Lecture 5 — Examination of the Opinions

Let us return to the subject from which we have digressed. Some seem to think, not without reason, that the supreme good called happiness is a good belonging to this life. [55]

Now, most men, including some very eminent persons, place happiness in pleasure, and so logically prefer a sensual life. [56]

There are indeed three very prominent types of life: that just mentioned, another called public life, and last the contemplative life. [58]

The majority of men seem quite bestial in choosing to live a life of pleasure. [60]

They justify their choice on the plea that many in high places share the tastes of Sardanapalus. [61]

Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honor [62]

For honor seems to be nearly the whole purpose of public life. [63]

But this seems too superficial to be the good we are looking for. Honor consists in the action of those rendering it, rather than anything in the power of the person honored; while happiness certainly should be a good proper to man and a thing not easily taken from him. [64]

Another reason is that men appear to seek honor to convince themselves of their own good qualities. They strive to be honored by the prudent, by those who know them best and for their virtue. Obviously, then, in their opinion, virtue is a better thing than honor. [65]

From this, someone may conclude that virtue rather than honor is the end of public life. [66]

But apparently virtue too is lacking in perfection, because a man may have a habit of virtue when he is asleep or when he has no opportunity to exercise its acts for a lifetime. [67]

Moreover, he may be subject to evils and very often may be ill-favored by fortune. No one would call such a man happy unless he were merely defending an argumentative position. Enough has now been said, for we treated the subject sufficiently in the Encyclis. [68]

Later on, we shall investigate the third type of life, the contemplative. [69]

As to the accumulator of riches, he lives a life of constraint. [70]

And riches themselves are not the good we seek, for they are merely useful and sought for the sake of something else. Rather, therefore, the things previously treated are considered ends, since they are desired for themselves.

Yet even these are not the supreme good and happiness, although many arguments have been marshalled to prove this. But these discussions must be terminated now. [72]

55. Let us return to the subject. After the Philosopher has recounted the different opinions about happiness, he begins to investigate the truth of these opinions.

First, he examines the opinion of those discussing happiness from the moral point of view who place happiness in some good of this life.

Second, at perhaps it will be better (1096a11; [74]), he examines the opinion of those who do not discuss happiness from the moral point of view, but place it in some separated good.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

He lays down a notion that opinions on this subject have in common;

and next, at now, most men (1095b16; [56]), he begins to investigate the variety of opinions. Then, because the Philosopher seemed to have made a digression from his principal purpose while he was determining the mode of procedure, he returns to the point from which he had digressed, that is, to the opinions about happiness. He asserts that some seem to think, not without reason, that the final good called happiness is a good belonging to this life on the purely human level. This is the goal of all the works of life. Now, means are proportionate to that end. Hence it is probable that happiness is among the number of goods belonging to this life. But what the truth may be in this matter will be indicated later [60, 64–65, 70–72].

56. Next, at now, most men (1095b16), he searches for the truth about the things on which the opinions differ. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he examines the opinions that seem more likely to be true.

Second, at as to the accumulator of riches (1096a5; [70]), he examines an opinion rather remote from the truth.

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he examines the opinion placing happiness in the things that pertain to a life of pleasure.

Second, at men of superior refinement (1095b22; [62]), he examines the opinion placing happiness in the things pertaining to public life.

Third, at later on we shall investigate (1096a4; [69]), he mentions the contemplative life.

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he presents the opinion.

Second, at there are indeed three (1095b17; [58]), he distinguishes three types of life without elaborating on them.

Third, at **the majority of men **(1095b19; [60]), he examines the truth of the opinion presented.

57. He says, then, in the first place that some men, from the goods of this life, choose pleasure and place happiness in it. They include not only the majority or the common people, who by and large favor pleasure, but also persons eminent either in knowledge and teaching or in uprightness of life. Even the Epicureans, who considered pleasure the highest good, carefully cultivated the virtues. They did so, however, on account of pleasure, that is, for fear their pleasure would be hindered by means of contrary vices. The vice of gluttony, for instance, causes bodily suffering through excessive eating; because of theft, a man is thrown into prison. So different vices are an impediment to pleasure in different ways. Since, then, the ultimate end is exceedingly delectable, they who make pleasure the highest good intensely love the life of pleasure.

58. Then, at there are indeed three (1095b17), he distinguishes three types of life: the sensual just mentioned, the public, and the contemplative. These he calls the most prominent types. For evidence of this, we must now bear in mind what will later be discussed in book 9 [1944–49], that every man thinks his life to be that to which he is most strongly drawn, as the philosopher to philosophizing, the hunter to hunting, and so on. Because man is most strongly drawn to the last end, it is necessary that the types of life be distinguished according to the diversity of the ultimate end. Now, the end has the nature of good, and good is threefold: the useful, the pleasurable, and the virtuous or honorable. Two of these, namely, the pleasurable and the virtuous or honorable, have the nature of end because both are desirable for their own sake. That indeed is called virtuous that is good according to reason, and this has pleasure attached to it. Hence the pleasurable, as distinguished from the virtuous, is called such in reference to the senses. Reason, we must remember, is both speculative and practical.

59. Therefore, that life is called sensual that fixes its end in the pleasures of the senses; and that public which fixes its end in the good of the practical reason, for example, in the exercise of virtuous deeds; and that contemplative which fixes its end in the good of the speculative reason or in the contemplation of truth.

60. Next, at **the majority of men **(1095b19), he examines the opinion cited above. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he disproves it.

Second, at they justify their choice (1095b21; [61]), he advances a reason why some are drawn to this life.

In regard to the first, we must consider that the sensual life, which fixes its end in sense pleasure, necessarily has to place that end in those very intense pleasures following from the natural operations by which the individual is preserved by eating and drinking and the species by sexual intercourse. Now, pleasures of this kind are found in both men and beasts. It follows, then, that the multitude of men who fix their end in such pleasures seem quite bestial in choosing a life that even the pigs enjoy. If the happiness of man would consist in this, dumb animals enjoying the pleasure of food and sexual intercourse would have to be called happy for the same reason. Assuming that happiness is a characteristically human good, it cannot possibly consist in these things.

61. Then, at **they justify their choice **(1095b21), he gives the reason why some hold this opinion. He says that the reason they offer is that many in high places, like kings and princes who are considered very happy by the common people, share the tastes of a certain Assyrian king named Sardanapalus, who was much given to sensuality. On this account, it is thought that pleasure is something very good, since it is a thing highly esteemed by the great.

62. At men of superior refinement (1095b22), he investigates opinions concerning the active or public life.

First, he does this in regard to honor;

and second, at from this, someone (1095b30; [66]), in regard to virtue.

This is a reasonable procedure, for the active or public life aims at the honorable good. Now, it is called honorable as pertaining to the state of honor. Hence, both honor itself and virtue, which is the cause of honor, appear to belong to it.

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, in presenting the opinion, he notes that persons of superior refinement—namely, the virtuous and those occupied in the active life—place happiness in honor.

63. Second, at **for honor seems **(1095b23), he offers a reason for this: the sole purpose of public life appears to be honor, which is rendered as a reward to the politically successful. Therefore, for those engaged in public life, happiness probably seems to consist in honor.

64. Third, at **but this seems **(1095b23), he disproves this opinion by two reasons.

In the first of these, he says that, in a way, we divine the true nature of happiness; that is, we surmise happiness to be a good proper to the happy man, a thing belonging preeminently to him and taken from him with difficulty. But this is not true of honor, which seems rather to consist in the action of the one rendering the honor and to be in his power rather than in the power of the one honored. Therefore, honor is something more extrinsic and superficial than the good we are seeking, which is happiness.

65. He gives the second reason at **another reason **(1095b26). Happiness is some very good thing that is not sought on account of another. But there is something better than honor, namely, that on account of which honor is sought. Men appear to seek honor in order to confirm the solid opinion they have formed of themselves that they are good men and that they may be assured of this by the judgment of others. They look, therefore, for honor from prudent men with correct judgment and from those who know them best and can be better judges. Hence, they seek to be honored for their virtue, which is the source of man’s good, as will be shown in book 2 [307–8]. So virtue, for whose sake honor is sought, is a better thing than honor. It follows, then, that happiness does not consist in honor.

66. Then, at **from this, someone **(1095b30), he investigates the opinion of those who place happiness in virtue.

In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he states the opinion and says that perhaps someone will think, by reason of what was just said, that virtue rather than honor is the end of public life.

67. Second, at **but apparently **(1095b31), he rejects this for two reasons.

The first is that happiness seems to be a most perfect good. But virtue is not of such a nature, for sometimes it is found without the perfection of activity, as we see in those who are asleep and yet have the habit of virtue. It is possible, too, that a man may have the habit of virtue but, for lack of opportunity, not perform a single act of a particular virtue during his whole life. This is particularly evident regarding magnanimity and magnificence, virtues perhaps possessed by a poverty-stricken person who is never able to perform great deeds. Therefore, virtue is not the same as happiness.

68. He gives the second reason at moreover, he may be (1095b33). It is this: it happens that one who has the habit of virtue may be ill-favored by fortune. Who will call such a man happy except someone obstinately defending a thesis against the plain truth? Therefore, happiness is not the same as virtue. This, he says, is sufficient for his purpose. Enough has been said on the subject in his Encyclis, that is, in certain learned verses that Aristotle composed on happiness.

69. Then, at **later on, we shall investigate **(1096a4), he mentions the contemplative life, saying that it will be investigated later on in book 10 [2086–2125].

70. At as to the accumulator of riches, he examines another, less probable, opinion that places happiness in a thing that has the nature of a useful good, money. But this is incompatible with the nature of an ultimate end, for a thing is called useful because it is ordered to an end. However, since money has a universal utility in respect of temporal goods, the opinion that places happiness in money has some probability.

71. But he rejects it for two reasons.

The first is that money is acquired under coercion and is parted with under coercion. But this is not in keeping with happiness, which is the goal of voluntary operations. Consequently happiness does not consist in money.

72. He gives the second reason at **and riches themselves **(1096a6). It is this. We look for happiness as a good that is not sought for the sake of something else. But money is sought for something beyond itself, since it is by its nature a useful good, as was just said [70]. Therefore, happiness does not consist in money.

73. A further conclusion notes that pleasure, honor, and virtue, all of which were treated above [57–72], can be considered ultimate ends at least in the sense that they are sought for themselves, as was said [57, 61, 63, 70]. However, the ultimate end is not to be found in these, as has been shown [57–72], although many arguments have been marshalled by various philosophers to prove that happiness consists in these goods. But these discussions must be terminated.