Lecture 16 — Happiness and Changes of Fortune

We ought not to make changes of fortune our norm, because good and evil do not consist in these, although human living does stand in need of external goods, as we have indicated. But virtuous action is the dominant factor in human happiness, just as vicious action is the dominant factor in man’s unhappiness. [187]

This contention is strengthened by what we have just learned, for virtuous actions are more uniformly constant than other human activities. They are more abiding, apparently, than the speculative sciences. Among the virtues, the most noble seem to be more lasting, because the happy man is quite intent on them and because he lives according to them at all times. For this reason, man does not forget about the virtues. [188]

The happy man will have what we had inquired about, for he will be happy all his life. [191]

He will always, or nearly always, perform virtuous actions and be contemplating the life of virtue. [192]

Because he is really good and foursquare without reproach, he will bear all changes of fortune most admirably and will be eminently prudent in all matters. [193]

Many events differing in importance happen by the change of fortune. A short run of good luck or of bad luck clearly does not notably affect life. But great and frequent good fortune will be an occasion of a happier life, for external goods were made to enrich human life and their use is becoming and a means of virtue. On the contrary, great and frequent evils cause the happy man external annoyance and internal affliction, bringing about sadness and hindering many good works. However, even here, the good of virtue shines forth when a man gracefully endures frequent and major misfortunes, not because he is insensible to the sorrow, but because he is courageous and magnanimous. [194]

If virtuous actions play the dominant role in a happy life, as we have indicated, a happy person will not become unhappy, nor will he sometimes perform hateful and evil actions. As a truly good and wise man in the estimation of all, he will bear the changes of fortune in a becoming manner. He will always make the best of the existing circumstances, like a general who employs his present forces to the best advantage in battle, or like the cobbler who makes the best shoe possible from the leather at hand, or like other artisans in similar circumstance. This being the case, then, the unhappy man will certainly not become happy. We can say, too, that the happy man will not fall into the misfortunes of Priam. He will not easily be moved. He will not be changed from happiness by minor misfortunes, but only by great and frequent ones. After such catastrophies, he will not become happy again soon, but if indeed he does, it will take an abundance of good and noble deeds during a long period. [198]

What, therefore, hinders us from calling that man happy who acts in accord with perfect virtue and has sufficient external goods not for a short time but all during life? We must also add that he will live his whole life in this way and will die in a manner befitting reason, because the future is not clear to us; and we understand happiness as an end altogether perfect in every respect. If this be so, we shall call those happy in this life—happy, we must remember, as men—who have now and will have the conditions we presented. Now we have said enough on these points. [200]

187. We ought not to make changes of fortune. After explaining his problem, the Philosopher here solves it.

First, he solves the principal problem.

Second, at it seems quite foreign (1101a22; [203]), he solves the lesser one.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he introduces a point necessary for the solution of the problem.

Second, at this contention is strengthened (1100b11; [188]), he applies it to the solution of the present problem.

In regard to the initial point, we should consider that, while happiness consists essentially in the performance of virtuous actions, external goods that are subject to fortune are in a way tools of happiness. Hence he says we ought not to make changes of luck the norm for reckoning a man happy or unhappy, because man’s good or evil, which is judged by reason, does not consist principally in such changes of luck. Human living, however, does stand in need of external goods as means, as has been indicated [163]. But virtuous actions are the principal and predominant factor in a man’s happiness, such that he can be called happy principally because he acts virtuously. On the contrary, vicious actions are powerful and dominant in the opposite state, which is misery, so that he is truly miserable who is occupied with evil deeds.

188. Then, at this contention is strengthened (1100b11), he applies what was said just now [187] to the solution of the problem.

First, he shows that deeds of virtue are especially long-lasting compared to other human things.

Second, at the happy man will have (1100b18; [191]), he shows that, in keeping with what was said, happiness can endure all during life.

Third, at if virtuous actions play (1101b33; [198]), he shows that all inconveniences are avoided if we follow this teaching.

He says first that what we have now learned [186] about the permanence of happiness confirms our contention that virtuous actions are of foremost importance in happiness. The reason is that no human activity is found so uniformly constant as these. It is clear that external goods, and even internal bodily goods, because material and corporeal, are subject to change by their nature. But the goods that belong to the soul are changeable only indirectly, and so less liable to change. Of the goods pertaining to a man’s soul, some belong to the intellect, as the sciences, and some to the activities of living, as the virtues. These virtues are indeed more lasting than the disciplines, that is, the demonstrative sciences.

189. However, this must not be understood as referring to the matter, for demonstrative sciences have as their object necessary things that cannot be otherwise. It is to be understood, rather, as referring to the exercise of the act. Now, we do not have the same opportunity to cultivate the study of the sciences continually as we do to practice virtue, for situations are constantly arising where we must act according to virtue or contrary to virtue, as in the use of food, association with women, conversations with others, and similar actions with which human life is continuously concerned. Hence, it is reasonable that the habit of virtue be more firmly fixed in man because it is used more than the habit of science.

190. Among the virtues themselves, the most noble seem to be more lasting both because they are more intense and because men work more constantly to live according to them. Such are the virtuous operations in which happiness consists, because they are most perfect, as has been proved [128, 130, 150, 160, 164]. This is naturally the reason why man does not forget to be virtuous, because he continually has the occasion to exercise the virtues. Another reason, too, is that virtue consists chiefly in the inclination of the appetite that is not destroyed by forgetfulness.

191. Then, at the happy man will have (1100b18), he shows that, according to this doctrine, happiness can last a lifetime. He says that virtuous actions are most lasting, as was pointed out [188–90]. If, then, happiness be placed principally in them, as we have said [153–90], it would follow that the happy man will have what was inquired about in a previous question—that is, he will be happy all his life.

He proves this first from the actions themselves, at he will always (1100b19; [192]).

192. One who has a habit perfectly can act always or almost continually according to that habit in everything he does. The happy man possesses perfect virtue, as was explained above [187–8]. Consequently, he can always or nearly always perform virtuous actions in a life of activity and can attentively consider in a life of contemplation.

193. Second, at because he is really good (1100b20), he shows the same thing from the goods of fortune, an object of lesser importance in happiness. He says that the happy man will bear all changes of fortune most admirably and will be eminently prudent in all matters, since he is really a good man and not superficially so. He is foursquare without reproach, or as some have explained, perfect in the four cardinal virtues. But this interpretation does not seem to be according to the mind of Aristotle, who has never been found making such an enumeration. The tetragon does, however, indicate something perfect in virtue after the manner of a cube, which has six squared surfaces and so lies evenly on any surface. Similarly, the virtuous person is of an even temperament in any fortune. Since, therefore, it pertains to virtue to bear all fortune becomingly, obviously the happy man will not cease to act virtuously because of any change of fortune.

He shows this then in detail, by way of division, as it were, when he adds many events (1100b22; [194).

194. He says that, since many good and bad things differing in importance may happen by changes of fortune, it is evident that a short run of good luck and, likewise, a short run of bad luck do not change life from happiness to misery, or conversely. If, however, they are great and frequent, they will be either good or bad. If good, they will make a man’s life happier. The reason is that, as was indicated above [169, 173], happiness has need of external goods either as adornments or as means of virtuous actions. In regard to adornments, he says that they were made to enrich the life of man. As to the means of virtuous action, he says that the use of external goods is becoming and virtuous insofar as virtues make use of them to perform worthy deeds.

195. If, on the contrary, the evils should be frequent and great, they will cause the happy man external annoyance and internal affliction, because internally they bring about sadness and externally they hinder good works. However, they do not eliminate virtuous action entirely, because virtue makes good use even of misfortunes themselves. In this way, the good of virtue shines forth insofar as a man gracefully endures frequent and great misfortunes, not because he may not feel the sorrow or sadness, as the Stoics held, but because, being courageous and magnanimous, his reason does not succumb to such afflictions.

196. This, in fact, was the difference between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, whose leader was Aristotle. The Stoics held that sorrow in no way afflicts a virtuous man, because, in their view, corporeal or external things are not in any sense a good of man. The Peripatetics, on the contrary, said that a virtuous man is affected by sadness, yet this does not overwhelm reason, but is moderated by it. In their opinion, corporeal and external things do not constitute the greatest good of man, but the least, and this in the degree that they help him.

197. But it should be observed that some change could happen that would entirely take away a man’s happiness by hindering virtuous action altogether. For example, some sickness could cause madness or insanity or any other mental breakdown. Since happiness may not be attained except by living humanly or in accord with reason, when the use of reason is gone, human living is not possible. Consequently, in what concerns living humanly, the condition of madness must be equated with the condition of death. So it seems we must say the same of him who continues in virtuous action until loss of mind as if he had continued until death.

198. Then, at if virtuous actions play (1101b33), he excludes the unsuitable things that seemed to follow from the premises. He says that, if virtuous actions play the dominant role in happiness, as we have asserted [188], it will not follow that the happy man becomes unhappy on account of misfortunes, or that because of misfortune he will perform hateful and evil actions, namely, contrary to virtue. But, by reason of his perfect virtue, the happy man—it can be predicted—will bear all changes of fortune becomingly like a truly good and wise man. In other words, he will act according to virtue under every condition. Even if he does not perform the same actions in every contingency, he will always act most nobly according as the circumstances are favorable or unfavorable. He will use the material that fortune provides in the way that a good general with an awareness of the condition of his army ought to dispose his existing forces to the best advantage in battle. A commander will do one thing if he has seasoned troops and another if he has an army of raw recruits. Likewise, a cobbler ought to make the best shoes possible from the leather at hand. He will of course make better shoes from one piece of leather than from another. The same may be said of all other craftsmen.

199. If this is so, the unhappy man will not be made happy by any additional good fortune. The reason is that he will use that good fortune badly and the evildoer will always remain unhappy. Likewise, the happy man will not fall into the misfortune of Priam: first, because he will prudently guard against it; second, because if he should be stricken unexpectedly, he will bear it most gracefully, as we have pointed out [198]. He will not, therefore, be changed easily from happiness to unhappiness by any misfortune whatsoever, except by frequent and great changes that deprive him of the use of reason. If he has been made unhappy, he will not readily become happy again, but he will need an abundance of great and noble things acquired after a long time by the exercise of virtuous action and by the restoration of external fortune.

200. Then, when he says what, therefore (1101a14), he brings to an end his own thoughts on happiness. He says that nothing hinders us from calling that man happy who acts in accord with perfect virtue and has sufficient external goods for virtuous activity, not just for a short time but all during life, or at least for a long period. This is enough for a man to be called happy in this life.

201. If we wish to understand happiness in the most perfect sense possible, we must add to the definition of happiness that the happy man will live his whole life as we have indicated [129] and will complete it by dying in a manner befitting reason. It appears that this condition must be added because the future is unknown to us. Now all that is perfect and best seems to belong to the definition of happiness, since it is the ultimate end. In this second way, Solon was speaking of happiness. If the case be as just described [200], we shall call those men happy in this life who have now and will have in the future the conditions we have laid down [177–86].

202. But because these things seem not to measure up in all respects to the conditions required for happiness above [104–17], he adds that those we call happy are men subject to change in this life, who cannot attain perfect beatitude. Since a natural desire is not in vain, we can correctly judge that perfect beatitude is reserved for man after this life. He concludes with the remark that we have said enough on these points.