D. 6 - Effects of the fall of the angels with regard to their nature

Division of the text

Having shown the separation of the wicked angels from the good by defection and conversion, here he begins to consider what follows for the averted and converted in keeping with what they have in common and where they differ. And it is divided into three parts.

In the first, he examines what follows for them with regard to the condition of their nature.

In the second, he examines what pertains to their power, at it was said above that the angels who remained steadfast were confirmed through grace. (Sent. II, 7.1(33).1.)

In the third, he examines what pertains to their assumption of bodies, at it is also usual among the learned to discuss the question of whether all angels, both good and evil, are bodily. (Sent. II, 8.1(43).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines the truth.

In the second, he raises a question based on what has been determined, at but it is usual to ask whether they are all in this cloudy atmosphere. (Sent. II, 6.5(30).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he sets out their condition with regard to their rank of nature before sin.

In the second, he sets out their condition after sin, at and because of such great pride, he was cast down from heaven . . . into this cloudy atmosphere. (Sent. II, 6.2(27).1.)

And he first addresses the place.

Second, he addressed their ranking of preeminence, which follows their natural ranking, at and just as among the good angels some rule over others, so also among the evil ones some have been given precedence over others. (Sent. II, 6.4(29).1.)

But it is usual to ask whether they are all in this cloudy atmosphere. (Sent. II, 6.5(30).1.) Here he raises a question about what was said concerning the place:

and first, he treats of it in general;

second, more particularly, at but as to Lucifer, some hold the view that he is bound there. (Sent. II, 6.6(31).1.)

There he first reaches a conclusion about the first angel;

second, about the others, at it seems too that the power to tempt other men is taken away from those demons who are overcome by the saints who live justly and decently. (Sent. II, 6.7(32).1.)

Question 1

Effects of the fall of the angels with regard to their nature

Here five questions arise:

first, to which order did the highest of the sinful angels, who is called “Lucifer,” belong;

second, how the others’ sin relates to his sin;

third, the place allotted them after sin;

fourth, whether there is any order of preeminence among them;

fifth, their war on us.

Article 1

Whether Lucifer was the highest of all the angels

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.63.7; SCG III.109.) It seems that Lucifer was not the highest of all.

Obj. 1: For it is said to him: you a cherub stretched out, and protecting (Ezek 28:14). (RSV reads with an anointed guardian cherub I placed you.) But the order of Cherubim, according to Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:205).) and Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1249).) is not the highest order. Therefore, it seems that he did not belong to the highest order.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene says of him that he was set over the earthly order. (John Damascene, The Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:874).) But, according to Dionysius, lower orders are set over lower ministries. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, cc. 7–9 (PG 3:206–73).) Therefore, it seems that he belonged to one of the lower orders.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nature of any angel is ordered to beatitude. But it is not probable that the divine ordering would be frustrated in the most noble nature in the whole universe. Therefore, it seems that the angel who was higher than the rest did not fall from beatitude.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sin can only exist in a nature that has potentiality, which follows on it insofar as it is made from nothing. But in the case of this higher angel, the closer it was to God, who is pure act, the less it partook of potentiality. Therefore, it seems that sin would have a place in him least of all.

On the contrary, it is said: no tree in the paradise of God was like it in his beauty (Ezek 31:8). But the trees in paradise signify the angels. Therefore, it seems that none of the angels could have equaled the angel who sinned, to whom the aforementioned words refer.

Furthermore, Gregory says in the text (Sent. II, 6.1(26).2, quoting Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 23 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:665).) that he was more splendid in comparison to the rest. But the order of splendor follows on the rank of nature. Therefore, the angel who sinned was higher than the rest.

I answer that Augustine raises this question in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1 (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 17 (CSEL 28.1:349; PL 34:438).) and leaves it undetermined due to the fact that he wished to assert little pertaining to the angels. But afterwards Gregory (Sent. II, 6.1(26).2, referring to Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 29 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:665).) expressly determines that he was higher than the rest, not only those who sinned but also those who stood firm. The common opinion agrees with this. And this is probable both because of the many authorities who seem to express this in a figurative manner, and also by the fact that it is not probable that a spirit who was also subject to another created thing would have in some way desired equality with the Creator. Hence the one who desired this must have been higher than the rest.

Reply Obj. 1: The gifts of the lower orders, by which they are named, are also present in the higher orders by way of eminence. Hence a higher order can be referred to by the name of a lower order. Thus, I say that this angel is not called a “cherub” because he was from the order of the cherubim; rather, he was from the order of the seraphim. But he is called a “cherub” to express the quality of his fault. For he fell through the vice of vainglory and thus is referred to by knowledge, which is what the name “cherub” designates, of which the Apostle says, knowledge puffs up (1 Cor 8:1).

Reply Obj. 2: According to some people, Damascene is relating the opinion of some rather than asserting the truth.

Or we may say that even though it belongs to the lower orders to be set over earthly matters in respect of the fact that they carry out such activities immediately, nevertheless those who are higher are also set over earthly matters by the fact that they illuminate the lower and direct their acts.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine ordering concerning any created thing cannot be frustrated. For even if it falls short of one order, it falls back into another order, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 2, a. 2, reply sed contra 4.) This is why Boethius says, in Consolation 4, for order brings together all things such that it allows within the reign of providence what might have deviated from an assigned account of order still to slide back into another order. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6, para. 53 (PG 63:84).)

Reply Obj. 4: The angels do not act in accord with a necessity of nature. Thus, one in which there is less disposition to sin can sin more. Thus, the sin of the first angel was also more grave than the rest, inasmuch as it was inherently less likely that he would turn to sin.

Article 2

Whether the sin of the first angel was the occasion for the others to sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.63.8.) It seems that the sin of the first angel was not the occasion for the others to sin.

Obj. 1: For what is deformed cannot move anything to imitate it by way of occasion. But as soon as the angel sinned, it was deformed. Therefore, it did not move others to imitate it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it does not seem that it would give others the occasion to sin except by drawing them into common agreement with its desire, which was to be set over other created thing like God. But in this the others do not seem to have been in common agreement. For as the saints say, (According to Mandonnet, these include Augustine, Gregory, Bernard (as is clear from what has been said above), as well as Jerome (Commentary on Isaiah, bk. 5, at Isaiah 14:13 [PL 24:165–66]) and Isidore of Seville (Sentences [On the Highest Good], bk. 1, ch. 10, nn. 7–8 [PL 83:555]).) they sinned through pride. But it is of greater dignity to be subject to one who is higher, that is, God, than to the lower, that is, angels. And what is of greater dignity in estimation is at least more desired by one who is prideful. Therefore, it seems that the highest did not persuade the others to fall.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among other reasons for the reparation of man, one is that he fell through another and in that way would appropriately rise again through another. But the fall of the lower angels is not reparable. Therefore, it seems that they did not fall at the suggestion of a higher angel.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the wicked fell by turning away from God, so also the good were confirmed by turning toward him. But we do not hold that among the good angels one was the cause of another’s turning to God. Therefore, it seems that neither should we posit that one among the wicked was the cause of another’s ruin.

On the contrary, the Apocalypse says (Rev 12:4) that the dragon that fell from heaven dragged with it a third of the stars. But to drag pertains to a cause that in some way moves. Therefore, it seems that the first angel moved the others to sin.

Furthermore, it is said of the devil in the figure of Leviathan: he is king over all the sons of pride (Job 41:25). But, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.1, 1013a10.) a king is called “first” inasmuch as he moves by his will and commands those who are subject to him. Therefore, it seems that the first angel would have led the others to sin.

I answer that there are many opinions concerning this. Some say that we find no order between the sin of the first angel and the others except with respect to the quantity of the fault, since the sin of the first angel was more grave than the rest. But this seems problematic, because Scripture’s manner of speaking points to a causality of the first angel with regard to the sin of the others.

Thus, others say that it took precedence both in gravity and causality, and even in time. But this does not seem to work. For, according to Damascene, what death is in men, the fall is in angels. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith (PG 94:875), bk. 2, ch. 4.) Hence just as those who die in their sins are immediately subject to damnation, so also an angel who sins immediately receives its damnation and is cast out of the company of the good. Hence it would not be able to draw others to sin.

Thus, we must say that the sin of the first angel preceded the sins of the others not only in quantity of fault, but also in its causality, yet not in time. How this happens can be seen in this way: as has been said before, (Above: d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, resp.) the first angel willed to obtain the result that, just as it excelled the others by nature, so also it would in a certain way be the cause of their obtaining their ultimate perfection. Because this motion of desire was indivisible and not continuous, its beginning did not precede its term. Thus, the motion of another caused by it, which began at its term, was altogether simultaneous with it, insofar as what it desired it tried to carry out by expressing its desire to the others. The others’ vision and perverse consent to the desire was simultaneous with this. Something similar occurs in all instantaneous activities of which one is the cause of another when they are simultaneous in time, such as the illumination of air, the vision of color, and the discernment of the thing thus seen, even with regard to things that are sensible incidentally.

Reply Obj. 1: Deformity ensued in the first angel from its act simultaneously with the act of the others. Now, the lower angels’ vision was not turned to the first angel insofar as its act left it deformed, but rather insofar as the act proceeded from it. For things that are joined together in time are separated by the act of the soul, especially when one precedes the other in nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The lower angels also sinned through pride, yet they still willed to be subject to the higher angel, as he wished. Hence they were prideful inasmuch as they desired something for themselves, namely, to acquire glory for themselves in accord with the power of their own natural endowments—though under God and under the higher angels—and that they would be the ones to transfuse glory to the lower angels. And they desired something for the higher angel, in which they agreed with him, namely, that he would achieve the aforementioned dignity. For there was the same account for one as for all of them. This is similar to the case of those who all equally stand to gain something, and thus all conspire together, with each of them desiring for himself and for the others.

Reply Obj. 3: This is not the real reason why the sin of the angel was unforgivable, though there is a certain appropriateness that the sin of man would be more readily remedied. Besides, the case is not comparable. For man sinned through someone tempting him, but the lower angels sinned through someone presenting them with the occasion.

Reply Obj. 4: Conversion had its efficacy through grace, which is not from any created thing. But for defection the power of the created thing is sufficient. Moreover, it is not far from the truth that the conversion of one angel would be the occasion and example for the conversion of others. Rather, this even seems to be what is meant where it says, war arose in heaven, Michael and his angels fighting against the dragon (Rev 12:7).

Article 3

Whether it is fitting to assign a place to the angels after their fall

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.64.4.) It seems unfitting to assign a place to the wicked angels after their fall.

Obj. 1: For to one who receives no impression from a place, every place is equally fitting. But the demons, since they are incorporeal substances, do not receive any local and bodily impressions, since they are neither illuminated by bodily light, nor do they get cold. Therefore, it seems that it is meaningless to say that one place is more due to them than another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to sinners, only a place of imprisonment and punishment is due. But, according to the Philosopher, Pythagoras said that the place of fire is a prison. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.13, 293a32. Mandonnet notes that Aristotle is not speaking about Pythagoras himself here, but rather, about certain of his followers living in Italy.) So it seems that they should be there after their sin, not in the air.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a place should be proportionate to what is placed there. But the demons are shrouded in darkness by sin. Therefore, it seems that they should be assigned a place near the earth, which is a dark body.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since the demons deserve a perpetual punishment, God should not grant them a place they desire, since fulfilled desire mitigates punishment. But the demons eagerly wish to be here with us. Hence we read that they frequently begged not to be cast into hell. Therefore, it seems that they should always be in hell.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the sin of a demon is more grave than the sin of a man. But the souls of the damned immediately descend into hell and are not permitted to remain here with us. Therefore, it seems that neither are the demons.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as a gloss on James 3 says, (Bede, In epistulas septem catholicas: expositio in epistulam Jacobi, ch. 3, v. 6 (CCSL 121; PL 93:27).) the demons carry the fire of hell with them wherever they go. But that fire, since it is bodily, acts from a necessity of nature. Therefore, it seems that they never come near us, since then everything around us would be burned up.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, among bodies that have a single weight, there is a single place, just as for all heavy things there is a center toward which they tend in their motion. But, according to Augustine, love among spirits is the same as weight among bodies. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 28 (CCSL 48; PL 41:341).) Therefore, since all the demons sinned through the desire of a single vice, it seems that only a single place is due to them.

On the contrary, there is what is said in the text. (Sent. II, 6.3(28).1.)

I answer that a place is not due an angel with respect to its essence, as has been said in Book I, (Sent. I, 37.7(170).3; 37.8(171).) but only with regard to its activity, either by fittingness, as for example in the act of contemplation, or by necessity, as in those acts they perform concerning us. But since an angel is an intellectual substance, its activity, according to its nature, is to contemplate. Hence they were all created in a place befitting contemplation, namely, the empyrean heaven. But the activity of glory only differs from the activity of their nature as the perfect differs from the imperfect, and so the same place is due to the angels both as created and as glorious.

But with regard to the state of fault or wretchedness, their activity can be considered in three ways: either with respect to the light of nature, which has remained in them even though darkened by sin; or with regard to the darkness of fault, and in this way, a place of darkness and punishment is due to them; or with regard to the order of the divine wisdom, which draws out good from their wickedness, namely, the cause of our training. With regard to these three things, the air is suitable for them, especially with regard to its middle region. For inasmuch as it is transparent by the nature of light, it accords with their complete nature. But with regard to its turbulence, it is suitable for them as a penalty for fault. And with regard to the fact that it is close to us, it is suitable for our training. But the place of hell is suitable for them as a penalty for their fault, inasmuch as it is terrible and dark, whereas our dwelling is suitable for them for the sake of our training.

Reply Obj. 1: They are not said to be in a place as if receiving anything from a bodily place, but rather as working something concerning a place that is consonant with the properties of that place.

Reply Obj. 2: Among other generable and corruptible bodies, fire is the most subtle and possesses more light. Hence it is not suitable for angels shrouded in darkness. Hence God and the good angels are more aptly described by metaphors taken from fire, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15 (PG 3:327).) But Pythagoras is speaking of the fire that he posited as being in the middle of the universe, which is the same place that we now refer to as the fire of hell, which is dark and terrible, and is the demons’ place of punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: The portion of the air that is close to the earth is more luminous and warmer than that which is the middle region of the air. For the splendor and heat in the air near the earth is multiplied by the reflection of the rays of the sun. Hence vapors released from water and earth rise up, and where less heat is found, due to distance from the place of reflection, the vapor loses its nature and thereby becomes cooler and condenses, as when water that has been heated is separated from what heats it. For this reason that place is cold and dark, and from there rains, hail, gusts of wind, and things of this sort descend. Thus, the argument presupposed something false.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that they are near us in no way lessens their punishment, except that they reckon it a punishment for themselves that they are not able to do us harm when they are in hell.

Reply Obj. 5: The error of the Greeks is in positing that before the judgment day no soul goes to hell or to heaven. This is derived from the myths of Pythagorean poets, who posited that the souls of those who are slain haunt their tomb until their death is avenged, and as well that they do not return to their own proper star before the completed period of their life, which was cut short from its terminus by an early death. But that the souls of the damned descend immediately to hell is proved in the text (Sent. II, 6.3(28).1.) on the basis of the just who descended there, and by: they spend their days in prosperity, and in a moment they go down to hell (Job 21:13) (RSV reads and in peace they go down to Sheol.) and the rich man also died: and he was buried in hell (Luke 16:22). (RSV for Luke 16:22–23 reads the rich man also died and was buried; and in Hades, being in torment, etc.) Likewise, that the saints immediately ascend to heaven is proved by what is said in Scripture: for we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens (2 Cor 5:1). Even so, both groups sometimes appear to us for our benefit, as when the blessed angels and demons come to us here. Nor is the situation of the souls of the damned and demons the same. For demons were established as above us in accord with the rank of their nature in order to provide a benefit to us. And this should not have been altogether lost by their sin. Hence they have been given to us for the sake of training, which is not the case with the souls of the damned.

Reply Obj. 6: Some say that the sensible punishment of the demons themselves was deferred until judgment day. But this seems to be both contrary to the authority of the saints and the account of divine justice, which immediately condemns the souls of the damned to the punishment of hellfire, and their sin is not greater than the sin of the demons. Thus, others say that they always burn in hellfire, which they also always bear with themselves. Yet this fire does not burn up other bodies, since it acts as an instrument of divine justice only on those upon whom it is inflicted as such a punishment. But since they are incorporeal, it does not seem probable that they bear a bodily fire around with themselves. Hence we must say that they always burn in hellfire, yet it is not always present to them locally. For it does not act in a bodily manner by heating up and drying out, but rather in a spiritual manner. Hence a specific distance is not required as it is in bodily action.

Reply Obj. 7: The three places mentioned are due to any given demon in accordance with different conditions, as has been said.

Article 4

Whether there is an order among the demons

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 47, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; ST I.109.1; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 6, lect. 3.) It seems that there is not an order among the demons.

Obj. 1: For it is said (Job 10:21–22) that there is no order in the land of wretchedness and darkness, but rather everlasting horror dwells there. But the demons inhabit this land. Therefore, there is not an order among them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, wherever we find an order of preeminence among things, we find some harmony of peace. But the demons seem to be at odds with one another. For it is said: by insolence the heedless make strife (Prov 13:10). Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the order of preeminence of anything is in accord with some rule of law. But the will of the demons cannot be directed by any law. Therefore, there cannot be an order of preeminence among them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the higher demons sinned more gravely insofar as they had received better natural endowments by which they could have stood firm. But those who sinned more deserve to be punished more severely. Therefore, it does not seem probable that they received preeminence over the others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no order of preeminence is posited among men who are damned. But there is a single damnation of damned men and demons. Therefore, it seems that neither is there an order among the demons.

On the contrary, it is said of the scales of Leviathan, signifying the members of the devil, that they are joined one to another; they clasp each other and cannot be separated (Job 41:8). Therefore, it seems that there is some harmony among them and an order of preeminence.

I answer that an order of preeminence among the demons is appropriate to their nature, to the divine wisdom, and their own wickedness. For by nature some were higher than others, and since sin does not take away nature, it follows that even after sin some remain higher than others. It also pertains to the divine wisdom that things that are from God be ordered by him from whom comes all authority, as it is said in Romans 13:1. Thus, the demons’ power for training men and punishing the damned is from God, and thus it should be ordered through ranks of preeminence. Likewise, from their wickedness they are enemies of the human race. But for those who have a common enemy, it follows that they are friends. Thus, in order to cause greater harm to men, they are in a sort of confederation with one another in order to attack men in a more harmonized and ordered way.

Reply Obj. 1: The order directed to the end of beatitude is altogether taken away there, since they have irreparably fallen from it. But there is still among them an order of authority, which is more from God than from them.

Reply Obj. 2: Just in themselves, the demons would never have harmony. Rather, they harmonize to carry out a single undertaking. For it is not probable that they have any benevolence toward one another, but rather only agreement regarding some act.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in any evil some good must remain, since it is not wholly corrupted by evil, so also in acts of injustice some order of right can remain. This is clear, for example, in the case of thieves who, after unjustly robbing others, have a certain form of justice among themselves when each remains faithful to the others. And it can be the same way among the demons.

Reply Obj. 4: The authority that they possess does not lessen the punishment of any of them. Rather, the higher their office, the more severe the torment to which they are subject. Hence it is said: mighty men will be mightily tormented (Wis 6:6). (RSV reads tested instead of tormented.) Nor is authority given to them as a reward but rather as a service to the divine wisdom.

Reply Obj. 5: Men are not preeminent with respect to one another in the order of nature. Neither are the damned ordered to the training or punishment of others. Thus, the argument concerning men is not like the argument concerning demons.

Article 5

Whether the demons who are overcome by the saints are thrust down to hell

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the demons who are overcome by the saints are not thrust down again into hell.

Obj. 1: For to inflict a punishment on one who loses in a fight is to incite him to fight all the more bitterly. But this does not fit with God’s mercy. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ more effectively conquered his tempter than other holy people. But Lucifer, who tempted Christ, is not altogether excluded from the role of tempting. For in the time of the Antichrist, he will tempt men most severely. Therefore, even less are the others so excluded.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the fewer tempters there are, the lighter the temptation. Therefore, if it happens continuously that some demons are overcome by the saints, if those who are overcome ceased from tempting, then at the end of the world temptation would be the lightest of all—which is false. Therefore, so is the former proposition.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the demons are ordained by God for our training. So if they ceased altogether from the training of temptation, they would be ordained to nothing at all. This does not suit the divine wisdom, which leaves nothing without order. Therefore, and so on.

On the contrary, a just judge should establish equal conditions for contending parties. But demons who overcome us lessen our training. Therefore, it seems that the converse likewise occurs.

Furthermore, this can be proved from human justice, which does not admit a conquered contender again to the fight.

I answer that all concede that a demon that has been overcome in some way ceases from tempting. But concerning the question of the manner in which it ceases, there are three opinions. Some say that a demon is driven away such that it can tempt neither the same person nor a different person, either to the same or to another sin. Others say that it can tempt the very one who overcame it to another sin, but it cannot tempt him, or others, to the same sin again. These two opinions are laid out in the text. (Sent. II, 6.7(32).1.) But still others say that by the fact that someone overcomes a demon tempting him to one vice perfectly, he cannot be tempted by it to the same vice, though he can be tempted to another, but that the demon can tempt others to the same vice as well as to another. Now, this opinion has a clearer rationale. For someone is said to overcome the devil perfectly in a given vice when the passions inclining him to that vice are altogether overcome, as in the case of those who acquire a habit of customary virtue. And then there does not remain a great inclination to that sin. Thus, the devil does not tempt him to this sin, since he knows his strength. But there can be an argument for the other opinions, for since charity makes good works common to the whole Church, all receive some advantage from the victory of one when their enemies are diminished. Which of these is truer remains unknown, since not much can be confirmed either by reason or by authority.

Reply Obj. 1: The will of the demons always remains equally obstinate with regard to harming men. Thus, it is a greater help that they be removed from the fight, since in this way, their power to assault is held in check, even though their wicked will is neither lessened nor increased.

Reply Obj. 2: Even those who hold that the demons cease from all tempting understand that there is a determined time after which they again return to the fight.

Reply Obj. 3: And in this way, the reply to the third objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: Their evil is always ordered by way of punishment, which they both always undergo themselves and inflict on the damned in hell.

Exposition of the text

‘A dragon,’ falling from heaven*, ‘dragged down with him a third part of the stars*.’ (Sent. II, 6.2(27).1, quoting Revelation 12:3–4.) The “dragon” is understood as Lucifer himself. The “tail” is understood as the persuasion by which he expressed his desire to the others. The “stars,” are understood as the angels shining with natural light, of whom a third are said to have fallen, with regard not to number, but to quality. Those who remained are the ones who cling to God by attending and ministering, while the others fell through defection.

‘Against the princes and powers of this world.’ (Sent. II, 6.2(27).2, quoting Ephesians 6:12.) It should be known that even though it is probable that some fell from each order, the demons are not named after those orders whose names are taken from the gifts of sanctifying grace, as, for example, the seraphim are named after the burning fire of charity and thrones after the divine indwelling. Rather, they are named after the others whose names are taken from the graces freely given, which pertain to knowledge and power.

As long as the world lasts. (Sent. II, 6.4(29).1.) On the contrary, they will always remain in their distinct ranks of nature and punishment. Therefore, the order will always remain.

We must reply that the order of preeminence among the good and wicked spirits is said to cease with regard to the acts they carry out concerning us, either by guarding or by tempting.