D. 2 - Purely spiritual creation

Division of the text

Here the Master begins to treat of specific created things, as far as this pertains to the consideration of a theologian. And it is divided into three parts.

In the first, he treats of the purely spiritual creature.

In the second, he treats of the purely bodily creature, at let what we have said of the condition of the angelic nature suffice. (Sent. II, 12.1(58).1.)

In the third, he treats of the creature that is composed of both, at after having gone over these things, we now take up what we promised above to fulfill and explain in order concerning the creation of man. (Sent. II, 16.1(92).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he treats of the creation of the angels.

In the second, he treats of their separation by defection and conversion, at after these matters, reflection requires that we enquire what they were like after being separated by their defection and conversion. (Sent. II, 5.1(20).1.)

In the third, he treats of the dignity of the good, at after the above matters, it remains to know what Scripture teaches concerning the orders of angels. (Sent. II, 9.1(47).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he treats of the creation of the angels with regard to that which is adjacent to them as a sort of measure.

In the second, he treats of their condition as created, at see, it has been shown where the angels were as soon as they were created. (Sent. II, 3.1(13).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows when the angels were created.

In the second, where they were created, at it has already been shown when the angelic nature was created. (Sent. II, 2.4(10).1.)

In the first, he says what the intention concerns.

In the second, he pursues the question, at some authorities appear to indicate that the angels were created before any other creature. (Sent. II, 2.1(7).2.)

And concerning this he does two things.

First, he raises the question, laying out arguments on both sides.

Second, he settles it, at and so it seems that it must be held. (Sent. II, 2.1(7).3.)

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he settles the question.

Second, he confirms his conclusion, at Augustine manifestly shows that the bodily and spiritual creatures were created together. (Sent. II, 2.1(7).4. The Silano translation has been slightly modified.)

Third, he resolves the objections to the contrary, at and yet Jerome, in On the Epistle to Titus*, seems to feel otherwise*. (Sent. II, 2.3(9).2.)

It has already been shown when the angelic nature was created. (Sent. II, 2.4(10).1.) Here he treats of where the angels were created.

First, he shows that it was in the empyrean heaven.

Second, he wraps up what he had said, at and so the matter of visible things and the nature of invisible things were established together. (Sent. II, 2.5(11).1.)

Third, he resolves an objection to the contrary, at it is usual to ask here, if the angels were in the empyrean heaven as soon as they were made. (Sent. II, 2.6(12).1.)

Here there are two questions.

This first is about aeviternity, which measures the duration of the angels. (Q. 1.)

The second is about the empyrean heaven, which is called the “place of the angels.” (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Aeviternity

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether aeviternity differs from eternity or time;

second, whether there is only one aeviternity;

third, whether aeviternity, which measures the duration of the angels, began before time.

Article 1

Whether aeviternity is the same as eternity

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 2; d. 19, q. 2, a. 1; ST 1.10.4–5; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 14, ad 10; ad 18; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 10, lect. 3; Quodl. X, q. 2.) It seems that aeviternity is the same as eternity.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 2.) intelligence is put on par with eternity. But this is only as what is measured to the measure. Therefore, since aeviternity is posited as the measure of angelic duration, it seems that it is the same as eternity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as measured things relate to one another, so do their measures. But angels are not the cause of temporal things. Therefore, the measure of their duration will not be a cause of time, but only the measure of the duration of the Creator, which is eternity. But aeviternity is a cause of time, just as Boethius says that those who bid time go from aeviternity. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, poem 9 (CCSL 94; PL 63:758).) Therefore, aeviternity is eternity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as movable things are related to one another in succession, so also unmovable things are related to one another in immobility. But there is a single successive measure of all movable things, namely, time. Therefore, there is also a single measure of all unmovable things, namely, eternity.

On the contrary (4), it seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For, according to Augustine, God moves the spiritual creature through time. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 28.1:259; PL 34:388).) But aeviternity is posited as a measure of such a creature. Therefore, aeviternity and time are the same.

Furthermore (5), every measure of a created thing’s duration is divisible. But the parts of a duration do not exist at once. Therefore, since aeviternity is the measure of the duration of a creature, it seems that there is succession in it. But this is the account of time. Therefore, it seems that time and aeviternity are the same.

Furthermore (6), no created thing is actually infinite. But angels will endure to infinity, since they will never be corrupted. Therefore, their duration is not all at once. And so the same follows as before.

Furthermore (7), in everything whose duration is entirely at once, being and having-been do not differ. But that which has been cannot be understood not to have been. Therefore, angels cannot be understood not to exist, nor can God do this, which is false. Therefore, the duration of an angel is not entirely at once.

I answer that aeviternity is posited as an intermediate measure between time and eternity. But concerning the distinction between time and aeviternity there are three opinions.

Some say that the “now” of aeviternity and time is the same essentially, but that they differ in account. For the “now” of time measures the mobile itself inasmuch as it is in motion by the fact that just as time is related to motion, so also the “now” of time is related to the mobile, as is said in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 220b34–221a6.) But the “now” of aeviternity measures the substance of the first mobile itself as it is considered in itself. And in this way, time and aeviternity differ only in account. Nevertheless, by aeviternity the substance not only of the heavens is measured, but even that of the angels.

But this cannot stand, since duration regards actual existence, whereas the to-be of the heavens, which is measured by aeviternity, and their being-moved, which is measured by time, have neither the same act nor are of a single account. Thus, time and aeviternity differ in reality, since there are different measures for different genera, as is clear from the Metaphysics 10. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b20–1053b9.)

Thus, others who conceded this said that aeviternity is the measure of a permanent created thing while time is the measure of a moved thing, and yet that there is in aeviternity a “before” and an “after,” as there is in time; but they differ, since in time there is “before” and “after” with newness, while in aeviternity “before” and “after” are present without newness and aging.

But this seems to say nothing at all. For wheresoever there is “before” and “after,” we must understand there to be an earlier part and a later part, and in no duration do the earlier and later parts exist at once. Hence when the “before” exists, the “after” must not exist. Thus, the “after” must come newly, since it was not there before.

The example they give also supposes something false. For they say that just as we find a flowing of one thing from another that is continuous with newness due to the fact that what flows is always one thing and then another, as in the procession of a stream from a spring, so also we find a flowing that is continuous without newness, as in the procession of a ray from the sun, which is always the same. But it is not true that we consider “before” and “after” first and essentially in the procession of a ray from the sun: illumination is not a motion but the terminus of a motion, and it is in time only secondarily, because “to be illuminated” is traced back as to a cause to a certain motion in which there is change of place, namely, to the motion of the illuminating body, which illuminates so long as it is moved over the earth. But the being of an angel is not traced back to the renewal of a motion as to its cause, nor does it have any newness in itself, since nothing comes to be there that previously was not. Therefore, it is impossible that in any way there should be “before” and “after” there.

Thus, we must say that time is a measure that has “before” and “after,” which aeviternity does not have. For it is necessary to take the account of a measure from what is measured. But the being of an angel, which is measured by aeviternity, is indivisible and has no variation, and thus, aeviternity does not have “before” and “after.” But motion, which is measured by time, is perfected by a kind of succession. Thus, in time there is found “before” and “after.” However, aeviternity does differ from eternity, even as the being of an angel differs from divine being, in two respects. First, because divine being stands on its own, since it is God’s essence, whereas in an angel the being is one thing and the essence another. Second, because the being of an angel is from another, but divine being is not. Hence it is clear that just as the being of an angel is a certain participation in the divine being, so also aeviternity is a certain participation in eternity. And this is why teachers say little of the difference between aeviternity and eternity—hence Dionysius uses both indifferently.

Reply Obj. 1: By this the reply to the first objection is clear, since in that place “eternity” is taken as meaning participated eternity, which is aeviternity. And God is said to be above eternity, as he is above being and above everything that is named.

Reply Obj. 2: Likewise, “aeviternity” is taken there as meaning eternity. But if it is taken as differing from eternity, in this case time is said to flow from aeviternity not as from an efficient cause, but as from an exemplar cause. For the more worthy among beings are in a certain way exemplars of the lower inasmuch as they approach closer to the first exemplar. Thus, aeviternity is the exemplar of time inasmuch as it is more like eternity.

Reply Obj. 3: “Motion” can be used univocally, at least in its generic intention. Thus, one measure can correspond to all moved things that are ordered to one another. But no created being can be spoken of univocally with uncreated being. Thus, we must posit two measures.

Reply Sed Contra 4: An angel can be considered in two ways. It is considered either with regard to its being—which is without alternation, and in this way, it is measured by aeviternity. Or it is considered with regard to its activity—and in this way, too, it is measured by aeviternity with respect to one activity: namely, insofar as it perceives things in the Word, since in this case there is not an alternation in its activity. But with regard to another activity, in which there is alternation, it is measured by time, namely, insofar as it perceives things through the multiple species it has among it. But this time is something other than the time that measures the motion of the first mobile, because the latter alternation is not ordered on the basis of the former and because this time is not a continuum, but rather the discrete numeration of a discontinuous alternation. For continuity accrues to time on the part of numbered motion and not with reference to its own form by which it is number, as the Commentator says on the Physics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 99.)

Reply Sed Contra 5: Every division of duration stems from the motion that gives rise to the succession of “before” and “after,” Thus, time is a measure after the manner of number. But aeviternity and eternity measure act in which newness through motion does not occur, and consequently they are indivisible measures after the manner of unity. For just as time is the number of “before” and “after” in motion, so also aeviternity is the unity of the permanence of an act that is the being or activity of a created thing, and likewise eternity for what is uncreated.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The being of an angel is not infinite by privation in the manner of quantity, since it is an indivisible, and there cannot be an actual infinite of that sort of thing. Rather, it is unlimited by negation, not simply, but with respect to the limit that is an endpoint of duration, which it does not have.

Reply Sed Contra 7: God can make an angel not to exist. For just as it could not begin by itself, so also it cannot endure except by his will. Likewise, too, it can be understood not to exist by the fact that its “whatness” is not its own existence. Even so, he cannot make it at the same time to be and not to be, nor is this even thinkable. And so, he cannot make it not to have existed, since the latter impossibility is derived from the former, as was said in Book I. (Sent. I, 43.1(187), especially 8–10.) Thus, this objection does not apply to the case in question.

Article 2

Whether there is only one aeviternity

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.10.6; Quodl. V, q. 4.) It seems that there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 1: For just as time is the numbered number, (Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes “number” into the numbering number (the abstract number by which we count, e.g., three, considered by itself) and the numbered number (the concrete things that have been counted, e.g., the three men). Time is a number in the latter sense. See Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, lect. 17, n. 581.) so also aeviternity seems to be unity restricted or determined to a given thing. But such unity is multiplied on the basis of the multiplication of those things to whom it belongs to be one. Therefore, there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is not a single measure of corporeal and incorporeal things, since they belong to different genera. But some bodies are measured by aeviternity, such as the substance of heaven. Therefore, since some spiritual things are also measured by aeviternity, it seems that there is not one aeviternity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the motions that have a single time are traced back to a single motion as to a cause. But angels are not traced back to a single angel as to a cause. Therefore, they are not measured by a single aeviternity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, with the removal of any given angel, the being of the other angels measured by aeviternity will still remain. But whatever things are related in such a way that, when one is taken away, the other remains, do not depend on one another. Therefore, it seems that the aeviternity of one angel does not depend on the aeviternity of another, and so there is not one aeviternity of all of them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if they were measured by one aeviternity, this is only through the aeviternity that is the measure of the being of the first angel. But, as is said below, the angel who fell was the greatest among them all. Therefore, it seems that the being of all the good angels would be measured after the aeviternity of a demon, which is absurd. Therefore, it seems that there is not only one aeviternity.

On the contrary, the mean has the nature of the extremes. But aeviternity is the mean between eternity and time. But there is one eternity, and likewise one time. Therefore, aeviternity is one.

Furthermore, this is also seen through the fact that aeviternity is more simple than time and thus is more one.

I answer that to maintain the unity of aeviternity, we must investigate it with regard to its likeness to time. Three different reasons are given for this likeness.

Some say that time is the number of motion. Hence just as it is the same “ten” by which ten dogs and ten horses are numbered, so also it is the same time by which all motions are numbered. But the Commentator disproves this in the Physics 4, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 134.) since the unity of the number of different numbered things is only a unity of number taken mathematically. But time is not a mathematical thing, but rather a natural thing. Moreover, all mathematical things are multiplied with respect to the being that they have in things, as, for example, it is not the same line in copper and in wood with respect to being. Hence it would follow that time would be numbered with respect to being on the basis of the number of motions. Thus, it would follow that there would be many times simply speaking, but one time only in the imagination.

Others have said that since time is a measure of variation, and every variation stems from the potentiality of matter, and matter is one, there is one time on the basis of the unity of matter. But this does not seem to be true. For time does not measure variation in potency, but rather variation in act. Now, the act of variation in matter is not one, but more than one. Only the prime potency for variation is one—though even this fact is not known through itself and, indeed, it might be false that there is one matter of all movable things.

Moreover, time, since it is number, necessarily regards a numbered multitude. But in prime matter there is not a multitude with respect to essence, but only with respect to being, and with respect to this being it is not one in many things. Hence time does not correspond to matter with respect to its essence, but only to being, insofar as it is varied by way of motion. Hence time can in no way be one on the basis of the unity of matter.

Thus, we must say with the Commentator on the Physics 4 that time is one on the basis of the unity of the motion of the first mobile. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 130, 132.) For time is compared to this motion not only as the measure to what is measured, as it is to other motions, but as accident to subject, which is included in its definition, from which it possesses unity and multitude. Hence it first measures the daily motion and through it measures all others. For, as said in the Metaphysics 10, each thing is measured by that which is the first and least of its kind. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b32–1053a23.) And, similarly, it should be said of aeviternity that it is one on the basis of the unity of the simplest of aeviternal beings, which is the first angel, since one must be simpler than another, as will be said below.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of measure. One is intrinsic, which is in what is measured, as an accident is in a subject. And this is multiplied when what is measured is multiplied, as, for example, there are several lines that measure the length of several equal bodies. But there is also extrinsic measure. And it is not necessary for this to be multiplied when the things that are measured are multiplied. Rather, it is in one as in a subject against which many things are measured, as, for example, many cloths are measured against the length of one arm. And in this way, many motions are measured against the number of a single first motion, and this number is time. And many permanent things are measured against the unity of a single permanent thing, which is aeviternity.

Reply Obj. 2: Spiritual and bodily things can be likened in the permanence of being and in this respect have one measure, though in others they stand at a great distance from one another.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though one angel is not the cause of another, it is, nevertheless, simpler than another. And this suffices for the account of a measure.

Reply Obj. 4: If there were not the first angel that there now is, there would be another first one after whom the others would be measured, just as if there were not this first mobile, there would be another, the measure of which would be time.

Reply Obj. 5: Since aeviternity is a participation in eternity, the more something participates in eternity, the more primarily it is measured by aeviternity. Thus, since a blessed angel participates more in eternity than one who fell through sin, it does not follow that a blessed angel would be measured against the aeviternity of a demon, but rather conversely.

Article 3

Whether the duration of angels began before the world

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.61.3; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 18.) It seems that the duration of the angels began before the world.

Obj. 1: For Gregory Nazianzen said that God first thought up angelic substances. (Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, On the Theophany, n. 9 (PG 36:319): but since this movement of self-contemplation alone could not satisfy Goodness, but Good must be poured out and go forth beyond Itself to multiply the objects of Its beneficence, for this was essential to the highest Goodness, He first conceived the Heavenly and Angelic Powers.) And God’s thinking is his work, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:874).) Therefore, it seems that angels were made before other created things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a bodily creature is not held to be equal to a spiritual one. But it is said that God did not will to make the world from eternity so that the world would not seem to be equal to himself. Therefore, it seems that neither should he have made bodily creatures at the same time as spiritual ones.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one can have knowledge of a thing that will be made unless he exists before that thing. But according to Augustine, angels receive in the Word their knowledge of creation that will be made through the Word, which is called “morning knowledge.” (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 8 (CSEL 28.1:43; PL 34:269); see also bk. 4, cc. 22 and 30 (CSEL 28.1:121, 128; PL 34:311, 315); bk. 5, cc. 4–5 (CSEL 28.1:142–47; PL 34:323–27).) Therefore, it seems that the angels were made before other created things.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to some, angels move the heavens. But the mover precedes the moveable. Therefore, it seems that angels preceded the heavens and other bodily things.

On the contrary (5), at whatever time there were angels, they were at a distance from one another by essence. But a distance between things is unthinkable unless place exists, and place is unthinkable unless there is a body. Therefore, the angels were not created before bodily things.

Furthermore (6), if angels were created before bodily things, then the “now” of the creation of the angels would have to come before the “now” of the creation of the world. But wherever there is a “now” before and a “now” after, there is time. Therefore, before the world there would have to have been time, which seems to be impossible, since then there would also be motion.

I answer that the creation of things depends on the will of the Creator, who willed to create things at a given time and not before. And since God’s will is not known to us, we cannot investigate the beginning of the creation of things by reason, but rather hold it by faith as it has been handed down to us by those to whom we believe the divine will was revealed.

Therefore, it should be known that concerning the beginning of things, the saints agree in what is of faith, namely, that nothing is from eternity besides God, but they are found to have said various things, at least as regards the surface meaning of their words, in those matters that are not necessarily of faith, in which they were permitted to form different opinions, just as we are. For several of those who preceded Augustine, such as Jerome, (As in the text of Lombard: Jerome (ca. 342–420 AD), On Titus, ch. 1, v. 2 (PL 26:456).) Hilary, (Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, bk. 12, n. 37 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:456).) and Gregory Nazianzen, (Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, as referenced in John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:874).) seem to have held that the angels were made before the bodily creation and that the bodily creation was successively distinguished through species. But Augustine holds that the bodily and spiritual creation were made at the same time and that the bodily was made all at once with respect to matter and species, but not with respect to individuals, which are generated through the succession of time. Those who followed, such as Gregory and Bede, (Bede, Libri quattuor in principium Genesis, bk. 1, at 1:1 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:13).) agree with Augustine that bodily and spiritual creatures are of the same age, and they agree with the others in the succession of the distinction of bodies through different species. Thus, it is commonly held that angels were not made before bodily creatures.

This does seem more probable, both as regards the divine omnipotence, to which it does not belong to work in a successive manner, and in order to exclude an error, lest it seem that angels are the creators of bodily things. Nevertheless, we must not be prejudiced against the other opinion, as is said in the text, since this view has neither been demonstrated nor expressed by faith.

Reply Obj. 1: If we wish to harmonize the statements of those whose opinions differ—which in fact is not necessary—it can be said that the authorities who seem to deny that they are of the same age should be explained by reference to the order of dignity and not of duration.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not a like case, since God precedes the created not only by dignity, but also by causality, which the beginning of the world shows. For, as Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, ch. 71.) the easiest way to show that there is a God and that everything is from him, is on the supposition of the finite age of the world. Thus, it was established in the law that they would keep a feast on the seventh day, on which the world was consummated, so that by the finite age of the world, they would always keep God in mind. But the spiritual creation exceeds the bodily in dignity, not in causality. And to exclude the possibility that it would be believed to be the cause of it, it was appropriate that both be made at the same time.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge of a thing already made can be received as if it were still to be made, if it be considered in the causes from which it proceeds. And so the angels received their knowledge of things that would be made in the Word, which is the practical art of things.

Reply Obj. 4: The mover does not necessarily precede the moveable in duration, but rather in dignity, as is clear in the case of the soul and the body.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The other arguments to the contrary are also sophistic, since the essence of an angel does not necessarily need a place and their being distinct is not with respect to local order or distance, but rather according to essential principles.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Similarly, the other objection is based on imagined time. For we can imagine a “now” before the world, just as we can also imagine many lines outside of heaven.

Question 2

The empyrean heaven

Next we inquire concerning the empyrean heaven, in which the angels are said to have been made. And concerning this three questions arise:

first, whether it is a body;

second, of what sort is it;

third, whether it has an influence on other bodies.

Article 1

Whether the empyrean heaven is a body

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.66.3.) It seems that it is not a body.

Obj. 1: For every natural body is sensible, and especially to the sense of sight. But the empyrean heaven is not visible, but rather intellectual, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 2.4(10).3.) Therefore, it is not a body.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the empyrean heaven is a place of contemplation. But a bodily place is not due to contemplation, which even those who exist in a body abstract from bodies, since, according to Augustine: as long as we perceive something divine in our mind, we are not in this world. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:907).) Therefore, it seems that the empyrean heaven is not a body.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher proves in On the Heavens (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.7, 275b5–11; 1.9, 279a12–b2.) that outside the first mobile there is not another body, and yet in a certain way he places the blessed life outside of it, which blessed life we say belongs in the empyrean heaven. Therefore, it seems that it is not a body.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, philosophers have thoroughly examined the natures of bodies, by which God has even revealed his invisible things, according to the Apostle (Rom 1:19–21). But they have made no mention of the empyrean heaven. Therefore, it is not a body.

On the contrary (5), everything that is moved in a place is in a place, since local motion is the first among motions, as is proved in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 260a27–261a26.) Therefore, it seems that the first mobile is in a place. But place is the surface of a containing body. Therefore, it must have a body at rest containing it, and this we call the empyrean heaven.

Furthermore (6), as is said in On the Heavens 2, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.12, 292a22–b5.) what acquires goodness without motion is more perfect than what acquires it through motion. But the works of God are perfect. Therefore, the most perfect body must be unmovable.

Furthermore (7), before anything multiform there is something uniform, as is proved in the Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.1, 1045b28–1046a2.) But there is a non-uniform heaven, which is partly transparent and partly actually luminous, as the starry heaven is. Therefore, there must be one that is only transparent and one that is only luminous. This conclusion can also be drawn from the proposition that the Philosopher uses in Physics 8, (See perhaps Aristotle, Physics 8.2, 252b29–253a2.) namely, that if anything is found as a composite of two things of which one can be found by itself, the remaining could also be found by itself. But transparent is as potency with respect to the luminous. Therefore, the first body must be wholly actually luminous. And this we call the empyrean heaven.

I answer that the empyrean heaven cannot be investigated by reason, since whatever we know of the heavens is either through sight or through motion. But the empyrean heaven is subject neither to motion nor to sight, as is said in the text. (Although not said explicitly, in Sent. II, 2.4(10).1–3, its invisibility is implied and its lack of motion is entailed by its lack of “instability.”) Hence it is held to exist not by natural reason but only by authority. And it is this body that has principally been ordered to be the dwelling of the blessed. It is more ordered for the sake of men, whose bodies will also be glorified and so are due a place, than for angels who do not need a place. And since that glory exceeds human investigation, so also does the empyrean heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is called “intellectual” because it is not subject to our sight, but is grasped only by the intellect, not because it is not visible in itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven is called “the place of contemplation” not as much with respect to necessity as with respect to appropriateness, as for example a church is called “the place of prayer.”

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher’s proofs demonstrate that there is no body outside the whole universe, not that outside this heaven there is no other heaven, since philosophers are also found to disagree on the number of the spheres.

Reply Obj. 4: The reason has already been stated why philosophers did not know of this heaven, since it is subject neither to sight nor to motion. And, nevertheless, many of the things they said on these matters they knew not demonstratively, but with probability. Hence the Philosopher himself attests that he resolves difficult questions with a probable solution. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2. The entirety of this book proceeds by way of merely probable argumentation, e.g., 2.11: with regard to the shape of each star, the most reasonable view is that they are spherical; 2.12: we regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one’s way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence.)

Reply Sed Contra 5: The other arguments are also not compelling, since the last heaven that is moved is not in a place through itself, but incidentally, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b11–22.) in the passage where the Commentator has also laid out the different opinions of philosophers on this subject. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 46.)

Reply Sed Contra 6: Nor is it necessary for that which participates without motion in the divine goodness to be a body.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Nor, again, is it necessary that what is multiform be traced back to a uniform bodily thing.

Article 2

Whether the empyrean heaven is luminous

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the empyrean heaven is not luminous.

Obj. 1: For, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, pt. 3, ch. 2. The Liber de anima (Kitāb an-nafs) is itself a section of Avicenna’s larger Book of Healing (al-Shifa’) and was available to Aquinas through a translation by Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus).) the cause of luminosity is the gathering together of the parts of something transparent, as is clear in a crystal, and the Commentator says this in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere. (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 2.) But the empyrean heaven is most subtle, since it is the most noble of bodies, and most formal. Therefore, the empyrean heaven is not luminous.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the empyrean heaven is greater in quantity and power than the sun. But the sun, when it directly faces us, produces day for us and is seen by us. Therefore, since the empyrean heaven is always facing us directly, it seems that if it were luminous, it would always be day for us and we would always see it, which is false.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems that it is not unmovable. For everything with a size has parts at a distance from one another. But when something has parts at a distance from one another, where there is one part another part can also be. Thus, its individual parts can be where they are not, and such a thing is movable with respect to place. Therefore, since the empyrean heaven has a size because it is a body, it seems that it is movable.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every natural body is movable, both because nature is the principle of motion, and because a material body is a body in matter: and matter and motion follow from each other. But the empyrean heaven is a natural body. Otherwise, it would be mathematical and only in the imagination. Therefore, the empyrean heaven is movable.

Obj. 5: Again, it seems that it is divisible by density and rarity. For one can only produce vocal sound in a such a body that is divided this way, as in air. But vocal sounds will be produced in the empyrean heaven, because there will be vocal praise there, as many say. Therefore, it seems that it is divisible.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, every body that one can move through is divisible by rarefaction and condensation, unless we posit that two bodies are in the same place. But glorified bodies will move in the empyrean heaven, as Scripture says: the just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds (Wis 3:7). Therefore, it is divisible. And from this we can further conclude that it is generable and corruptible, since density and rarity are principles of generation and corruption.

On the contrary, the text says (Sent. II, 2.4(10).2.) that it is called “empyrean” not from burning, but from splendor. It also says that it has been set apart from the inconstancy of the world. It also says that it does not have burning and consequently has neither an active nor a passive quality. Therefore, it is incorruptible, unmovable, and luminous.

I answer that, since all things are determined by their end, it is necessary to reason out the conditions of the empyrean heaven in accordance with what befits the state of the good, for the sake of which it was made. And since they participate fully in eternal light, rest, and eternity, it is then fitting that the empyrean heaven be luminous, unmovable, and incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument deals with what is luminous in such a manner that it emits rays visible to our senses, while even fire does not shine in its proper sphere for this reason. But we do not say that the empyrean heaven is luminous in this way, but rather because in its nature it has light by the fact that it is most formal.

Reply Obj. 2: From this the reply to the second objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: Place is not properly due to a thing that has size precisely as a thing having size, nor consequently is potency with respect to place due to it. Rather, this is due to it inasmuch as it has a determinate nature. Hence it says in On Generation and Corruption 1 that we must grant contact and place to mathematical things by way of similitude. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 322b30–323a12.)

Reply Obj. 4: “Natural” can be understood in two ways. One way is as distinct from a being in the soul, and in this way, everything that has fixed being in nature is called “natural.” In this way, the empyrean heaven and angels are called “natural.” In the other way, something is called “natural” as distinct from divine being, which is withdrawn from matter and motion, and thus, only what is moved and has been ordered to generation and corruption among things is called “natural.” And in this way, the empyrean heaven is not a natural being, but rather a divine one, which has been ordered to the glory of the good. And it does not have matter determined to a motion, but rather to its end, since even mathematicians do not abstract from all matter but only from sensible matter, as is said in the Metaphysics 8. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.2, 1028b19–26; 7.11, 1036a26–b6.) Hence it is not necessary that wherever there is matter there be motion. But it is true that matter is in movable and unmovable things equivocally.

Reply Obj. 5: The empyrean heaven is the place of the angels, souls, and men. Now, it is obvious that in the empyrean there will be no vocal praise on the part of angels and separated souls. But there is a doubt about whether there will be vocal praise there on the part of men after the resurrection. Some say that there will not be vocal praise there, but only mental praise, which is more worthy, because no one will breathe there, and only those who breathe produce vocal sound, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b28–421a7.) But others say that there will also be vocal praise there, not because of any need, but rather so that nothing will be missing from divine praise among the saints, whether mind or tongue.

But the way this can happen, so they say, is that there is air in the lungs and vocal instruments, and that through this air they will be able to form vocal sounds, just as animals that have implanted breath do, as is said in On Sleep and Sleeplessness. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 2, 456a6–23.) And this seems to be fitting in one respect, since the expulsion or drawing in of air is not necessary for the formation of vocal sounds. Hence an animal cannot form a vocal sound by breathing, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b5–421a7.) But in another respect it seems insufficient, since for a vocal sound not only internal air is required, but also external air, which carries sound by its disturbance and motion.

Hence we say that one must add that some sensible things are carried to the senses after the manner of spiritual being only, such as the species of colors. Others have contact with the sense organs after the manner of their material being, such as in the case of taste and touch. And others are carried in both manners, such as the species of odors with the admixture of vaporous exhalation, although such a species is even extended beyond the vaporous exhalation. And the case is similar with sound and motion, since the species of sound would be born after the manner of spiritual being alone. Hence it will not be necessary for there to be motion in a medium, disturbance, or condensation.

Or it can be said that even the empyrean heaven will be disturbed, and this will not take away from its nobility because it will be an instrument moved by the glorified tongue, and the matter of the vocal sound offered for the praise of God. Nor does it follow from this that it is generable and corruptible, because rarity and density are said equivocally of that body and other bodies, just as astronomers also hold that between two spheres, which cannot be cut, there is a space filled with a divisible body, since the planets move through this space in accordance with the motion of the epicycle.

Reply Obj. 6: And in this way, the reply to the last objection is clear. Again, it can happen that two bodies are in a single place by a miracle, which is at least necessary while the glorified body is brought up to the empyrean heaven through an intermediate heavenly body without its being cut.

But what is true about these things is uncertain, since it is neither determined by faith nor proved by reason.

Article 3

Whether the empyrean heaven has an influence on other bodies

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the empyrean heaven has an influence on other bodies.

Obj. 1: For in the elements, it is always the case that what contains is preservative of what is contained, even if it is contrary to it, by the fact that it is its place and is related to it as act to potency and as whole to divided part, as is said in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212a31–213a4.) But the empyrean heaven contains the other heavens. Therefore, all the more, since it is not contrary to them, does it seem that it has influence over them by containing and preserving them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Avicenna and other philosophers, the sun has an effect on lower bodies through its light, which it emits by its radiance. But the empyrean heaven is wholly luminous. Therefore, it seems that it exerts an influence over lower bodies.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the first mobile there is right and left and other positions, as is determined in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 285a28–286a2.) But this can only be due to the influence of something higher. Therefore, since there is no higher body besides the empyrean heaven, it seems that the first mobile would have this through its influence.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a nobler disposition belongs to a nobler form. But the light of the starry heaven disposes things to the form of the vegetative soul. Therefore, since the sensible soul is nobler, it seems that the light of the crystalline heaven disposes things to that soul. So to go further, the light of the empyrean heaven disposes things to the rational soul. And so, it has some influence on lower things.

On the contrary, the state of glory is not the same as the state of generation and corruption, which belongs to wayfaring. But the empyrean heaven is ordered to the state of glory. Therefore, it seems that it is not of the same order as other bodies. But things that are not of the same order do not have an influence on one another. Therefore, the empyrean heaven does not have an influence on other bodies.

Furthermore, the angels are more noble than the empyrean heaven. But the angels do not have causality over other things. Therefore, still less does the empyrean heaven.

I answer that it can be reasonably posited that the empyrean heaven has no influence over other bodies. For we hold that a body has an influence on another only through motion, since, as is said in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 3.) even the soul falls short of an intelligence in this respect, since it makes an impression on things only by moving them, which is all the more true of the body. But no body moves unless it has been moved, as has been proved by philosophers. For heaven through its motion causes generation and corruption in the lower bodies. Hence it says in the Physics 8 that its motion is like life for all existing things. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b10–14.) Hence Rabbi Moses says that heaven in the universe is like the heart in an animal: if its motion were ever to cease, the life of the body would be ended. (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, ch. 72.) Hence since the empyrean heaven is held to be unmovable, it cannot reasonably be held to have an influence on bodies. For it is obvious that it does not have an influence without motion, after the mode of a Creator. And yet we need not deny that God could have granted to it the power to have an influence without motion. But because this is confirmed neither by authority nor by reason, the position of those who say that the empyrean heaven has an influence on other bodies is rejected as easily as it is held. (Aquinas holds a different position in ST I.66.3, ad 2: ita caelum empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quae moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur; “so too the empyrean heaven has an influence over the bodies that are moved, even though it itself is not moved.”) And especially since in such matters the question is not what God, by a miracle, is able to do, but rather what befits the nature of a thing, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 1 (CSEL 28.1:32; PL 34:263).)

Reply Obj. 1: A body moved by direct motion, a body both generable and corruptible, needs a containing and preserving place. And this power of locating and preserving in one of the elements with respect to another arises from the power of the heavens influencing the elements through motion. But a body circularly moved and incorruptible does not need a place containing it extrinsically for motion or even for preservation. And that such a thing should have an extrinsic body containing it is incidental, as the Commentator says on the Physics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, ch. 5, comm. 43.) Hence it does not depend on it except inasmuch as it revolves by its revolution. But no one holds that there is a revolution in the empyrean heaven. Hence no manner of influencing remains.

Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven, as has been said, (Above: a. 2.) does not have light after the manner of a refulgence that casts rays onto other bodies. And so, neither does it have an influx of illumination onto other bodies; the reason for this is that, since it is the most powerful of bodies and the greatest, it would illuminate all things without the light of the sun. And, moreover, the light of heaven is only a cause of effects in lower things on the supposition of motion, which is not present in the empyrean heaven.

Reply Obj. 3: Right and left are in heaven by the power of its mover, whatever it is, and not from the influence of a body, just as in the case of an animal this stems from the power of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: The noblest disposition that can ever be in a body with regard to form is below the nobility of heaven. Hence it is the same heavenly power by which a body is disposed to the form of an element and a mixed body, as well as a vegetative, sensible, or rational soul. Nor is it necessary, if heaven disposes this to the vegetative soul, that it could not dispose it to the sensible soul, unless it is proved that this would be the extent of its power, which is false. Hence it is clear that this position is founded on three false premises. The first is that the disposition in the human body with regard to the soul cannot be from the power of the sun. The second is that light is a body that comes materially into composition with what is animated. The third is that there is a mean between soul and body. And these are absurd as far as all who have spoken reasonably on the matter are concerned. Thus, with one unsuitable premise granted, other such things follow. And this is no wonder.

Exposition of the text

‘How many prior eternities . . . shall we adjudge to have passed?’ (Sent. II, 2.3(9).2, quoting Jerome, On Titus, ch. 1, v. 2 (PL 26:456).) It seems false to say that there is only one eternity.

Moreover, in what do aeviternity, time, and eternity differ?

To this we must say that in an angel three things should be considered. The first is its being, the measure of which is an called an “age,” since, as is said in On the Heavens 1, each thing’s end and horizon of life is called its “age.” (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.9, 279a12–35.) The second is its activity, by which it knows things in their proper nature through innate species, in which there is alternation and a certain manner of motion. And in this way, it is measured by time, though not the time that is the number of the motion of heaven. The third is the activity by which it perceives the Word. And in this way, it enters into a participation of eternity and beatitude. And insofar as there are many participated beatitudes, so also there are many eternities, even though beatitude is essentially only one.

But there Lucifer calls ‘heaven’ God’s highness. (Sent. II, 2.6(12).1.) This heaven is not a body since the heaven of the Holy Trinity is said to be, and is, the same as the essence of its majesty, in which heaven nothing created can be, just as it cannot be equal to God. Rather, only the three coeternal and coequal persons are in it.