D. 3 - Condition of the angels at their creation
Division of the first part of the text
Having shown when and where the angels were created, here he inquires as to their condition when they were made. And this is divided into three parts.
In the first, he inquires as to their condition with regard to the perfection of nature.
In the second, he inquires as to their condition with regard to grace or fault, at that too seems worthy of investigation. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).1.)
In the third, he inquires as to their condition with regard to glory or wretchedness, at after these matters, it is to be seen whether God created the angels perfect and blessed, or miserable and imperfect. (Sent. II, 4.1(19).1.)
The first is divided into two parts.
In the first, he shows which are the natural perfections conferred on the angels at the beginning of creation.
Second, he shows how they are compared to one another with respect to those perfections, at here it is to be considered. (Sent. II, 3.2(14).1.)
And concerning this latter he does two things.
First, he shows in what things they were unequal.
Second, he shows in what things they were equal, at and just as the angels differed in the foregoing, so they also had some things as common and equal. (Sent. II, 3.3(15).1.)
Concerning the first, he does two things.
First, he shows that they were unequal in natural perfections.
Second, he shows that following on the ranking of natural qualities, there was also in them a ranking of gratuitous gifts, at therefore, it is to be believed that, in the same way, those spiritual natures . . . received differences suitable to their purity and excellence. (Sent. II, 3.2(14).3.)
Question 1
The perfection of their nature
Here six questions are asked:
first, whether angels are so simple that they are not composed of matter and form;
second, whether there is personhood in them;
third, whether there is number in them, and what it is;
fourth, whether they are all of a single species;
fifth, if not, whether they are of a single genus;
sixth, on the difference between an angel and the rational soul.
Article 1
Whether an angel is composed of matter and form
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2; ST I.50.2; SCG II.50–51; Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, a. 1; Quodl. III, q. 8; IX, q. 4, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 74; On Being and Essence, ch. 5.) It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 1: For whatever is in a genus participates in the account of that genus. But the account of substance, as a category, is to be composed of matter and form. For Boethius says in his Commentary on the Categories (Boethius, Commentary on the Categories, bk. 1 (PL 64:184).) that Aristotle, leaving behind the extremes, namely, matter and form, deals with the mean, that is, the composite, when he deals with substance. Therefore, since an angel is in the category of substance, it seems that it is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever things are in one genus share uniformly in the principles of that genus. But the principles of the genus of substance are matter and form. Therefore, since bodies that are in the genus of substance share these principles in such a manner that they are composed of them, it seems that an angel, which is in the same genus, is also composed of matter and form.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever the properties of matter are found, matter is found, since the properties of a thing are not separated from the thing. But to receive, to be a substrate, and things of this sort, are the properties of matter. Therefore, since they are found in an angel, it seems that an angel is composed of matter.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that exists is either act alone, potency alone, or both together. But an angel is not pure act, since in that case it would not differ from God. Nor is it pure potency, since in that case it would not differ from prime matter. And besides, it would have no activity. Therefore, it is composed of act and potency. And this is to be composed of matter and form. Therefore, and so forth.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it says in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 4.) that every created thing is composed of the definite and the indefinite. But an angel is a created being. Therefore, it is composed of the indefinite, which is matter.
Obj. 6: Again, Boethius says in On the Trinity that simple form cannot be a subject. (Boethius, De Trinitate, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) But an angel is the subject of grace. Therefore, it is not form alone, but also has matter as a part of it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says in On Divine Names that angels are understood to be immaterial and incorporeal. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).)
Furthermore, Boethius says in On the Two Natures that no nature of an incorporeal substance rests upon any foundation of matter. (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium (De duabus naturis), ch. 6 (PL 64:1350).) But an angel is an incorporeal substance. Therefore, it does not have matter as a foundation.
I answer that concerning this matter there are three positions. Some say that in every created substance there is matter and that there is one matter for all things. The source of this position seems to be Avicebron who composed a book entitled The Fountain of Life, (Avicebron, The Fountain of Life 1.2–3.) which many follow. The second position is that matter is not in incorporeal substances, but nevertheless is in all bodies, and that there is only one matter. And this is the position of Avicenna. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 12.) The third position is that the heavenly bodies and the elements do not have the same matter. This is the position of Averroes (Averroes, On the Substance of the Heavenly Sphere, ch. 2.) and Rabbi Moses, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, ch. 75.) and it seems to harmonize more with the statements of Aristotle.
Thus, we choose this position as far as pertains to the present issue, saying that whatever may be the case for bodily things, matter cannot be present in any way in angels, both by reason of their intellectuality and by reason of their incorporeality. For it is commonly held by philosophers that no intellectual thing is material. Hence they even conclude that God has intellect from the fact of his immateriality.
The reason is manifest enough, namely, that prime matter receives form not inasmuch as it is form simply, but rather inasmuch as it is this form. Hence a form existing in matter is not understood except potentially, since knowledge is of a form inasmuch as it is a form. Thus, if an intellect were posited as having matter, the form existing in it would not be actually understood, and so it would not understand through that form. And a sign of the same truth is that a material form does not become intellectual unless it is abstracted from the conditions of matter, and in this way, it becomes a perfection of the intellect proportionate to it. Hence the intellect must be non-material. And this does not follow on matter on the part of its form, since every form becomes intelligible by abstraction from the conditions of matter. Rather, it follows on it in itself and universally, whether it is under a bodily form or a spiritual one.
Second, incorporeality is incompatible with matter. For since to one perfectible thing one perfection is due, and since there is no differentiation in prime matter, every form must invest the whole of it, before which there cannot be any differentiation in it, nor can such be understood. But before corporeality, no differentiation can be understood to be present, because differentiation presupposes parts, which cannot exist unless we assume divisibility, which follows on quantity, which cannot exist without corporeality. Hence the whole of matter must be invested with the form of corporeality. Thus, if there is anything incorporeal, it must be immaterial.
Even so, we do hold that there is a composition in the angels; what kind of composition this is should be explored. In things composed of matter and form, the nature of the thing, which is called “whatness” or “essence,” results from the joining of the form to the matter, as, for example, humanity results from the joining of soul and body. But it does not pertain to the account of whatness, precisely as whatness, that it be composite, since then a simple nature could never be found, which is at least false in the case of God. Nor does it pertain to its account that it be simple, since some are found to be composite, as in the case of humanity. But being, insofar as a thing is said to be actually, is found to relate in different ways to different natures or quiddities. For there is one sort of nature whose existence does not pertain to understanding it, as is clear from the fact that one can understand it, while at the same time not knowing whether it exists, as in the case of a phoenix, or an eclipse, or something of this sort. But another sort of nature is found whose very to-be pertains to its account, or rather, to-be is itself its nature. Now, an existence of this sort does not have existence acquired from another, since that which a thing has from its own whatness it has from itself. But everything except for God has existence acquired from another.
Therefore, in God alone is his to-be his whatness or nature, whereas in all other things to-be is outside their whatness, to which the to-be is added. But since a whatness that follows on composition depends on its parts, it must not itself be what subsists in the existence it acquires. Rather, this is the composite itself, which is called the “supposit.” Thus, the whatness of a composite is not the very thing that exists; rather, it is that-by-which something exists, as a man exists by his humanity. But a simple whatness, since it is not founded on any parts, subsists in the existence that it acquires from God. Thus, the whatness of an angel is what subsists, and its very existence, which is outside its whatness, is that-by-which it exists, just as motion is that by which something is designated as moving. In this way, an angel is composed of to-be and what-is, or of that-by-which-it-is and what-is. For this reason it says in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 9.) that an intelligence is not existence alone, like the First Cause is, but rather there is in it existence and form, which is its whatness.
Since everything that does not have something from itself, but receives it from another, is possible or in potency with respect to it, the whatness itself is as potency, while its acquired existence is as act. Consequently there is a composition of act and potency there. If this potency is called “matter,” then there will be a composite of matter and form, although this would be an entirely equivocal statement. After all, a wise man does not quibble over names.
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to the account of substance that it subsists as a being by itself, as it were. Thus, form and matter, which are a part of the composite, since they do not subsist, are not in the category of substance as a species but only as principles. But that a subsisting thing has composite whatness does not belong to the account of substance. Hence it is not necessary for what is in the category of substance to have composite whatness. It is necessary for it to have a composition of whatness and being. For in the case of everything that is in a genus, its whatness is not its own existence, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 7, ch. 4.) Thus, God cannot be put in the category of substance. Hence what Boethius intends to say is that among these three things, namely, matter, form, and the composite, out of these only the composite is in the genus of substance as a species. But he does not intend to say that everything that is in the genus of substance must be a composite of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 2: Some things that are not of a single genus naturally are of a single genus logically speaking, such as those things that share in the intention of the genus that logic studies, and yet they have a different manner of being. Hence in the Metaphysics 10 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26–28, 1059a10.) it says that nothing is said in common of the corruptible and the incorruptible except by use of a common name. Thus, it is not necessary for angels to share the same principles with bodily things, except with respect to the intention alone, inasmuch as potency and act are found in all things, though analogically, as is said in the Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.4, 1070a32.)
Reply Obj. 3: As the Commentator says on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 3, 12.) to receive, and all things of this sort, are said equivocally of matter and of intellect. For prime matter receives a form not insofar as it is form simply, but as being a “this.” Hence it is individuated by matter. But the intellect receives a form insofar as it is a form simply, not as individuating it, since a form in the intellect has a universal being. Hence the Philosopher also says in the same place (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a13–18; 3.7, 431a3–7.) that to understand is in a certain way to undergo, though said in a common manner and equivocally. Hence on this basis we do not posit the composition or materiality of an intellectual substance.
Reply Obj. 4: The reply to the fourth objection is already clear from what has been said. For it has been shown that in an angel there is potency and act, though not as parts of the whatness. Rather, the potency is on the side of the whatness, while to-be is its act.
Reply Obj. 5: The objection proceeds from a false understanding of the text. For the sense is not that a created being is composed of the definite and the indefinite as of integral parts, but rather as it were of subjective parts. (Although not especially obvious from the name, the “subjective part” of a whole is a species relative to its genus, or generally, the particular relative to the universal. On subjective and integral parts, see Sent. I, 3.4.2.) For a created being has a certain definite aspect, such as “incorruptible,” and a certain indefinite aspect, such as “corruptible,” which is not determined only to being, but rather is at one time, and is not at another time. Hence in one commentary on On Causes, the explanation is given that the indefinite is potential being or non-being. (Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones super Librum de causis, q. 12.)
Or we may say that it is composed of the indefinite, namely, potency, and of the definite, namely, act.
Reply Obj. 6: An entirely simple form that is its own being, as is the divine essence, about which Boethius speaks in that place, can in no way be a subject. But a form subsisting simply that is not its own being, by reason of the potentiality it has, can be a subject, though equivocally and not in the same way as “subject” is said of matter or the material, as has been said.
Article 2
Whether there can be personhood in the angels
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that there cannot be personhood in the angels.
Obj. 1: For individuation pertains to the account of person, since a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. But the principle of individuation is matter. Since, therefore, an angel lacks matter, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) it seems that personhood is excluded from it.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every form, as far as lies in itself, is communicable and universal. But an angel is a simple form. Therefore, it seems that it is universal. But we do not call universals persons, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium (De duabus naturis), ch. 2 (PL 64:1343).) Therefore, it seems that an angel is not a person.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a perfection has to be proportionate to the perfectible. But an intelligible form, which is a perfection of the intellect, does not have the account of an individual, but rather of a universal. Therefore, neither does the intellect. But angels are divine intellects and divine minds, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11 (PG 3:283).) Therefore, they are not persons.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. But Dionysius puts angels in the order of intellectual things that he established as supra-rational. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 1–2 (PG 3:694).) Therefore, it seems that an angel is not a person.
On the contrary, a person, according to the masters, is a hypostasis with a distinct property pertaining to dignity. But an angel, since it is something subsisting, is called a “hypostasis,” and its properties are most noble. Therefore, it seems that it is a person.
Furthermore, this same thing is related in the text (Sent. I, 3.1(13).2.) and in the statements of Richard of Saint Victor, (Richard of Saint Victor (d. 1173 AD), On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 14 (PL 196:938).) who in accordance with different properties applies “person” to man, angel, and God in different ways.
I answer that there is personhood in angels, though in a different way than in man. This is clear if the three things that pertain to the account of person are considered, namely: to subsist, to reason, and to be an individual. For man subsists in the parts from which he is composed. But an angel subsists in its simple nature, needing no foundation of parts or matter. Man reasons by discursion and inquiry with an intellectual light that is shadowed through space and time, due to the fact that he receives knowledge from the senses and imagination. For, according to Isaac in the Book of Definitions, reason arises in the shadow of intelligence. (Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (ca. 855‒955 AD), Liber de definitionibus.) But an angel participates in pure and unadulterated intellectual light. Hence according to Dionysius, it also understands without inquiry, after the mode of God himself. (See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:867).) Likewise, a man has incommunicability by the fact that his nature, which can be received in the foundation of matter, is determined by matter. But in an angel the nature is determinate in itself by the fact that it cannot be received in another as a determinable form. And from this very fact it is sufficiently incommunicable, not through the determination of a receiver, just as the divine being is proper and determinate not by the addition of anything accepting it but by the negation of every possibility of addition. Hence it says in the Book of Causes that its individuation is pure goodness. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 8.) For this reason it is clear that personhood in an angel is much nobler than in man, as also are those other things that befit them according to Dionysius. (This teaching is found throughout On the Divine Names, see ch. 5, para. 3 (PG 3:818).)
Reply Obj. 1: A form that can be participated is individuated only by matter, in which it receives determinate being. But a form that is not receivable does not need determining matter. Rather, in its own nature it is determined to being, which it acquires without depending on matter as do corruptible forms. Nor does it acquire being in matter though not dependent on matter, like the rational soul.
Reply Obj. 2: From this the reply to the second objection is also clear, since form has the account of universality from the fact that it is receivable in more than one thing.
Reply Obj. 3: A form received in the intellect can be considered in two ways. It can be considered either by comparison to the thing whose likeness it is, and in this way, it has universality. For it is not the likeness of man with respect to individuating conditions, but rather with respect to the common nature. Or it can be considered by comparison to the intellect in which it has being, and in this way, it is something individuated, just like the intellect. And so, one intellectual species of man numerically is in the intellect of Socrates while another is in the intellect of Plato. Hence it is not necessary for the intellect not to be something determinate and subsisting.
Reply Obj. 4: “Rational,” according to Dionysius, is in the angels and in God eminently, and in this way, the divine intellect and the angelic intellect are called by the name of “reason.” (See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7 (PG 3:866–67).)
Article 3
Whether there can be number in the angels
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.50.3; 112.4, ad 4; SCG II.92; On the Power of God, q. 6, a. 6.) It seems that in the angels there cannot be number.
Obj. 1: For number is quantity. But the subject of quantity is matter. Thus, since there is not matter in angels, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) it seems that neither is there number.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to philosophers, in things that are without matter there can be number only according to cause and caused. But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore, if they are without matter, there can be no number in them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the closer something is to the simply one, the less it is divided. But among all created things, the angelic nature is closer to God, according to Augustine, who says in the Confessions: two things have you made, O Lord. One close to you, an angel, the other close to nothing, matter. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 7 (CCSL 27; PL 32:828).) Therefore, it seems that either there is not number in them or that it is very small.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, since the parts of the universe are ordered to one another, offering mutual assistance, that from which no benefit comes among the parts of the universe seems to be pointless or vain. And so it seems that such a thing does not even exist. But a spiritual substance only assists a bodily one by moving it. Therefore, it seems that there is not more than one separated spiritual substance unless the motion of a bodily creature is accomplished by them. Thus, it seems that the number of the angels should be reckoned after the number of the motions of the heavens or even of movable things themselves. Therefore, it seems that the number of angels can be known by us.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, we can know nothing about the angels except what is handed down to us in Sacred Scripture. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, cc. 1, 2 (PG 3:119, 135).) But it is said: thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him (Dan 7:10). Therefore, it seems that we know their number determinately.
On the contrary, Jerome says that each soul has a good angel deputed to guard it and a wicked angel deputed to train it. (Jerome, On Matthew 18:10 (PL 26:130). At this place, Jerome mentions a good angel but not an evil angel.) But we do not know determinately the number of men in the world living at the same time. Therefore, neither do we know the number of guardian angels, who are of a single order, and still less the number of all the angels.
Furthermore, Job 25:3 says: is there any number to his armies? But his soldiers are the angels, as Luke 2:13 says: there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly army. Therefore, it seems that we do not know their number determinately.
I answer that human reason falls short of knowledge of separated substances, even though they are the most well known things of nature, since our intellect is related to them like the eye of a night owl to the light of the sun, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b9–11.) Thus, it says in On the Parts of Animals (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 1.5, 644b22–35.) that we can know very few things about them by reason, though what is known about them is very delightful and beloved. Thus, philosophers have said practically nothing demonstratively and few things with probability about them. The differences in what they hold about the number of the angels shows this.
For some posited the number of separated substances on the basis of the number of the motions of heaven, as Aristotle does in the Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.8, 1073b2–1074a16.) Others posited the number on the basis of the number of the spheres, as does Avicenna in his Metaphysics. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, cc. 2–3.) Others, in contrast, denied altogether that there is anything incorporeal, as did Empedocles, Democritus, and the Sadducees among the Jews. Some even posited that there is only one angel who is allotted different labels on the basis of different acts, as did some heretics. Another posited that the angels are not in a determinate number with regard to us. Rather, he says that “angels” in the Scriptures signifies every power, whether bodily or spiritual, through which God fulfills the order of his providence as a sort of messenger of the divine will, even to the point that he calls the concupiscible power the angel of concupiscence. But he says that separated substances exist with reference to the number that philosophers have posited. And this is Rabbi Moses. (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, ch. 12.)
But the Catholic faith holds that the number of the separated substances that we call angels is a number definite to God but indefinite to us. Hence Gregory says in a gloss on Daniel 7 (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 17, ch. 13 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:20).) that it exceeds all material multitude, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 14 (PG 3:322).) And this is probable enough. For we see that the bodies that participate more nobly in the divine goodness, namely, heavenly bodies, exceed generable and corruptible bodies beyond all proportion, so to speak. This is because the cause of the production of created things is the divine goodness, which he willed to communicate to things. Hence it seems that he created spiritual natures, in which his goodness shines forth par excellence, in a number disproportionately outstripping, as it were, the number of bodily natures.
We can take the manner in which they are distinguished with regard to one another from the words of the Commentator on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5.) where he says that if the nature of the potential intellect were unknown to us, we would not be able to assign a number to the separated substances. Hence I say that distinction between the angels follows on the degree of potentiality mixed in with the angelic nature. For it has been said above that the nature or “whatness” of the angels is possible with respect to the existence that they have from God. (Above: a. 1.) For as a nature mixed with potentiality withdraws from likeness to the divine nature, which is only act, the more and more distant from act we find it to be. Therefore, that whatness is complete act whose being is not apart from it, namely, the divine nature. And the simple whatness that is closer in likeness to the divine being partakes less of potency and more of act and is nearer to God, more perfect, and so forth, until we arrive at the nature that is in the last rank of potentiality among spiritual substances to the point that it only acquires being in another, even though its being does not depend on it—namely, the human intellect, which, according to the Commentator, is last in the order of intellectual natures, just as prime matter is last in the order of bodily natures.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said in Book I, “one” can be spoken of in two ways. (In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, aa. 1, 3.) One way is as convertible with “a being,” which is not determined to a genus, and neither is the multitude that follows on this sort of “one.” And this sort of multitude is posited in the angels, since it does not follow on a division of quantity or of matter, but on a distinction of natures. In the other way, “one” is that which is the principle of number, which is a discrete quantity caused by the division of matter or a continuum. And this sort is only in material things.
Reply Obj. 2: Even according to the philosophers who distinguish the number of the separated substances by cause and caused, cause and caused are not the distinguishing factors in themselves. Rather, according to those philosophers, they follow on the principles of distinction. For since the distinction, essentially speaking, results from greater or lesser composition and with reference to the distance between potency and act, according to them it follows that what is more in act is the cause of what is less. This is the way they say that multitude proceeded from one simple first thing, although the Commentator calls this manner of procession insufficiently proved in the Metaphysics 11, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 38.) and he concedes that more than one thing could have proceeded immediately from one simple first thing. Thus, we also concede that all intellectual natures have proceeded immediately from God as distinct according to the order of the wisdom that ordains different ranks of spiritual natures. Thus, having removed what belongs to faithlessness, namely, the order of causality from the angels, and having retained what agrees with the faith, namely, the ranking of simplicity, we will have the same manner of distinction that they had.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves the simplicity of the angelic nature, and especially of that which is highest in it. But it does not exclude plurality of ranks from it. Moreover, we must not speak of the angels as of the divine nature, especially since the angels differ from one another not only numerically, but also in species, as will be said.
Reply Obj. 4: Angels were not made for the sake of bodily motions, since nothing is made for the sake of something baser than itself. Hence if there are some substances that do not move things, it does not follow that they are superfluous. Nevertheless, we must say that all these substances do provide some benefit or assistance to bodily things. For the lower angels minister to God in the motion of the spheres, as is said by some and seems probable, since Gregory says that the bodily creation is administered through the spiritual. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 6 (PL 77:328).) But the illumination of the lower angels comes from God through the first and the intermediate angels, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3, para. 1 (PG 3:163).) Thus, they all have an influence over the motion of bodily things, or at least as regards the guardianship of men, which pertains to the last order.
Reply Obj. 5: These words are interpreted differently by Gregory and Dionysius, though to some extent in the same way. For they agree that we do not know the number of the angels determinately. But they also differ. For when it says thousands of thousands, Dionysius is of the opinion that one thousand is multiplying another, as if saying “one thousand a thousand times.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 14 (PG 3:322).) And in this way, an equal number is implied, since it says thousands of thousands first and ten times one hundred thousand second, as one text has it. For ten times one hundred thousand is as much as one thousand times one thousand. And in this respect we can understand the number of those ministering and of those attending as equal. Or, according to another text that has thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him, we can understand that the number of those attending exceeds the number of those ministering on account of their nobility. This agrees with what was said above according to the understanding of Dionysius—namely, that more noble creatures are greater in number. Hence he says that in this word, namely, “one thousand,” the greatest number in our vocabulary that has a proper name is multiplied by all the greatest numbers, meaning the named limits: that is, it is multiplied by itself when it says thousands of thousands, by ten when it says ten thousand times, and by a hundred when it says a hundred thousand. In this way, an exceedingly great numerousness exceeding our understanding is shown. Gregory is of the opinion that it is a partitive construction when it says thousands of thousands, as if saying, “thousands from the number of the thousands.” Hence he wishes us to understand that there is a greater number of those who minister than of those who attend by the fact that an indeterminate number is applied to those who minister and a determinate number to those who attend.
Article 4
Whether there is more than one angel of a single species
To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; In IV Sent, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, resp. and ad 3; ST I.50.4; SCG II.93; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 8; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 3; On Being and Essence, ch. 5.) It seems that there is more than one angel of a single species.
Obj. 1: For just as an angel is a simple substance, so also is the soul. But all rational souls are of a single species. Therefore, all angels are as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a perfection that is one in species belongs to things that share a species. But all angels are perfectible by a perfection that is one in species, namely grace or glory. Therefore, it seems that they are all of a single species.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as has been said, (Above: a. 3.) it is proper to the divine goodness to multiply nobler things among beings, so as to spread its goodness more widely. But among baser created things one finds a great multitude of participants in a single species. Therefore, it seems that this is all the more true among the angels.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Boethius, one cannot joyfully possess anything without a sharing in common. (This saying does not seem to be in Boethius verbatim, but see Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 2, prose 4, para. 20 (CCSL 94; PL 63:677–680); and ST I-II.4.7.) But among the angels there is the greatest joyfulness, since delight pertains to the account of happiness, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a5–31.) Therefore, it seems that among the angels a single species is shared in common by many.
On the contrary, the multiplication of individuals of a single species is only to preserve the perpetuity of the species, which cannot be preserved in one individual alone. Hence among incorruptible bodies there is only one of a single species, such as the sun and the moon. But an angel is an incorruptible substance. Therefore, there is not more than one angel of a single species.
Furthermore, an angel is more perfect than any body. But there is a body that arrives at such perfection that nothing of its nature is outside of it, as is clear in things that are constituted of all the matter of their species, as is clear in the case of heaven, as is said in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.9, 278a23–b9.) Therefore, it seems all the more that outside a single angel there is not anything of its species.
I answer that concerning this there are three opinions. For some have said that all angels are of a single species and even go so far as to say that an angel and the soul do not differ in species. However, others say that angels and the soul differ in species and that the angels of one order also differ from those of another, but that all those who belong to a single order are of a single species. Finally, others say that no angel is of a single species with another. And this opinion agrees with the statements of philosophers and also of Dionysius, who declares in the Celestial Hierarchy that in the same order there are the first, the middle, and the last. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10 (PG 3:271).)
It is necessary to agree with this view, both on the basis of immateriality and on the basis of incorporeality. For if we hold that they are immaterial, then since no form or nature multiplies its number except in the differentiation of matter, a simple and immaterial form that is not received in any matter must be only one. Hence whatever is outside of it is of another nature by the fact that it is at a distance from it formally, not with respect to a material principle, since there is not one there. Now, such a differentiation causes a difference in species. Hence it is necessary for any two given angels to differ according to species.
This follows necessarily even if angels were composed of matter, so long as we do not posit them to be bodies. This is clear in the following way: in the case of whatever things whose matter we posit as differing with respect to being, if this matter is of the same order in both (as the matter of generable and corruptible things is one), then the different forms in accord with which it receives different being must be received in different parts of the matter. For one part of the matter cannot at the same time receive different opposed and disparate forms. But it is impossible to conceive of different parts in matter unless dimensive quantity—at least indeterminate, by which it can be divided—is presumed already present, as the Commentator says in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 1.) and commenting on the Physics 1. For when quantity is separated from substance, it remains indivisible, as the Philosopher says in the Physics 1. (This statement could be seen as being implied in Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 189a23, a35, b8, in regard to quantitative contraries.) But only a bodily form is received in matter understood as under quantity. Therefore, it is impossible for two things to share in matter or the potency of a single order. But the angels are incorporeal. Therefore, it is impossible for two angles to share in matter or in the potency of a single order.
But every form or nature that is received in different degrees of potency is also received in primary and secondary manners with respect to being. But it is impossible for the nature of a species to be shared in by individuals primarily and secondarily, either with respect to being or with respect to intention, (Intentio is a broader term in Latin than our English “intention,” and giving the latter word as the translation can be misleading, since the English signifies something narrowly limited to the will. Nevertheless, to avoid over-interpretation, we will translate the word as “intention” throughout this work. We should note that although Aquinas frequently uses intentio for human intention, he just as often uses it to mean an act of knowledge or signification, and in these cases, the words “concept” or “meaning” might be fair, albeit interpretive, translations (see, for example: above, a. 1, obj. 2 and ad 2; below, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; and d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). At other times, however, including in this particular case, Aquinas means something analogous by the term intentio, namely, the transitory and relational mode of being that a sensible form has in the medium or organ of cognition; for another example, see d. 13, q. 1, a. 3. And indeed, in this passage in particular, “intention” can be especially serviceable if one hears it metaphorically or in an extended sense, as meaning a name’s basic aim or tendency, as befits its etymology: in + tendere, “to tend toward.”) though this is possible in the nature of a genus, as is said in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3, 999a6–22.) Therefore, it is impossible for two angels, if they are incorporeal, to be of a single species.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the soul is a simple form, as is an angel, nevertheless the soul does not receive being from God except in a body. For, according to Augustine, it is both created at its infusion and infused at its creation. Hence from the body it receives individuated being such that, since it does not depend on the body, the individuation remains even after the destruction of the body. Thus, Augustine says that the position of those heretics who say that multiple souls were created before the body is impossible. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 7, cc. 3–13 (CSEL 28.1:200; PL 34:357), and On the Nature and Origin of the Soul, ch. 19 (CSEL 60:333; PL 32:493).) But this is not the case with angels, and thus the argument is not comparable.
Reply Obj. 2: This holds in perfections that pertain to the nature of the thing, but not in superadded perfections, which do not follow from the principles of the nature, such as are grace and glory. For even in bodies, things that differ in species can possess a single color of species.
Reply Obj. 3: The essential perfection of the universe is not estimated on the basis of individuals, the multiplication of which is ordered to the perfection of the species, but rather on the basis of the species through itself. Hence the divine goodness is more readily apparent by the fact that there are many angels of different species than if they were of only a single species.
Reply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics, delight follows on a perfected activity. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b13–1175a22.) Thus, for joyfulness a sharing is required in that nature in which there cannot be a complete activity in one without the help of another, as in men, among whom one by himself is not sufficient for the activity of his species. But we cannot hold this regarding the angels, and thus such an objection is in vain. Even so, we do not deny that one angel may be assisted by another, since the lower are enlightened by the higher. And in this society there is the joyfulness of the citizens of the heavenly court. Yet a unity of species is not required for this, but rather the conformity of grace.
Article 5
Whether the angels are of a single genus
To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that angels cannot be traced back to a single genus.
Obj. 1: For whatever things are of a single genus share in the one potency of the genus, as is said in the Metaphysics 10. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.7, 1057a18–b33.) But angels do not share in one potency of a genus, since they are immaterial. Therefore, it seems that they are not of a single genus.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever things proceed from a common thing, proceed from it by division and were first in it in potency. But an angel does not proceed from potency to act, unless we take it as the potency of the agent. Otherwise, it would be generable and corruptible. Nor, again, can we posit one thing in reality that is divided among many angels. For this could only be the case if that one thing had some kind of size. Therefore, there is not found more than one angel of a single genus.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every genus is predicated of its species univocally and equally. But the essentials of the angels, which follow on the nature that is common in them, are found in angels to greater or lesser degree, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 3.2(14).1–2.) Therefore, it seems that they are not of a single genus.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what differs from another in species, if it shares a genus with it, must be composed of the genus and a difference. But it would seem that composition of genus and difference presupposes composition of form and matter. For, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 5, cc. 5–7.) the difference is taken from the formal principles of a thing, while the genus is taken from the material principles. Hence, in the Metaphysics 5, things that agree in matter are said to be one in genus. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016a18–23.) Therefore, it seems that since an angel is not composed of matter and form, and one angel differs in species from another, they cannot agree in genus.
On the contrary, the genus of substance is only a single genus. But any angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore, it seems that they share in one genus.
Furthermore, a difference added to a genus constitutes a species. But “incorporeal,” according to Porphyry, is a difference of substance. (Porphyry, Isagoge, bk. 1, “On difference.”) Therefore, incorporeal substance is a species of substance. But it is predicated of many angels who differ in species. Therefore, it is a subaltern genus. Thus, the angels also agree in a subaltern genus.
I answer that, according to Avicenna, (Porphyry, Isagoge, bk. 1, “On difference.”) everything that has being that is other than its whatness must be in a genus. Thus, all angels must be placed in the category of substance, for this is the account of substance insofar as it is a category; for according to Avicenna, it is a thing having a whatness to which existence is owed through itself, not existence in another, namely, an existence that is other than the whatness itself. Thus, the account of the genus is drawn from the potentiality of the whatness, while the account of the difference—in accord with which it approaches actual existence—is drawn from the completion of the whatness.
But this occurs differently in composite and simple substances. For in composite substances the potentiality is on the part of the matter, but the completion is on the part of the form. Thus, the genus is taken on the part of the matter and the difference on the part of the form, not in such a way that the matter is the genus or the form is the difference, since both are parts and neither is predicated. Rather, because the matter is the matter of the whole, not only of the form, and the form is the perfection of the whole and not only of the matter, the whole can be described on the basis of the matter and the form and of both. Now, the name that designates the whole on the basis of the matter is the name of the genus, the name that designates the whole on the basis of the form is the name of the difference, and the name that designates the whole as being from both is the name of the species. This is clear if we consider how “body” is the genus of “animated body” and “animated” is the difference. For we always find that the genus is taken from what is material and the difference taken from what is formal. So it is that difference determines genus as form determines matter.
But in simple natures genus and difference are not taken from any parts, due to the fact that for them completion and potentiality are not founded on different parts of the whatness, but rather on the simple thing itself. This simple whatness possesses potentiality insofar as it does not have being from itself and possesses completion insofar as it is a likeness to the divine being, according as it approaches more or less a participation in the divine being. Thus, there are as many specific differences as there are degrees of completion.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not necessary for them to agree except in the one intention of potency, which is the possibility of receiving being from God, in whom they subsist without quantity and matter.
Reply Obj. 2: In this way, the reply to the second objection is clear. For there need not be a single potency numerically that is divided among all the angels or in which they existed potentially before they existed actually.
Reply Obj. 3: The genus is predicated equally of its species with regard to intention, (On “intention” as a translation of intentio, see the note above in a. 4.) but not always with regard to its existence, as in the case of shape and number, as is said in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3, 999a6–16.) But this does not happen with species, as is said in the same place. Hence this would be sufficient to prove that they are not of a single species, but not that they are not of the same genus, since they agree in the genus to which all angels are related, just as different species of numbers, of which one is prior to another with respect to existence, are related to number.
Reply Obj. 4: The reply is clear from what has been said.
Article 6
Whether an angel and the soul differ in species
To the sixth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.75.7; SCG II.94; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 7.) It seems that an angel and the soul do not differ in species.
Obj. 1: For all things that agree in the ultimate constitutive difference are the same in species, since this itself is what completes the account of the species. But an angel and the soul are such things. Therefore, they do not differ in species. Proof of the minor premise: the ultimate constitutive difference is taken from what is most noble in a thing, since it is related to the genus and the preceding differences proportionately, as form is to matter. But an angel and the soul agree in what is most noble in both, namely, the intellect. Therefore, they agree in the ultimate constitutive difference.
Obj. 2: You might say that the ultimate constitutive difference of an angel is “intellectual,” which is based on the intellect, whereas the ultimate difference of the soul is “rational,” as Dionysius also seems to distinguish the orders of intellectual and rational things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:374).)
On the contrary, things that belong in common to two things do not distinguish between them. But the intellect is not held to be in angels only, but also in the soul, as is clear in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4–6.) Likewise, too, reason belongs not only to the soul, but also angels. Hence Gregory in his Homily on the Epiphany of the Lord calls an angel a rational animal. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 1, homily 10, para. 1 (CCSL 141:66; PL 76:1110).) And above, the Master distinguished the rational creature into angels and the soul. Therefore, an angel and the soul do not differ on the basis of “rational” and “intellectual.”
Obj. 3: You might say that they are distinguished on the basis of “unitable” to a body and “non-unitable.”
On the contrary, whatever comes after a thing that has complete being does not distinguish it essentially from another thing, since all such things that come after the thing in this way pertain to the genus of accident. But union to a body is a kind of relation that follows on a soul having complete being in itself, not depending on the body. Otherwise, it could not exist without the body. Therefore, the fact that it is unitable to a body does not distinguish the soul essentially or in species from an angel.
Obj. 4: A specific difference is only assigned to a thing inasmuch as it is in a genus as a species, since the difference is that by which a species exceeds its genus. But the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of such a body, is not in the genus of substance as a species, but as a principle. Therefore, since unitability only befits the soul insofar as it is a form, it seems that being unitable cannot be what distinguishes the soul in species from an angel.
Obj. 5: Things that have a single end do not differ in species, since to any given thing there corresponds a proper end. But the end of an angel and the rational soul is the same, namely, eternal beatitude, as the Master says above in Distinction 1. (Sent. II, 1.4.1–5.) This can also be gleaned from what is said in the Gospel: they shall be as the angels of God in heaven (Matt 22:30). Therefore, an angel and the soul do not differ in species.
On the contrary, the soul differs from an angel more than one angel differs from another. But one angel differs from another in species, as has been said. (Above: a. 4.) Therefore, all the more does the soul differ in species from an angel.
Furthermore, the same perfectible thing corresponds to the same form or perfection. But the soul and an angel are forms, according to how we commonly call all substances separated from matter forms, of which material forms are images, as Boethius says in On the Trinity. (Boethius, De Trinitate, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) Since, therefore, the human body as a perfectible thing corresponds to the soul, whereas to an angel there corresponds either no body or one of another species—for example, a body of air, according to what Augustine seems to say, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 3, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:72; PL 34:284).) or even a heavenly body, according to the opinion of Avicenna (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 2; see also De intelligentiis (attributed to Avicenna).) and certain philosophers—it seems that the soul and an angel are not of a single species.
I answer that concerning this there are three opinions.
For some say that the soul is not in the genus of substance as a species, but as a principle, since it is a form. Hence it is not properly said that the soul differs or agrees with another substance in species. Rather, it is properly said that based on the soul the composite agrees with or differs from another substance. But this does not seem to be necessary. As Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 2, ch. 1; tract. 6, ch. 5.) for something to be properly in the genus of substance it must be a reality that has a whatness to which absolute existence is due, such that it is said to exist through itself or to be subsistent. Thus, it can happen in two ways that something would belong to the genus of substance but not be in the genus of substance as a species. This is either because the thing has no whatness other than its existence, and this is why God is not in the genus of substance as a species, as Avicenna himself says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, cc. 5–7.) Or it is because the thing does not have absolute existence such that it can be called a “being through itself,” and for this reason prime matter and material forms are not in the genus of substance as species, but only as principles. But the rational soul has an absolute existence, one not dependent on matter, which is other than its whatness, as has also been said of the angels. Thus, we must conclude it is in the genus of substance as a species and also as a principle inasmuch as it is the form of this body. This is where we get the distinction that, among forms, some are material forms, which are not species of substance, while some are forms and substances, such as rational souls.
The second opinion is of those who say the soul and an angel are of a single species, which is absolutely impossible if we exclude composition of form and matter from the soul and angels, as has been said above concerning the angels. (Above: a. 4.)
Thus, the third opinion is more common, to which it seems that we must assent, namely, that the soul and an angel differ in species.
Yet the specific differences by which they are distinguished are assigned in different ways. For some say they are distinguished in species on the basis of “unitable to a body” and “non-unitable.”
However, others say they are distinguished on the basis of “rational being” and “intellectual being.”
Third, some say they are distinguished on the basis of having an intellect in potentiality only with respect to higher things, which befits an angel, who receives illumination from a superior, either God or another angel. This is also on the basis of having an intellect in potentiality with respect to higher and lower things, as befits the human soul, which is both illuminated by higher things and also receives knowledge from phantasms.
Fourth, some say they are distinguished on the basis of having an immutable capacity for turning, which befits an angel due to the fact that it immutably clings to the good or evil that it has once turned itself toward through its choice; or it is on the basis of having a mutable capacity for turning, as befits man, who can be changed from good to evil and vice versa.
Fifth, some say they are distinguished with respect to communicative power. For, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:267).) an angel communicates or speaks by certain intellectual indications and signs without vocal expression, as will be clear below, whereas man speaks through vocal expression.
And it is no wonder that angels and souls are said to differ in these different ways. For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.10, 1035b4–31.) essential differences that are unknown and unnamed are indicated by the incidental differences that are caused by essential differences, as a cause is designated by its effect. For example, the differences of fire and water are assigned as “hot” and “cold.” Hence multiple differences can be assigned for specific things in accordance with the multiple properties of things that differ in species, which properties are caused by essential differences. Yet from among these it is better to assign those that are prior, since they are, so to speak, closer to the essential differences.
Therefore, since, as has been said of the angels, (Above: a. 4.) there is a difference in species among simple substances in accordance with the degree of potentiality in them, a rational soul differs from angels due to the fact that it holds the last rank among spiritual substances, as prime matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator says on On the Soul 3. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5–6.) Hence because it has a great amount of potentiality, its being is so close to material things that a material body can participate in being when the soul is united to the body with regard to a single being. Thus, the differences between the soul and an angel, “unitable” and “non-unitable,” follow from the different degrees of potentiality.
Again, the other differences, “rational” and “intellectual,” follow from the same thing. For from the fact that an angel partakes more of act than the soul, and partakes less of potency, it participates in the intellectual nature as if in the full light (for which reason it is called “intellectual”). But if the soul, because it holds the last rank among intellectual things, participates in the intellectual nature more deficiently, as if in a shadow. Thus, it is called “rational,” since reason, as Isaac says, arises in the shadow of intelligence. (Isaac Israeli, Liber de definitionibus.)
The third distinction follows from the first and second. For from the fact that the soul is the form of the body and its act, certain powers connected with organs proceed from its essence, such as the senses and things of this sort, from which it receives intellectual knowledge, on account of the fact that it is rational and has discursive knowledge, which goes from one thing to another. And so, it comes to intelligible things from sensible ones and in this fact differs from an angel, who does not receive knowledge in a discursive manner by going from sensible things to intelligible ones.
The fourth distinction follows from the second. For it is said that through the fact that an angel has a God-like intellect, it can be turned to anything immovably, and in this way, an angel is said to differ from the soul, which has knowledge not by a God-like intellect, but through the inquiry of reason.
The fifth distinction, in turn, follows from the first. For on account of the fact that the soul is united to the body, it forms a bodily voice, while an angel does not.
Hence it is clear that the first of these distinctions is better, since it is taken with respect to the being of the soul, which is first. The second and third are taken on the basis of cognoscitive or intellective power alone, as in the second, or on the basis of intellective power together with sensitive power, as in the third. The fourth, in turn, is taken on the basis of appetitive power, since choice pertains to appetite, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b7; 3.3, 1113a11.) and it is through this that the soul is turned in a mutable way. Hence since the appetitive power is subsequent to the cognitive power, this distinction is of less importance than the preceding ones. The fifth distinction is taken on the basis of motive power. For the formation of the voice arises from the bodily motion of the members. But motive power is subsequent to cognitive and appetitive power. Hence it is of less importance among the others.
Reply Obj. 1: Difference is not more noble than genus in the way one nature is more noble than another, or one form is more noble than another, since a difference indicates no form that is not contained implicitly in the nature of the genus, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 5, ch. 9.) For genus does not signify a part of a thing’s essence, but rather the whole. But it is said to be more noble than genus as determinate is more noble than indeterminate. As such, to have intellect in such a way is more noble than to have intellect simply, and to have senses in such a way is more noble than to have senses simply. Thus, the soul and an angel do not agree in that which is most noble in them in this particular way. Hence it is not necessary for them to agree in the ultimate specific difference and thus be the same in species.
Reply Obj. 2: In man there is intellect, but he is not for this reason placed in the order of intellectual things. For something is called an “intellectual substance” whose whole knowledge is based in intellect, since everything it knows is immediately available to it without inquiry. But this is not the case with the soul’s knowledge, since it arrives at knowledge of a thing through inquiry and discursive reason. And in this way, it is called “rational,” since its knowledge is intellectual only with reference to its end and beginning: with reference to the beginning, since it knows first principles at once without inquiry, for which reason the habit of indemonstrable principles is called “understanding”; with reference to the end, since the inquiry of reason is terminated in understanding of the thing. Thus, it does not have intellect as its proper nature, but rather by way of a certain participation. Now, we also speak of “reason” in the case of God and the angels, though it is taken in a different sense, namely, insofar as all immaterial knowledge can be called “reason”—reason being distinguished here from the senses and not from the intellect.
Reply Obj. 3: Unitability is not a proper essential difference. Rather, it is a kind of designation of an essential difference through its effect, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 4: From this the reply to the fourth objection is also clear. For what befits the soul, inasmuch as it is a form, is the effect of an essential difference.
Reply Obj. 5: Things that differ in species differ with respect to their proximate end, which is a thing’s permanence or activity, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (See Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.12, 292b1–24.) But they can still agree in the last end, and beatitude is such an end.
Exposition of the first part of the text
And four things seem certainly to have been their attributes. (Sent. II, 3.1(13).2.) It seems unfitting to number them in this way, since Dionysius attributed three things to the angels, namely, essence, power, and activity. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11 (PG 3:283).) But here there is no mention of activity.
Moreover, the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11 that separated substances are divided into will and intellect. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 38.) Thus, it seems that there should be only two attributes.
Moreover, free will is a faculty of reason and will. Therefore, it seems that it should not be divided against the third attribute.
Again, the question is asked about the reason for the number.
To this we must say that these attributes are taken with reference to three things: “substance,” “species,” and “power.” They differ in the following way: for a thing can be considered as the principle of another, and in this way, “power” is found in the thing, and in this regard free will is attributed to the angels. Or it can be considered as it is in itself, and this in two ways: either with regard to the nature itself subsisting, or with regard to the mode of its perfection, in accord with which it is allotted a species. In this way, there is the “species” and the third attribute, which is rationality of nature, insofar as reason has been said to be in the angels. (Above: a. 6.) However, if we consider it with reference to the nature itself as subsisting, in this way, it is the “substance.” And with reference to this, two things are drawn out in accord with the two ways we can take it, namely, as being called the “whatness” of the thing, and in this way, the first attribute is drawn out, that is, simplicity of essence; or as being called the “hypostasis,” and in this way, the second attribute is drawn out, that is, personhood.
Therefore, to the first we say that the principle of activity is the angel itself. And so this is not numbered among the things conferred on it from creation.
To the second we say that these two attributes are like two of its powers. Hence they are reduced to the final attribute and to the third in different ways.
To the third we say that reason and will are set down as the third attribute, not insofar as they are powers following on essence, but instead to designate by them the species of the essence from which they proceed, just as “rational” is given as the difference of man. But they pertain to the fourth attribute insofar as they are powers.
They are rightly understood to have had a different fineness of essence, and a different perspicacity of wisdom, and a different aptitude for choice. (Sent. II, 3.2(14).2.) It is clear how this is from what has been said. For the closer a whatness is to the divine being, the less it has of potency, and thus, its simplicity remains greater. And so, too, the rest will be more noble inasmuch as they receive nobler being.
Those who at that time excelled the rest through their natural goods should afterwards also be preeminent over them through the gifts of grace. (Sent. II, 3.2(14).3.) With regard to those who posit that the angels were created in the state of grace, it is easy to assign the reason. For grace could be measured with reference to nothing other than the capacity of nature. But if they are posited not to have been created in the state of grace, then, since in natural things we must take effort into account even as we say that natural things are those which we can do through natural principles, “natural” being distinguished in contrast to “gratuitous,” it is again probable that the one whose nature is of greater dignity would also put forth a greater effort toward that to which its nature is ordered, since there would not be anything holding it back, as is the case in us, in whom a perishable body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). Thus, whatever may be the case with the angels, it is certain that in us grace is not infused after the measure of natural endowments but rather after the measure of effort.
Division of the second part of the text
Here the Master inquires as to what condition the angels were in respect to fault or grace when they were made. And this is divided into two parts.
In the first, he shows that angels were not made wicked at the beginning of their creation.
In the second, he shows by what perfection they were good, at here it is usual to ask what wisdom they had. (Sent. II, 3.5(17).1.)
The first part is divided into two parts.
In the first, he poses the question.
In the second, he pursues it according to different opinions, at for some have held that the angels who fell were created evil. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).2.)
And concerning this he does two things.
First, he lays out the opinion of those who say that the angels were created wicked.
Second, he lays out the contrary opinion, at but it seems to others that all the angels were created good. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).5.)
And concerning this latter he does three things.
First, he lays out the opinion.
Second, he lays out the disproof of the first opinion and the confirmation of this by authority and reason, at and to confirm this, they make use of the testimony of Augustine. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).6.)
Third, he lays out a reply to the texts used to support the first opinion, at therefore, Augustine, rejecting the opinion of those who hold that the angels were created evil, proves by authority and reason that they were created good. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).8.)
And he first explains the text from Job.
Second, he explains the text from the Gospel, at Augustine next reveals how the words of the Lord, which he set out above, are to be taken. (Sent. II, 3.4(16).9.)
Here it is usual to ask what wisdom they had before their fall or confirmation. (Sent. II, 3.5(17).1.) Here he shows the perfection that the angels had at the beginning of their creation.
First, he shows this with regard to knowledge.
Second, he shows this with regard to love, at it is also usual to ask whether they had any love of God or of each other. (Sent. II, 3.6(18).1.)
Question 2
Their condition as regards fault or grace
Here three questions are asked:
first, whether angels were made wicked at the beginning of their creation;
second, about the natural knowledge of the angels; (Q. 3.)
third, about their love. (Q. 4.)
Article 1
Whether an angel could have been wicked at the beginning of its creation
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; ST I.63.4–5; III.34.3, ad 1; SCG III.107; On Evil, q. 16, aa. 2, 4; On Truth, q. 29, a. 8, ad 2; Commentary on John, ch. 8, lect. 6; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 19.) It seems that an angel could be wicked at the beginning of its creation.
Obj. 1: For Romans 9:21 says, has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use? The vessels God makes for honor, like a potter, are the saints, who are prepared for glory. But the vessels unto dishonor are sinners prepared for punishment. Therefore, God can create some just and others sinners. And so an angel could be wicked at the beginning of its creation.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Scripture says that God makes good and creates evil (Isa 45:7). (The complete verse from Isaiah 45:7 reads as follows: I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.) But the first evil was found in an angel. Therefore, it seems that it was created wicked by God.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, angels and men, at least with respect to the soul, were created at the same time. (See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 35 (CSEL 28.1:136; PL 34:320).) But man was made for the reparation of the ruin of the angels. Now, this would not have been the case if an angel had not yet fallen to ruin. Therefore, it seems that an angel at the beginning of its creation was wicked and fallen to ruin.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in bodily natures we see that as soon as a thing begins to be, it has its own activity. Hence the instant in which the generation of fire is terminated and in which its local motion begins are the same instant. But the will of an angel is more powerful than a bodily nature. Therefore, at the beginning of its creation its will could proceed to its activity. But through its activity, which is indivisible, and thus able to be completed in an instant, it became wicked. Therefore, it is well said that in the first instant of its creation it could be wicked.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, if it was first good and later wicked, we can assign a last instant in which it was good or innocent, and a first instant in which it was wicked. Therefore, either they are one and the same instant, and in this case it is good and wicked at the same time. Or they are different instants, and in this case, since between any two instants there is an intermediate time, in this time it will be neither good nor wicked. Now, neither of these is possible. Therefore, an angel did not turn wicked from being good, but rather was wicked at the beginning of its creation.
On the contrary, Genesis 1:31 says, God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good. But he had made the angels. Therefore, at the beginning of their creation they were good.
Furthermore, it is said that the lower angels took the occasion for their own sin from the sin of the first angel. But this cannot be true unless they had first seen him good. Therefore, it seems that at one time he was good.
I answer that there have been three positions concerning this. Some said that angels were created wicked by God. But this is heretical and impossible. For no effect follows from an agent except according to the condition of the agent. But it has been said above that the cause of the creation of things is that God willed to communicate his goodness to things. (Above: q. 1, a. 3.) Hence it is impossible for anything to be made by him except as being a participant in his goodness. And such a thing is good, not wicked.
Thus, others said that an angel was wicked at the beginning of its creation, not because it had any wickedness from God, but by an act of its own will. But this position is vain, erroneous, and false. It is vain because it does not have a firm foundation through which it might be proved, since the wickedness of an angel depends on its will, and so, since its will extends to whichever side it wants, it cannot be reached by reason. It is erroneous because it is too near the first opinion and is condemned by the masters. It is false because it is impossible that an angel in the first instant of its creation could have sinned.
The reason for this impossibility is given by some in the following way. For there cannot be a single terminus of two activities that follow on one another. Now, the activity of an angel follows on its creation. Hence it cannot be that the instant in which it is first a being, which is the terminus of its creation, and the instant in which it is first wicked, which is the terminus of its activity, are the same instant. But this argument does not seem to be compelling. For since the activity of an angel’s will is not continuous, it is not necessary for the end of its activity to be different from the beginning of it. But the beginning of its activity can be at the same time as the terminus of its creation. Hence the end of its activity can also be at the same time as the terminus of its creation. Nor can it be said that the act of its will must follow the apprehension of the intellect, except by an order of nature, for there can be knowledge and will pertaining to the same thing at the same time. Nor again can it be said that a comparison must precede having appetite, since the intellect of an angel is not inquisitive or comparative.
Thus, we must say otherwise, that since the will is only for the good, nothing can be willed unless it is apprehended as a good to be desired, and that if it truly is good, then there is no sin in the appetite. Therefore, if it is a sin, it must appear to be truly good yet not be truly good. But, according to Augustine in Against the Skeptics, no one can judge an appearance of truth unless the truth is known. (Augustine, Against the Skeptics, bk. 2, ch. 12 (CCSL 29; PL 32:932).) Therefore, an understanding of the true good must precede an understanding of the apparently true good. Thus, the appetite for the supposed good whereby an angel becomes wicked cannot follow on the first act by which the intellect considers the true good, but rather the first act by which it considers the apparent good. Hence, since it is impossible for the created intellect to understand more than one thing at the same time, the appetite of an angel could not have been wicked in the first instant of its creation.
Reply Obj. 1: In the vessels of dishonor God does not make the wickedness, but rather the nature. But he does order the wickedness to punishment. And it is this order that is designated when it says unto dishonor. For the order can be designated either as the order of punishment with regard to fault, and this order is from God, or the order of fault with regard to nature, and this joining is not from God. Hence this proposition is understood in a consecutive, not a causative, manner.
Reply Obj. 2: This refers to the evil of punishment, not the evil of fault. And this will be addressed in greater detail below. (See In II Sent., d. 37, q. 2, a. 1, and q. 3, aa. 1, 2.)
Reply Obj. 3: Even on the supposition that man was created at the same time as the angels, it is not necessary that man be created with an angel already existing as wicked. For the reparation of the ruin of angels is not the principal end of the man’s creation, but is rather a certain subsequent benefit, as was said above. (Above, the division of the second part of the text refers to Sent. II, 1.5.1.) God foresaw this benefit, whose foreknowledge encompassed the outcomes of all things.
Reply Obj. 4: At the instant of its creation, it could have had an act of the will, yet its first act could not have been wicked, just as its first knowledge could not have been false.
Reply Obj. 5: According to some, in the same instant an angel was first good and later wicked, and this instant, although one in reality, differs in account insofar as it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. But the different frames of reference do not remove the connection between the things that exist in a single instant. Hence it would follow that its innocence and malice would be conjoined, which is impossible.
Consequently, others say that during the whole preceding time it was good, but that it is wicked in the final instant of this time. And just as we cannot assign an instant immediately before the other instant, neither can we assign a final instant in which it was good. But this argument, as invoked by the Philosopher in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b11–28.) is apt in a situation where the “now” joins continuously a time of rest and of motion—motion always being linked with passion, which is in the movable subject at the time of rest, whether the rest precedes or follows. But if an instant were placed between two rests, or between two parts of continuous motion, it would not be more linked with one than the other. However, we are not saying here that an angel became wicked through a continuous motion. Thus, the first instant of its malice is not intermediate between rest and motion, but rather between two rests. Hence this argument does not apply to the case in question.
Thus, we must say otherwise, that we can assign the final instant in which an angel was good, and the first in which it was wicked, and that there was no intermediate time between these instants, since time formally is number and it does not give rise to continuity except on the part of motion. Hence since the alternation of affections in an angel through which it is good or evil is not continuous nor ordered to a continuous motion, the number of these will be called “time,” since it is related to “before” and “after,” but it will not be continuous. Hence between its instants we will not necessarily find an intermediate time, just as we do not find a number between two unities.
Question 3
Angelic knowledge
Next we ask about the knowledge of the angels. And concerning this four questions are asked:
first, whether angels know through species;
second, whether in higher angels there are more universal species;
third, whether through these species they can have knowledge of singulars;
fourth, whether they can understand more than one thing at the same time.
Article 1
Whether an angel knows things through its own essence
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; ST I.55.1; 84.2; 87.1; I-II.1.6; 51.1, ad 2; SCG II.98; On Truth, q. 8, a. 8.) It seems that an angel knows things through its essence and not through various species.
Obj. 1: For, according to the Philosopher, the soul is the species of species. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 432a1–2; see Themistius, Paraphrasis De anima, 257–58.) But an angel is more simple and more noble than the soul. Therefore, the essence of an angel is the likeness or the species of things. But a thing can be known in its likeness. Therefore, it seems that an angel knows things by perceiving its essence and not through various species.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every species either is the cause of a thing or is received from a thing. But the species of things in the intellect of an angel cannot be caused by things, since an angel lacks the powers and organs by which abstraction from sensible things comes about. Nor, again, are they the causes of things, since angels are not causers. Therefore, it seems that angels do not know through species.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, the more noble among beings are exemplars of the lower. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, n. 9 (PG 3:823).) But a thing is known best of all in its exemplar. Therefore, since angels are the most noble among created things, as though closer to God, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 7 (CCSL 27; PL 32:828).) it seems that having gazed upon their own nature they know other things.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is understood and the intellect do not differ except when both of them are in potency, as was said in Book I. (See In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; d. 39, q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore, in every intellect that is always in act, understanding and understood do not differ. But the intellect of a separated substance seems always to be in act, since its understanding does not follow a transmutation. Therefore, it seems that in it the species understood and the substance of the intellect do not differ. Thus, it does not know through species.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that the angels are illuminated through the knowable accounts of things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 1 (PG 3:694).) But these are nothing else than the species of things as understood. Therefore, they have knowledge of things through species.
Furthermore, it is said in the Book of Causes that every intelligence is full of forms. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 10.) But what is in an intelligence is in it after an intelligible manner, as is said in the same book. Now, the things that in this way are in it are in it for the purpose of knowledge. Therefore, it seems that they know things through forms.
I answer that the angelic intellect is a mean between the divine and human intellect both in power and in mode of knowing. For in the divine intellect the likeness of the thing understood is the essence itself of the one understanding, which is the exemplary and efficient cause of realities. But in the human intellect, the likeness of the reality understood is something other than the intellect’s substance, and is as its form. Hence from the intellect and the likeness of the reality comes about a single complete thing, which is the intellect actually understanding. And the likeness of this is received from the reality. But in the angelic intellect, the likeness of the reality understood is something other than the substance of the one understanding, yet it is not acquired from the reality, since they do not piece together knowledge out of divisible realities, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, n. 2 (PG 3:867).) Nor is it the cause of the reality, according to the faith, but has been, rather, infused by God for the sake of knowledge.
And the reason for this can be taken from the words of the Commentator on the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 37.) For he says that in accord with the order of simplicity of separated natures there is an order of the distance of the understood species from the intellect. Hence in the first essence, in which there is no admixture of potency, what understands and what is understood are entirely the same. But in others there is a greater distance between the species understood and the intellect insofar as there is a greater admixture of potency. The reason for this is that nothing works except insofar as it is in act. Hence that thing whose essence is pure act understands without the reception of anything else outside its essence perfecting it, whereas that in which there is potency cannot understand unless it is perfected in act through something received from without. And this is the natural intellective light that is cast by God into intellective substances. Since each thing is received in something according to the mode of the receiver, the light that is simple in God is received in the mind of an angel as divided and multiplied. For every receptive potency has divisibility of itself insofar as it is not restricted to one thing, which is accomplished through a determining act. Thus, it says in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 10.) that just as singulars are multiplied in lower nature, so also intelligible species are multiplied in intelligences. For both arise on account of the multiplicability of potency. And these are the species through which the angels know.
Reply Obj. 1: The soul is called the “species of species” inasmuch as it makes species actually intelligible through the agent intellect and receives them in accord with the potential intellect, just as in that same place the senses are called the “species of sensible things” and the hand is called the “organ of organs” inasmuch as all artifacts are made by the hands. (See Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 432a1–2.) Hence it says in History of Animals 14 (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 4.8–11, especially 4.10, 686a25–30, 687a3–24.) that hands were given to man in place of horns and all those other things that are of aid to other animals. Hence it does not follow that the essence of the soul or of an angel is the sort of species in which everything is known.
Reply Obj. 2: The likenesses of things existing in the intellect of an angel are not received from things, since the intelligible species is not received from a thing except by the mediation of a phantasm, which is related to the intellect as color is to sight, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a14–17; 3.7, 431a15–19.) Yet neither are they the causes of things by way of creation, though maybe they are by way of motion, if perhaps we posit that they move the spheres, the motion of which is the cause of natural forms. Nevertheless, they must know certain things of which they are not the cause, such as the spheres themselves and other angels. Hence we must say that it can come about in two ways that they are like one another. One way is such that one is the cause of another, impressing its likeness on it, as in the case of fire and heated air; and this is how the divine intellect and the human intellect have assimilated the things understood, though in a converse manner, since the divine intellect impresses onto the thing the form by which the thing is made like it, whereas the human intellect receives from the thing the species through which it is made like the thing. The other way is in such a manner that both are from one cause impressing a like form on both. And in this way, the angelic intellect is likened to the things known because the forms that are impressed on things by God for subsistence are also impressed on angels to be known.
Reply Obj. 3: A thing is not known perfectly in an exemplar except one from which it is derived with respect to all that is in it. This is how things are known in the first exemplar, which things imitate with respect to the being that is in a thing. But this is not the case with the essence of an angel, since it is not the cause or exemplar of all that is in the thing, namely, of its matter and form, except through the fact that its potency is completed by light cast into it by God, as has been said. (Above: resp.)
Reply Obj. 4: The angelic intellect, even if it is posited as always in act with respect to natural things known, does not have actual existence from itself, but from another. Hence just as in it existence and what-is differ, on account of the fact that the being that it has, it has it from another, so also in it the intellect and that by which it actually understands differ, on account of the fact that it has understanding from another.
Article 2
Whether the higher angels understand through more universal species
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.55.3; 89.1; SCG II.98; On Truth, q. 8, a. 10; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 7, ad 5; a. 18; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 10.) It seems that the species of the higher angels are not more universal than the species that the lower angels possess.
Obj. 1: For, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 1, the universal “animal” either is nothing or is secondary. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 402b8–9.) For it is only said to be secondary due to abstraction from things, in which the intention of universality is completed through the act of the abstracting intellect. Therefore, since the intellect of an angel does not abstract species from things, it seems that the species in it are not universal.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if they are called “more universal,” either this is with regard to knowledge or with regard to activity. It is not with regard to knowledge, since they all have knowledge of natural causes, of themselves, and of God. Nor is it with regard to activity, since they do not cause things, as has been said. (Above: d. 1, q. 1, aa. 3–4.) Therefore, it seems that in no way are some of them more universal species.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more particular knowledge is, the more perfect it is. But the higher angels’ knowledge is more perfect, just as their nature is more simple, as is clear from what has been said before. (Above: q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore, it seems that the species of higher angels are not more universal.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the one who knows universals can only know proper attributes if he acquires something about the proper attributes of a thing. So if the species of the lower angels were more proper, it would be necessary for higher angels to receive the act of proper knowledge of things from the lower. This is not fitting, since what happens is rather the other way around, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11 (PG 3:283).) Therefore, the same holds as before, it seems.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that the higher angels have more universal knowledge, whereas the lower have more particular and subordinate knowledge. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12 (PG 3:291).)
Furthermore, this same thing is seen when the Book of Causes says that, since every intelligence is full of forms, in some there are more universal forms, namely, in the higher, and in others less universal forms, namely, in the lower. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 10.)
I answer that, according to theologians and philosophers, we must hold that the forms of the higher angels are more universal. The reason for this is that in all sciences and arts, whether speculative or practical, that which is higher and which orders other things must consider more universal accounts due to the fact that principles are small in quantity and great in power, and that simple things extend to very many things. For example, under civil science there is military science, and under military science there is horsemanship, and so forth. But civil science considers the good of man absolutely, whereas military science considers the same thing in regard to matters of warfare, and so forth. For this reason the lower receives its principles from the higher, which demonstrates the reason why, so to speak. This is even clearer in the speculative sciences. For metaphysics, which orders all the others, considers the account of being absolutely, while the others consider the account of being according to a given determination. But this is also the case with the angels, both according to all the philosophers and according to us. For it is the higher that order the acts and offices of the lower through their knowledge, illuminating, perfecting, and purifying them. Hence the knowledge of the higher must be more universal, and their species must be more universal.
How this comes about can be seen from the words of the Commentator on the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 51.) For he says that in accord with the order of difference between what understands and what is understood, there is also an order of the multiplication of things understood. For in a higher intellect, which has less potentiality, there is less composition of what understands and what is understood. So it is also the case that there are fewer intelligible forms in it, since the less potency the intellectual light has, the less division and multiplication there is in it. Thus, these forms must be more universal than the forms that are more multiplied. Therefore, in keeping with this, the knowledge of God is most universal, since he knows all things by a single likeness, which is his essence, as if someone were to know all things through the common account of being. The fewer forms through which one understands, the more universal is his knowledge and the more like the divine knowledge, such as if one person knew all things through the concept of the ten genera, and another person only by receiving the first species of the genera, and so on, descending all the way to the most specific concepts. The narrowness of the species would be found to track their multiplication.
Reply Obj. 1: There are three kinds of universal. One is in the thing, namely, the nature itself, which is in particulars, even though it is not in them under the aspect of actual universality. There is another kind of universal that is received from the thing through abstraction, and this is secondary to the thing. In this way, the forms of the angels are not universal. But there is also a kind of universal with regard to the thing, which is prior to the thing itself, even as the form of a house is in the mind of the builder. And this is how the forms of things existing in the mind of the angels are universal, not in such a manner that they are practical, but rather that they are similar to practical forms, as in the case of someone who possesses practical knowledge in a speculative manner.
Reply Obj. 2: They are more universal both with regard to knowledge and with regard to activity: with regard to knowledge, both on the part of the species themselves, since they extend to many things; and on the part of the things known, since the higher know the same thing that the lower know, but more perfectly and clearly. Hence they illuminate them, just as one who knows a conclusion because he demonstrates it knows the same conclusion in a different way from one who knows it dialectically. Nor is it far from the truth that more things should come under the natural knowledge of the higher than of the lower.
Likewise, they are also more universal with regard to activity, both according to philosophers, who posit an order of intelligences in accord with the order of motions, from which it follows that the causality of the forms of a higher intelligence must be more universal, since its motion is more universal in causing; and also according to us, since we posit the orders in accord with different divine offices, whereby the higher order the lower in their offices and not vice versa. Hence the same way of proceeding remains for us as for the philosophers, according to what has been handed on by Dionysius. (See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cc. 4–5.)
Reply Obj. 3: Perfect knowledge is not possessed through a universal medium that is not effective for the knowledge of all proper attributes. But if all proper attributes were known effectively through a universal medium, this would be the most perfect knowledge. For the more something is one and simple, the more powerful and noble it is. This is how we say the higher angels know things sufficiently through universal forms, even as God knows all things perfectly through his essence.
Reply Obj. 4: The argument would follow if the universal forms of the higher angels were not sufficient for the knowledge of proper attributes, which is false. For a higher angel knows through universal forms everything that a lower angel knows through particular forms, and even more besides. Because particulars receive confirmation from universal causes, so it is that the knowledge of the lower angels is perfected by the higher.
Article 3
Whether the angels understand particulars
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.57.2; 89.4; SCG II.100; On Truth, q. 8, a. 11; q. 10, a. 5; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 20: Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 3.) It seems that angels do not know particulars through intellectual forms.
Obj. 1: For where one common nature is found, there is not a diversity in the activity that follows on that nature. But there is an intellectual nature in angels and in us. Therefore, since our intellect cannot understand singulars, it seems that neither does the angelic intellect.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, all knowledge is through assimilation. But any singular in material things is singular through matter. Therefore, given that the species of things in the mind of the angels are altogether removed from matter and from material conditions, since the intellect of the angels is not less immaterial than the human intellect, it seems that it cannot be the principle of knowing a singular precisely as existing in its singularity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if they know different singulars, then they know either through one thing or through more than one. If through one thing, then since particulars are infinite, it seems that in the intellect of an angel there would be one thing by which it knows infinite things; and in this case it will be equal to the divine intellect. If on the other hand they know through more than one, there will have to be a multitude of species existing in the intellect of an angel matching the multitude of individual things that can exist. Thus, in the mind of an angel there would be an actual infinity of species, which is not fitting.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the being of many singulars depends on contingent causes, at least with regard to generation. For example, the generation of Plato depends on the will of his father, namely that his father mingle with his mother. Therefore, if the angels know singulars, then it seems they know future contingents. But this is denied, since to know future contingents belongs to God alone. Therefore, it seems that they do not know singulars.
On the contrary, it is the office of certain angels to guard men, as the saints have handed down. But this cannot be unless they know the men whom they guard. Therefore, it seems that they know individual men and, for the same reason, the individuals of other species.
Furthermore, the angels’ knowledge is more perfect than ours. But we know not only universals, but also singulars. Therefore, it seems that all the more do the angels know singulars.
I answer that, besides the position holding that the angels do not have knowledge of singulars, which is heretical and contrary to the truth of Sacred Scripture, (Scripture clearly teaches that angels interact with human beings and know them and their particular affairs, as in the cases of the angel who assisted Hagar (Gen 16), the three angels who visited Abraham and Sarah (Gen 18), the angels who dealt punishment to Sodom (Gen 19), the angel who stood in the way of Balaam (Num 22), and the angels who fought for Israel (Josh 5), among many other examples.) there are different opinions concerning the manner in which the angels know singulars.
Some say that the angels know only universal causes through their innate forms, but receive from the realities themselves the basis for knowing the singulars produced by the universal causes. But this does not seem to work. For what is received from a singular thing leads to knowledge of its singularity only as long as the material conditions that individuate it are preserved in it, which can only be with a species existing in a bodily organ like the senses and the imagination. Hence since the angels have no bodily organ, even if they abstracted species from things, they could not have knowledge of singulars through such species.
Therefore, others said that all singulars are produced by universal causes ordered in nature. Hence since with the angels there are forms of the order of causes in the universe, then through forms of this sort they can know all singulars. This seems to be the approach of Avicenna. But this is still not sufficient according to our faith. For in universal causes something is not known with respect to individual conditions, namely, being known as it is here and now, and things of this sort. Hence Avicenna himself says (Avicenna (mistakenly attributed), De fluxu entis, ch. 4; Metaphysics, tract. 8, cc. 6–7; tract. 9, ch. 4.) that God does not know particular things in a particular way, namely, in such a way that he knows this thing as now existing and as now not existing. This is like someone who knows an eclipse in its universal causes, but who does not know this eclipse as it is here, now beginning and now ending, unless he perceives it by his senses.
Thus, some added to this position that from the application of these universal forms to this or that particular, the knowledge of an angel is determined such that it knows the singular. But again, this does not seem sufficient. For this application of universal causes to a singular is either to the singular in the intellect of the angel, and thus, this position would suppose the very thing in question, namely, that singulars are in the intellect of an angel. Or the application is to a singular in the thing, as it seems to mean in such a way that, if sunlight, for example, were intelligent, it would understand the bodies to which its rays are applied. But this cannot be. For since there is no knowledge except by way of assimilation, it is impossible for knowledge to extend beyond that in which there is assimilation. Therefore, if sunlight or the intellect of an angel is assimilated to the thing upon which it casts rays, this can be only either from the fact that what belongs to the thing is received in the intellect or in the sunlight (and they do not posit this, since this would amount to the first position), or from the fact that the sun lays down something regarding the thing. And in this case it would know about the thing only what it lays down regarding it, as if the sun were to know the nature of light and not this or that color’s proper account, which is due to a differing proportion among receivers. Similarly, an angel would not have proper knowledge of things through this sort of application, since it does not confer the thing’s proper nature on it.
Others say that particular knowledge results from joining together the universals that they know insofar as several forms being gathered together results in a certain collection of accidents, which we cannot discover in another. But this too is insufficient. For the individuation of form is only due to matter. Hence no matter the extent to which forms are brought together, the collection always remains communicable to many up until it is understood as individuated by matter. Hence by knowledge of such forms brought together, Socrates or Plato is not known.
And so, we must say otherwise, that the account of the knowledge of singulars is the same in God and in the angels. Hence we must consider how God knows singulars. For it is necessary for the power that knows a singular to have within it a likeness of the thing with regard to the individuating conditions. This is the reason why a singular is known through a species in the senses and not through a species in the intellect. Now, within the artisan there must be a likeness of the thing made by his art with reference to that whole which is produced by the artisan. For this reason a builder knows by art the form of the house that he puts into matter, but not this or that house except through the fact that he receives it from the senses, since he does not make the matter. But God is the cause of the thing not only with regard to the form, but also with regard to the matter, which is the principle of individuation. Hence the idea in the divine mind is a likeness of the thing with regard to both matter and form. Thus, through it things are known not only universally, but also in particular. Now, the forms that are in the mind of an angel are most similar to the ideal accounts existing in the divine mind, with the individuating conditions being drawn immediately from them as from exemplars as accounts or ideas of realities existing in the divine mind. Hence through them the angels can know the singulars of things, since they are likenesses of things even with regard to individuating material dispositions, as also are the accounts or ideas of things existing in the divine mind.
Reply Obj. 1: The human intellect is last in rank among intellectual substances. Thus, there is in it the greatest potentiality with respect to other intellectual substances. For this reason it receives intelligible light from God as weaker and less like the light of the divine intellect. Hence the intellectual light received in it is not sufficient for deriving proper knowledge of a thing except through species received from things, which species must be received in it formally in accord with its mode. And so, since singulars are individuated by matter, they only know singulars through a kind of turning back of the intellect to the imagination and the senses, namely, when the intellect applies the universal species, which it has abstracted from singulars, to the singular form preserved in the imagination. But in an angel the species that give rise to proper knowledge of things are derived from the light itself, without receiving anything else. Thus, since that light is the likeness of the whole thing inasmuch as it is drawn from God after the manner of exemplars, proper knowledge of singulars can be had through species of this sort. And thus, it is clear that, in accord with the ranking of intellectual nature, there are different modes of understanding.
Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence, even though it is pure act, is still the likeness of matter insofar as every being, no matter how imperfect, is deduced from the first being after the manner of an exemplar. Thus, the immaterial forms that are in the intellect of an angel are also the likenesses of things, even with regard to material principles.
Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from what has been said, (Above: q. 1, a. 3.) the higher an angel is, the more things it can know by a single species. But there is no angel in whom species must be multiplied to keep up with the number of individuals, since through one species it knows all the individuals of that species. And that species is rendered the proper account of this or that thing in this or that respect after the manner in which ideas are multiplied in the divine intellect. Thus, neither will the intellect of an angel be equal to the divine intellect, nor will there be infinite species in the intellect of an angel. However, it is not a problem for the relations that follow on the acts of reason or of the intellect to be multiplied to infinity.
Reply Obj. 4: Through species implanted in them at their creation, the angels know causes which have an order in nature and everything determined in those causes either simply or as coming about frequently. Because future contingents are not determined in their causes, but rather are rendered actually present after the determination of the causes has been accomplished, therefore they do not know them so long as they are in the future. Rather, this knowledge belongs to God alone, who perceives all the successions of time by a single act.
Article 4
Whether an angel can understand more than one thing at the same time
To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.58.2; SCG II.101; On Truth, q. 8, a. 14.) It seems that an angel can understand actually more than one thing at the same time.
Obj. 1: For, according to Dionysius, an angel possesses a God-like intellect. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) But God understands actually all things at the same time. For with him there is no change nor shadow of alteration (Jas 1:17). Therefore, an angel understands more than one thing at the same time.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in heaven our thoughts will not be shifting. (See Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 16 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1079).) But the saints in heaven are promised that they will be like angels (Matt 22:30). Therefore, it seems that the intellect of the angels does not turn from one thing to another, but rather knows all things at the same time.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, happiness resides in an activity, not in a habit. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.6, 1177a10.) But the angels—at least the blessed ones—have the most noble happiness. Therefore, it seems that they have actual knowledge of everything they know at the same time and not in succession.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the intellect of an angel is not less noble than the agent intellect of the rational soul. But it is said of this intellect in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a22.) that it does not understand at one time, and at another time not, but rather it understands always. Therefore, all the more is this true of an angel’s intellect.
On the contrary, according to Augustine, God moves the spiritual creature through time. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 22 (CSEL 28.1:259; PL 34:388).) But to be moved through time is to be moved through affections and through conceptions of the intellect. Therefore, it seems that among the angels there is succession in understanding.
I answer that the reason why more than one thing cannot actually be understood at the same time is given by Algazel, (Algazel, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, problem 18.) for the intellect must always be conformed actually to the intelligible species of the thing it has within it, of the thing understood actually, if there is to be the assimilation of both that is required for knowledge of a thing. But just as it is impossible for a body with reference to the same part to be configured variously with various shapes, so also it is impossible for one intellect at the same time to be actually informed by different species for the understanding of different things. Thus, one should consider that each intellect that understands more than one thing through more than one species must not understand them at the same time, as is clear in the human intellect, which in the wayfaring state receives species from things.
Now, because the divine intellect knows all things by a single act, it has actual knowledge of all things at the same time. But the intellect of an angel knows things in two ways.
One way is through various species that are in its intellect. And in this way, it is necessary for it not to understand more than one thing at the same time, except inasmuch as they are reduced to a single species through which they are known.
In the other way, they know things in one thing that is their cause, and this is the Word. And in this way, they are capable of knowing all things at the same time actually. But this knowledge is quasi-formal with respect to the preceding, from which they are never excepted. Thus, it is frequently handed down by the saints and philosophers that in their intellect there is not succession or renewal, though there is alternation inasmuch as they understand things in their proper nature through concrete species.
Reply Obj. 1: The intellect of the angels is called “God-like” due to the fact that it conforms to the divine intellect, not because it understands all things by a single act and so at the same time. Rather, it conforms to the divine intellect in the fact that it does not receive knowledge from things, but rather knows without the investigation of reason and the support of the senses.
Reply Obj. 2: Thoughts are called “shifting” that turn things over in accord with the discursive process of reason, proceeding from caused to causes or vice versa in order to arrive at the knowledge of the unknown from what is known. But this does not exclude a succession of thoughts from the angels and the saints except with respect to the contemplation of the Word, as they are brought into perfect assimilation to God. And this is what their essential happiness consists in.
Reply Obj. 3: Hence the reply to the third objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 4: The potential intellect and the agent intellect are in the angels as in us, though in a different way. For the potential intellect in us is in potency with respect to the species received from things through the light of the agent intellect which makes them intelligible actually, but in them it is in potency with respect to the light flowing into them from God. Similarly, the light of the agent intellect in us is not sufficient to have distinct knowledge of things, except in accord with the received species, which it informs as light does colors. But the intellectual light in the angels is sufficient to have distinct knowledge of things. For this is the very light on the basis of which those intellectual forms are multiplied with which the intelligences are said to be full. Consequently, their agent intellect is always said to be in act, since in the angels, as in us, it shines unceasingly for the actual consideration of something as far as it lies within. But it is not then necessary that it always be turned toward a single species such that a single thing is always understood actually.
Question 4
Angelic love
Article 1
Whether angels in the state of nature loved God more than themselves and all other things
Concerning the third main area of inquiry, we inquire concerning love, namely, if the angels were not created in grace, whether in the state of innocence they loved God above themselves and more than all things. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.60.5; I-II.109.3; II-II.25.2; 26.3; Quodl. I, q. 4, a. 3; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 9–10.) And it seems that they did not.
Obj. 1: For to love God in this way is an act of charity, which someone who does not have charity cannot possess. But the angels in this state did not have charity, which does not exist without grace, since it is never unformed. Therefore, it seems that they did not love God more than themselves.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Bernard, nature is always curved back on itself. (See Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153 AD), On Loving God, ch. 8 (PL 76:386).) But angels’ love in their first state was only from a natural principle. Therefore, it was wholly turned back on the lover so that, whatever the angels loved, they loved for their own sake. Thus, they did not love God above themselves.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 4.) that no action of any nature is generous except those of God alone, due to the fact that every other action results in some benefit to the agent himself. But the love by which someone loves God above himself is the most generous of all. Therefore, it seems that someone can only have this love through grace.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, each thing naturally desires to acquire its end. But when someone desires to acquire something for himself, he loves that thing for himself and less than himself. Therefore, since the angels in the state of natural endowments loved God as their end, it seems that they did not love him above themselves.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) natural goods remain in the angels even after sin. But it is obvious that a sinful man or angel does not love God above all things. Therefore, it seems that neither did they in the state of natural endowments.
On the contrary, all love is either of use or enjoyment. Therefore, if the angels loved God in the state of innocence, it was either as using him or as enjoying him. If it was as using him, then they made use of a thing meant to be enjoyed, which is a mark of great perversity, according to Augustine. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 24 (CCSL 48; PL 41:338).) Thus, it would be the love of sin and not natural. But if it was as enjoying him, then they loved God for his own sake, since to enjoy is to cling to a thing in love for its own sake.
Furthermore, that God is to be loved above all things, since it belongs to the natural law, was more expressly inscribed in the mind of the angels than in the mind of man. But one cannot remain free from sin if he acts contrary to what has been implanted in the heart by the natural law. Therefore, if the angels did not love God above all things, they sinned. Therefore, as long as they were without sin, they loved God above all things.
I answer that concerning this there are two opinions. Some distinguish love of concupiscence from love of friendship. And if we consider these two carefully, they differ with respect to the two acts of the will, namely, to desire, which is for something not in one’s possession, and to love, which is for something in one’s possession, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 118, sermon 8, para. 3 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1520).)
Therefore, the love of concupiscence is that by which someone desires something so as to seek what is good for himself in some way. And with such love the angels in the state of natural endowments loved God more than themselves in desiring the divine good more intensely than their own, since it was more delightful to them. Hence they turned this whole love back on themselves. On the other hand, the love of friendship is that by which someone loves in another the likeness of what he has in himself, willing the good of the one to whom he has a likeness. For this reason the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155a35.) like is friend of like, as when one virtuous man loves another, among whom alone there is true friendship. And with this kind of love the angels in a certain way loved God above themselves, since they wished a greater good for him than for themselves, namely, to be God, which they did not will for themselves, but something less good. But even so, they willed the created good for themselves more intensely than the divine good for God.
Yet this response cannot stand. For it is necessary to hold that the angels in that state had the love of friendship for God, since the divine likeness shone brightly in them with respect to natural goods. But it pertains to the account of friendship that even though it has pleasing and beneficial aspects associated with it, the eye of the lover does not regard these, but rather the good that is loved. Therefore, in the heart of the lover the good that is loved is of greater weight than the benefits or delights that follow from the beloved. But there was no good in the angels that was not from the beloved, namely, God. Therefore, they loved the beloved divine good more than the good that they themselves were or that was in them. And this is the other opinion.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of charity can be spoken of in two ways: either as the act that arises from charity, and this only exists in one who possesses charity; or as the act that is for charity, not as meritorious or generative, but as preparatory, and in this way, the act of charity can be possessed before charity is possessed, just as to do just things comes before the habit of justice.
Or it can be said that in the friendship of charity the soul is moved to love God out of a likeness of grace, whereas in natural love it is so moved out of the very good of nature, which is also a likeness of the supreme goodness. For this reason we must say that when it is said that one who possesses charity loves God on account of God, the “on account of” denotes relation to an end and to an efficient cause, since God himself adds to nature that whereby nature tends to the love of him. But when it is said of one who lacks charity that he loves God on account of God, the “on account of” denotes relation to an end and not to a proximate efficient cause, except as God works in every nature at work.
Reply Obj. 2: Nature is said to be curved back on itself because it always loves its own good. But it is not necessary that the intention rest in the fact that it is its own, but rather in the fact that it is good. For unless it were good for it in some way, either truly or apparently, it would never love it. But this does not mean that it loves it because it is its own, but rather because it is good. For the good is through itself the object of the will.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though in any created nature some advantage redounds to the agent from its action, it is not necessary that this advantage be what is intended, as is clear in a friendship between upright men.
Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of end. One kind is proportionate to a thing and is received in it as a perfection inherent it, such as, for example, health in medical procedures. And because this end has no being except in that for which it is acquired, it is not loved by anyone above himself absolutely. Rather, being oneself along with such a perfection is something that is loved above being oneself simply. But there is also a kind of end subsisting in itself, not dependent for being on the thing that is directed toward the end. One does indeed desire to acquire this end, but one loves it above what one acquires from it. And God is such an end, as has been said above. (Above: d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.)
Reply Obj. 5: Natural goods, considered absolutely in the being of nature, remain intact after sin, yet they are perverted with regard to the right order that they possessed toward grace or virtue. And to love God above all things followed on this uprightness.
Exposition of the second part of the text
Here it is usual to ask what wisdom they had before their fall or confirmation. (Sent. II, 3.5(17).1.) Here he posits two kinds of knowledge in the angels. One is speculative by which they knew God, themselves, and other created things. And the other is practical and follows on their activity pertaining to themselves, by which they knew what they should choose or reject. And this was like the knowledge of prudence in us.
Chapter 53 of 186