Lecture 1 — Subject Matter and End of Moral Philosophy

All arts and all teaching, and similarly every act and every choice, seem to have the attainment of some good as their object. [8]

For this reason, it has correctly been proclaimed that good is what all desire. [9]

Now a certain diversity of ends is apparent, for some are operations while others are works outside the operations. [12]

If the ends are works, then the works are better than the operations. [14]

Since there are many operations, arts, and sciences, there must also be different ends for each of them. Thus, the end of medical art is health; of shipbuilding, navigation; of strategy, victory; of domestic economy, riches. [15]

In all such skills, a subordination of one to another is found. For instance, the art of bridle-making is subordinated to the art of riding, as also are the arts which make riding equipment. The art of riding, in turn, and all military operations come under strategy. In a similar way, other arts are subordinated to still others. [16]

It follows, then, that, in all these, architectonic ends are more desirable than the ends subordinated to them. The reason is that men seek the latter for the sake of the former. [17]

It does not matter whether the ends are operations themselves or something other than the operations, as in the skills mentioned above. [18]

1. As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason, whose characteristic is to know order. Even if the sensitive powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another is exclusively the work of intellect or reason.

Now, an order with two parts is found in things.

One kind is that of parts of a totality—that is, a group—among themselves, as the parts of a house are mutually ordered to each other.

The second order is that of things to an end, and this order is of greater importance than the first.

For, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 11, the order of the parts of an army among themselves exists because of the order of the whole army to the commander.

Now, order is related to reason in a fourfold way.

There is one order that reason does not establish, but only beholds; such is the order of things in nature.

There is a second order that reason establishes in its own act of consideration, such as when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concepts as well, because words express the meanings of the concepts.

There is a third order that reason, in deliberating, establishes in the operations of the will.

There is a fourth order that reason, in planning, establishes in the external things that it causes, such as a chest and a house.

2. Because the operation of reason is perfected by habit, a differentiation of sciences arises according to the different modes of order that reason considers in particular. The function of natural philosophy is to consider the order of things that human reason considers but does not establish—understanding that metaphysics is included here with natural philosophy. The order that reason makes in its own act of consideration pertains to rational philosophy (logic), which properly considers the order of the parts of verbal expression with one another and the order of principles to one another and to their conclusions. The order of voluntary actions pertains to the consideration of moral philosophy. The order that reason, in planning, establishes in external things arranged by human reason pertains to the mechanical arts. Accordingly, it is proper to moral philosophy, to which our attention is at present directed, to consider human operations insofar as they are ordered to one another and to an end.

3. I am talking about human operations, which spring from man’s will according to the order of reason. But if some operations are found in man that are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human, but natural, as clearly appears in operations of the vegetative soul. These in no way fall under the consideration of moral philosophy. As the subject of natural philosophy is motion, or mobile being, so the subject of moral philosophy is human action ordered to an end, or even man as he is an agent voluntarily acting for an end.

4. It must be understood that, because man is by nature a social animal, needing many things to live that he cannot get for himself if alone, he naturally is a part of a group that provides him with help to live well.

He needs this help for two reasons.

First, to have what is necessary for life, without which he cannot live the present life; for this, man is helped by the domestic group of which he is a part. For, every man is indebted to his parents for his generation, his nourishment, and his instruction. Likewise, individuals, who are members of the family, help one another to procure the necessities of life.

In another way, man receives help from the group of which he is a part so as to have a perfect sufficiency for life—namely, so that he may not only live, but live well, having everything sufficient for living. In this way, man is helped by the civic group of which he is a member, not only in regard to bodily needs—as certainly in the state there are many crafts that a single household cannot provide—but also in regard to right conduct, inasmuch as public authority restrains with fear of punishment delinquent young men whom paternal admonition is not able to correct.

5. It must be known, moreover, that the whole that the political group or the family constitutes has only a unity of order, for it is not something absolutely one. A part of this whole, therefore, can have an operation that is not the operation of the whole, as a soldier in an army has an activity that does not belong to the whole army. However, this whole does have an operation that is not proper to its parts but to the whole—for example, an assault by the entire army. Likewise, the movement of a boat is a combined operation of the crew rowing the boat. There is also a kind of whole that has a unity not only of order but also of composition, or of conjunction, or even of continuity, and according to this unity, a thing is one absolutely; therefore, there is no operation of the part that does not belong to the whole. For, in things all of one piece, the motion of the whole and of the part is the same. Similarly, in composites and in conjoined things, the operation of a part is principally that of the whole. For this reason, such both considerations of the whole and those of its parts must belong to the same science. It does not, however, pertain to the same science to consider the whole, which has solely the unity of order, and the parts of this whole.

6. Thus it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts.

The first of these, which is called individual ethics, considers an individual’s operations as ordered to an end.

The second, called domestic ethics, considers the operations of the domestic group.

The third, called political science, considers the operations of the civic group.

7. Thus Aristotle, as he begins the treatment of moral philosophy in the first part of this book called the Ethics, or Morals, first gives an introduction in which he does three things.

First, he shows what he intends to do.

Second, at our study will be (1094b10; [32]), he determines the manner of treatment.

Third, at now every man (1094b27; [37]), he explains what manner of person the student of this science ought to be.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he presents in advance certain things necessary to explain his intention.

Second, at if our actions (1094a18; [19]), he manifests his intention.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows how it is necessary to start with the end.

Second, at since there are many (1094a6; [15]), he compares habits and acts with the end.

On the first point, he does three things.

He states initially that all human beings are ordered to an end.

Second, at now a certain diversity (1094a3; [12]), he shows that there can be a number of ends.

Third, at if the ends are works (1094a5; [14]), he makes a comparison among ends.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he states his intention.

Second, at for this reason (1094a2; [9]), he explains his purpose.

8. In regard to the first, we should consider that there are two principles of human acts—namely, the intellect or reason and the appetite—which are active principles, as explained in the third book of De anima. The intellect or reason considers both the speculative and the practical. The rational appetite is concerned with choice and execution. Now, all these are ordered to some good as to their end, for truth is the end of speculation. Therefore, in the speculative intellect, he includes teaching, by which science is conveyed from teacher to student, while in the practical intellect, he locates art, which is right reason applied to things to be made, as is stated in book 6 of this work [1153]. He indicates that the act of the appetitive intellect is choice, and that execution is action. He does not mention prudence, which is in the practical reason together with art, because choice is properly directed by prudence. He says, therefore, that each of these faculties obviously seeks some good as an end.

9. Then, at for this reason (1094a2), he manifests his intention by the effect of good. In regard to this, we should bear in mind that good is enumerated among the primary entities to such a degree—according to the Platonists—that good is prior to being. But, in reality, good is convertible with being. Now primary things cannot be understood by anything anterior to them, but by something consequent, as causes are understood through their proper effects. But, since good properly is the moving principle of the appetite, good is described as movement of the appetite, just as motive power is usually manifested through motion. For this reason, he says that the philosophers have rightly declared that good is what all desire (1094a2).

10. There is no problem from the fact that some men desire evil. For, they desire evil only under the aspect of good—that is, insofar as they think it good. Hence their intention primarily aims at the good and only incidentally touches on the evil.

11. The saying, what all desire, is to be understood not only of those who knowingly seek good but also of beings lacking knowledge. These things by a natural desire tend to good not as knowing the good, but because they are moved to it by something cognitive—that is, under the direction of the divine intellect in the way an arrow speeds toward a target by the aim of the archer. This very tendency to good is the desiring of good. Hence, he says that all beings desire good insofar as they tend to good. But there is not one good to which all tend; this will be explained later [58–59, 108–9]. Therefore, he does not single out here a particular good, but rather discusses good in general. However, because nothing is good except insofar as it is a likeness and participation of the highest good, the highest good itself is in some way desired in every particular good. Thus, it can be said that the true good is what all desire.

12. Then, at now a certain diversity (1094a3), he indicates that there is a diversity of ends. In this, we must keep in mind that the final good, to which the inclination of each thing tends, is its ultimate perfection. Now, the first perfection is possessed after the manner of a form, but the second perfection by way of an operation. Consequently, there must be this diversity of ends: some are operations and others are works, that is, works which exist apart from the operations.

13. For evidence of this, we must consider that activity is of two kinds, as noted in Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 9, ch. 8 1050a23; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Metaph., bk. 9, ch. 8, lect. 8 [Marietti, nn. 1862–1865].)

One, which remains in the agent himself (like seeing, wishing, and understanding), is an operation of the type properly called “action.”

The other is an operation passing over into external matter and is properly called “making.” This has two aspects:

sometimes a person accepts external matter only for use, as a horse for riding and a guitar for playing;

at other times he takes external matter to change it into some other form, as when a carpenter constructs a house or a bed.

Accordingly, the first and second of these operations do not have any product that is their term, but each of them is an end. The first, however, is more excellent than the second, inasmuch as it remains in the agent himself. But the third operation is a kind of generation whose term is a thing produced. So, in operations of the third type, the things done are the ends.

14. Then, at if the ends (1094a5), he presents the third type, saying that, whenever the products that are extrinsic to the activities are ends, the things produced necessarily are better than the operations that brought them to be, as the thing generated is better than the generative action. The end is more important than the means—in fact, the means have goodness from their relation to the end.

15. Then, at **since there are many operations **(1094a6), he compares habits and acts with the end.

In this matter he does four things.

First, he shows that different things are ordered to different ends. He says that, since there are many operations and arts and sciences, there must be different ends for each of them, for the ends and the means are proportional. This he shows by saying that the end of medical art is health; of shipbuilding, navigation; of strategy, victory; and of domestic economy, or managing a household, riches (1094a6). He accepts this last example on the opinion of the majority of men, for he himself proves in the first book of the Politics (Politics 1.3–4.1253b12–1254a; see Aquinas, In I pol., lec. 2, nn. 46–51; see also Politics 1.9–11.1256b40–1259a36 (Aquinas, In I pol., lec. 7–9, nn. 71–100).) that riches are not the end of domestic economy, but the instruments thereof.

16. Second, at in all such skills (1094a9), he arranges the order of habits among themselves. It happens that one operative habit, which he calls “virtue” (or “skill”), is subordinated to another, as the art of bridle-making is subordinated to the art of riding because the rider tells the bridle-maker how he should make the bridle. In this way, the rider is the designer, that is, the chief producer of the thing itself. The same arguments hold for the other arts making additional equipment needed for riding, such as saddles or the like. The equestrian art is again subordinated to the military, for in ancient times, the army included not only mounted soldiers, but everyone who fought for victory. Hence, under military science, there is not only the equestrian, but every art or skill ordered to the prosecution of war—archery, ballistics, and everything else of this kind. In this same way, other arts are subordinated to still others.

17. Third, at it follows, then (1094a14), he lays down the order of ends according to the order of habits. He says that, in all arts or skills, it is commonly true that the architectonic ends are absolutely more desirable to everyone than are the ends of the arts or skills that are subordinated to the chief ends. He proves this from the fact that men follow (that is, seek) those things (that is, the ends of the inferior arts or skills) for the sake of these (that is, the ends of the superior). The text, however, is suspensive, and should be read as follows: in all such skills, a subordination of one to another is found . . . in all these the architectonic ends.

18. Fourth, at **it does not matter **(1094a16), he shows that it makes no difference in the order of ends whether the end is a product or an activity. He says that it makes no difference in what pertains to this order whether these ends be activities or some product other than the activities, as is evident from the explanation given above [16]. The end of bridle-making is a finished bridle; but the end of horsemanship, which is of greater importance, is an operation, namely, riding. The contrary is true in medicine and gymnastics, for the end of medicine is something produced, namely, health. But of gymnastics, which is comprised under it, the end is an activity, which is exercise.