D. 12 - Purely bodily creation

Division of the text

In the preceding part the Master examined the purely spiritual creation. In this part, he considers the purely bodily creation, insofar as this pertains to a theologian’s consideration, that is, according as it was first established by God in the works of the six days.

This is divided into three parts.

In the first, he examines the establishment of the bodily nature with regard to the work of creation.

In the second, he examines it with regard to the work of distinction, at the first working of distinction was the making of light. (Sent. II, 13.1(64).1.)

In the third, he examines it with regard to the work of adornment, at next: God said: ‘let there be lights in the firmament of heaven.’ (Sent. II, 14.9(79).1, quoting Genesis 1:10.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the work of creation in itself.

In the second, he considers it by comparison with other works, at now it remains to pursue that spatial arrangement in order and how it was brought to completion. (Sent. II, 12.5(62).4.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he puts forth different opinions on the work of creation.

In the second, he pursues his investigation on the basis of the second of these opinions, at and so let us examine the order and mode of creation, and of the formation of things according to this latter tradition. (Sent. II, 12.3(60).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he indicates the topic and mentions the difference of opinions.

Second, he explains them at indeed, some of the holy Fathers . . . appear to have written almost opposite things regarding this. (Sent. II, 12.2(59).)

And so let us examine the order and mode of creation, and of the formation of things according to this latter tradition. (Sent. II, 12.3(60).1.) Here he pursues the work of creation on the basis of the second of the aforementioned opinions. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he explains the creation of the first-created matter as regards the names given it in the Scriptures.

Second, he explains it as regards its condition, at but before we treat that, two things seem to us to require discussion. (Sent. II, 12.5(62).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he sets out what he intended to say.

Second, he rules out a doubt, at note that Augustine says here that darkness is not anything. (Sent. II, 12.4(61).1.)

But before we treat that, two things seem to us to require discussion. (Sent. II, 12.5(62).1.) Here he shows the condition of the matter first created.

First, he does so with regard to form.

Second, he does so with regard to place, at now it remains to explain what was proposed in the second place. (Sent. II, 12.5(62).3.)

Now it remains for us to pursue that spatial arrangement in order and how it was brought to completion. (Sent. II, 12.5(62).4.) Here he examines the work of creation by comparison to other works. And concerning this he does two things.

First, he sets out the universality of the work.

Second, he sets out the distinction of divine works, at for as Alcuin says, in On Genesis, ‘God works in four manners.’ (Sent. II, 12.6(63), quoting Alcuin of York (ca. 735–804 AD), Interrogationes et responsiones in Genesim, int. 19 (PL 100:519).)

Question 1

The work of creation

Concerning this part, five questions are asked:

first, whether a single matter belongs to all bodily things;

second, whether all bodies were created at the same time in their distinct species;

third, if they received their distinction at the same time, how are the days enumerated in the beginning of Genesis to be understood;

fourth, if they were not distinguished at the same time, then what was the quality of that formless matter;

fifth, on the number of the four coevals.

Article 1

Whether the same matter belongs to all bodily things

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.66.2; SCG II.16; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1 lect. 6.) It seems that all bodily things have a single matter.

Obj. 1: For whatever things have a form of the same account also have one common matter, due to the fact that proper act comes about in proper potency, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 414a26.) But the form of corporeality has a single account in all bodily things. Therefore, it seems that higher and lower bodies have a single matter.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the text it says (Sent. II, 12.2(59).1–3(60).3.) that from the formless matter first created, all bodies were formed in their distinct forms through the work of distinction and adornment. Therefore, they all have a single matter.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever things are resolved actually or in the intellect into one and the same thing, just as into a first subject, either actually or in the intellect, have a single matter. But all bodies are of this sort. Therefore, and so on. Proof of the middle premise: that in which the final resolution of all things lies is simple matter without any form, since as long as some form is found in matter, it can be further resolved. But in formless matter there is no differentiation, because the principle of distinction of matter is on the part of the form. Therefore, the resolution of all bodies lies in a single last body.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Physics 1 (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a5–14.) posits only a single prime matter. Therefore, since in that book he is considering the movable in general, it seems that all moveable bodies have a single matter.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 2, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b25.) it is necessary to imagine matter in a movable thing. Therefore, whatever things have some motion in common seem to have a matter in common. But change of place is common to higher and lower bodies. Therefore, so is matter.

On the contrary, whatever things do not possess a single potency do not possess a single matter. For just as form is act, so also matter is potency. But lower and higher bodies do not have the same potency, since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1050b6–27; 12.2, 1069b25–27.) in lower bodies there is potency with respect to being, whereas in higher bodies there is potency only with respect to place. Therefore, it seems that they do not possess only a single matter.

Furthermore, in whatever something is found, we must find something from which it is never separated. But the prime matter that is in lower bodies is never separated from the privation of form. For whenever it is under one form, the privation of another form attaches to it. But a privation attached to matter introduces corruptibility. Therefore, it seems that the prime matter of the lower bodies is not found in the heavenly bodies that are incorruptible by their own nature.

I answer that on this issue we find two opinions among philosophers, with each side having its supporters. Avicenna seems (Avicenna, Sufficentia, bk. 1, ch. 3.) to posit that there is a single matter belonging to all bodies. He draws an argument from the account of corporeality, that is, that since it has one account, then there is one matter owed to it.

This is the position that the Commentator intends to disprove at the beginning of On the Heavens, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, ch. 1.) and in several other places. He does this on the basis that since matter in and of itself is in potency to all forms, and cannot be under more than one at the same time, then insofar as it is found under a single form, it must be in potency to others. But no passive potency is found in a nature to which there does not correspond an active potency capable of reducing it to act. Otherwise, such a potency would be in vain. Hence since we can find no natural active potency that can reduce the substance of the heavens to the act of another form—because it has no contrary, as its motion shows, for there is no contrary to its natural motion, that is, circular motion, as is said in On the Heavens 1 (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3, 270a19.)—we must not be able to find anything of the prime matter of lower bodies in it.

Nor can it be said that the whole potency of the matter as it is under the form of the heavens is terminated such that nothing remains in the same potency to another form. For potency is only terminated through attaining the form to which it was in potency. Hence since prime matter considered in itself is in potency to all natural forms, its whole potency can only be terminated through attaining all forms. For there is not a single form received in matter (even if more noble and more perfect) that takes away potency to another less noble form. For matter existing under the form of fire still remains in potency to the form of earth. Hence, even if the form of the heavens is the noblest, nevertheless, when received in prime matter, it will not terminate its whole potency, unless at the same time all other forms are also received together with it, which is impossible. Besides, if we posited that by its perfection the form of the heavens terminates the whole potency of matter, it would still be necessary for matter lying under an elementary form to be in potency to the form of the heavens and to be reduced to act through the action of celestial power. In this case the heavens would be generable and corruptible. Thus, he is of the opinion that higher and lower bodies in no way agree in matter.

This seems more probable and more consonant with the statements of the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.2, 1069b25–27.) Nor do I say, as some do, that they agree in matter if it is understood to mean the first foundation, which is neither white nor black, as is said in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.8, 989b7.) but that they differ in matter insofar as matter is determined by motion. For difference of motion is a sign of difference of matter, not its cause, but rather vice versa. For motion is the act of something existing in potency. Hence where a single matter is found by its essence, a potency with respect to the same motion must be found insofar as matter is in potency to more than one thing.

Reply Obj. 1: corporeality, considered according to logical intention, is found univocally in all bodies. But considered according to being, it cannot have a single account in a corruptible and in an incorruptible thing. For they are not alike in their potency for being, since one has the potentiality to be and to not be, whereas the other does not. This is how the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 10 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26–1059a9.) that nothing is said in common of the corruptible and the incorruptible except by use of a common name. This is how the Commentator in that same place resolves this argument.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as all things, as they now are in their completion, are called a “single world” or a “single universe,” so also, considered as they were when formless by their lack of final completion, they were called a “single formless matter,” not by way of continuity, as though everything were made from a single matter numerically.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Sufficentia, bk. 2, ch. 85.) one should only seek differences on the basis of acts in things that agree in a single potency. For species that agree in a single potency of a genus are distinguished by specific differences. But differences themselves that do not agree in genus, such that the genus is a part of their essence, are distinguished just by themselves. Likewise, the most general genera are not divided by any differences, but rather by themselves. Similarly, composites that agree in matter are distinguished by different forms, but different matters are distinguished by themselves, according to their proportion to different acts, insofar as different accounts of potentiality are found in them.

Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher in the Physics had not yet proved that there is a fifth essence, as he demonstrates in the beginning of On the Heavens. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 269b1–15; see the note appended to d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 8.) This is why in the Physics he makes no determination about things that are proper to this essence, which is also why he repeats his treatment of the infinite in On the Heavens 1, as the Commentator says. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5–7, 271b1–276a15.)

Reply Obj. 5: As is said in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.4, 320a2.) matter is the subject of generation and corruption immediately, whereas it is the subject of other motions with greater or lesser priority; this is to the degree that the thing in respect of which the change occurs presupposes a greater perfection of motion. Thus, one finds a commonality of prime matter only in things that have generation and corruption in common and, consequently, also in things that belong together in the three motions of growth, diminution, and alteration, insofar as growth and diminution do not occur without generation and corruption, which is even the terminus of alteration. But, as is proved in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 260b15–29.) change of place is the most perfect because it alters nothing intrinsic to the thing. Hence the subject of this motion is a being complete in primary being and in all the intrinsic properties of the thing. Such motion befits a heavenly body. Thus, its matter is like the complete subject in these lower bodies, as the Commentator says in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere. (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 1.) Hence commonality of matter remains only by analogy.

Article 2

Whether all things were created simultaneously and distinct by species

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.74.2; On Truth, q. 8, a. 16; On the Power of God, q. 4, a. 2; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 4, lect. 1.) It seems that all things were created simultaneously and distinct by species.

Obj. 1: This is first because Sirach 18:1 says, he who lives forever created all things at once. (RSV reads he who lives forever created the whole universe.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual and bodily creation are more distant from each other than two bodies. But spiritual and bodily creation are held to have been made at the same time. Therefore, all the more were all bodily creatures made at the same time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said: his works are perfect (Deut 32:4). Nor can there be a reason why a perfection that the created thing could not obtain on its own, or from any other than God, would be deferred to a later time. Therefore, since created things are distinguished into species according to their perfections, it seems that all things were created from the beginning in distinct species.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the work of creation manifests the divine power. But an effect completed successively demonstrates the power of the agent less than one produced immediately in a state of perfection. Therefore, it seems that from the beginning all things were created distinct at the same time.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is obvious that God produced the entire work of a single day in a single moment. Therefore, it seems ridiculous to say that throughout the whole day he ceased working up till the beginning of the next day, as if worn out from the work. Therefore, it seems that created things were not distinguished over successive days, but rather from the beginning of creation.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the parts of the universe depend on one another, especially the lower on the higher. But of things that depend on one another, one does not exist without the other. Therefore, it seems unfitting to say that first there were water and earth and then later on were the stars made.

On the contrary (7), Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CSEL 28.1:39; PL 34:267).) that the authority of the passage of Scripture related at the beginning of Genesis is greater than all the perspicacity of human intelligence. But it is written there that created things were distinguished over the course of six days. Therefore, it seems necessary to take this position.

Furthermore (8), nature imitates the activity of the Creator. But in the activities of nature there is a progression from imperfect to perfect. Therefore, it seems that this is also the case in the activity of the Creator. Thus, it seems that not all things were distinguished simultaneously at the very beginning of creation.

I answer that the things pertaining to faith are distinguished in two ways. For some are of themselves the substance of faith, such as that God is three and one, and things of this sort. In these matters no one is permitted to hold a different opinion. Hence the Apostle says (Gal 1:8) that if an angel of God preached another Gospel than he himself had taught, let him be accursed. But other things are only incidental to faith inasmuch as they are handed on in Scripture, which faith posits to have been promulgated at the dictation of the Holy Spirit. These are things that those who are not bound to know the Scriptures can be ignorant of without danger, such as many historical details. In these matters, even the saints thought different things, explaining the divine Scripture in different ways.

And so concerning the beginning of the world, there is something that pertains to the substance of faith, namely, that the world began to be by creation, and all the saints agree on this. But how and the order in which it was made only pertains to faith incidentally, inasmuch as it is handed on in Scripture. And the saints, while preserving the truth of Scripture, have handed on different things by their different explanations.

Augustine (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 5, ch. 5 (CSEL 28.1:147; PL 34:325); The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 9 (CCSL 48; PL 41:323).) is of the opinion that at the very beginning of creation some things were distinguished by their species in their proper nature, such as the elements, heavenly bodies, and spiritual substances. But other things were distinguished only in their seedlike principles, such as animals, plants, and men. All these things were afterwards produced in their proper natures during that work in which, after the course of the six days, God governs the nature he previously created. Of this work it is said: my Father is working still, and I am working (John 5:17).

Nor should we expect to find an order of time in the distinguishing of things, but rather an order of nature and teaching. There is an order of nature, just as sound precedes a song by nature but not by time. Thus, things that are prior by nature are recounted as made earlier, such as the earth prior to the animals, water prior to fish, and so forth. There is also an order of teaching, as is clear in the case of those who teach geometry. For even though the parts of a figure constitute that figure without any order of time, a geometer teaches how they are constructed by protracting one line after another. This was the example given by Plato, as is said at the beginning of On the Heavens. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.10, 279b33–35.) So, too, Moses, instructing an uneducated people on the creation of the world, divided into parts things that were made at the same time.

However, Gregory and other saints hold that the text preserves an order of time in the distinguishing of things. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 12 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:644); see also Ambrose of Milan (ca. 339–397 AD), Hexameron, bk. 1, ch. 7 (CSEL 32.1:24; PL 14:136); Basil the Great, Homilies on the Hexaemeron, homily 2 (PG 29:47–51); John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407 AD), Homilies on Genesis, homily 2 (PG 53:26–32).) And this position is more common and seems more consonant with a surface reading of the text. But the former opinion is more reasonable and defends Sacred Scripture better from the mockery of unbelievers. Augustine teaches (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 19 (CSEL 28.1:30; PL 34:261).) that we should take careful note to explain the Scriptures in such a way that they not be mocked by unbelievers. And this opinion is more pleasing to me. Nevertheless, upholding both positions, we must reply to all the arguments.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 12 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:644).) all things are said to have been created at the same time in the substance of their matter, not the species of their form; or else in their likeness, as in the case of the rational soul, which is like the angels, not being propagated from matter.

Reply Obj. 2: All bodily things share in matter, whether it is one matter or several. Because matter precedes the composite in nature, bodily matter was made first and then distinguished by forms, so that the order of time would correspond to the order of nature. But the bodily creation is not produced from the spiritual creation, either as from a material or as from an efficient cause. Thus, the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as a created thing does not have being from itself, neither does it have perfection from itself. Thus, to show both, God willed that the created thing first would not be and then later would be, and likewise willed that it would first be imperfect and then later perfect.

Reply Obj. 4: Creation should show not only the strength of power, but also the order of wisdom, such that what is prior by nature should also be established first.

Reply Obj. 5: It was in order to show the different natures of distinct things that God willed that one day would correspond to each distinction of things, not due to any necessity or exhaustion on the part of the agent.

Reply Obj. 6: The nature of a thing already complete is not the same as when it is coming to be. Thus, even though the nature of the completed world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist at the same time, it could still have been otherwise at the time of the world’s making. For example, in a complete man the heart cannot exist without other parts, yet in the formation of an embryo the heart is generated before all other members.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Explaining Scripture in different ways in no way detracts from its authority, so long as the faith is preserved. For the Holy Spirit has endowed it with greater truth than any given man is able to discover.

Reply Sed Contra 8: It is due to the imperfection of the created that in its working it goes from the imperfect to the perfect. No doubt it would give the final perfection to whatever degree it could, while respecting the condition of the work. Thus, in this matter God’s activity need not be like the activity of the created.

Article 3

Whether Augustine’s explanation preserves the distinction of days

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that Augustine’s explanation does not preserve the distinction of days. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 33 (CSEL 28.1:131; PL 34:317).)

Obj. 1: For “day” refers to a time. But in the formation of things, according to Augustine, there was no succession of time. Therefore, the distinction of days has not been preserved either.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since “day” indicates some kind of illumination, the days must be understood either with reference to the illumination of bodily light or intellectual light. But it cannot be with reference to bodily light, since a day only does this by multiple revolutions completed through the succession of time. Nor can it be with reference to intellectual light, since created intellectual light did not flow down after the manner of irradiation for the creation of things. But the account of a day requires some irradiation. Therefore, it seems that these days are not fittingly assigned.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, we cannot find different parts in spiritual illumination. But different parts, namely, morning and evening, are assigned to day. Therefore, it seems that these days cannot be understood with reference to the illumination of spiritual light.

Obj. 4: One might say that the morning of this day refers to the knowledge of things in the Word while the evening refers to the knowledge of things in their proper nature.

On the contrary, a thing is said to be known in that from which a likeness of the thing is received. But the angels do not have the knowledge of things through likenesses received from things, but rather through species implanted within their mind by the Word. Therefore, they only know created things in the Word and not in their proper nature. And so, they possess only morning and not evening.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, wherever a thing is, it can be known there. But a created thing has being in three ways, namely, in the Word, in the mind of the angels, and in its own proper nature. According to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 8 (CSEL 28.1:43; PL 34:269).) this is signified by the fact that it said let there be made with regard to the being of the thing in the Word, it was made with regard to the being of the thing in the mind of the angels, and he made with regard to the being of the thing in its proper nature. Therefore, three parts should be assigned to this day.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as any ordinary day has evening and morning, so also it has noon. Therefore, just as we assign morning and evening knowledge, so also we should assign noonday knowledge.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, all the days should be uniform. But morning is not assigned to the first day, since the morning that follows evening cannot be the morning on which the first day begins, but is, rather, that on which it ends. But the seventh day is given as having a morning, at which the sixth day is brought to a close, but not an evening. Therefore, neither should morning together with evening be assigned to the other days.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, we only go from evening to morning by passing through night. But no mention of night is made. Therefore, the order of the days is insufficiently explained.

I answer that, according to Augustine, the six days are a single day presented all at once with six distinctions between things, on the basis of which it takes its enumeration. This is just as there is one Word by which all things were made, namely, the Son of God, even though we read over and over: God said. It is also just as these works are preserved in all that follows and takes its propagation from them by the working of nature, so also these six days abide in the whole succession of time.

However, we should see how this can be. The angelic nature is intellectual and is light. If it is properly light, then its enlightening must be called “day.” But the angelic nature received knowledge of things at the beginning of their creation. And so, in a certain way the light of the angelic nature’s intellect was present to created things inasmuch as they were known. Hence this very knowledge of things is called “day.” The days are distinguished and ordered in accord with the different genera of things known and their order. The first day represents the formation of spiritual creation through conversion to the Word. The second day represents the formation of bodily creation with regard to the higher part, which is called the “firmament.” The third represents the lower part, namely, the earth, water, and lower atmosphere. The fourth represents the higher part, namely, the adorned firmament. The fifth represents the lower with regard to air and water; the sixth represents the lower with regard to the earth.

Since God is full light and there is no darkness at all in him (1 John 1:5), the knowledge of God himself in himself is full light. But because a created thing, by the fact that it is from nothing, has the darkness of potentiality and imperfection, the knowledge by which the created thing is known is mixed with darkness. However, it can be known in two ways.

In one way, it can be known in the Word, as having proceeded from the divine art. And in this way, knowledge of it is called “morning knowledge.” For just as morning is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, so also the created thing takes a beginning of light from the Word after it previously had not existed.

But it can also be known as it exists in its proper nature. Such knowledge is called “evening knowledge” because of the fact that just as evening is the terminus of light and tends toward night, so also the created thing subsisting in itself is the terminus of the Word’s activity, as if made through the Word and from itself tending to the darkness of deficiency unless supported by the Word.

Yet even so, this knowledge is called “day” because just as in comparison to the knowledge of the Word it is shrouded in darkness, so also it is light in comparison to ignorance, which is altogether dark. So, too, the present life of the just is said to be clouded with respect to future glory, yet it is light in comparison to the life of sinners.

Thus, we find a kind of cycling between morning and evening, insofar as an angel knowing itself in its proper nature has referred this knowledge to the Word as to the end in which it took its knowledge of the following work, as in the beginning. And so, a morning of this sort is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the following day. This explanation is refined and appropriate, as long as “light” and “day” are spoken of in spiritual things properly and not metaphorically, as Augustine would have it. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 28 (CSEL 28.1:126; PL 34:315).) Otherwise, it would be a mystical explanation, not a literal one.

Yet because it is denied by many, while maintaining with Augustine that all things were created and distinguished in their species at the same time, we can say that the days are understood with reference to the enlightening of bodily light, though such that the order of the days is taken account of with respect to their order and distinction, upon which bodily light casts its brightness. For just as the angels received knowledge of all natural creatures, so also light diffuses itself onto all bodily things, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) received in different ways in different things in accord with the differences among the receivers. Thus, just as Augustine distinguishes six days with respect to the presence of spiritual light, which is said to have been made on the first day, to six genera of things, so also with respect to the presence of bodily light to six genera of things, six days can be distinguished in the same way without distinction of time. And because in keeping with infusion of light a period is fixed for each bodily thing as if between two terms, since any bodily power is finite, the terms beyond which the power of the thing does not extend are called “morning” and “evening.”

Reply Obj. 1: “Day” is both a part of time and also the effect of light. Therefore, the distinction between the first days is not taken from the perspective of time, but rather from the perspective of light, insofar as different things are clearly identified through light, either with regard to angelic knowledge or with regard to the shedding of bodily light onto various things.

Reply Obj. 2: This light can be understood as being both bodily and spiritual. If it is understood as bodily, then a day is distinguished on the basis of different illuminated things and not on the basis of the time of illumination. But if it is understood as spiritual, then it is not through the infusion of light for the creation of things, but rather through the brightness of light for the knowledge of things.

Reply Obj. 3: The parts of a day with reference to spiritual light do not refer to different things known, but rather to different modes of knowing the same thing. Just as the days are not successive because an angel at once perceives the different genera of things in the Word, neither are the parts of a single day, since it sees created things within the Word and in their proper nature at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4: The “evening knowledge” of things in their proper nature is not so called from the fact that they receive species through which to know things from the things themselves, but rather because they know things as they subsist in their proper nature through the species that they received at creation.

Reply Obj. 5: The species of things have being first in the divine art, which is the Word. This kind of being is signified when it says: *God said, ‘let there be made’—*that is, he begot the Word in whom it was that it would come to be. Second, they have being in the angelic intelligence. This is signified by the fact that it says: it was made, through the influence of the Word. Third, they have being in things. This is signified by the fact that it says: he made. Thus, this threefold distinction is not included in the production of spiritual light or in the formation of man, who is also intelligent. And so, too, does an angel have a threefold knowledge of things: as they are in the Word, as they are in its mind, and as they are in their proper nature.

Now, even though an angel only knows things in their proper nature through the species it has within itself, the knowledge by which it knows things as they are in itself still differs from the knowledge by which it knows things as they are in their proper nature. For the intellect can be turned to a species that it has with it in two ways. This is either by considering it insofar as it is a being in the intellect, and in this way, it recognizes that it is intelligible or universal or something of this sort. Or it is insofar as it is the likeness of a thing, and in this way, the intellect’s consideration does not stop at the species but rather passes through the species to the thing whose likeness it is, just as the eye sees a stone through the species that is in the pupil. The case is similar with an image of the stone, which can be considered precisely as a thing or as the likeness of a thing. Thus, it is clear that the two aforementioned acts of knowing differ. But both are evening knowledge, because the very being of an angel’s intellect is also a created thing and so tends to the darkness of deficiency in and of itself.

Reply Obj. 6: Noonday knowledge cannot be knowledge of what is created, which has an admixture of the darkness of defectability; rather, it is the knowledge of God himself, who is the full light. This is why noon is not named among the works of creation.

Reply Obj. 7: According to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 9; bk. 4, ch. 22 (CSEL 28.1:11–13; PL 34:251–53; CSEL 28.1:121; PL 34:311).) the first day recounts the formation of the intellectual nature itself, whose knowledge naturally follows its being in its proper nature. Thus, it does not have morning knowledge of itself, but rather evening knowledge. Likewise, too, the seventh day pertains to God’s rest in himself from all the works that he made for his own sake. This rest is limited by no defect, and for this reason no mention is made of an evening on this day.

Reply Obj. 8: If an angel, having received the knowledge of the created, did not refer it back to the praise of the Creator, but stopped at the created thing itself, then there would be night in it. For this would be to enjoy the created in a perverse manner. But this does not befit the blessed angels, who are signified by “light.” Thus, in the course of the six days, no night is recounted.

Or taking another approach, one can say that morning and evening are included because they are the principles of day and night. Now, that passage sets out the establishment of the principles of nature, from which all things were propagated. Thus, the extremes are set down, leaving aside what is between.

Article 4

Whether the first matter was formless

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.66.1; On the Power of God, q. 4, a. 1.) It seems that the first matter was formless.

Obj. 1: For that matter was common to all the elements, since all things were made out of it. But the elements do not agree in anything except formless matter. Therefore, the first matter was altogether formless.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, speaking to God: you taught your servant, O Lord, that before you made these things there was not anything, neither appearance, nor color. . . . Even so, there was not absolutely nothing, since there was a kind of formlessness. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 3 (CCSL 27; PL 32:827).) Therefore, the first matter was altogether lacking in form.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if that matter had a form, then either it had the form of a mixed body or the form of a simple body. But it was not the form of a mixed body, since in this case the mixed would be prior to the simple bodies, which would agree with the position of Anaxagoras. Therefore, it would have to have had the form of a simple body. This would take us back to the opinion of the natural philosophers of old who posited a single element for all things, such as fire, water, or air.

Obj. 4: One might say that it did not have any of these forms, but rather another.

On the contrary, everything that is generated is generated from its contrary. But from this first matter existing under a bodily form, the elements were made. Therefore, it must have had a contrariety with regard to the elements made from it. But contrariety among the first bodies cannot extend beyond the set of four, as is proved in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.2, 330a25.) Therefore, this matter must have been under the form of one of the four elements if it was under a bodily form. Thus, there would be only a single first element, which the Philosopher disproves. Therefore, this matter must have been altogether formless.

On the contrary, all being is from form. Therefore, if there was a first matter before the distinction of things, it must have had a form.

Furthermore, just as a natural body is related to different shapes, so also prime matter is related to substantial forms. But it is impossible for there to be a body without any shape. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be matter without any form.

I answer that matter is said to be “primary” in two ways: either such that “primary” implies an order of nature, or such that it implies an order of time.

As implying an order of nature, prime matter is that at which the analysis of natural bodies finally comes to a stop, which must be without any form. For every subject that has a form is divisible into the form and the subject of the form. Thus, because all knowledge is through the form, this prime matter, as the Philosopher says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 191a7.) is knowable only by analogy, such as, for example, when we say that prime matter is related to all bodies as wood is related to a couch. Even though prime matter, understood in this way, does not have a form as part of its essence, it is never truly divided from every form, as Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 2, ch. 3.) Rather, when it loses one form, it acquires another, insofar as the corruption of one thing is the generation of another. Thus, prime matter taken in this way could not have been prior in duration to the bodies formed from it.

In the other way, matter is primary insofar as “primary” implies an order of time, namely, that which preceded by duration the ordered arrangement of the parts of the world. This is the kind of matter now under consideration, following those who posit that the world did not always exist and that all things were not distinct from the beginning of creation. Taking the first matter in this way, it must have had a form.

But the ancient philosophers were of various opinions concerning this. For some posited that it was entirely under a single form, positing one of the elements or something among them as the first matter of all things. They conclude that from this all things are generated by density and rarity. However, others held that it was under more than one form, though these were not ordered to one another, but rather mixed together by a kind of confusion, and were reduced to order and distinction by the activity of the Creator. And even this they explained in different ways, as the Philosopher relates, though it does not pertain to the present discussion. All these positions have been sufficiently disproved by the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a12–189a10.)

Moderns are also divided into these two approaches. For some posit that the first matter was created entirely under a single form. But, in order to avoid seeming to fall into the ancient error, they posit that this form was not one of the four elements, but rather something that related to them as in process, that is, as imperfect to perfect, as the form of an embryo is related to the completed animal. But this comparison is misleading in the case of the elements. For, according to the Commentator, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 20.) the first aptitude in matter is for the form of an element. Hence no form is found as a mean between prime matter and the form of an element, though many means between prime matter and the form of an animal are found. Among these, one succeeds another until the ultimate perfection is arrived at, with many generations and corruptions intervening, as Avicenna says. Moreover, although the natural principles were established at that time, necessarily even now we would observe a form prior to the form of an element in the generation of the elements. But this is not what we sense.

Unless, perhaps, it is said, following the position of the book The Fountain of Life, (Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol), Fons Vitae.) that there is a single first form and thus in matter a common bodily form would be introduced first and afterwards specifically distinct forms. But Avicenna disproves this position, since every substantial form gives being that is complete in the genus of substance. But whatever comes in after the thing actually exists is an accident; for it exists in a subject described as a being complete in itself. Hence all other natural forms would have to be accidents. In this case, the ancient error would return that generation is the same thing as alteration. Hence he is of the opinion that from the same form essentially, fire is fire and also a body and a substance.

Thus, holding to the approach of other saints who posit a succession in the works of the six days, it seems to me that we must say that the first matter was created under more than one substantial form and that all the substantial forms of the essential parts of the world were produced at the beginning of creation. And Sacred Scripture shows this, since it recounts heaven, earth, and water at the beginning. This, too, the Master seems to say, for he posits that in the formless matter the element of earth was fixed in the middle and that the rarer waters were spread out up above after the manner of a mist.

But I say that the active and passive powers had not yet been conferred on the parts of the world in the beginning, on the basis of which they are said to be distinguished and ordered. It is clear that this is possible, if we wish to maintain the opinion of Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 2, ch. 11.) who posits that elements in a mixed body remain according to their substantial forms with regard to primary being, but are transmuted with regard to secondary being, namely, with regard to active and passive qualities. For the mixture is the union of mixable alternates. Hence it is possible for matter to be under a substantial form without having the active and passive qualities that it has at its completion. And so, since primary being precedes secondary being by nature, the order of nature is expressed in the succession of time when things come into being in primary being before they are perfected in secondary being.

Reply Obj. 1: The prime matter that is one numerically in all the elements as a part of their essence is altogether formless, considered in its own essence. But this could not precede the elements in duration. Hence the matter that preceded by duration was bodily, not one by unity of essence, but rather by likeness to formlessness with regard to secondary forms.

Reply Obj. 2: Since Augustine (Augustine, Against Enemies of the Law and the Prophets, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 49; PL 42:610).) does not posit an order of duration, but rather an order of nature alone, according to him we must say that the first matter is altogether formless, which cannot be the case according to the position of the other saints.

Reply Obj. 3: It did not have a single form, but rather several, though not the forms of mixed bodies, since these follow on the active and passive powers of the world’s principles of which it is essentially composed.

Reply Obj. 4: And in this way, the reply to the fourth objection is clear.

Article 5

Whether the four coevals are fittingly assigned

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that the four coevals are unfittingly assigned as the empyrean heaven, the angelic nature, the matter of the four elements, and time.

Obj. 1: For place follows on the generation of things just as time does. But there is no mention of place among the first created things. Therefore, neither should there be mention of time.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, time is an accident. But there is no mention of other accidents. Rather, these are understood to have been created together with their subjects. Therefore, it seems that neither should time be mentioned.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, time is the measure of the motion of the first mobile. But the first mobile, namely, the firmament, was made on the second day. Therefore, time did not exist at the beginning of creation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the matter of the higher and lower bodies is not the same. But the matter of all bodies was established in the beginning of creation. Therefore, it seems that there should be five: the empyrean heaven, the matter of the firmament, the matter of the four elements, and so on.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, on each of the six days it is said: God said, ‘let it be made,’ in order to show that the work of that day was made through the Word. Therefore, since formless matter was made through the Word, it seems that at its creation it should be said: God said, ‘let heaven and earth be made.’

Furthermore, we ask according to what is the number of these things taken.

I answer that, turning to the last objection, through the work of creation, the whole creation was established first with regard to its formless being. Hence things that cannot be traced back to a single formless principle, which is matter, warrant enumeration in the works of creation.

But substance and accident are not traced back to a single matter, since matter is not part of an accident. Thus, they do not agree in matter-from-which. But it can be said that an accident agrees in a way with substance in its matter-in-which, insofar as the accident is in the substance. And therefore, that accident that designates by measuring from without the substance, namely, time, is enumerated together with substance.

Likewise, spiritual substance and bodily substance are not traced back to a single matter, since spiritual things lack matter. Thus, the angel is enumerated.

Likewise, too, the heavenly bodies and the lower bodies do not have a single matter. Thus, the heavens and the matter of the four elements are enumerated. And so, in the work of creation the four aforementioned things must all be enumerated.

Reply Obj. 1: Place is the surface of the locating body. Thus, the creation of place is understood as being together with the creation of bodily nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Some accidents designate that in which they exist, for example, whiteness. Such things are understood to have been created in the creation of their subjects, if they pertain to what follows on primary being, such as shape, quantity, and so forth. But some accidents also name that in which they do not exist as in a subject, for example, place. For place does not belong to the containing body in which it is as in a subject but rather to the body so contained. And time is the number of all motions, even though it first belongs to that in which it is as in a subject, namely, the motion of the first-moved, by which all other motions are numbered, as is said in the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.2, 1054a5–10.) But even so, time and place have different accounts. For place is the same essentially as the surface of the locating body, but time is not the same numerically as another accident founded in the substance. Furthermore, place has its whole completion in the thing, but the account of time is in a way completed by the action of the soul that enumerates. Hence it has more of the account of something extrinsic than does place, and consequently it is numbered among the things first created rather than place or some other accident. And I especially consider this fact in order to remove the ancient error of the philosophers, except for Plato, who posited that time is eternal, as is said in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.2, 251b16.)

Reply Obj. 3: The motion of the heavens began on the second day, but not all things were created at the same time. Hence this time cannot be understood as the number of the first mobile. Rather, it must be that either by “time” aeviternity is signified, as some say, or else that “time” is taken broadly for the number of any kind of succession, so that in this case the time first created would mean the time that measures the very creation of things, by which things proceeded into being after non-being.

Reply Obj. 4: According to some, the firmament pertains to the nature of the lower bodies, and in this way, its matter is understood in the matter of the four elements. In this case, only the empyrean heaven and the fifth essence will be of another nature. But if we say that the firmament is the fifth essence, then by “heaven” is understood the empyrean heaven, the crystalline heaven, and the starry heaven, though with regard to the formless nature of the latter two. For the empyrean heaven had its ultimate completion immediately upon its creation.

Reply Obj. 5: “Word,” properly speaking, indicates the account of exemplary form for created things by the fact that the Word is an art, as Augustine says. Thus, in the course of the six days, it is fitting to mention the Word wherever the formation of a created thing is recounted. But where the production of formless matter is recounted, the Son is shown to be the cause as principle, not as Word. Hence in each case the causality of the entire Trinity is shown in different ways. In the creation of formless matter, the Father is designated by the name of God who created, the Son by the name of beginning, and the Holy Spirit by his proper name, since he is called the Spirit of the Lord. But in the formation of things the Father is signified as speaking, the Son as the Word, and the Holy Spirit as the benignity by which what had been made was approved of. And so, by the same love by which God willed that creation be made, he was also pleased that it should remain. (Note that the sixth objection is answered directly in the respondeo above.)

Exposition of the text

As Augustine says, in Against the Manichees*, Moses called this matter earth, ‘because the earth is the least beautiful of all the elements.’* (Sent. II, 12.3(60).2, quoting Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, bk. 1, ch. 7 (PL 34:179).) It should be known that, according to Augustine, who does not posit an order of time in the distinction of things, prime matter should be understood as altogether formless, as has been said. (Above: a. 4.) In this case, it will be called by the name “water” or “earth” due to likeness alone, so that it is called “earth” because of its lack of form (for among all the elements earth partakes less of species, since it is the grossest element) or “water” because of its receptivity to forms, since what is moist is quite receptive and terminable. But the abyss takes its name from the fact that it is ugly incidentally, as is said in the Physics 1, (See Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a18–25.) for “abyss” is derived from a-, that is “without,” and -byssus, which is a very bright white type of flax, and so it means “without brightness.” This belongs to the matter incidentally by reason of privation. Or “abyss” is so named as being “without bottom,” meaning a great depth, especially one of waters, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, bk. 22, ch. 11 (CSEL 25.1:599; PL 42:405): abyssus est aquarum inaestimabilis profunditas; Against Enemies of the Law and the Prophets, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PL 41:612; CCSL 49): potest intelligi quod informis illa materies aquae vel abyssi vocabulo insinuata sit; see also: On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 1, para. 3 (PL 34:247; CSEL 28.1:3): verbo tenebrosam abyssum intelligamus naturam vitae informem.) Similarly, prime matter is called an “abyss” inasmuch as it is deprived of the form through which it receives substantifying being. But, according to other saints, we may say that in the literal sense it was under the substantial form of earth or water.

And the earth was void and empty. (Sent. II, 12.3(60).2; Silano translates the Latin as waste and disordered.) If by “earth” formless matter is understood, then we must explain the receptivity of matter as being in a certain way like the receptivity of place, inasmuch as different forms successively come into a single remaining matter, just as different bodies come successively into a single place. For this reason, Plato said that place and matter are the same thing, as is said in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.2, 209b12.) Thus, by way of likeness we predicate of matter what belongs to place. And so, matter is called void and empty with reference to its lack of form. Here it is empty inasmuch as form fulfills the capacity of matter, and it is void inasmuch as form is the end to which the appetite of the matter tends.

But if “earth” is taken for the element still in a formless state, then it is called empty and void in the literal sense due to the lack of mixed bodies, of which it is the place and to which, as to an end, it is ordered.

Or the dark quality of the air. (Sent. II, 12.4(61).) It should be known that every privation, with regard to that which is signified by the name, is non-being, but something must still be presupposed. For because a privation is a negation in a substance, as is said in the Metaphysics 4 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a12–17.) (hence the subject is presupposed, as well as its aptitude for the reception of the form of which it is deprived), and since darkness is opposed to light by way of privation, it can be taken in three ways. It can be taken either for the deprived subject itself, that is, the dark air, and in this way, it is obvious that the darkness is something and that it was created. In the second way, it can be taken for the power of air through which it is receptive to light, that is, transparency, to the extent that it has not been perfected by light, and in this case the “darkness” can be said to be the dim quality of the air, which is something created. In the third way, it is taken properly for what is signified by the name, and in this case the privation is a non-being. And in this way, speaking of the essential meaning, it cannot be said to have been created by God except incidentally, inasmuch as he made an opaque nature by whose opposition to a bright body darkness is left, just as one who closes a window is said to bring about darkness in a house.

‘First, in the Word, by disposing all things.’ (Sent. II, 12.6(63), quoting Alcuin, Interrogationes et responsiones in Genesim, int. 19 (PL 100:519).) It seems that this is false, since nothing that happens in the Word is made, and thus God works nothing in the Word.

To this we must reply that according to some, Alcuin has spoken improperly, and it should be explained that God works *in the Word—*that is, he begot the Word, which is the art of all the things to be worked through him. But they say this because they do not differentiate between working and making, though these differ greatly. For making is properly a thing’s act that passes over into external matter. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 that artificial things are makeable, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a1–23.) and in this way, God did not make anything from eternity. But “working” or “activity” names any act of a thing, even if it does not pass into something external, as for example understanding is an activity of the intellect and can be without motion. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26.) that God rejoices with one simple activity. In this way, God works in the Word from eternity, as an artisan works by thinking up the forms of artificial things.