D. 9 - Distinctions among the orders of the good angels

Division of the text

Having considered what pertains to the state of the creation of the angels, and what pertains to their distinction through conversion and defection, here he examines what pertains to the dignity of the good angels. And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he takes up the distinction between the orders.

In the second, he considers certain acts that follow on the distinct orders, at it is also to be investigated whether all those celestial spirits are sent to announce external things. (Sent. II, 10.1(54).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the distinction among the orders of angels.

In the second, he shows how men are taken up into the orders of angels, at it is also to be noted that we read that a tenth order is to be restored from men. (Sent. II, 9.6(52).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows the distinction among the orders.

In the second, he shows the beginning of the distinction in time, at it now remains to enquire whether these orders were distinguished in this way from the beginning of creation. (Sent. II, 9.4(50).1.)

In the third, he shows the manner of distinction with regard to equality, at moreover, it is suitable to consider whether all angels of the same order are equal. (Sent. II, 9.5(51).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he sets out the distinction between orders.

Second, he gives the reason for the distinction, at here it is to be considered what an order is. (Sent. II, 9.2(48).1.)

Third, he gives a reason for why they are named, at these names were not given to them for their own sake, but for ours. (Sent. II, 9.3(49).1.)

And concerning this latter he does two things.

First, he determines the truth.

Second, he rules out an objection, at but here the following question arises. (Sent. II, 9.3(49).3.)

It is also to be noted that we read that a tenth order is to be restored from men. (Sent. II, 9.6(52).1.) Here he shows how men are taken up into the orders of angels. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he shows in what manner they are taken up, both with regard to the single tenth order and with regard to all nine.

Second, he shows the number of those who are taken up, at for it is not in proportion to the number of those who fell, but of those who remained, that men are allowed into blessedness. (Sent. II, 9.7(53).1.)

There he does two things.

First, he shows the truth.

Second, he rules out something contrary to it, at and yet, it is held by some that men shall be restored in proportion to the number of the angels who fell. (Sent. II, 9.7(53).2.)

Question 1

The distinctions among the orders of the good angels

Here eight questions are asked:

first, what is a hierarchy;

second, the acts of the hierarchy;

third, the distinction among the hierarchies and orders;

fourth, the naming of the distinct orders;

fifth, the distinction or equality of persons existing in one order;

sixth, the connection of the hierarchies;

seventh, the beginning of the orders;

eighth, their restoration accomplished through men.

Article 1

Whether the definition of hierarchy given by Dionysius is fitting

To the first we proceed as follows and propose Dionysius’s definition in the Celestial Hierarchy 4: a hierarchy is a divine order, knowledge, and action approaching likeness to God, to the degree possible, which in accord with the illuminations divinely implanted in it ascends proportionately to the likeness of God. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:163).) Now, it seems that this is unfitting.

Obj. 1: For a definition should contain nothing superfluous. But he elsewhere defines a hierarchy by saying: a hierarchy is unity and likeness to God insofar as possible. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:119).) Therefore, since in the previously assigned description, many things besides the divine likeness are put forth, it seems that they are superfluous.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a part should not be included in the definition of the whole, at least as a genus. But an order is a part of a hierarchy, since each hierarchy contains three orders. Therefore it seems unfitting to say: a hierarchy is an order.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among the angels there is not only an order with respect to knowledge, but also with respect to other gifts of nature and grace, all of which are present more excellently in the higher than in the lower. Therefore, just as he includes knowledge, he should have included the other gifts.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, action pertains to those who minister. But the hierarchy is common to those who minister and those who attend. Therefore it seems that it describes the common through the proper, which is against the art of definitions.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the same thing cannot be placed in different genera that are not arranged as subaltern. Therefore, since knowledge, action, and order are not subaltern to one another, it seems that they are unfittingly assigned to a hierarchy as genera in the aforementioned description.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in the divine persons there is not an order of knowledge and action, since the three have one knowledge and one action. But it belongs to the account of hierarchy that there be an order of knowledge and action. Therefore, it seems that it does not approach likeness to God.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, god-likeness and divine likeness are the same thing. Therefore, there seems to be a repetition of words when he says ascending to divine likeness after saying approaching likeness to God.

I answer that “hierarchy” means “sacred principate,” from hieron (“sacred”) and archon (“prince”). But every principate requires degrees of power and of end, so in a sacred principate these things must be sacred and divine. Now, in a secular principate the end is that the subject multitude be peacefully disposed to the good intended by the prince, as is clear in the case of an army, which, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a13.) is ordered to the good of its leader as to a last end; similarly, in a sacred principate the end must be assimilation to God. But the angels can only obtain this end through ordered action, for which ordered power and directing knowledge are needed. Thus, the definition of hierarchy includes order, which expresses degrees of power, knowledge as directing, action as leading to the end, and likeness to God as the end intended.

Reply Obj. 1: The end is the cause of causes. Consequently, a definition based on the end is the most formal of all definitions and is the means of demonstrating the others. Thus, the description of hierarchy as unity and likeness to God is like a definition that is a means of demonstration. But this phrase: a hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action, if nothing is added, is like the conclusion of the demonstration, since it includes the essential principles of hierarchy. Hence Dionysius draws it as a conclusion from the aforementioned. But the definition set out is complete, since it encompasses both. Hence it is like a demonstration differing in position.

Reply Obj. 2: “Order” can be understood in two ways: either as naming one rank only, as when those who belong to a single rank are said to belong to a single order—understood this way, order is a part of hierarchy—or as naming the relation among different ranks, as when the ordering itself is called “order.” This latter is, as it were, an abstract way of understanding it. And this is how it is included in the definition of hierarchy, whereas in the first way it is taken concretely, such that an ordered rank is called a “single order.”

Reply Obj. 3: The soul introduces one kind of effect, such as being, in the body immediately in all its members, inasmuch as it is the form of the body. But it introduces another kind of effect, such as motion, in one member by means of another. In the same way, God introduces immediately the life of nature, grace, and glory in all the orders of the celestial hierarchy, but in order to carry out the divine offices he moves them in an ordered fashion: the middle-ranking through the first, and the last through the middle-ranking. This is why neither nature, nor grace, nor glory is included in the definition of hierarchy, but rather knowledge as directing action in the divine offices.

Reply Obj. 4: The action carried out concerning us is proper to those who minister, and this is not included in the definition of hierarchy. But the action of knowing, as signifying the transfusion of perceived light coming from God to another, is common to all.

Reply Obj. 5: Dionysius does not intend to put the definition in order, but rather to touch on the essential principles of hierarchy. Of these, one is like a material principle, standing in the role of genus, namely, “order.” But the others are like formal principles, completing the account of hierarchy by way of difference. Of these the first is the very reception of the divine light, which is implied in the word “knowledge,” since this knowledge follows on receiving the divine light. The second is its communication to another, which “action” designates. And the third is the obtaining of the end, in “likeness to God.” In this way, it is clear that what follows is always formal with respect to what precedes. Hence if a definition should be given in order, it can be said in this way: “a hierarchy is a divine order according to knowledge, action, and so on.”

Reply Obj. 6: According to some, there is a kind of hierarchy among the divine persons, which they call super-celestial, which follows the order of nature in the divine persons, to which the celestial hierarchy of angels and the sub-celestial hierarchy of men are likened. But this does not work, nor does it follow Dionysius’s intention, since it is heretical to posit among the divine persons a preeminence of one over another, or that the Father purifies the Son or illuminates or perfects him, or that what belongs to the Father is received by the Son in an inferior way. But these are required by the account of hierarchy, according to Dionysius’s intention and according to the meaning of the word. Thus, we must say otherwise, namely, that it “approaches God-likeness” inasmuch as perceived light is likened to the divine clarity, not indeed as on a level but in its own proportion—which is why he says, insofar as possible. And every created perfection is a likeness to the divine goodness, but some are more clearly so than others.

Reply Obj. 7: A receiver can be likened to some agent or what makes an impression in two ways: either with respect to form alone, or with respect to form and action, just as when something is illuminated by the sun in such a way that it also illuminates other things after a likeness to the sun, as does the moon. This is assimilation that agrees in both form and action. But some things are illuminated in such a way that they shine in their very selves, but do not transfuse light to another, such as colored earthly bodies, since color is something of light. This is also how angels are likened to God by the reception of the divine light. This assimilation is shown where he says, approaching likeness to God insofar as possible, as well as in the transfusion of the same to others, which is shown when he says, in accord with the implanted illuminations, that is, ascending to the likeness of God in accord with the power and rule of the illuminations given them by working on others in their own proportion. This is why he calls it ascent, since the perfection of likeness consists in this, and of all possible likenesses it is more divine to become co-workers with God, as Dionysius says in the same place. This is why even philosophers posited that the end of the intelligences moving the spheres (as they understood it) was an assimilation to the divine in causation. And so, it is clear that the first likeness corresponds to knowledge, while the second corresponds to action.

Article 2

Whether one angel purifies another

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that one angel does not purify another.

Obj. 1: For purification only happens through grace. But God alone gives grace. Therefore, he alone purifies.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one is only purified from uncleanness. But no uncleanness remains in the good angels after the fall of the wicked. Therefore, there is no purification there.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems that the illumination of one does not come about through another. For God alone informs the mind, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:876).) But an angel can only be illuminated if its mind is informed. Therefore, it seems that one angel does not illuminate another.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as it says in the Gospel, you have one master, the Christ (Matt 23:10). On that passage Augustine says, he alone is the one who teaches from within. (Augustine, In epistulam Ioahnnes ad Parthos tractatus X, tract. 3 (PL 35:2004).) But illumination occurs by way of a kind of teaching. Therefore, it seems that God alone illuminates the mind of angels.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, all the angels possess their beatitude from the fact that they see God immediately. But God is the sufficient medium for knowing all things. Therefore, it seems that one does not illuminate another.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, if one illuminates another, it does this either by creating a new light in its mind or by transmuting light received from God. But the first is heretical, since angels are not creators. But the second seems impossible, unless we posit a medium to carry the illumination, as in the case of bodily illumination. But in this case it is not easy to come up with such a thing. Therefore, it seems that one does not illuminate another.

Obj. 7: Again, it seems that one does not perfect another. For, as has been said above, (Sent. II, 4.1(19).5–6.) the perfection possible in an angel belongs to nature either as created or as glorified. But neither can be in an angel from another angel. Therefore, it seems that one does not perfect another.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, no perfection can be in an angel except via the reception of divine light. But this reception happens by illumination. Therefore, perfection does not differ from illumination.

I answer that action can only be in accord with the condition of the thing whose action it is. But since a hierarchy is perfected in knowledge, as is clear from the definition, hierarchical action must consist in the transfusion of knowledge. Hence Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) that the reception of divine knowledge is purification, illumination, and perfection. Now, two things concur in the acquisition of knowledge, namely, the removal of its contrary or privation, and its fulfillment—as is the case in the acquisition of any form. But the fulfillment of knowledge consists in two things, like bodily vision, for which is required light whereby what is visible may be seen, and on the basis of which knowledge of the visible thing itself follows. Similarly, intellective knowledge is gained through intellectual light. Therefore, with regard to the removal of privation, there is purification. With regard to the influx of light, there is illumination. But with regard to the consequent knowledge, to which the light is directed as its ultimate term, there is perfection. For this reason Dionysius calls angels “perfecters,” following the tradition of the sacred teachings.

Reply Obj. 1: Purification from fault happens through grace, but purification from ignorance through the light of teaching. This can also be from one another rather than from God.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels are not purified from uncleanness, but rather from the confusion of unlikeness, as is said in the Celestial Hierarchy 3, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:163).) or from ignorance, as is said in the Celestial Hierarchy 6. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:210).) These two amount to the same thing. For confusion of the intellect stems from the fact that it is in potency with respect to more than one thing. In this it is unlike the first, namely, the divine, intellect, which has no admixture of potentiality. Therefore, through the light received from God, by the mediation of a higher angel, the intellect of an angel is freed from this confusion of unlikeness inasmuch as it is brought to a single ending point, to which it more strongly adheres to the degree that the means of knowledge is more efficacious. This is clear in the case of one who does not know which side of a contradiction to choose. But with the understanding of a probable means, he is more inclined to one side, and with the addition of a demonstrative means, he is confirmed in it.

To the question then asked about illumination, we must say that concerning this some have formed contrary opinions. For some said that the lower angels never see the essence of God, but rather take knowledge of God through the illumination of the higher angels, who see him immediately. Against this is what is said, their angels always behold the face of my Father (Matt 18:10), speaking of the angels of a lower order assigned to the guardianship of men. Others say, on the contrary, that all angels receive illumination immediately from God, denying that the lower are illuminated by the higher. They deny the whole of what Dionysius hands down on the angels as proved by authorities of Sacred Scripture and consonant with the doctrine of philosophers.

Hence, choosing a middle way, we say that all angels do see the divine essence immediately by the fact that they are blessed. But it is not necessary for one who sees the cause to see all its effects, unless he comprehends it regarding its entire power, as God knows all things in comprehending himself. But of the others who see him without comprehending him, each one knows more things in him to the degree that he grasps him more fully by the enjoyment of glory, just as one who has a better understanding of speculative principles can draw more conclusions from them. Hence in the divine effects pertaining to the state of nature or grace that are carried out through the offices of angels, the higher illuminate and instruct the lower, as is expressly related in the Celestial Hierarchy 7 (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:210).) and in the beginning of On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:695).)

Reply Obj. 3: And so, to the third objection that God alone can form the mind, we must say that it is true of justification through grace, but this kind of formation is not relevant to the present discussion.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as in natural actions a lower agent has efficacy in the production of an effect only through the power of the first agent, which makes an even stronger impression on the effect, so also in intellectual actions a lower illuminator can effect nothing except through the power of the first illuminator. For this reason it is God himself who teaches all—and yet illumination is not excluded from others, just as natural action is not excluded from natural agents.

Or we may say that one who leads another to the knowledge of a thing is properly said to teach. But just as man arrives at the sensible knowledge of color from two things, namely, from the visible object and from the light under which it is seen (hence one who provides light and one who presents an object are both said to point it out), so also two things are required for intellectual knowledge, namely, the intelligible object itself and the light through which it is seen. Thus, someone is said to teach in two ways: either as proposing the intelligible object, or as providing the light for understanding.

Now, there are two lights. One is intrinsic and connatural to the intellect, to which is likened the light that belongs to the composition of the eye. God alone is said to teach through the conferral of this light. The second light is one that comes over and above to strengthen the connatural light, which is like the light of the sun or a candle in physical light. And in this way, an angel can illuminate another angel or even a man to know something. However, a man cannot teach in this way, since in him intellectual light is most weakly received. Still, some say that in no way can an angel teach as providing the light, which seems to be explicitly contrary to what Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:271).)

Similarly, an intelligible object is also of two sorts. There is one for the understanding of which a man’s intellect suffices, as long as it is proposed to him for consideration. Here the one who proposes it is said to “teach” (docere), as though “leading” (ducens) another to knowledge, just as in the case of bodily sight someone demonstrates a thing by placing it before the eyes. The other is that for the knowledge of which the learner’s intellect does not suffice unless he is led by the hand to it through something more known to him. Here one who proposes something better known to him is also said to teach him. There is something like this in physical sight when someone demonstrates a far-off thing to someone else by pointing to it with his finger. In these two ways a man is said to teach, and this teaching is not by way of illumination but rather by way of speaking.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though they all see God, they do not comprehend him. Thus, it is not necessary that they all know all things in him. For this reason the possibility is not excluded that one angel who knows something in the Word of God can in that respect illuminate an angel who does not know it in the Word of God.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as among bodily things, that which is in act, acts through leading the patient’s potency to act, so also when the intellect of a lower angel is in potency with respect to various things, it can be led to a like act through a higher angel that is in more perfect act—but not by the creation of a new light, nor through there being the same light numerically in the higher as is received by the lower. It is not necessary for there to be any medium carrying the power of the agent. For it is false to imagine distance of place between them. Rather, what placement is among bodily things, order is among spiritual things, according to Augustine. (See Albert the Great, Commentary on Sentences II, dist. 2, a. 7.)

Reply Obj. 7: Perfection is here said to be that to which the motion of illumination is directed as its term, not the perfection of glory or nature.

Reply Obj. 8: These three actions are sometimes joined together and thus differ only according to account. For everyone who perfects, illuminates and purifies by the fact that he perfects, and everyone who illuminates, purifies. But this is not convertible, as is clear especially in our hierarchy, according to Dionysius. For the reception of light does not follow on just any purification, but rather a perfect one. Likewise the perfection of knowledge does not follow on just any illumination, but rather a completed one.

Article 3

Whether the angelic hierarchy is divided fittingly into three hierarchies and nine orders

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 4; ST I.108.2, 3, 5, 6; SCG III.80; Compendium theologiae, ch. 126; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 1, lect. 7; Commentary on Colossians, ch. 1, lect. 4.) It seems that the angelic hierarchy is not fittingly divided into three hierarchies and nine orders.

Obj. 1: For the division is either a division of an integral whole into parts or of a genus into species. It is not divided in the first way, since the common definition does not befit the parts, just as the definition of a house does not befit a wall. Nor is it after the manner of genus, since not all orders are equally related to participation in the account of hierarchy. Therefore, it seems that in no way can this division be adequate.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the closer something is to a single first thing, the less multiplication it has. But the angelic hierarchy is a mean between us and God, as is said in the Celestial Hierarchy 4. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:178).) Therefore, since there is only one hierarchy of men, it seems that there are not three hierarchies of angels.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is higher and lower among the angels only on the basis of a different proportion and reception of divine things. But the orders are related as higher and lower. Therefore, it seems that they have differing proportions to receiving divine things. But the hierarchies are likewise related to one another as higher and lower. Therefore, it seems that the rationale for distinguishing orders is the same as for distinguishing hierarchies.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the account of hierarchy consists in an order of power. But powers are determined through acts. Therefore, since the account of hierarchy is threefold, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) it seems that there are only three orders of the celestial hierarchy.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the celestial hierarchy is an exemplar for the ecclesiastical hierarchy, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:123).) But in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, according to Dionysius, there are only three orders. Therefore, it seems that this is likewise true in the celestial hierarchy.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as is said in the text, (Sent. II, 9.2(48).2.) the unity of order stems from the fact that many spirits agree in a single gift of grace. But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are seven, as related in Isaiah 11:1–3. Therefore, it seems that there are only seven orders of angels.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, there seems to be a difference in how Gregory and Dionysius distinguish the hierarchies. For Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8 (PG 3:238).) posits the virtues as the middle order of the second hierarchy and the principalities as the first of the third hierarchy, while Gregory (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34, para. 10 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1251).) does the contrary. And we must ask why this is so.

I answer that three distinctions are found among the angels. One is the distinction of hierarchies from one another. The second is the distinction of orders within the same hierarchy. The third is the distinction of persons of the same order. Each of these distinctions is based on a different proportion to the reception of the divine light.

The differentiation of the hierarchies follows on different modes of receiving divine illuminations. The differentiation of the orders, in turn, follows on the different acts that the divine light perfects as more or less perfect. Finally, the differentiation of persons of a single order follows on differing power in the execution of an act more or less efficacious. For example, our hierarchy is distinguished from the angelic by the fact that ours is perfected by the divine light as veiled through sensible likenesses both in the sacraments and in the metaphors of the Scriptures. But the angelic hierarchy is perfected by the light as simple and absolute. Even though the aforementioned mode is common to all who are in our hierarchy, their acts still differ, on the basis of which the different orders are distinguished. For the act of priests differs from that of deacons. And in the exercise of any of these acts, some are more competent than others. However, all the angels, even though they agree in the mode of receiving the divine light without the discursive act of inquiry and without the veil of figures, still differ in the fact that some of them receive it with greater universality than others. Hence the higher are said to have a more universal knowledge, as has been said. (Above: d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, sed contra; see also Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12 (PG 3:291).)

Now, this can only vary in three ways. For either they receive the knowledge of divine effects in the first and universal cause itself, and this mode is proper to the first hierarchy, which is proportioned to receive illuminations in the very brightness of the divine light. For this reason they are said to be near God, and all the orders of this hierarchy take their names from an activity concerning God. Or they know things in the universal accounts of things, and this is the mode of the second hierarchy. Thus, it belongs to the angels of this hierarchy to receive the perfection of knowledge through the illumination of the first hierarchy in which the forms are most universal. For this reason the orders of this hierarchy are not named after activities concerning God but rather by names pertaining to the power of carrying out activities on things, inasmuch as the forms through which they know are operative, at least with respect to the effects in which they minister to God. Because these forms are universal, they are named after power that is not limited or determined to a person or persons. Or they know things in their proper accounts, and this is the mode of the last hierarchy, in which the forms are the most particular and proportionate such that they can be received from them into our intellects. For this reason the angels of the third hierarchy are said to receive the divine light in accord with what befits our hierarchy. It is also for this reason that the orders of the third hierarchy are named after acts that are limited to one man or one province.

Now, we can see a likeness to this in earthly principates. For of the ministers who are under a single king, some act immediately on behalf of the king’s person, such as chamberlains, counselors, and assessors. This corresponds to the first hierarchy with respect to God. Others have offices regarding the general government of the kingdom and are not deputed to this or that province, such as lords of the royal court, military leaders, court judges, and persons of this sort. The angels of the second hierarchy are like these. Some are placed in charge of the government of a part of the kingdom, such as prefects, bailiffs, and minor officials of this sort. The orders of the third hierarchy are like these. In this way, the definition of the three hierarchies is clear.

Now, the number and distinction of the orders of the first hierarchy can be understood in the following way, corresponding to the three acts of enjoyment by which the soul enjoys God. One of these is to comprehend or to possess, by which the memory is perfected. This corresponds to the order of thrones, since on them God is seated and rests when he makes them to rest in him. The second act is to see, by which the understanding is perfected. This corresponds to the order of cherubim, which is translated as “fullness of knowledge.” The third act is to love, by which the will is perfected. This corresponds to the order of seraphim, which is translated as “burning” or “enkindling.” Because the most complete union with God is found in this act, since love causes one to enter the interior things of the beloved, the order of seraphim is the first. The order of cherubim is second because of the unity of assimilation, in which knowing is actually brought to completion. The third is the order of thrones, because sitting implies union only through contact.

Next, the number and division of the orders of the second hierarchy can be understood in the following way. The government of a community deals with the dispensation of the common good in an orderly and peaceful manner. This order of peace is provided for by three things. The first is by someone judging what is owed to each. The order of powers corresponds to this, for which reason they are said to constrain the powers of the air. This is not the last end, but rather to provide calm and the benefit of goods, such as when the secular power hangs a thief for the peace of the city. Now, a judgment should be effective and right. But for it to be effective, it needs something assisting and contending so that nothing the judgment determines will be impossible to carry out. The order of virtues corresponds to this, since these attain to what is last in carrying out all the difficult activities that pertain to divine ministries. Thus, working miracles is attributed to them, since to work against the laws of nature is exceedingly arduous. Now, for it to be right, the judgment needs something to direct and command it. The order of dominations corresponds to this, since it pertains to this order to give direction in all the divine ministries, just as an engineer also gives instructions in mechanical things. Thus, this order is the first of the second hierarchy because whatever is done through angels in the divine ministries is directed and commanded by it. The second is the order of virtues, from whom the acts of the powers have their efficacy, just as secular laws must be backed up by arms in order to have coercive force.

Finally, the number and order of the orders of the third hierarchy can be understood in the following way. For since they have limited power, their acts must either be limited to a single province or to a single man. If they are limited to a single province, then this is the order of principalities, as in the case of the prince of Persia, who presided over the Persians (Dan 10:13). If it is limited to one man, then either it concerns what pertains to him alone, and this is the order of angels, who are for this reason said to announce lesser things, and to whom it also belongs to guard individual men, or else it concerns what is carried out through one person’s act that pertains to the good of many. This is the order of archangels, as in the case of Gabriel, who announced the birth of Christ and of John the Baptist. Thus, their name is composed out of the two orders at either extreme. For they are called “archangels,” being, as it were, prince-angels. For this reason they are also said to announce greater things, since the good of the nation is more divine than the good of one man, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b7–9.)

Yet the number of angels in each of the orders is unknown to us.

Reply Obj. 1: The division of a hierarchy into orders is that of a potestative whole into its potential parts, just as the soul is divided according to its powers. (A “potestative whole” or “potential whole” is a whole whose account is found completely in one of its parts, but found in the other parts by a participation. See In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; d. 8, q. 5, a. 3; In III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 2; ST 1.77.1, ad 1; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 11, ad 2. The division of the soul according to its powers is the division into the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational. See In IV Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, resp.) This whole is like a middle between the universal whole and the integral whole. For a universal whole exists in any given part both in essence and in complete power, and so it is predicated equally of them all. But an integral whole does not exist in each of its parts, either in essence or in total power, and so it is in no way predicated of a part. But a potential whole is present to any given part in essence, while as to complete power it is present in the highest part, since a higher power always has in itself more completely what belongs to a lower power. This is how a hierarchy compares to the orders.

Reply Obj. 2: All men belong to a single species. Thus, in them all there is one common mode of receiving divine illuminations. For this reason there is one hierarchy for them all. But the angels belong to different species. For this reason they are ordered in different hierarchies on the basis of different modes of reception, as has been said. But it is true that any given nature among the angels is more unified and simple than human nature, which is the last intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 3: In this way, the reply to the third objection is clear. For just as there are three orders of the hierarchy of men according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5 (PG 3:503).) so also are there three orders of any celestial hierarchy. Hence for the three hierarchies there are nine orders, so that in this way, the likeness of the Trinity may be reflected in all things, with respect to their beginning, middle, and end.

Reply Obj. 4: In our hierarchy, orders are distinguished in accord with three hierarchical actions. For it belongs to ministers to purify, to priests to illuminate and purify at the same time, and to bishops to perfect. But there cannot be such a distinction in the celestial hierarchy, since the lowest order of angels is higher than the highest order of our hierarchy. Hence it can perfect, illuminate, and purify.

Reply Obj. 5: Difference of proportion can be understood in several ways. It can be understood either with reference to different genera of proportion, as in the case of double and sesquialterum, of which the first is a multiple and the second a superparticular. (“Sesquialterum” means one-and-a-half times as much, typically expressed by the ratio 3 to 2. A “superparticular” ratio is the ratio of two successive integers.) For there is a difference between the proportion of 4:2, since this is a double proportion, and that of 3:2, since this is a sesquialtern proportion. Or it can be understood with reference to different species of the same genus, as in the case of double and triple, which belong to the same genus of proportion, namely the multiple. Or it can be understood with reference to different numbers in the same species of proportion, such as 4:2 and 6:3. (These ratios are both members of the species double.) The first difference belongs to the distinction of hierarchies, the second to the distinction of orders, and the third to the distinction of persons of a single order.

Reply Obj. 6: The gifts on whose basis the orders are distinguished are gifts that are perfective in hierarchical acts, and these are varied, as has been said. (Above: a. 1.) But gifts and powers are perfective with respect to personal acts. Thus, they are not the basis of the distinctions between orders.

Reply Obj. 7: The ordering Dionysius sets out is more reasonable, since he distinguishes the second hierarchy from the third with reference to the universal and the particular, the unlimited and the limited. This is why he places the virtues in the second hierarchy and the principalities in the third. But Gregory intends not so much to give an order as to enumerate the orders. Nonetheless, this ordering can be taken in accord with external acts and in accord with its conformity to our hierarchy. Because in our hierarchy those who have preeminence are above private persons, so in the second hierarchy he orders those whose names imply an office of preeminence, namely, dominations, principalities, and powers, whereas in the third he places the orders whose acts are those of even private persons, such as to work wonders, which belongs to the virtues, to announce great things, which belongs to the archangels, and to announce lesser things, which belongs to the angels.

Article 4

Whether the names of the angels are fittingly distinguished

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.108.5; SCG III.80; Compendium theologiae, ch. 126; Commentary on Colossians, ch. 1, lect. 4.) It seems that the names of the angels are not fittingly distinguished.

Obj. 1: For the name of the whole should not be imposed on the part. But order is a part of hierarchy. Therefore, since “hierarchy” is the same as “sacred principate,” as has been said, (Above: a. 1, resp.) it seems that no order should be called a “principate.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the name of the whole should not be imposed on any order of that nature. But all the heavenly spirits are called “angels.” Therefore, it seems that the last order of angels should not be called by the name “angels.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what belongs to a higher order is not necessarily found in a lower order, even though the contrary is true. But names correspond to things. Therefore, since all the angels are called “heavenly virtues,” according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 9 (PG 3:259).) it seems that the middle order of the second hierarchy should not be called by this name, since the names of the higher do not belong to the lower.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every virtue is a medium between essence and activity. But no order among the angels is called by the name “essence” or “activity.” Therefore, neither should there be an order called by the name “virtue.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) we arrive at the angels’ properties through the names of the orders. But it befits no angel to inflame through charity or to make an impression on the will, because this belongs to God alone. Therefore, it seems that the seraphim, “those who enkindle,” (This is the probable etymology of the Hebrew word seraphim.) are unfittingly named.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, to burn with charity, to see God, and to possess him belong to the substance of beatitude. But all the angels are blessed. Therefore, no orders should be named after these acts.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the question arises of how these three differ: “seraph,” “seraphin,” and “seraphim”; and “cherub,” “cherubin,” and “cherubim.”

I answer that concerning the naming of the orders, it should be observed that the higher each order is, the more perfect is that after which it takes its name. Even though those things that belong to the higher are, in a certain way, participated in by the lower and vice versa, their names should not be confused but distinct. In order for a name to name a thing properly, two things are required: that what is signified by the name be regarded perfectly with respect to completed act, and that it be its ultimate perfection. Because each thing takes its name from the form that gives it being and is its principle of activity, the angels are named after that which in them holds the place of form as after that which is more worthy. For example, in man there is a certain participation in intellect, and because he does not have the full act of the intellect that would allow him to understand without inquiry and imagination, he is not placed in the order of intellectual things. Similarly, even though he has senses that are the most complete in their activity with respect to all animals, since sensing is not in accord with his ultimate perfection, he is not placed in the order of sensitive things. Rather, he is placed in the order of rational things, since he has the act of reason fully, and it is his act inasmuch as he is man.

Therefore, in accord with this I say that the gift of the higher is in the lower by way of a certain participation, but not as completed act. Thus, they cannot be named after it. On the other hand, the gifts of the lower are in the higher more eminently, though their ultimate completion is not in those acts, for which reason they are not named after them as with a proper name. So it is that they are said to yield to each other in being named, namely, in such a way that the higher order is allotted its proper name from the more excellent act.

Reply Obj. 1: A principate taken generally, with reference to an office of any kind of preeminence, is referred to by the name “hierarchy.” But a principate taken specifically, with reference to the governance of a determinate province, has the name of a single specific order.

Reply Obj. 2: The name “angel” designates manifestation, since an angel is said to be a messenger. For the ability to manifest belongs to all the orders simply inasmuch as, going down through the orders, the intellectual light is less simple in them and more proportionate to the intellect of those that follow. Thus, Dionysius says that a lower angel is always able to manifest a higher to all those ordered below itself. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:274).) And it belongs to the last order to be manifestive of all the higher orders with respect to us. For this reason, we signify the last order by the name “angels,” naming the other orders after what denotes a more excellent mode of announcing or manifesting. In this way, “angel” is the name of the nature, since it expresses a condition of nature. But if announcing is taken with reference to the external ministry they exercise, then in this way, “angel” is the name of the office, not the nature, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34, para. 8 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1250).)

Reply Obj. 3: The name “virtues,” as naming a specific order, is taken for a specific gift or act, which is to carry out and perfect whatever is arduous or very difficult in the divine ministries. But as applicable to all the heavenly spirits, it is taken from the virtue that follows on nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Some names of the angels are common to all the orders, but some are proper to certain orders. Of the common names, some are taken from the essence or a natural condition, as when they are called “heavenly essences,” “angels,” “spirits,” “divine minds,” “divine intellects,” and “heavenly spirits.” But some are taken from virtue, as when they are called “heavenly virtues.” And some are taken from their activity, as when they are called “angels.” Yet the names of specific orders are taken from superadded gifts and from offices consequent on those gifts. Thus, the names of the specific orders can more readily be equivocated with the general names that are taken from virtue and activity, which are superadded to the essence, than with those that are taken from nature, which is not superadded, but rather underlies.

Reply Obj. 5: The seraphim are not said to enkindle as if they infused the habit of charity, but rather because they illuminate things pertaining to the love of charity.

Reply Obj. 6: The names of the higher orders are not taken from the acts of enjoyment simply, but from their excellences, which are found only in the higher angels, although enjoyment is common to all the angels. For the seraphim are not called “those who love,” but “those who burn,” which expresses the consummation of charity. Likewise the cherubim are not called simply “those who see” or “those who know,” but rather “those who are full of knowledge.” Hence to have knowledge in this way is not common to all, even though knowledge or vision is common to all. For this reason they cannot all be called “cherubim,” as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12 (PG 3:291).)

Reply Obj. 7: The names ending in -in, such as “cherubin” and “seraphin,” are neuter in gender and plural in number and are set down for the whole group of a single order. But those ending in -im are masculine in gender and plural in number and are set down for more than one person of a single order. But “cherub” and “seraph” are masculine in gender and singular in number, and signify a single person of that order.

Article 5

Whether all the angels of a single order are equal

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.108.3.) It seems that all the angels of a single order are equal.

Obj. 1: For there is more in common between those who belong to a single order than between those who belong to a single hierarchy. But Dionysius frequently calls those who belong to a single hierarchy equal in power. Therefore, it seems that all the more are those who belong to a single order equal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, all things that are related as higher and lower are ordered in different ranks or orders. But all those among the angels who are unequal are related as higher and lower. Therefore, it seems that they belong to different orders. Therefore, if any belong to a single order, it seems that they are equal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the dignity of the angels follows on the gifts they have received. But those who belong to a single order are perfected by a single gift, as is implied by the definition of order set forth in the text. (Sent. II, 9.2(48).2.) Therefore, it seems that they are equal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the more immediately something is joined to another, the less distant it is from it, just as, for example, three is less distant from two than ten. But if the angels who belong to a single order were unequal, then a lower angel of one order would be related more immediately to the first angel of a lower order than to a higher angel of its own order. In this case angels of different orders would be closer together than angels of the same order, which seems absurd. Therefore, all the angels of a single order are immediately related to one another in such a way that they mutually do not exceed one another.

On the contrary, wherever there is first, middle, and last, there is inequality. But among the angels belonging to a single order, we find some who are first, middle, and last, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:274).) Therefore, the angels of a single order are not equal.

Furthermore, after God, the greatest beauty is found among the angels. But the account of beauty consists in the ordered harmony of differing degrees. Therefore, it seems that even among the angels belonging to a single order we can find a gradation of this sort.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 3, q. 1, a. 3; see also Sent. II, 3.2(14).3.) on the basis of their differences in natural endowments, the angels have also been differently perfected in gratuitous gifts. They are distinguished in their various orders with reference to these gifts. However, since, as was said above, (Above: d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.) there is not more than one angel of a single species, and species can only differ in the angels as partaking more or less of potentiality and act, one angel must always possess a more sublime nature than another. Thus, we cannot admit that there are two equal angels anywhere in the whole celestial hierarchy.

Reply Obj. 1: The angels of a single hierarchy are said to be equal in power not simply, but rather in a qualified sense, namely, with regard to the mode of receiving divine illuminations that is proper to that hierarchy. Likewise, the angels of a single order are equal in power with respect to their agreement in the act of that order and not simply.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not any distinction of rank that creates the distance between orders, as has been said above, (Above: a. 1.) but rather one that corresponds to different acts.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though they all have one gift, they do not all participate in it equally, but rather to a greater or lesser extent.

Reply Obj. 4: In natural things, differing quantity and differing intensity of quality do not cause a difference of species; rather, such is a disposition to a different species, inasmuch as each species requires a determinate quantity of dimension, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a15.) Likewise, for the species of fire a determinate intensity of heat is required. For this reason it is possible for something that is more distant by species to be less distant in quantity or intensity of quality. So it is also in the angelic orders that if we consider distance with reference to the account of quantity alone, it is not unfitting for the lowest angel of an order to be more distant from the highest in its own order than from the highest of the lower order. This is so even while also being more distant from the lower by a formal difference and in species, inasmuch as it possesses the account of the higher order, which the other does not have. This would be the case, for example, if it were said that the coldest man is less distant from the hottest woman than from the hottest man, with whom he nevertheless has more in common by reason of his sex. And this is found to be universally true in each thing that allows for a range of different degrees.

Article 6

Whether all the hierarchies are connected

To the sixth we proceed as follows. It seems that not all the hierarchies are connected.

Obj. 1: For there is no connection between those things whose account is to be distinct, since connection is opposed to distinction. But the account of hierarchy consists in the distinction of higher and lower. Therefore, there is no connection between them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that differ in what is most common do not have anything else by which to be connected. For example, things that differ in species agree in genus, while things that differ in the most general genera do not have anything univocally in common. But a hierarchy is something most common, encompassing orders and persons under it. Therefore, different hierarchies are not connected by anything.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, we find nothing in the angels but natural endowments and gratuitous gifts. But they are not connected by natural endowments, since they belong to different species. Nor are they connected by gratuitous gifts, since different orders are perfected by different gifts of grace. Therefore, it seems that they are not connected by anything.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are not joined together in one common terminus do not seem to have a connection, like discrete things. But hierarchies and orders are not united in one common term, since there is not a single order that belongs to different hierarchies or a single angel that belongs to different orders. Therefore, it seems that there is no connection between them.

On the contrary, there is what Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:274).) when he assigns a connection between the orders and hierarchies.

Furthermore, the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11 (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 18.) that the ordering of separated substances under God and among themselves is like that of several arts under one common art (as for example the science of God is like metaphysics, under which all the sciences fall) or like several offices ordered under the ruler of the city. But there is a connection between all these things insofar as they depend on one another. Therefore, it seems that there is a connection between the celestial hierarchies and orders.

I answer that the orders of the angelic hierarchy are all connected to one another and even to the orders of our hierarchy, as Dionysius hands down in the passage above. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:274).) But this connection must be understood after the manner of the order of the universe. For the parts of the universe are all ordered to one another inasmuch as one helps another to the attainment of its end and also to the ultimate good, which is the end of the entire universe. So also there is a connection between the hierarchies both with reference to their relation to one last end, insofar as the end of every hierarchy is unity and likeness to God, and with reference to what pertains to the essence of the hierarchy itself, namely, with respect to order, knowledge, and action.

There is also a connection with reference to order, inasmuch as in all of them the distinction among first, middle, and last is found. For just as the angelic hierarchy is in the middle between God and us, so also in that hierarchy itself we discover a first, middle, and last hierarchy. In each of these, we discover a first, middle, and last order. And in each of these, we discover first, middle, and last angels, from the first down to the very last. There is a connection with reference to knowledge, inasmuch as the radiance of the divine light extends from the first down to the last, as it is said: is there any number to his armies? Upon whom does his light not arise? (Job 25:3) But it is not received uniformly by them all. Rather, it is received by the higher with greater simplicity and by the lower with less. Finally, with reference to action, the first have a hierarchical action on the middle and the middle on the last. The middle manifest the first and the last manifest the middle in the way explained above.

And so, in accord with the four things included in the definition of a hierarchy, we can assign a fourfold connection.

Reply Obj. 1: The distinction that belongs to the account of a hierarchy is that of things ordered to one another and to one common thing. Such a distinction does not exclude connection; rather, it requires it.

Reply Obj. 2: More than one hierarchy has the one common end and one common perfection and account. Thus, things that differ in hierarchy are connected by their last end, by the common account of hierarchy, and by the light that perfects the hierarchy. But besides all this, the orders of a single hierarchy are connected by what is proper to that hierarchy. And those angels belonging to a single order are connected by what is proper to that order.

Reply Obj. 3: The angels are perfected by two lights: by natural light, insofar as they are intelligences, and by a gratuitous light that perfects them with respect to hierarchical acts. Both lights are one in all the angels on the side of the principle from which they derive, and of the end to which they are ordered. But both are distinguished and appropriated differently according to the different capacities of the receivers. Yet even this distinction is ordered, and the order itself requires a connection. Thus, such a distinction does not exclude connection.

Reply Obj. 4: A certain common boundary exists among the hierarchies and among the orders, not that there is one single element in different areas, but rather inasmuch as the properties of different areas are found in a single element through a resemblance and in accord with the ordering of the divine wisdom, which joins the end of first things with the beginnings of second things, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7 (PG 3:871).) This is clear if we consider in order each individual hierarchy. For the first order of the first hierarchy in a certain way draws nearest to the divine properties. Hence they are named seraphim after the property of fire, which most of all signifies the divine properties, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15 (PG 3:330).) But the last order of that hierarchy has a kind of connection with the orders of the second hierarchy. And so it is named not only after an act concerning God, but also after an act that regards lower things. Thus, they are called “thrones” inasmuch as God is seated on them as the judge of all. Similarly, in the second hierarchy the first order, namely that of dominations, has something in common with the first hierarchy, namely, to preside and not to carry out. So also the first order of the third hierarchy, namely principalities, has something in common with the orders of the second hierarchy. Consequently, its name implies preeminence. Similarly, the highest order of our hierarchy has something in common with the last order of the celestial hierarchy. This is why the priest is called an “angel”: the lips of a priest shall guard knowledge, and men shall seek the law from his mouth, for he is the angel of the Lord of hosts (Mal 2:7). (The RSV reads messenger instead of angel; but the word “angel,” in its initial sense, simply means “messenger.”)

Article 7

Whether the distinction of the orders is from nature

To the seventh we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, resp. and ad 3; ST I.108.4.) It seems that the distinction of orders is not from nature in such a way that it began at creation.

Obj. 1: For conformity of the mind to God arises through grace. But a hierarchy approaches likeness and conformity to God as much as possible. Therefore, it seems that the orders of a hierarchy are only distinguished through grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) the properties of the orders are shown by their names. But some names of the orders express grace, especially the name “seraphim,” whose application is based on the ardor of charity. Therefore, it seems that the distinction of orders is through grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, our hierarchy is patterned after the celestial hierarchy. But in our hierarchy there is no distinction of orders by nature, but only by the sacramental grace that is conferred in the sacrament of orders. Therefore, it seems that neither in the celestial hierarchy is the distinction of orders by nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the distinction of orders requires a ranking according to hierarchical actions such that one purifies, illuminates, and perfects another. But this can only happen through the divine light received in them. Therefore, it seems that before the conferral of grace, there was no distinction of orders by nature.

On the contrary, in the definition of order put forth in the text it says (Sent. II, 9.2(48).2.) that an order is a multitude of heavenly spirits who agree in natural endowments and in the gifts of grace. Therefore, it seems that even by nature there is a distinction of orders.

Furthermore, wherever there is a difference of rank on the basis of higher and lower, there are different orders. But from the beginning of creation, before the infusion of grace—if they were not created in grace—there were higher and lower ranks among them insofar as some were of a more subtle essence and more perspicacious intelligence, as has been said above. (Above: d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, it seems that from the beginning of creation there were distinct orders among them.

I answer that the gift of grace is perfective of nature. Thus, the distinction of orders arises from different gifts of grace as from a formal and completing principle but from different gifts of nature as from a quasi-material or dispositive principle. Consequently, the definition of order embraces both, encompassing both material and formal principles. And so there was in a certain way a distinction of orders from the beginning of creation, but not in accord with its final completion.

Reply Obj. 1: Even in the angelic nature there is a certain likeness to God as being the first and most noble among created natures, and more closely approaching likeness to the divine in its natural properties. But complete likeness to God comes from gifts of grace.

Reply Obj. 2: In the angels, prior to the infusion of grace, there was also natural love and knowledge. The cherubim and seraphim could have been named after this ardor and fullness, though not in accord with their complete account.

Reply Obj. 3: The men of our hierarchy are all of a single species and nature formally, since the differentiation of individuals in the same species is wholly based on material principles. Thus, there is no distinction of order in us based on nature, but rather based on power gratuitously granted. It is not necessary for our hierarchy to correspond to the celestial hierarchy in every respect, even if it is patterned after it in its own way.

Reply Obj. 4: If the angels had natural endowments alone, the light of one would still exceed the light of another. Thus, there could be a kind of illuminating and perfecting, though not in the complete sense.

Article 8

Whether men are taken up into the orders of the angels

To the eighth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.108.8.) It seems that men are never taken up into the orders of the angels.

Obj. 1: For, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:179).) four ranks of things can be distinguished: the rank of intellectual things, which covers the angels; the rank of rational things, which covers men; the rank of sensible things, which covers the brute animals; and the rank of existing things, where we find insensible things. But sensitive things can never attain to the rank of rational things. Therefore, rational things can never attain to the rank of intellectual things. Thus, men are not taken up into the orders of the angels.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the nature of man is more distant from the nature of angels, especially the higher ones, than the nature of one angel is from the nature of another. But no angel of a lower nature was capable of the gift by which the higher are placed in their order. Nor, briefly, can an angel of one order attain to a higher order. Therefore, it seems that neither are men taken up into the orders of the angels.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, however much the intellect may be perfected by the light of grace or glory, it still must always understand by its natural light, since grace does not take away nature; rather, it perfects it. But our natural light is shadowy in comparison with an angel’s natural light. Therefore, man will always see more obscurely than an angel. But the whole substance of glory consists in vision. Therefore, it seems that man never attains to the glory of the angels.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever differs in hierarchy differs also in order. But angels and men differ in hierarchy. Therefore, it seems that they also differ in order. Thus, men are not taken up into the orders of the angels.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whoever is in an order has the act of that order. But the act of a certain order is to guard men and to be sent for ministry, which does not pertain to the holy souls. Therefore, it seems that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels.

On the contrary, the Lord said: but are like angels in heaven (Matt 22:30). And Dionysius says that men are allotted the glory of the angels. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 4 (PG 3:591–94).) Gregory, too, shows in a homily on the one hundred sheep (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34, para. 11 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1252).) that, on the basis of the difference of their merits, men are transferred into different orders.

I answer that there are three positions concerning this. A certain Greek commentator, the bishop Eustratius, says, commenting on Aristotle’s Ethics 6, (Eustratius, On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 20).) that no one can hope that his soul would become so advanced as to attain to the activity of the separated intelligences. Accordingly, there would be a single tenth order, lower than the nine orders of angels, of those men who are taken up into glory. But this position is contrary to the statements of the saints and seems also to smack of heresy, since the Blessed Virgin has been exalted above the choirs of angels—unless perhaps the statement of this commentator refers to natural activity, namely, the assertion that one can reach there by his natural powers.

Another position is that some men are taken up into the orders of the angels, but that others form a single tenth order. In this way, the parable of the tenth lost drachma, related in Luke 15:8–10, is fulfilled. But this is explained in different ways. Some say that only virgins are taken up into these orders, due to the fact that virginity bears a resemblance to the angels, as Jerome says, while the other elect constitute the tenth order. (Jerome, Sermo de Assumptione, n. 5 (PL 30:126).) But this is not true, since many who are not virgins, such as Peter and Mary Magdalene, are more eminent than even many who are virgins. Hence others say that the perfect are taken up into the orders of the angels, but that those who have imperfect merits will complete the tenth order. But since from men and angels there is to come a single Church and a single hierarchy, it is not probable that the number of orders, a number that belongs to the celestial hierarchy, distinguished as it is by three sets of three in order to express the vestige of the uncreated Trinity, would be increased by men.

Hence I prefer the third position, which also harmonizes better with the statements of the saints, namely, that all the elect are taken up into the orders of the angels: some into the higher orders, some into the lower, and some into the middle, in accord with the differentiation of their merits, but with the Blessed Virgin Mary over them all. But as to whether as many men will be taken up as there were angels who fell, or as many as those who stood firm, or as many as there were of both, or more or fewer than these, he knows to whom alone belongs knowledge of the number of the elect who will receive a place in the heavenly happiness. (Ember Saturday in Lent: Missa “Reminíscere,” Third Secret (Collect) for the Living and the Dead: Deus, cui soli cognitus est numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus; tribue quaesumus, ut intercentibus omnibus sanctis tuis, universorum, quos in oratione commendatis suscepimus, et omnium fidelium nomina, beatae praedestinationis liber adscripta retineat. Per Dominum, etc.)

Reply Obj. 1: Reason is at a greater distance from the senses than the intellect is from reason. For the senses and reason do not share a single object, since the senses grasp the images of things together with the conditions of matter, but reason and intellect grasp the images of things as separated from the conditions of matter. Hence they agree in object, while they differ in mode. For reason arrives by inquiring at the knowledge of the truth that the intellect sees with simple intuition. Hence reason comes to rest in the intellect. This is why certitude in demonstrations arises from resolution into first principles, which are grasped by the intellect. Thus, it is not unfitting if men, who are in the last rank when it comes to intellect, attain to the rank of the intelligences.

Reply Obj. 2: Man’s merit is more efficacious than the merit of an angel. This is both on account of difficulty, which is an occasion of greater effort, and also on account of the continuous growth of grace that can occur in man such that he goes from strength to strength (Ps 84:7 [83:8]), since man is a wayfarer for a longer time than the angels were. This is also inasmuch as our merits have their efficacy from the merit of Christ, whose grace is, in a certain way, infinite: for nowhere does he take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham (Heb 2:16). (RSV reads for surely it is not with angels that he is concerned but with the descendants of Abraham.) Thus, men can be transferred by the power of merit to the rank of a higher nature more than even the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: In man natural action can never attain equality with the angels. But the superabundant light of glory will take away every shadow, not indeed by taking away nature, but by perfecting the light of the intellect, in which we partake in a deficient manner by our nature.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:122); Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5 (PG 3:502).) our hierarchy or Church is related to the celestial hierarchy as the hierarchy of the Old Law is related to ours. The old hierarchy was a way to ours and signified it, and consequently, when the New Law came, the Old was taken up into it and its orders. In the same way, our hierarchy is a way to the celestial and a sign of it. Hence in our homeland there will not be separate hierarchies of men and angels, but rather one and the same hierarchy, and men will be spread among the orders of the angels.

Reply Obj. 5: The acts of angels on us follow on the orders of the angels more with regard to the rank of nature (because angelic nature is as a mean between God and us) than based on the essential properties of an order. Thus, just as the souls of the damned are not given to us for our training, neither are the souls of the saints given for our guardianship, since this does not belong to them according to the rank of their nature.

Exposition of the text

Hence Dionysius teaches that there are three orders of angels. (Sent. II, 9.1(47).) It should be known that the Master in the following words accepts the opinion of Dionysius in part, namely, with regard to the number of orders; and in part he accepts the opinion of Gregory, namely, with regard to their arrangement. For according to Dionysius, principalities are lower and virtues are in the middle, while according to Gregory it is the other way around. But the order of Dionysius accords with what he earlier enumerated, beginning from the lower orders: angels, archangels, and so on.