D. 5 - Conversion and fall of the angels

Division of the text

After these matters, reflection requires that we enquire what they were like after being separated by their defection and conversion. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) Having shown the condition of the angels at their creation, here he shows how they differ from one another by turning away from or toward God: defection or conversion. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the angels’ defection.

In the second, he considers what happened to the angels who turned away from God, as well as those who turned toward him, with respect to their activities among themselves, at moreover, it is fitting to know that, just as some remained constant from among the greater and lesser angels, so some fell to their ruin from both. (Sent. II, 6.1(26).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers the defection and conversion of certain angels.

In the second, he shows what they were turned away or converted through: for all had free decision. (Sent. II, 5.2(21).1.)

And concerning this latter he does two things.

First, he shows that they were turned away or converted through free will.

Second, he inquires whether free will is sufficient for conversion as it is for defection, at but if it is asked whether, after their creation, something was conferred on those who converted by which they might convert . . . we say that cooperating grace was conferred on them. (Sent. II, 5.3(22).1.)

And concerning this latter he does two things.

First, he shows that a grace was given to the converted through which they were converted.

Second, he inquires whether through that grace they merited their beatitude, at here it is usual to ask whether the angels became blessed in their confirmation. (Sent. II, 5.6(25).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he determines the truth.

Second, he rules out an objection, at and so it is customary for some to object that those who defected rather than converted are not to be blamed. (Sent. II, 5.5(24).1.)

Here there are two questions.

The first regards the defection of the wicked angels. (Q. 1.)

The second regards the conversion of the good. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The fall of the wicked angels

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether an angel could have sinned;

second, by what desire did it sin;

third, to what genus of sin is its sin traced back.

Article 1

Whether there can be sin in the angels

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.63.1; SCG III.108–110; On Truth, q. 24, a. 7; On Evil, q. 16, a. 2; Commentary on Job, ch. 4, lect. 3.) It seems that there could not be sin in the angels.

Obj. 1: For as it says in the Metaphysics 9, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.9, 1051a20. Mandonnet cites ch. 10, but this seems to be an error.) in those things that are always in act, there cannot be evil. Hence Avicenna says that there is no evil above the sphere of the moon. But there is still less potentiality in an angel than in a heavenly body. Therefore, there is no way that sin can be in the angels.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, for something to be wicked after it was good cannot occur without motion. But there is no motion without matter, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a26.) Therefore, since in the angels there is no matter, as was said above, it seems that there could not have been sin in them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as it says in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 247a1.) every change of a virtue (Recall that virtus can be translated broadly as “power” or “capacity” but also narrowly as “virtue”; vitium similarly has broader and narrower senses. In the passage from Aristotle, the Greek word is dunamis, which tends to have the more inclusive meaning, as opposed to the narrower sense that would be implied by the word arete.) or a vice is traced back to an alteration that regards the passions of the sensitive part. But there are no passions of this sort in angels, who have no sense organs. Therefore, in the angels there cannot be change from virtue to vice, such that they would sin after they had been good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the will is only for the good or the apparent good. Therefore, in one to whom nothing can appear good unless it is good, the will cannot be drawn to anything but the true good. But in the angels there cannot be an apparent good that is not also a true good. Therefore, they can only desire that which is a true good. Thus, they cannot sin. Proof of the middle premise: the intellect never errs in those things of which there is understanding properly, such as in the knowledge of principles. But the angels have only intellective knowledge. Therefore, they cannot err in their knowledge. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b26–30.) that the intellect is always correct, whereas the imagination can be correct or incorrect. Augustine says the same in On Genesis, book 12. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 14 (CSEL 28.1:398; PL 34:465).)

On the contrary, Scripture says, behold, they that serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness (Job 4:18). Therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, as has been said above, (Above: d. 3, exposition of the first part of the text; see Sent. II, 3.2(14).1; 5.2(21).1.) free will was given to the angels at their creation. But a free will that is from nothing can also be turned toward evil. Therefore, it seems that the angels could have sinned.

I answer that all Catholics hold as certain that angels sinned and became demons. But how they sinned is difficult to see. For there cannot be sin in the will unless there is deception in the reason in some manner. Hence every wicked person is in a certain way ignorant, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b28–29.)

We must see how to apply this to our understanding of the proposed question. For the Philosopher distinguishes in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a1–3.) between two types of knowledge of practical undertakings: universal and particular. Since activities concern singulars, it can happen that someone who has the right opinion in the universal sins concerning the singulars.

For one can know singulars in two ways: habitually and actually. Thus, it can happen that a sinner even has the right estimation of a singular practical matter habitually, though not actually. For in us habit is bound by passion in such a way that it does not proceed to actual consideration of the particular act to be undertaken—such as by drunkenness, wrath, and concupiscence, and this even to the point that one might pronounce words whose meaning he does not grasp mentally, inasmuch as the judgment of reason is overwhelmed by the vehemence of the passion. Hence it says in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b13.) that delight corrupts the estimation of prudence.

But even though the judgment of the intellect in angels cannot be bound in this way, since no such passions are in them, it can still be bound inasmuch as by considering one thing it is drawn away from the consideration of another due to the fact that it cannot understand more than one thing at the same time, except as it contemplates all things in the Word. It could happen that something would be chosen on the basis of a consideration of one aspect of the thing, yet it would not be chosen if all the other surrounding circumstances were taken into consideration. Thus, it was possible for there to be error of choice and sin in the angels.

Reply Obj. 1: In the nature of the angels there is no potency with respect to a form that they could acquire and lose, as there is in generable and corruptible things. Thus, no natural evil can be in them, just as neither in ungenerable and incorruptible things like the heavenly bodies. Even so, their free will is potential with respect to ordered motion. And so, in this regard there can be a disordering toward evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as passion and reception are said equivocally of intellectual and natural works, so is motion. Hence there does not have to be matter for such motion, but it suffices to have potency, such as we have said is in the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The statement of the Philosopher should be understood as pertaining to the virtues and vices that concern the passions and to knowledge acquired by the senses. And these are not found in the angels.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though the intellect cannot err such that it judges a thing to be what it is not, in regard to what it perceives of the thing, nevertheless, since the created intellect does not encompass all things at the same time, it can fail when it judges a thing to be suitable on the basis of a consideration of an aspect of the thing, which thing is not suitable on the basis of other aspects that the created intellect does not consider. This is like a physician judging something expedient for a sick person on the basis of a consideration of one infirmity of his when it is not expedient for him, simply speaking, on account of another sickness that the physician either does not know about or does not take into consideration.

Article 2

Whether the wicked angel desired equality with God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.63.3; II-II.163.2; SCG III.109; On Evil, q. 16, a. 3.) It seems that the angel did not desire equality with God.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 42 (CSEL 28.1:375; PL 34:452).) speaking of Adam, we must not believe that a man endowed with a spiritual mind willed to be like God. But the angel was much wiser than a man. Therefore, it seems that it did not desire equality with God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what cannot be apprehended cannot be willed, since will pertains only to what is apprehended as good. But the equality of a created thing with God cannot be apprehended, since God himself exceeds every created intellect by his greatness. Therefore, it seems that it did not desire equality with God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, even though one can will possible and impossible things, one can only choose possible things, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b20.) But the choice of the angel pertained to what it desired, since whoever does not sin through choice sins through weakness or ignorance, as can be gleaned from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Mandonnet cites Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, but it seems more evident from 3.1–2, 1109b30–1112a18.) But such was not the sin of the angel. Therefore, its desire was possible. Yet for it to be equal to God is impossible. Therefore, this was not its desire.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one sins in desiring his end, since this is natural. But the end of the angels and of anything created is to become like God. Therefore, it seems that it did not sin by desiring this.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whoever wills to become like something is turned toward it. For no one wills to be like someone he holds in disdain. But the angel by sinning was not turned toward God, but rather away from him. Therefore, it did not desire likeness or equality to God.

On the contrary, on the passage, then did I pay that which I did not steal (Ps 69:4 [68:5]), (RSV reads what I did not steal must I now restore?) the Gloss says that Eve, like the devil, willed to seize divinity. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 68:5, 3.927 (PL 113:946); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 68:5, sermon 1, para. 9 (PL 36:848).) Therefore, it seems that the devil desired equality with God.

Furthermore, it is said in the person of Nebuchadnezzar, as a figure of the devil: I will ascend to heaven, above the stars of God; I will set my throne on high (Isa 14:13). But this cannot be understood as referring to the empyrean heaven, since he was created in it. Therefore, it must be understood of the heaven of the Holy Trinity. Thus, it seems that he desired equality with the loftiness of God.

I answer that there are three opinions concerning this. Some concede simply and absolutely that the sin of the angel consisted in the fact that it willed to be equal to God simply. Nor is this precluded by the fact that such a thing is impossible. For, according to Augustine, blind ambition always presumes more than it is capable of. But this does not seem to work. For even though man can desire more than he can have, he cannot will more than he can think of. For the will follows the intellect and does not go beyond it. Besides, in an angel we cannot posit a passion that binds the judgment of the intellect by an appetite for honor, as there is in us. Moreover, no one ever wills something that, supposing he had it, would mean his nature did not remain. But if an angel were equal to God, it would not have its nature, but rather the divine nature. And so it would be desiring its own non-being.

Thus, others say that the angel did not desire equality with God directly, but rather indirectly. For it desired something that, once possessed, would mean that the angel was equal to God, that is, to be subordinate to no one. This also does not seem to work. For the whole good of an angel consists in the fact that it is subordinate to God, just as the whole brightness of air consists in the fact that it is subject to the rays of the sun. And so, this could not have been desired by an angel.

Thus, we must say otherwise, that it did not desire equality simply with regard to the substance of the desired object, namely, such that it would will to have as much goodness as God has. Rather, it desired equality in a qualified sense, namely, as regards the mode of possession. For in God there is a goodness or beatitude that he has by his nature, and from this nature there is poured out to a creature every beatitude and goodness. So the angel, seeing the dignity of its nature by which it excelled all other created things, willed that beatitude and goodness flow from it to all lower things. It also willed to arrive at the perfection of beatitude through its own natural endowments. Thus, it is said that it willed to have without merit what it would have had by its merits if it had stood firm. Nor even with regard to the mode of possession did it will to be equal to God simply. For it did not will to have beatitude from itself or to be the first one pouring it into others. Rather, what it willed, it willed to have from God and under God insofar as he works in every nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The angel did not will equality simply, just as man does not, but rather in the aforementioned way. Still, some say that Adam was more endowed with a spiritual mind than the angel. This is not based on rank of nature but on the divine revelation he is believed to have had when the Lord cast a deep sleep upon him.

Reply Obj. 2–3: These arguments hold concerning equality taken simply, which we do not say that the angel desired.

Reply Obj. 4: Likeness to God is the end of each created thing according to the mode determined for it by the Creator. Hence without a disordering, it cannot be that an appetite would tend to likeness to God beyond the limit established by God for its nature.

Reply Obj. 5: In any sinner, turning away from God is outside his intention. For evil cannot be intended. Rather, a good is always intended, in which there is a likeness to God. Thus, it was outside the angels’ intention that they would turn away from God, to whom they willed to be likened.

Article 3

Whether the first sin of the angel was pride

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; d. 43, q. 1, a. 6; ST I.63.2; SCG III.109; On Evil, q. 16, a. 2, ad 4.) It seems that the first sin of the angel was not in the genus of pride, but rather another.

Obj. 1: For as it is said the root of all evils is cupidity (1 Tim 6:10) or avarice. But the sin of the angel was as though the root of all sins. Therefore, its sin was that of cupidity or avarice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the text (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) it is said that to be turned away from God is to hate or to be envious. But the angels were turned away from God by sinning. Therefore, their sin was that of envy or hatred.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to avoid effort in spiritual goods pertains to acedia. But Bernard says (See Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones de tempore, serm. 5 (PL 183:353), and Sermones super psalmum ‘Qui habitat,’ sermon 11 (PL 183:160).) that the sin of the angel consisted in the fact that it willed to have glory without effort. Therefore, it seems that its sin was that of acedia.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not do that to which he is bound sins by omission. But the angel was bound to give consideration to the ordinance of God so as not to desire anything beyond that order, which it did not do. Therefore, it sinned by omission.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the virtues, faith holds the first place, being as it were the foundation. But infidelity is opposed to faith. Therefore, since the angel’s sin was the first, it seems that it was infidelity.

On the contrary, as Scripture says: the beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:13). (RSV reads the beginning of pride is sin.) But all sin draws its origin from the malice of the devil. Therefore, it seems that his sin was pride.

I answer that “pride” can be taken in three ways. In one way it is taken as habitual: namely, as a certain inclination toward pride, either from the rigidity of nature alone or from the corruption of the fomes, (Literally, fomes is the kindling, small twigs, or straw that facilitates the burning of larger pieces of wood. The word has become idiomatic for something that inclines one toward sin.) and in this way, pride is called the “beginning of all sin.” In another way, we speak of pride insofar as someone actually asserts himself outside the limits of a precept in order not to be subject to the one issuing the precept, and in this way, it is not a special sin but rather a kind of general condition following on every sin on the side of turning away from God. In the third way, pride is said to be an inordinate appetite for one’s own excellence, especially in dignity or honor, and in this way, it is a special sin, one of the seven capital vices. And in this way, the first sin of the angel was pride; this is clear both from the desired object, since it desired the eminence of dignity, and from the motive, since it fell into the ruin of sin out of a consideration of its own beauty.

Reply Obj. 1: Cupidity can also be spoken of in three ways. In one way, it is spoken of as the root of all sin, and in this way, it is a certain inclination to the inordinate desire of each desirable object, either due to the corruption of the fomes or due to the condition of nature, which is capable of being turned on account of the fact that it is made from nothing. In another way, it is spoken of as a condition following on every sin on the side of conversion, as indicating an actually inordinate desire for any desirable object, whether honor or knowledge, and so forth. In the third way, it is spoken of as a special vice and one of the seven capital vices, namely, an inordinate desire for possessing what promises sufficiency in life, such as money, and other things whose worth is measured financially. And it is self-evident that the devil did not sin by the desire for such things.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred and envy with respect to God presuppose depravity of the will in the angel, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, book 11, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 14 (CSEL 28.1:346; PL 34:436).) which is clear in the following way. For nothing can be hated unless it is at odds with and contrary to the will. But what is most good, having no admixture of defect, is only contrary to a will that is not upright. Likewise, envy is sadness at another’s prosperity, inasmuch as it impedes one’s own proper good. But the divine happiness does not impede anyone’s own proper good, unless this good is inordinately desired, since every good comes down from it. Thus, hatred and envy presuppose a sin through which the will becomes disordered.

Reply Obj. 3: Angels do not expend effort or suffer fatigue by the fact that they minister to God and merit. Thus, the sin of acedia has no place with them. But they are said to have willed to achieve glory without effort by willing to pursue it by their own power, according to how what exceeds the capacity of the one acting is said to require effort.

Reply Obj. 4: Omission is sometimes a special sin, namely, when something is neglected that should be done because it was specifically commanded. But sometimes omission is a condition that follows on every sin as being the neglect of some circumstance that ought to be observed in a work. And in this way, it is not unfitting that there was omission in the angel’s first sin.

Still, it can be said that the angel was not bound at that time actually to give such consideration, since it could have avoided sin in another way.

Reply Obj. 5: It is not necessary that things first in generation be first in destruction. Hence it does not follow that if faith is the first of the virtues, then infidelity is the first of the vices.

Question 2

The conversion of the good angels

Regarding the second main topic, we inquire concerning the conversion (Note that conversio, in light of its etymology, can be translated as “turning toward”; however, it need not suggest that one was initially in sin or had turned away from God.) of the good angels, and two questions arise:

first, whether there was a grace applied to them for their conversion;

second, whether by that grace they merited beatitude.

Article 1

Whether the angels needed grace to be converted to God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.62.2.) It seems that they did not need the application of a grace to be converted to God.

Obj. 1: For it pertains to the freedom of free will that it can be turned to either side, and particularly to the good. But the angels in the state of creation had free will not weakened by any sin. Therefore, they did not need grace to be turned to the good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as related above in the text (Sent. II, 4.1(19).6; 3.4(16).6–7, 9.) from the words of Augustine, God did not distinguish among the angels prior to their conversion or defection. But no grace was applied to those who were turned away, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) Therefore, neither was there grace applied to those who were converted prior to their conversion.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by the fact that angels were turned to God, they were filled with grace by him, so conversion is a preparation for grace. Therefore, if conversion can only take place through a preceding grace, and that grace too requires preparation for its reception (since otherwise it would be given to all), it seems that in this way we proceed to infinity, which the intellect even in its nature rejects. Therefore, there is a primary state, namely, such that it was not necessary for conversion that grace be given to prepare for that conversion.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is the same habit that works with the one who possesses it, rendering his work good, as works in him, making him good. But an angel did not need operating grace, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 5.4(23).1.) Therefore, neither did it need cooperating grace for the work of conversion.

On the contrary, no one can progress to the reward of life without grace. But through their conversion the angels progressed to life. Therefore, they needed grace for it.

Furthermore, to be converted to God is to cling to him in love, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) But this is not understood of natural love, since they had loved him in this way before, as is written above. Therefore, it seems that this is understood of the love of charity, which does not exist without grace. Therefore, there could not have been a conversion without grace.

I answer that there are two opinions concerning this. Some say that for a meritorious conversion two graces are required: sanctifying grace, which informs the act of conversion and renders it meritorious, and a grace freely given, by which the substance of the act is elicited and which inclines the free will to willing. But it does not seem necessary to posit this grace, unless the freedom of the will itself is called a “grace,” since without a doubt God gives it to us; or unless the occasions that are sometimes given to men by God for conversion are called “graces,” for example, legal instruction, chastisement leading to humility, and other such things. But without them it is still possible to obtain grace, since if a man does what is in him, God gives him grace. But to do this he does not need anything else. For what he cannot do by himself through free will is not in man to do. For what is said to be in us is what we are the masters of. Hence this position implies a contradiction when it posits that free will is not sufficient to do what is in us.

Thus, we must say otherwise, that free will is sufficient to elicit the act of conversion, which, through this act, prepares and disposes oneself to possess grace. But conversion can only be efficacious for merit through grace. Hence it is one and the same motion whereby grace is infused, which is the disposition for grace as proceeding from free will, and whereby it is meritorious as informed by grace. This is similar in the motion of contrition by which a sinner is first justified.

How this is possible can be seen from things occurring in nature. For at the same instant that there is first the necessitating disposition in matter, the substantial form is also introduced. Since generation is the terminus of alteration, there must be in the same instant the alteration to be terminated according to the necessitating disposition, as well as the generation according to the substantial form. But because alteration is a continuous motion, the principle of the alteration and the medium by which the matter is disposed for the substantial form precede in time the introduction of the substantial form. But the motion of the will that disposes for grace is simple and not continuous. Thus, either the first motion alone is a disposition sufficient for grace, or it is the last among several, which acts by virtue of all the preceding motions. Thus, grace is infused together with it.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the power of free will can of itself suffice for the substance of the act, it does not suffice for the form of it, by which it is meritorious.

Reply Obj. 2: The motions of defection and conversion, insofar as they are from free will, precede the infusion of grace in some and the fall of the others, not in time but in nature, after the manner of matter and generation, just as a disposition precedes form.

Reply Obj. 3: In this way, the solution to the third objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: Something is said to come to be or to have been worked in two ways.

This is either from its contrary, as when we say that white comes from black, and this is how we speak of the operating grace by which someone comes to be good from being evil. And it was not in the angels in this way, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 5.4(23).1.)

In the other way, something is said to come to be from negation or privation, as when something shining comes from what was not shining or the shaped from the unshaped, and in this way, we speak of the operating grace by which someone, from not being good, by a gratuitous goodness comes to be good with such goodness. And in this way, operating grace was in the angels.

Article 2

Whether the angels merited their beatitude

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.62.4; Quodl. IX, q. 4, a. 3.) It seems that the angels did not merit their beatitude.

Obj. 1: For merit precedes reward as a path precedes its end point. But in the angels there could not have been merit, since before beatitude they did not have grace, which is the root of meriting, at least if they were not created in grace. Therefore, it seems that they did not merit their beatitude.

Obj. 2: One might say that they merited beatitude through their ministries, in which they serve us at the command of God.

On the contrary, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13 (PG 3:299).) the higher angels are not sent to carry out the function of an external mission. Therefore, if the lower merited through ministry, it seems that the higher are unjustly dealt with, since to them the capability of meriting is not granted.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one order does not infinitely surpass another. Therefore, if the lower continuously merit through their external ministry, it seems that they would eventually arrive at the rank of a higher order. Thus, there would be a confusion of the orders.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the efficacy of meriting in an activity is either because of the difficulty of the work or because of its perfection. But it is not because of difficulty, since the angels fulfill their ministries without any effort or difficulty. Therefore, if it is because of perfection, then since the activity by which they contemplate God is more noble and more perfect, it seems that they would also merit by it. Since this is common to all the blessed and is without interruption, it seems that the saints merit continuously, and consequently that their glory increases to infinity.

On the contrary, in whatever things is found a perfection of the same account, there are in them the same principles for obtaining that perfection. But beatitude has the same account in angels and in men. Therefore, since men do not arrive at beatitude without merit, it seems that neither do angels.

Furthermore, according to Bernard, the sin of the angel consisted in the fact that it willed to have glory without merit. (See Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones de tempore, serm. 5 (PL 183:353), and Sermones super psalmum ‘Qui habitat’, sermon 11 (PL 183:160).) But this would not have been for it a sin if it had been ordained to having a beatitude that it did not merit. Therefore, it seems that they did not have beatitude without merit.

I answer that, if we maintain that the angels were created in grace, the response to this is clear, since in this case merit certainly preceded reward. If they were not created in grace, but grace was given to them at the same time as glory, then there are three opinions. Some say that they in no way merited their beatitude and that grace was not given to them in order to merit, but rather to live blessedly. But this does not seem fitting. For beatitude has the account of a reward, but there cannot be a reward without merit, just as there cannot be punishment without fault.

Others say that by the works that came after their confirmation whereby they minister to us, they merit the beatitude that they earlier received, just as a soldier merits the position conferred on him by the king by afterwards performing his military service. But this too, speaking simply, seems unfitting because beatitude has the account of an endpoint, whereas merit, since it tends toward another, has the account of a path. Hence they do not seem compatible with each other such that someone who is blessed could exist in a state of meriting. But this can be maintained in a qualified sense, namely, if they are understood to merit not the essential reward, which is their beatitude, but rather an incidental reward, which is joy over those who are saved by the offices they carry out.

Thus, it seems that we must say with the others that merit in them did not precede reward in time but rather in nature. This can easily be understood from what has been said above. For just as an act of free will is a disposition for grace, so also an act informed by grace merits glory. Hence one and the same motion of conversion is a preparation for grace as coming from free will, meritorious for glory as informed by grace, and, again, is the act of fruition as completed through the habit of glory. (Aquinas seems to have changed his position by the time he wrote the Summa: non simul potest [actus] informari gratia imperfecta, quae est principium merendi, et gratia perfecta, quae est principium fruendi, “but an act cannot simultaneously be informed both by imperfect grace, which is a principle of merit, and by perfect grace, which is a principle of the enjoyment of beatitude” (ST I.62.4).)

Reply Obj. 1: It is not necessary that merit precede reward in time but only in nature. For any meritorious act has a reward connected with it, just as any inordinate act has a punishment, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 1, ch. 7 (CCSL 27; PL 32:670).)

Reply Obj. 2: Even if the higher angels are not sent, nevertheless they direct the lower angels in their ministries. Thus, the merit with respect to incidental reward is common.

Reply Obj. 3: In this way, the reply to the third objection is clear. And besides, the orders are distinguished with regard to rank in the essential reward, which is not increased by the ministries.

Reply Obj. 4: The angels’ acts of ministry have efficacy for meriting by reason of their effect, namely, the salvation of the men to whom they minister, from which joy redounds to them, which is an incidental reward.

Exposition of the text

To turn away meant to hold God in hate or to envy him. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) This also seems to be impossible. For just as nothing is loved except the good or something under the aspect of good, so also nothing is hated except under the aspect of evil. But in God there is no aspect of evil. Therefore he cannot be hated. But on the contrary, it is said: the pride of them that hate you ascends continually (Ps 74 [73]:23).

To this we must say that no one can hate God himself as he is, but rather under the aspect of some effect of his that is contrary to the will inasmuch as it punishes or forbids or something of this sort; as, for example, light in itself cannot be hated by the eye, but it can be hated inasmuch is it blinds an infirm eye.

They were not deserted by grace in the sense that it was taken away after having been previously given to them, but in the sense that it was never given to them so that they might convert. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.) From this it seems they were not created in grace. But these are the words of the Master, who seems to have been of this opinion.