animal due to the fact that in sleep natural powers are honed and animal powers are rested so that afterwards they are stronger in their acts.

Reply Obj. 4: In growth there is an alteration of what is added, since it is converted into the substance of what undergoes growth. But it is not necessary for there to be an alteration of that to which the addition is made, through which it departs from the perfection of its nature. What undergoes growth is that to which nutrition is added. Hence growth does not prove the passibility of a body that has undergone growth.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though Adam’s flesh was soft and able to be divided, it was kept safe from this kind of undergoing by his foresight, since he carefully avoided things harmful to him—and if he had not done this, he would have sinned. But through divine providence he was preserved unharmed from all violence.

Article 4

Whether man in his first state was impassible and immortal by nature

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; ST I.76.5, ad 1; 97.1; On Truth, q. 24, a. 9; On Evil, q. 5, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, ch. 152; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that man in his first state was impassible and immortal by nature.

Obj. 1: For it belongs to the same thing to infuse life and to prolong it. But the soul naturally infuses life to the body. Therefore, it also naturally would have prolonged life in the body perpetually.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Augustine says in On Genesis (See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 16 (CSEL 28.1:401; PL 34:466).) and the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a19.) the agent is more noble than the patient. But Adam’s body was the most noble of bodies. Therefore, it could not have suffered from any body in such a way as to be corrupted, even as regards the condition of its nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, corruption occurs in mixed bodies due to the fact that the predominance of one of the elements dissolves the harmony of the mixture. But Adam’s body was most moderate. Therefore, it seems that natural corruption could not have arisen there through the excess of a contrary.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the natural corruption of animals occurs due to using up the natural humors. But in Adam’s body, if something was expended it could be restored through the consumption of food, especially since he knew the quantity of the expenditure and the power of the food consumed and preserved moderation in eating. Therefore, it seems that it would never have naturally been corrupted.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, we say that what follows from the seedlike principles implanted in things happens naturally. But through the power of the tree of life, man would have obtained immortality, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 19.5(114).3 and 6(115).4.) Therefore, since that tree was a natural body, it seems that it could naturally have preserved his life.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:726).) that the demons did not lose their natural endowments through sin. But man did not sin more than a demon. Therefore, if he had possessed immortality naturally, he would in no way have lost it.

Furthermore, differences follow from the essential principles of a species. But “mortal” is a difference of man. Therefore, man’s quality of being mortal arises from natural principles. Therefore, since the nature of the species is the same before sin and after it, it seems that he was naturally mortal before sin as well.

I answer that the immortality and impassibility that man had in his first state were not due to the principles of his nature, as has been said, (Above: a. 2.) but rather due to a privilege bestowed by the Creator. Hence they cannot properly be called “natural,” unless perhaps everything that a nature received when it began is called “natural.” But he was preserved from corruption against the many modes and causes of corruption by several remedies.

For there are four ways the bodies of animals corrupt.

The first, which is commonly found in all generable and corruptible things, is from the fact that material things have a finite power for being. Hence they all must be corrupted within a certain period, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336b10–15.)

The second, common to all mixed bodies, is due to an inordinate excess of one of the contraries. Against both of these deficiencies support was afforded man through a power conferred on the soul so it could perfect its matter in accord with its own condition, so that, just as the soul has unfailing being, so also it would impart unfailing being to the body and a perpetual equality of constitution.

The third mode of corruption is proper to animate bodies, just as they also have a proper mode of generation, namely, from the fact that the heat that is the instrument of the soul consumes the moisture in which there is life. Support was afforded him against this deficiency by two privileges. For eating of the other trees of paradise restored the continual expenditure that occurred in his body, just as the food we use does for us. But because that which is converted from nourishment does not stand under the power of the species as fully as what was there before, since natural powers always grow weaker in acting, in us there must eventually come a diminution where the power of the species grows so weak on account of the mixture of the extraneous that the restoration cannot match the consumption happening. And so, in the end consumption must prevail, as the Philosopher says in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 321a30–b1.) He gives the example of wine that is constantly mixed with water so that in the end it becomes watery. But in this regard the tree of life afforded man support, by the divinely granted power of which the nutrition he consumed was brought into a perfect assimilation. This is also why some say that it conferred power for the restoration of the root moisture that was expended.

Finally, the fourth mode of corruption is through violence by an external agent, such as through the cutting of a sword or burning by fire and things of this sort. Man was preserved unharmed from this mode of corruption by divine providence, through which it was decreed that man would suffer no harm in his body unless he had first strayed from his innocence of mind.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not naturally infuse life into any except a certain kind of body, namely, one that is put together and furnished with organs just so. While this sort of disposition of the body remains, the soul continues to supply its life. But it is not possible for this disposition to endure forever with respect to the power of lower nature. Hence it is not necessary for immortality to be natural.

Reply Obj. 2: It is impossible for there to be something mixed in which one of two contraries does not predominate, for many reasons. The first is that, since the elemental natures are related as though materially to the form of the mixed body, the mixed body could not obtain one form simply unless the elements were aggregated into one in such a manner that one of them would be formal and predominant. The second is because the mixture requires the alteration of elements, which would not occur if their powers were supposed equal. For the power of what alters must exceed the power of what is altered. The third is because, if no element dominated in it, then it would have no natural place, and so neither would it have natural motion. Thus, it would lack a property of natural bodies. The fourth is because in animate things heat specifically is an instrument of the soul, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416b28–29.) Hence heat must predominate. And so, corruption must result eventually in any mixed body.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which is more noble simply from being less noble in some respect. For example, human flesh, which is more noble than a sword with respect to the nature of its species, is less noble with respect to the property of hard and soft, since “hard” names a natural power with respect to a thing, where “soft” indicates a corresponding impotence. In the same way it is less noble than fire, since it has heat potentially, whereas fire has it actually, and act is always more noble than potency. And so it happens that a more noble body suffers from a less noble body naturally, such as when the body of an animal suffers from fire.

Reply Obj. 4: What is converted from nourishment into flesh is always made to partake less and less of the power of the species. This is both because a natural power is weakened by its own action, due to the fact that the agent is at the same time a patient, as is said in the Physics 3; (See Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202b5–10; Physics 8.5, 257b14; The Generation of Animals 4.3, 768b15.) and because what is generated in itself receives the powers of a species more perfectly than what is generated through admixture with another. For example, wine that is generated on the vine is stronger than that which is co-generated from the addition of water converted into wine, and the admixture of the water weakens the entirety of the wine. And so, from the addition of nourishment that is turned into flesh, the power of the species is weakened. This is also because every power is more effective for acting the more united it is, and the more matter is multiplied, the more the natural heat is diffused. Hence it has less power to convert. It is like what the Philosopher says in the On the Parts of Animals 13, (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 3.4, 667a16.) that animals that have a large heart are timid, because the heat in a large heart is dispersed whereas in a small heart it is gathered together. Thus, in a child not only what is sufficient for the restoration of what was expended is converted from nutrition, but also what is needed for growth. But later on, only what is sufficient for the restoration of what was expended is converted. In the end, nature cannot convert as much as is expended. Hence diminution and at last corruption must follow. Thus, by a natural power it cannot happen that man’s life would be perpetually preserved by the consumption of food.

Reply Obj. 5: The tree of life was not the principal cause of immortality, but rather provided assistance for the continuation of life in the way explained above. Thus, immortality should not be judged natural on account of the power of the tree of life, but rather gratuitous on account of the power conferred above nature on the soul, which was the principal cause of immortality. Besides, in living things something is only called “natural” if it follows from an intrinsic principle, even if something is effected in them through the action of certain natural things acting extrinsically, as is clear in burning and other similar cases.

Article 5

Whether the immortality of Adam was the same as the immortality of the resurrected

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.97.3–4; 102.2; SCG IV.83; On Evil, q. 5, a. 5, ad 8, 9; Compendium theologiae, ch. 156.) It seems that the immortality of Adam was not the same as the immortality of the resurrected.

Obj. 1: First, because Augustine says (Rather: Bede the Venerable, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 3:21 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:59): electi habitum immortalitatis, quem in Adam in exordio saeculi perdiderunt, in fine saeculi sint recepturi in Christo, et quidem ampliori gratia.) that there was one immortality that we lost in Adam and another that we hope for in the resurrection through Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is no transmutation from the same into the same. But below it will be said that if Adam had stood firm, he would have been transferred from the immortality that he had into a spiritual life. Therefore, spiritual immortality such as that possessed by the resurrected is not the same as the immortality of Adam.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the impassibility of the resurrected is a kind of dowry for them. But Adam in his first state did not have a dowry, since a dowry is only due to one who is led into the house of the heavenly bridegroom after the manner of a bride. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are caused by different principles must be different. But the immortality of Adam was caused by the grace of innocence, whereas the immortality of the resurrected will be caused by the habit of glory in the blessed. Therefore, it is not the same immortality in both cases.

On the contrary, the immortality of the body follows on the freedom of the will in keeping with its different states. But in all states there is the same freedom of the will. Therefore, there is the same immortality of the body in the first state as in the final state of the resurrected.

Furthermore, it is one and the same potency that is first disposed and then afterwards rendered a necessity. But the body of man in his first state was immortal as though with respect to a disposed potency alone, due to the fact that he was able to die and not to die, while in his final state he will be immortal in respect of a potency that is the necessity of living, since it will be impossible for him to die. Therefore, it is one and the same immortality.

I answer that immortality indicates a certain potential to live forever and not die. But this potential is not found in human nature on the side of the body, except imperfectly, as if by obediential potency alone, since everlasting life cannot be had through the principles of nature. Rather, the completion of this potency comes from a divine gift gratuitously conferred. And so, immortality can be considered in two ways: either with regard to incomplete natural potency, and in this way, there is one and the same immortality just as there is one and the same nature; or with regard to the gift of grace, which is like the formal element completing the aforementioned potency. And in this way, we find a difference between the two immortalities and impassibilities, since the first was through the grace of innocence whereas the final will be through the gift of glory. For in the first state the soul’s dominance over the body was such that nothing in the body could happen that would be adverse to the soul. But in the last state the dominance will be greater, inasmuch as the properties of the soul will in a certain way overflow into the body such that the body will be rendered agile, bright, and spiritual, as well as impassible.

Reply Obj. 1–4, Sed Contra: And through this, the reply to each part is clear.

Exposition of the text

In the first state, the human body was animalistic. (Sent. II, 19.2(111).1; Silano translates animale as “animal,” but “animalistic” is given here to try to capture the distinction Aquinas is making below.) It seems that it will also be such in the third state, since “animal” is the genus of man and should always be predicated of its species.

It should be said that the words “animal” and “animalistic” differ in meaning. For “animal” names the nature of the genus, which is never removed from a species; hence man will always be called an “animal.” But “animalistic” indicates something named after the nature of an animal. However, since naming is properly based on what is formal and perfective of a thing, “animalistic” only belongs to that in which the properties of an animal dominate in some regard. But these are the things that man has in common with other animals. Thus, one who follows brute motions, that is, the passions of the sensitive part, is called an animalistic man by the Apostle (1 Cor 2:14). (RSV reads unspiritual or natural instead of animalistic, which is more faithful to the Greek.) Therefore, because in his first state man had to be occupied with the works of the nutritive and generative parts, without which he could not preserve life, he was said to have an animalistic life.

‘The body is dead because of sin.’ (Sent. II, 19.2(111).1, quoting Romans 8:10.) This seems to be false, and the adjoined explanation insufficient. For what must necessarily happen in the future is still not yet said to be done. Therefore, even if due to sin man incurs the necessity of death, his body should not be called “dead.”

According to some it should be said that man after sin is in a continuous act of failing all the way up to death, in keeping with what is said in Wisdom 5:13: we also, as soon as we were born, ceased to be. Thus, man can be called “dead” right away. But this seems to return to the opinion of Heraclitus, who posited that all things are always in motion. For he was of the opinion that every transmutation that occurs over a long time—for example, growth—divides with respect to all the particles of time such that in any part of time we could assign a part of motion, as is true of local motion, which alone is properly and truly continuous, as the Commentator says on the Physics 8. This is sufficiently disproved by philosophers.

Moreover, it is not possible for two contrary motions to be continuous. Hence since generation and corruption are contraries, between the time of the generation and the corruption of the same thing, there must be a time in which it is neither being corrupted nor being generated. Besides, it still should not be said that he is dead, but instead that he is dying.

Thus, we should say otherwise that Augustine’s explanation is sufficient, namely, that he is called “dead” due to the fact that he bears the necessity of death. For what is necessarily going to happen, even if not yet actual in itself, is still already determined in its cause such that it can in a certain way be said to exist. Hence too, demonstrations are made regarding the rising of the sun and luminaries, the sunset, and eclipses, as of things that always are, because they have determinate causes that cannot fail in any way. Hence Augustine says in On Genesis 9 (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:278–79; PL 34:398–99).) that the body of man is called “dead” after sin in the way physicians call a sick man without hope “dead” on account of the impossibility of avoiding death. But where it says, as soon as we were born, we ceased to be, this should not be understood as though man’s corruptive transmutation were actually present throughout his entire lifetime. Rather, either this is said on account of the brevity of life (for what is very short seems as if it were nothing, as is said in the Physics 2), or because the days determined by God for life are continuously slipping away.

‘Which came to him from the tree of life.’ (Sent. II, 19.4(113).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 6, ch. 25 (CSEL 28.1:197; PL 34:354).) This statement appears to be a return to the myths of the ancients, which the Philosopher derides and disproves in the Metaphysics 3. For they said that the gods who tasted of a certain food became immortal while others remained mortal.

But it should be said that the case is not similar. For they mythically conferred the whole cause of immortality on the food. However, Augustine does not intend that the tree of life would be the principal cause of immortality, but rather something providing a kind of assistance to immortality, as has been said. (Above: a. 4, resp., ad 5.)

Would he have the power not to die? (Sent. II, 19.5(114).1.) To solve this question it should be known that even if he had not received an external precept, internal reason dictated that food should be taken at a determined time. Thus, if he had not consumed food both from that tree and from the others, he would have acted against the natural law and thus would have sinned and would have died.