Lecture 14 — The Cause of Happiness

Next, we investigate whether happiness is something that can be learned or acquired by habit or attained in some way by training. Does it come to us by divine providence or by chance? [165]

If anything is the gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable to think that happiness, the best by far of all human goods, is the gift of God. But this subject is perhaps more properly treated in another science. [167]

On the other hand, if happiness is not sent directly by God, but comes to men by virtue and study and exercise, it would still be judged most divine. As the reward and end of virtue, it is apparently most excellent and divine and blessed. [169]

It will also be common to human nature, because, supposing it be the result of discipline and study, happiness can be had by all who are not impeded from virtuous action. [170]

If such is the case, it is better that happiness be attained in this way than by chance, and it is reasonable to have it so. The things that are in accord with nature are as good as they can be by their very make-up. The same too can be said of what is produced by art or by any cause, especially the highest. [171]

Besides, to abandon the greatest and the best good to the vagaries of chance is most pernicious. [172]

What we seek is evident from the definition of happiness as a certain kind of activity of the soul in accord with virtue. Of the remaining goods, some are necessary to enrich happiness and others work instrumentally for its attainment. [173]

This—that happiness is a virtuous activity—is apparent in the light of what was laid down in the beginning. There we stated that the end of political science is the best of human goods, for the principal aim of this science is the formation of men in such a way that they will become upright citizens and doers of good works. [174]

That is why we do not say properly that a cow or a horse or any other animal is happy, for it is not possible for any of them to participate in moral activity. [175]

For the same reason, children are not really happy, in that they have not yet attained sufficient age for the performance of virtuous deeds. Children are called happy because they give promise of happiness, while real happiness needs perfect virtue and a complete life, as we have already pointed out. [176]

165. Next, we investigate whether happiness. After the Philosopher has shown how different opinions are in agreement with the definition of happiness presented above, here he naturally investigates the cause of happiness.

First, he states the question;

second, at if anything (1099b11; [167]), he explains it.

In regard to the first, we must consider that happiness must proceed from either a per se and determined cause or a per accidens (or incidental) and undetermined cause—that is, chance. If from a per se and determined cause, this will be either human or divine. In the case of a human cause, the effect is produced in us in three ways: first by learning, as a science; second by practice, as a moral virtue; third by exercise, as a military drill and other things of this kind.

166. Accordingly, he proposes the question in three parts. The first concerns a human cause. He asks whether happiness is something that can be learned as a science, or that can be acquired by habit as a moral virtue, or that can to some extent be had by training, like setting up exercises. The second part concerns a divine cause. He asks whether happiness is something divine in us and a sharing in some way of god-like qualities that are above men. The third part concerns a per accidens and undetermined cause. In other words, he asks whether happiness occurs to man by chance.

167. Then, at if anything (1099b11), he explains the question.

First, in parts, as it were, by considering the individual sections of the question.

Second, by offering a common reason taken from the definition of happiness at what we seek is evident (1099b25; [173]).

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he shows it is eminently reasonable for happiness to have a divine cause.

Second, at on the other hand (1099b14; [169]), he shows that it is acceptable for it to have a human cause.

Third, at if such is the case (1099b20; [171]), he shows it is not fitting for it to be an effect of chance.

He says first that if the gods (that is, beings called gods by the ancients) make gifts to men, it is reasonable that happiness be the gift of the supreme God, because it is the most excellent of human goods. It is obvious that a thing is led to a higher end by a higher virtue or power—for instance, man is led to a higher end by military art than by bridle-making. Hence, it is reasonable that the ultimate end, happiness, should come to man from the highest power of all, the supreme God.

168. That separated substances may bestow something on men becomes evident from the fact that men and separated substances are alike in the power of intelligence. As the lower bodies are brought to perfection by the higher bodies, so are the lower intellectual beings by the superior intellectual beings. But there is no reason to delay any longer on this matter, for it belongs rather to another science, metaphysics.

169. Then, at on the other hand (1099b14), he shows it is acceptable to say that happiness has a human cause. Although God is the principal cause, man does contribute something to happiness. Aristotle shows this in two ways.

First, the fact that happiness has a human cause does not do away with its chief characteristic, that it is most excellent and divine. He says that, if happiness is not a gift sent directly by God, but comes to men by virtue as a thing acquired by habit, or by study as a thing to be learned, or by exercise as a thing to be had by training, nevertheless it seems to be something especially divine. The reason is that, since happiness is the reward and end of virtue, it follows that it is something most excellent and divine and blessed. A thing is not called divine only because it comes from God, but also because it makes us like God in goodness.

170. Second, at it will also (1099b18), he proves the same point in this way. Applicable to happiness is the idea that what belongs to the purpose of a nature should be something common to the things having that nature, for nature does not fail in what it intends except in the minority of cases. So, if happiness is the end of human nature, it must be common to all or many having human nature. This principle remains intact if the cause be a human one. If happiness were to be had through discipline and study, it could come to everyone who is not impeded in the performance of virtuous works either by defect of nature—as in those who are naturally stupid—or by an evil habit that imitates nature. From this it is clear that the happiness spoken of by the Philosopher does not consist in that contact with separated intelligence by which man can understand all things, as certain people have maintained. Such experience does not happen to very many, and in fact, to no one in this life.

171. Then, at if such is the case (1099b20), he rejects chance as the cause of happiness for two reasons.

First, things that are in accord with nature are very good, since nature produces what is suitable. The same is true also of everything made by art or by any cause whatsoever. This is especially the case with the principal cause, upon which happiness, as the most excellent good, seems to depend. One reason is that art and all efficient causes operate for the sake of good. It follows, then, that every agent should most aptly arrange, as far as possible, what he does. This particularly applies to God, who is the cause of all nature. The things that are in accord with nature seem to be better from their very make-up. But it is better that happiness springs from a per se cause, either divine or human, than from chance, which is a per accidens cause; for what is per se is preferable to what is per accidens. Consequently, chance is not the cause of happiness.

172. He offers a second reason at besides, to abandon (1099b24). Happiness is the most perfect of all human goods because all others are ordered to it as to an end. Now, it would be very harmful if this good were to depend on chance, for other goods would be much more subject to chance. As a result, man’s zeal in pursuing these goods would vanish, a most perilous situation. Chance, therefore, is not the cause of happiness.

173. Then, at what we seek (1099b25), he settles the question we are considering. He says it is evident from the definition already given [130] where the truth lies in our investigation of the present question. As was previously indicated [127–8], happiness is an activity of the rational soul in accord with virtue. Now what is in accord with virtue is, according to reason, influenced by some divine cause. But what is according to chance is contrary to reason. It follows that happiness does not spring from chance, but from some human cause immediately and from a divine cause principally and ultimately. Certain other goods, however, in which chance plays a part, do conduce to happiness, but happiness does not chiefly consist in them. Some, though, are necessary for a certain enrichment of happiness, and others work instrumentally to attain it, as we have said [169]. But we must not attribute happiness to chance because of these secondary goods.

174. Then, at this—that happiness (1099b28), he shows that the previously discussed definition of happiness is in agreement not only with the opinions of others on happiness but also with observations made in keeping with his own opinion. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows what concurs with his earlier remarks about happiness [19–42].

Second, at that is why (1099b32; [175]), he concludes what is the correct view in accord with this opinion.

He says first that this—that happiness is an activity in accord with virtue—is apparent, that is, in harmony with the words of the introduction [19–42]. We said there that the best human good, happiness, is the end of political science, whose goal manifestly is activity in accord with virtue. Political science is especially concerned with framing laws and apportioning rewards and punishments in order to develop good citizens and doers of good works. This is to operate in accord with virtue.

175. Then, at that is why (1099b32), he concludes from the reason assigned that happiness cannot be attributed to certain beings according to what has been correctly laid down.

First, he says that no dumb animal is called happy, and rightly so, because none of them can share in the activity of virtue, which is in accord with reason and which constitutes happiness.

176. Second, at for the same reason (1100a1), he also excludes children from happiness, saying that, for a similar reason, they cannot be called happy. Lacking sufficient age, they have not attained that full use of reason requisite for the performance of virtuous actions. If children are sometimes called happy, this is because we see in them signs that give promise of future excellence. At present, therefore, they are not happy, for happiness, as we have indicated [126–7], needs perfect virtue to be not only a good, but the best, operation and a life perfected by good activity that is continuous and permanent.