Lecture 4 — Opinions About Happiness

Since all knowledge and choice have some good for their objective, let us ask on resuming our inquiry what it is that we call the objective of political science, the highest good of all human actions. [43]

As to the name, nearly all agree, for both the common people and the educated say it is happiness. They identify happiness with living well and acting well. [44]

But, as to where happiness is to be found, men are at variance. The multitude differs from the philosophers, for the people generally think that happiness consists in something apparent and obvious such as pleasure or riches or honors; some place it in one of these, others in another; and oftentimes even the same person shifts his position.

For instance, the sick man thinks happiness is found in health, and the poor man considers that it is found in riches, while men conscious of their own ignorance esteem those happy who give utterance to lofty ideas that are above their comprehension.

Some philosophers [Platonists] were of the opinion that, over and above the many goods, there exists an absolute good that is the cause of goodness in all other things. [46]

It is perhaps vain to examine all these opinions, and it will be sufficient to give special attention to those that appear probable on the surface or are thought by many to have some probability. [50].

In this matter, we should be aware of the difference in arguments, some of which proceed from principles, and others to principles. Previously, Plato had learnedly discussed the subject when he examined the question of whether we proceed from or to principles, like athletes in the race-course running from or toward the judges.

In either case we must start from things known. Now, these are of two kinds, namely, things known to us and things known absolutely. Presumably then, we should begin from what is known to us. [51]

One who is going to devote himself seriously to the study of good and just deeds and to political affairs in general ought to have been accustomed to a virtuous life. This will serve as a principle, and if it be adequate, he will have no need to know the reasons for virtuous conduct. A student with this upbringing will discover working principles within himself or readily acquire them from someone else. The man, however, who can do neither of these things should listen to the verdict of Hesiod.

That man, the poet says, is best who understands everything by himself; and that man good who takes what is well said by another. But he who neither himself understands nor takes to heart what he hears from another is indeed a useless fellow. [53]

43. Since all knowledge and choice. Having finished the introduction, Aristotle here begins the treatise on the science itself.

He divides the treatise into three parts.

In the first part, he investigates happiness, which is the supreme human good, and he comes to the conclusion from a study of the subject that happiness is activity flowing from virtue.

In the second part, he discusses virtues, at if, then, happiness is a kind of operation according to perfect virtue (1102a5; [224]).

In the third part, he completes his treatise on happiness, explaining which operation it is and of what nature. This he does in the tenth book, at after these matters, we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure (1172a19; [1953]).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at as to the name (1095a17; [44]), he carries it out.

Resuming what he was investigating before [9–13], he first says that, since all knowledge and choice aim at some good—that is, are ordered to some desired good as an end—we must discuss the nature of that good to which political science is ordered. Such is the highest good of all actions, that is, the highest among those attainable by human operation. Moreover, it was said above [18] that these two notions must be studied about the ultimate end of human good: what it is—this is here proposed for consideration—and to what science it belongs, which was treated above in the introduction [25–30].

44. Next, at as to the name (1095a17), he treats happiness. He proceeds here in two steps.

First, he investigates the opinions of others about happiness.

Second, at let us return again to a consideration (1097a15; [103]), he states his own opinion.

In regard to the initial point, he does two things.

First, he gives the opinions of others about happiness.

Second, at let us return to the subject (1095b14; [55]), he examines these opinions.

He handles the first point in two ways.

Initially, he presents opinions about the ultimate end of human actions.

Then, at **it is perhaps vain **(1095a28; [50]), he points out how we should examine opinions of this kind.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

He indicates the aspects of general agreement;

and then, at but, as to where happiness (1095a20; [46]), he shows in what way there is disagreement.

45. In the beginning, he presents two points on which there is general agreement about the ultimate end.

First, at as to the name (1095a17), he asserts that both the many—that is, the common people—and the cultured or philosophers name happiness the highest human good.

Second, they have a common understanding of the term because all consider that living well and acting well are identified with being happy.

46. Then, at but, as to where happiness (1095a20), he shows in what respect the opinions of men differ about happiness. He affirms that, especially about the nature of happiness, men are at variance, holding different opinions. This difference is threefold.

First of all, the multitude does not think in this matter like the philosophers. People commonly consider that happiness consists in something apparent and obvious among the objects of sense, which alone are evident to the multitude and, therefore, so obvious as not to need exhaustive search—such as pleasure, riches, honor, and the like. The views of the philosophers on this point are given later [49].

47. The second difference is found among the common people themselves. Some of them place happiness in one sensible good, others in another. The avaricious place it in riches, the self-indulgent in pleasures, and the ambitious in honors.

48. The third difference arises from the end in itself. Since it is characteristic of the ultimate end that it be greatly desired, people consider that to be happiness which is desired most of all. Now, need of a good increases the desire for it, and so the sick man who lacks health judges the supreme good to be health; the beggar looks upon riches in the same way. Likewise, those who are conscious of their own ignorance esteem as happy others who give utterance to lofty ideas that are above the comprehension of the ignorant. All this pertains to the opinion of the multitude.

49. But some among the philosophers, the Platonists, were of the opinion that, over and above the many different sensible goods, there exists one that is good in itself and that is the separated essence of goodness itself. As the separated form of man was called by them “man in himself,” so the separated good was “good in itself,” and this is the cause of the goodness of all other things, as they partake of that highest good.

50. Then, at it is perhaps vain (1095a28), he shows how we should proceed in our investigation of the aforesaid opinions.

He handles the discussion in three steps.

First, he shows which of these opinions we ought to investigate.

Second, at **in this matter, we should **(1095a30; [51]), he shows in what order we should do this.

Third, at one who is going to devote himself seriously (1095b4; [53]), he shows how the student should be disposed so that he may properly understand what is taught.

He says, then, that to examine all opinions men hold about happiness would be useless for a good philosopher, inasmuch as some of them are altogether unreasonable. But it suffices to examine at most the opinions that on the surface are probable either because they give that appearance or at least are considered to have weight by many.

51. Then, at in this matter, we should be aware (1095a30), he shows in what order we must discuss opinions of this sort, and in general all moral matters. He points out a difference in the manner of reasoning. There are some argumentations proceeding from principles—that is, from causes to effects, such as demonstrations of the reasoned fact (propter quid). On the contrary, there are other argumentations proceeding from effects to causes or principles. These do not produce a demonstration of the reasoned fact, but only of the fact (quia). This distinction was previously made by Plato when he inquired whether we should proceed from or to principles. Then, he offers this example from the race-course. In order to judge athletes running in a race, certain agonothetes or judges were stationed at the beginning of the course. Sometimes the athletes started from the judges and ran to the finishing line, and sometimes they started from the end and ran toward the judges. Likewise, there is a twofold order in the process of reasoning.

52. In order to know the order of procedure in any subject we should reflect that it is necessary to begin from what is better understood. Through things better known, we arrive at a knowledge of things unknown. Now things are said to be better known in two ways.

Some are better known in regard to us, such as the composite and the sensible.

Others are better known absolutely and in themselves, as the simple and the intelligible.

Because we acquire knowledge by reasoning, we must proceed from what is better known to us. Now, if the better known absolutely are the same as the better known to us, the reason proceeds from principles as in mathematics. If, however, the better known absolutely are different from the better known to us, then we must use the effect-to-cause procedure, as in the natural and moral sciences.

53. Then, at **one who is going **(1095b4), he shows how a student of such subjects should be disposed. He says that, since in moral matters we ought to begin from what is better known to us, that is, from certain effects noted about human acts, a man who wishes to be a competent student of moral science must be well-informed and experienced in the ways of human living—namely, about external good and just actions or works of virtue—and in general about all civil matters like laws and political affairs and other things of this sort. The reason for this is that, in moral matters, we must take as a principle that a thing is so. For example, we accept from experience and custom that concupiscence is overcome by fasting.

54. If this is obvious to someone, it is not so necessary for him in acting to understand the total explanation. Thus, to effect a cure, a physician need know only that this medicine cures a particular malady. But to know the reason, we must have a scientific knowledge that is sought chiefly in speculative sciences. Now such a one—namely, one who is skilled in human affairs—either discovers working principles for himself and sees them as self-evident or readily acquires them from someone else. But a man about whom neither of these things can be correctly said should listen to the verdict of the poet Hesiod. He calls that man “best” who can understand by himself, and that man “good” who takes what is said by another. But the man who is capable neither of understanding by himself nor of bearing in mind what he hears from another is useless as far as acquiring a science is concerned.