D. 4 - Condition of the angels with regard to glory and wretchedness

Division of the text

Having shown the condition of the angels at the beginning of their creation with regard to nature and with regard to fault and innocence, here he inquires as to their condition with regard to glory and wretchedness. This is divided into three parts.

In the first, he raises the question.

In the second, he settles it, at to this it can be said that they were created neither in blessedness nor in misery. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).1.)

In the third, he wraps up what he had said, at it has been shown what the angels were at their creation. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).7.)

The second part is divided into two parts in accord with two proposed questions.

The first of these asked about beatitude.

The second asked about the perfection connected with beatitude, which he settles at in regard to the question as to whether they were created perfect or imperfect, it can be said that they were perfect in some way and imperfect in another. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).5.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he settles the question with regard to the wicked.

Second, he settles it with regard to the good, at but perhaps the good ones who remained steadfast had foreknowledge of their blessedness. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).2.)

Third, after inquiry, he confirms the solution, at from the above, it follows that the angels who fell to ruin were never blessed. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).4.)

Concerning the second, he does two things.

First, he lays out an approach by which it seems that the good angels were created blessed.

Second, he rules it out: but Augustine says these things more by way of opining and searching than asserting. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).3.)

Question 1

The condition of the angels with regard to glory and wretchedness

Here three questions are asked:

first, whether the angels at the beginning of their creation were blessed or wretched;

second, if not, whether they foreknew their beatitude or wretchedness;

third, whether they were created perfect in grace.

Article 1

Whether the angels were created blessed

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST 1.62.1.) It seems that the angels were created blessed.

Obj. 1: First, this seems to be from Augustine, who says in On Church Doctrine (Rather: Gennadius of Marseilles (d. ca. 496 AD), Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 29 (PL 42:1218).) that the angels who persevered in that beatitude in which they were created possess, not by nature but by grace, the fact that they will never be changed. But the good angels, about whom he is speaking, persevere in the beatitude of perfect glory. Therefore, it seems they were created in it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whole substance of beatitude consists in the vision of God. Hence John 17:3 says, this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. But the angels saw God at the beginning of their creation. Otherwise, they would not have known created things in the Word by the morning knowledge that Augustine discusses. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 30 (CSEL 28.1:128; PL 34:316).) Therefore, it seems that they were blessed when created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it was said above that the angels had a knowledge of God at the beginning of their creation. But they did not know in a mirror dimly, as we do now, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:12. For the obscurity of darkness belongs to reason shadowed on the basis of space and time, inasmuch as it receives knowledge from the senses and phantasms by inquiry. Therefore, they knew through species and thus were blessed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it belongs to the power of one who inquires and compares to arrive at primary things from secondary things, and to arrive at causes from caused things. But the angelic intellect is not of this sort. Quite the contrary: it understands in a God-like manner without inquiry, as we understand first principles. Therefore, it seems that they knew God not from created things, but in himself, and thus they possessed the vision of glory.

On the contrary, confirmation in one’s state is part of the very account of beatitude. Hence Boethius says: why boast, my friends, so often of my joy? For one now fallen never stood secure. (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 1, poem 1 (CCSL 94; PL 63:586).) But the angels at the beginning of their creation were not all confirmed in their state, as the fall of some of them shows. Nor were some of them confirmed and others not, since a distinction in lacking benefits conferred by God could not have come before fault. Therefore, it seems that they were not created blessed at the beginning of their creation.

Furthermore, the good angels became blessed and the wicked angels became wretched at the same time. Therefore, it seems that since the wicked angels were not wretched at the beginning of their creation, just as they were not sinful, neither were the good angels blessed at the beginning of their creation.

I answer that beatitude or happiness consists in the most perfect activity of one possessing reason and intellect. But the most perfect activity of intellect consists in the contemplation of the highest intelligible object, which is God. Hence for God, as well as for angels and also for man, ultimate happiness and beatitude is the contemplation of God. This is not only according to the saints, but also according to the philosophers.

Now, this activity cannot be equally present in all. Hence the beatitude of each consists in the degree to which he attains this activity in keeping with the manner of his perfection. Thus, it is found in different ways in God, in angels, and in man in consideration of their natural characteristics. For God sees himself through his own essence and not through a likeness to himself. Next, the intellect of an angel sees him with natural knowledge through likeness to him acquired in him. Hence in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 8.) it is said that an intelligence knows what is above it inasmuch as it is created by it. Hence it participates in a likeness of the cause after its own manner. But the human intellect only arrives at this vision by natural knowledge through a likeness received from created things, inasmuch as through the things that have been made it knows the invisible things of God, as is said in Romans 1:20.

These three types of vision differ, to speak in a sensible manner, as the eye sees light existing in the pupil, not through any species of it. And this is like the vision by which God sees himself. But the vision by which an angel sees God is like the vision by which one sees a man through the likeness immediately received from him. Finally, the vision of the human intellect by which it sees God is like the vision by which one sees a man by peering into a mirror in which the image of the man is reflected. For this reason we are said to see in a mirror (1 Cor 13:12). The angels were created in this beatitude of the divine vision that is naturally due to them. And this is their perfection at that time.

But there is another perfection at which they cannot arrive by their nature, but of which they are still capable, namely, to see God in his essence and not through a received likeness, in order that their beatitude be conformed to the divine beatitude. They were not created in this beatitude, but rather they arrived at it while the others fell.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Rather: Gennadius of Marseilles (see note at obj. 1 above).) calls the natural vision of God “beatitude,” although through it they were not blessed simply. For they were capable of greater perfection, but rather in a qualified sense, namely, as befit that time, just as the Philosopher says that some are blessed in this life, not simply, but rather as men. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1101a21.)

Reply Obj. 2: They saw the Word through the likeness of the Word impressed on them. But their ultimate beatitude does not consist in this, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: That knowledge is not properly said to be “in a mirror,” just as a man is not said to see “in a mirror” that whose likeness remains in his eye—unless the eye itself in which the species of the thing is reflected were called a “mirror.” Nor yet is it the blessed vision, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: The turning of the cognoscitive power to the species of the thing, and its turning to the thing itself, are one turning. Hence the fact that someone knows a thing through the species of the thing that he has within him does not mean that he makes a comparison. Rather, he is said to make a comparison when he grasps one thing from the likeness of another thing. Thus, it is clear that we need not hold that the angels’ intellect is comparative or inquisitive.

Article 2

Whether the angels foreknew their wretchedness or beatitude

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the angels foreknew their wretchedness or beatitude.

Obj. 1: For angels, as too for men, wretchedness arises from sin. But men’s sin is sometimes announced to them in advance, as for example when the Lord foretold to Peter his future sin (Matt 26:75). Therefore, it seems that he should also have announced to the angels their fall in advance.

Obj. 2: In the Twelve Degrees of Humility, Bernard says (Bernard of Clairveaux, Sermones de tempore, serm. 5 (PL 183:355–56).) that the devil foresaw that he would have dominion over the wicked and for this reason wished to set up his throne in the region of the north, as is said in Isaiah 14:13. But he only became the prince of the wicked through sin. Therefore, it seems that he foreknew his sin.

Obj. 3: Before sin the angels experienced no sorrow or pain. But for those who are holy, to be uncertain of one’s salvation is a great cause of pain, as Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 5, ch. 7 (CCSL 143; PL 75:685).) on the passage: to a man whose way is hidden, and God has surrounded him with darkness (Job 3:23). Therefore, it seems that the good angels were certain of their salvation, and thus also the wicked were certain of their fall.

Obj. 4: The more remote something is from the knower, the less it is subject to its knowledge. But the things of which the angels are not causes—such as the natural things of which they had knowledge—are more distant from them than the motions of free will by which they are turned toward or away from God, of which they themselves are the causes. Therefore, they foreknew their conversion toward or defection from God.

On the contrary, whoever is certain of a future evil cannot at the same time hope for the contrary good. Therefore, if the angels who fell had foreknown their fall, they would have had to despair of receiving beatitude. But then they would have been in despair before they had sinned, which is a problem.

Furthermore, everything that someone apprehends must either be agreeable with his will or disagreeable. But the evil of fault cannot be agreeable to the will of a sinner without sin, nor can something known disagree with the will without sorrow and pain. Therefore, if they foreknew their fall, pain or fault in the angels would have had to precede their first fault, which is impossible.

I answer that something can be foreknown in two ways: either with certain knowledge, as in the case of things that have infallible determinate causes, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow, or with conjectural knowledge, as in the case of things that have causes determinate for the most part, as a physician foreknows future health and a sailor foreknows a storm. Therefore, since the fall or the confirmation of the angels depend on free will, which is not a cause determined to a single outcome, they could not have foreknowledge of it with certitude except from God who perceives all things in a present manner. But even so, they could have presumed as a conjecture that they would all attain beatitude, since their nature was more inclined to this, as being established for it. But they could not have foreknown their fall on their own, either as a conjecture or with certitude, but only the potential for falling. Nor was it appropriate for it to be revealed to them by God, lest pain precede fault. Nor, again, was it appropriate for their confirmation in grace to be revealed to the good, lest their distinction precede their fault, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).3.) However, if there had been a revelation to both sides, they would have received it not with certainty, as it existed in God, but rather in their own manner, as a sort of cautionary statement.

Reply Obj. 1: Peter received the Lord’s announcement in advance not with certitude, but rather as something said as a warning. Moreover, the situation with men is not like with the angels. For man falls in a reparable manner, and so foreknowledge of his fall does not compel him to despair, as in the case of an angel, whose fall is irreparable.

Reply Obj. 2: When a consequence can come about through many different antecedents, it can happen that the consequence is known without the antecedents being determinately known. For example, Joseph foresaw his dominion over his brothers, but he did not see being sold or the other circumstances which resulted in his dominion. So also the demon could have foreseen its preeminence over the wicked without foreknowing its fall, since it could have been the prince of the wicked even while existing as good.

Reply Obj. 3: The conjectural knowledge, by which they presumed concerning their goodness, removed all doubt and anxiety from them, along with the fact that there was not anything in them inducing them to fall, as there is in us.

Reply Obj. 4: They could not have known in their causes those natural effects that do not have causes determined to a single outcome, but only those that proceed from natural causes determined to a single outcome. Thus, they knew in themselves the things that were determinate in their nature, but not those that depended on free will, as has been said.

Article 3

Whether the angels were created in grace

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST 1.62.3.) It seems that the angels were not created in grace.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CSEL 28.1:7; PL 34:248).) by “heaven,” which is mentioned as the first thing created, may be understood formless spiritual nature as it can exist in itself without having been turned toward the Creator. But this turning to God takes place through grace. Therefore, it seems that the angelic nature was created formless, without grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was related above in the text, (Sent. II, 4.1(19).7.) the angels could stand through what they received at the beginning of creation, but they could not progress. But through grace one can merit an increase of grace and thus progress. Therefore, they were not created in grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was related above, Augustine says (Sent. II, 3.4(16).9, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 23 (CSEL 28.1:355; PL 34:441).) that the devil fell as soon as he was made, not from what he received, but from what he would have received if he had willed to submit to God. But he fell from grace. Therefore, he had not yet received grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine, the light first created signifies the angels’ grace. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 3, and in other places (CSEL 28.1:7; PL 34:248).) But as soon as the light was made it was separated from the darkness, which refers to the angels who sinned. Therefore, since no angel was darkness through sin at the beginning of its creation, it seems that neither were they light through grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, since at the beginning of creation there was no distinction between angels with regard to grace and fault, if some were created in grace then all would have been created in grace. But those who fell were never in grace. For since there would not have been in them anything drawing them away, they would have followed the impulse of grace directing them to God. Therefore, it seems that none of them were created in grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says that God was at the same time creating nature and bestowing grace. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 12, ch. 9 (CCSL 48; PL 41:357).) Therefore, at the beginning of creation they had grace.

Furthermore, on the passage, they love the husks of the grapes (Hos 3:1), a gloss says (Jerome, Commentariorum in Osee, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 25:842).) that the demons were created with a great richness of the Holy Spirit of which they were deprived through sin. But the richness of the Holy Spirit is grace. Therefore, they were created in grace.

Furthermore, it pertains to the divine liberality that God pours out grace on all who are capable of grace, unless something resistant is found in them, even more abundantly than he grants natural form to any disposed matter. But the angels had the motion of free will at the beginning of their creation and there was no impediment in them. Therefore, it seems that he infused grace in them at once.

Furthermore, no one could merit grace through natural means, though one could prepare himself for grace through them. But preparation for grace can take place through even a single motion of the free will, as is clear in the case of contrition. Therefore, it seems that since they had the motion of free will at the beginning of their creation, there would be no reason for the conferral of grace to be deferred. Thus, it seems they possessed grace at once.

I answer that there are two opinions regarding this. Some say that the angels were created not in grace but in natural endowments alone, and this is the more common opinion. Others say that the angels were created in grace. However, we cannot pin down by effective argument which of these opinions is more true, because the beginning of created things depends on the Creator’s simple will, which is impossible to investigate by reason. Nevertheless, we can consider one side as more probable according to how well it fits with God’s other works. For the opinion that posits that the angels were created in natural endowments alone agrees with the opinion that posits that all things were created at the same time in matter, though not through distinct species. Just as formless matter is related to bodily forms, so also angelic nature is related to grace. But the opinion that posits that the angels were created in grace agrees more with the opinion that posits that all things at the beginning of creation existed as specifically distinct. I prefer this opinion more, though without prejudice to the other side, since it seems that more authorities among the saints, especially with regard to the grace of the angels, agree with this position.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the distinction of works that is recounted at the beginning of Genesis does not designate a succession of time, but only the order of nature. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 34 (CSEL 28.1:133; PL 34:319).) Hence it is not necessary that the substance of heaven’s body preceded the creation of light in time, or that the angelic nature preceded grace, but only in the order of nature, insofar as in the process of generation the imperfect comes before the perfect and with regard to the same thing potency comes before act, even though act precedes potency simply.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels are said not to have been able to progress, not because they could not merit, but rather because they could not be transferred to glory through their own power, without a fuller infusion of light.

Reply Obj. 3: We must say that the angels who sinned fell from something they possessed, whether they were created in grace or not—at the least, they fell from innocence or natural uprightness. Thus, when it is said that they fell from what they had not yet received, this must be taken as referring to the fall from glory, which is clear from what is stated before: they did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, etc.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as in the transparent there is something of the nature of light, even though present imperfectly, that is completed when it becomes actually luminous, so also at the beginning of the creation of the angels there was in them something of the nature of the light, either of grace or at least of the natural intellect alone. Hence when it is said, let there be light, this should be understood of perfect light, which is glory, which was not in the good prior to their being separated from the wicked, if we understand the heavens to be made prior in time to light. But if we understand it to have been made prior not in time but in nature, as Augustine explains in On Genesis 1, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CSEL 28.1:5; PL 34:247).) then it can be understood of the light of grace. And then by “darkness” we will understand not the sin of the angels, but rather the formlessness of the bodily creation, which remained in need of formation, as Augustine himself explains in the same place.

Reply Obj. 5: The inclination of grace to the good does not necessitate that one who has grace cannot be diverted from the good, even if he has nothing to draw him away, unless it is the perfect grace that joins one to the end, as is the case in the blessed. For one who has grace does not act out of a necessity of grace any more than out of a necessity of nature, which is also ordered to the good, but rather out of the freedom of the will.

Reply Sed Contra: But those who maintain the other opinion respond to the authorities by explaining grace not as meaning sanctifying grace, but rather as some grace gratuitously given, such as perspicacity of intelligence or something of this sort in men. And to the other arguments, they say that God deferred giving grace in order to show how great a distance there is between the power of nature and the power of grace, and in this way, the created thing would be more inclined to see the benefit of grace as something received.

Exposition of the text

Who did not know what would happen to them. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).2.) For it pertains to the account of happiness that the one who is happy is not ignorant of what pertains to him, even though having knowledge of everything is not required for happiness.

That is completely and universally perfect to which nothing is ever lacking. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).6.) What the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b30–33.) agrees with this, that the being that is simply perfect is the one that has in itself all the perfections found in the genera of things. And in the same place the Commentator says that this perfection is found in God.