Lecture 3 — Qualities of the Student and Teacher

Our study will be adequately treated if it is investigated according to the nature of the subject matter. The same certitude should not be sought in all discussions, just as the same exactness should not be expected in all the productions of art. Now, good and just deeds, with which political science is concerned, are differently and mistakenly judged to such a degree that none of them seems to be good and just by nature, but merely by disposition of law. Because of bad judgment, many have been harmed even by good things: some men have lost their lives by reason of riches, others by reason of physical courage.

It is desirable, therefore, when treating of these variable subjects and when arguing from them as premises, to bring out roughly the outlines of the truth, and to conclude about those things which occur in the majority of cases. [32]

The student ought to take whatever is taught in this same spirit, for it is proper to an educated man to look for as much certitude in each study as the nature of the subject admits. It approximates the same thing to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments and to demand conclusive demonstrations from a rhetorician. [36]

Now, every man is a good judge of the things he knows. Accordingly, then, one educated in a particular subject judges well what belongs to that subject. But the man who is well-educated in all subjects can judge well about all. [37]

In keeping with this, a young man is not a good student of political science, for he is inexperienced in the ways of life that are the starting point and subject matter of this science. [38]

Furthermore, because he is strongly influenced by his emotions, he will study political science without result and uselessly, for the end of this science is not knowledge, but human action. Nor does it matter whether the student be immature in age or immature in character,

for the deficiency is not due to time, but to a life lived according to the passions and to the pursuit of each object of passion. Such men gain no profit from their knowledge; and the same is true of the incontinent. [39]

But it will certainly be very useful to have a knowledge of moral matters for those who desire and act according to the dictates of reason. To sum up what has been treated in the introduction: we have discussed the student, the method of demonstrating, and the purpose of our science. [41]

32. Our study will be adequately treated. After the Philosopher has shown what is the good principally intended in this science, he now determines the method proper to this science.

He does this first on the part of the teacher;

second, at the student ought to take (1094b22; [36]), on the part of the student.

In regard to the first, he lays down this reason. The method of manifesting truth in any science ought to be suitable to the subject matter of that science. He shows this from the fact that certitude cannot be found, nor should it be sought, in the same degree in all discussions where we reason about anything. Likewise, the same method is not used in all productions (that is, in things made by art); but each workman works with the material in a way suited to that material—in one way with the soil, in another with clay, in still another with metal. Now, the matter of moral study is of such a nature that perfect certitude is not suitable to it. He shows this from two classes of things that seem to belong to the material with which moral study is concerned.

33. In the matter of morals, the first and foremost place is held by virtuous works. They are called just deeds and are the chief concern of political science. Regarding them, there are no agreed opinions, but rather a decided difference is found in what men judge about them. In this matter, a variety of errors occur, for certain actions that are considered just and good by some are looked upon as unjust and bad by others, according to different times and places and persons. Now, a deed is considered vicious at one time and in one country, but at a different time and in a different country it is not considered to be so. Because of this disagreement, it happens that some are of the opinion that no action is just or good by nature, but only by disposition of law. We shall treat more fully of this opinion in the second book of this work [245–54].

34. Second, external goods that are used purposively by men have a moral consideration. In regard to them, it happens that we find the mistake just mentioned inasmuch as these material goods are not always used in the same way by everyone. Some men are helped by them, while others indeed are harmed by them. Many are ruined by having riches—for instance, those who are murdered by robbers. Some, by reason of their physical courage on which they rely, have carelessly exposed themselves to dangers. Thus it is evident that moral matters are variable and divergent, not having the same certitude each time.

35. Because, in the art of demonstrative science, principles must conform to conclusions, it is desirable and preferable when treating of such variable things, and when proceeding from premises likewise variable, to bring out the truth first roughly by applying universal principles to singulars and by proceeding from the simple (universal) to the complex (particular) where acts are concerned. For it is necessary in every practical science to proceed in a composite (deductive) manner. On the contrary, in speculative science, it is necessary to proceed in an analytical manner by breaking down the complex into elementary principles.

Second, we should bring out the truth in outline—that is, an approximation to the truth. This is to proceed from the proper principles of this science. Moral science treats the acts of the will, and the thing moving the will is not only the good, but even fictitious good.

Third, we must speak of events as they happen in the majority of cases, that is, of voluntary acts that proceed from the will, inclined perhaps to one alternative rather than another but never operating under compulsion. In these, too, we must proceed in such a way that principles are conformable to conclusions.

36. Then, at **the student ought to take **(1094b22), he shows that the student must accept this limitation in moral matters. He says that it is proper that each one should take whatever is said to him by another in the same spirit, that is, as the matter warrants. The reason is that a learned (that is, well-instructed) man should look for as much certitude in any matter as the nature of the subject admits. There cannot be as much certainty in variable and contingent matters as in necessary matters, which are always the same. Therefore, the educated man ought not to look for greater or be satisfied with less certitude than is appropriate to the subject under discussion. It seems an equal fault to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments as it is to demand from a rhetorician conclusive demonstrations such as a mathematician should give. But mistakes happen because the method appropriate to the matter is not considered. Mathematics is concerned with matter in which perfect certitude is found. Rhetoric, however, deals with political matter where a variety of views occurs.

37. Then, at now, every man (1094b27), he shows what sort of person the student of this science ought to be.

First, he shows who is an incompetent student;

second, at **furthermore **(1095a4; [39]), who is an unprofitable student;

and third, at **but it will certainly **(1095a10; [41]), he explains the characteristics of the ideal student.

In respect to the first, he does two things.

First, he introduces certain things necessary to explain his proposition. He states that each man can judge well only the things he knows. Thus, a man educated in one particular subject can judge well what belongs to that subject. But the man who is well-educated in all subjects can judge well about all, without restriction to a particular subject.

38. Second, at in keeping with this (1095a2), he proves his statement, namely, that a young man is not a good student of political science, nor of any part of moral science comprised under political science, because as was said [37], a man can judge well only the things he knows. Now, every student should make good judgments about what he studies, so that he may accept what is true but not what is false. Therefore, no one can be a good student unless he has some knowledge of what he ought to study. But a young man does not have a knowledge of things belonging to moral science, which are known mostly by experience. A young man is inexperienced in the ways of life because of the very brevity of his life, while the principles of moral science proceed from what pertains to and also treats of the actions of human life. For instance, if it be said that the generous man keeps the cheaper things for himself and makes a present of the more expensive to others, a young man will perhaps judge this not to be true because of inexperience. It is the same with other social dealings. Hence, it is evident that a young man is not a good student of political science.

39. Then, at **furthermore **(1095a4), he shows who is an unprofitable student of this science. Here we must consider that moral science teaches men to follow reason and to refrain from the things to which the passions incline, such as concupiscence, anger, and the like. Toward these, men are inclined in two ways.

In one way by choice—for instance, when a man of set purpose intends to satisfy his concupiscence. Such a one he calls a slave of his emotions.

In another way, when a man resolves to abstain from harmful pleasures but is sometimes overcome by the urge of passion, such that, contrary to his resolution, he follows the promptings of passion. A man of this type is said to be incontinent.

40. He affirms, then, that the one who is ruled by the emotions will study this science in vain (that is, without any result) and uselessly without attaining its proper end. The end of this science is not knowledge alone, which those enslaved to passion can perhaps gain. But the end of this science, as of all practical sciences, is human action. Now, those who follow the emotions do not attain virtuous acts. Thus, in regard to this, it makes no difference whether the student of this science is immature in age or immature in character—that is, a slave of the emotions. The reason is that, just as the person immature in age fails to achieve the end of this science that is knowledge, so the immature in character fails to achieve the end that is action. His deficiency is not due to time, but to the fact that he lives according to his emotions, seeking everything to which the emotions incline. Now, for such men, the knowledge of this science is useless; the same may be said of the incontinent who do not act in accord with their knowledge of moral matters.

41. Then, at but it will certainly (1095a10), he indicates the good student of this science. He says that it is very useful to have a knowledge of moral matters for those who regulate their desires and act in externals according to the dictates of reason.

42. Finally, in the conclusion, he sums up what has been discussed in the introduction [1–41]. He states that certain things have been said in a preliminary manner about the student, which was treated last.

He also states what is the method of demonstrating, which was treated in the middle of the introduction.

Finally, he states what is our purpose, that is, what is the principal aim of this science. This was treated first.