Lecture 15 — A Problem about Happiness

Many changes take place in life, and all kinds of fortune are met with in the course of a lifetime. Sometimes a very prosperous man falls into great misfortune in old age, as we read of Priam in the epic poems. Certainly no one calls a man happy who has enjoyed such goods of fortune and then ends his days in misery. [177]

Is no man, then, to be called happy so long as he lives, but must we consider the end of life, as Solon believed? [179]

If we hold this to be so, it follows that a man will be happy only when he dies. But such an opinion is altogether unreasonable, especially for us, who maintain that happiness is a kind of activity. [180]

We may say that a mad man is not happy and that Solon did not wish to assert that he is. We may say Solon meant that a man will safely be called happy at death because he is then beyond the reach of evils and misfortune. This meaning, though, gives rise to a problem. It seems that the dead no less than the living, even though unaware of it, are influenced by good and evil— for instance, by honors and dishonors or by the prosperity and misfortune of children, and of descendants in general. [181]

A difficulty, however, here presents itself. It may happen that a man has lived happily to a ripe old age and has died a worthy death, and afterwards many changes have taken place in regard to his children. Some of them are good and have gained a position in life they well deserve, while others are just the opposite. Indeed, it does happen that children are quite different from their parents. Now, it is incongruous that a dead man should suffer these same changes such that he at one time becomes happy and then again unhappy. On the other hand, it seems unfitting that the affairs of the children should in no way affect the parents, at least for a certain length of time. [183]

But we must return to our first problem. Perhaps from its solution light will be shed on our present difficulty. Let us suppose that we must look at the end and then declare each man happy not because he is happy, but because he formerly was happy. How nonsensical it is if, when a man is happy, we may not affirm it of him, since we are unwilling to call the living happy on account of the changes in the present life because we think happiness permanent and not easily changeable, and because fortune often goes in cycles for the same persons. Obviously, if we use fortune as our norm, we will very often call the same person happy and again unhappy, as though he were a chameleon, and declare him happy and yet insecure in his happiness. [185]

177. Many changes take place in life. After the Philosopher has shown what happiness is, he here raises a problem about happiness, namely, whether anyone can be called happy in this life.

On this point he proceeds in three steps.

First, he gives the reason for the problem.

Second, at is no man, then (1100a10; [179]), he presents the problem.

Third, at we ought not to make (1100b7; [177]), he gives the solution.

He says first that many changes take place in life, for life rarely remains the same either good or bad. It is stable in few things, changing from good fortune to bad and from bad to good. Sometimes, indeed, the changes occur in small matters and sometimes in great, and sometimes in matters of medium importance. Changes of this sort occur at any age—in adolescence, maturity, or old age.

178. Sometimes it happens that a man has had an abundance of external goods all his life, and in old age falls into great misfortune, as Priam did, according to the epic poem of Homer. No one will call that man happy who has enjoyed such goods of fortune and ends his life in misery. The fact that one has been reduced from great prosperity to extreme wretchedness seems to add to his misery.

179. Then, at is no man, then (1100a10), he proposes the difficulty.

First, he sets forth the question.

Second, at if we hold this (1100a11; [180]), he brings up an objection.

Third, at we may say (1100a14; [181]), he rejects a particular answer.

First, then, he asks the question about the view of Solon, one of the seven wise men who framed the laws of the Athenians. Considering man’s life as subject to the changes of fortune, Solon said that no one ought to be called happy so long as he lives, but only at the end of his life. In light of what happened to Priam, the question arises whether any man is to be called happy so long as he lives. Is it best, as Solon holds, to consider the end of life if happiness continues that long, in order that a man may be called happy? Or should this be disregarded?

180. Then, at if we hold (1100a11), he brings up an objection to the question that was asked and disproves the saying of Solon. If we hold as true what Solon said, it follows that man will be happy only when he dies. But this seems unreasonable on other grounds, such as because death is the worst of evils and happiness the greatest of perfections. Besides, happiness is a kind of activity, as we indicated above [119–26]. But a dead man does not seem to have an activity. The dead, therefore, cannot be called happy. It should be noted that the Philosopher is not here speaking of happiness in a future life, but of happiness in the present life. Can we attribute happiness to man while he lives or only at death?

181. Then, at we may say (1100a14), he rejects an answer, and this for two reasons.

He gives the second reason at but we must return to our first problem (1100a31; [185]).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he proposes an answer and rejects it.

Second, by reason of this he brings up a problem at a difficulty, however, here presents itself (1100a21; [183]).

In regard to the first point, we must consider that the previous argument of Aristotle showed that a man is not happy in death. Now, this will be granted by anyone who says that a dead man is not happy: Solon did not mean that a man is happy when he dies. But he did mean that when a man is dead, a valid argument can be made about his happiness, because the dead man is now beyond the danger of evils and misfortune, such that there is no longer any doubt about it. But he rejects this answer, saying it contains an uncertainty.

182. A dead man differs from a living man in the loss of consciousness. A good thing or a bad thing—such as defamation of character, the murder of his children, or the loss of riches—could conceivably happen to someone still living, and he might not feel it precisely because he does not know about it. By the same argument, it seems, some good or evil could happen to a dead man who is unaware of it. Here Aristotle is talking about good and evil in public life as his examples—honor and dishonor—show. Sometimes certain honors are given to the dead when they are praised and their memory celebrated. Likewise, certain dishonors are heaped upon them, for example, when their bodies are exhumed and their remains burned. Also, something good or bad can happen to them by reason of the prosperity or misfortune of their children and their grandchildren. Then it would seem that not even the dead are entirely beyond evils and misfortunes. Consequently, even in death, men cannot be called happy.

183. Then, at a difficulty, however (1100a21), he interposes a difficulty arising from the premises. Such things as the prosperity and misfortunes of children and grandchildren present a problem for him. It happens sometimes that a man lives happily—in the way we have described happiness—to old age and dies a worthy death, but afterwards many changes take place in regard to his children, some of whom are good after the example of a worthy father, but others just the opposite. Indeed, it does happen that children are quite different from their parents: good parents have wicked children and wealthy parents have needy children.

184. From this statement, something unfitting seems to follow for both parents and children. It is inappropriate that a dead man should suffer change because of misfortunes of this sort, such that he who at one time is happy now becomes unhappy. On the other hand, it seems improper if, at least for a short time after death, the lot of children should in no way affect the happiness of deceased parents.

185. Then, at but we must return (1100a31), he gives a second reason for rejecting the previous answer. He says that, passing over the second problem, we must return to the first, the solution of which will shed light on the truth of the second. Now, it seems that the answer given is not consistent. If we must look to the end of life and then call a man happy not because he is then truly happy, but because he was previously happy, there seems to be this inconsistency: when a man is happy, we may not say of him that he is happy, since the truth of a statement in the past is founded on the statement being true at the time it actually occurred. Therefore “it was” is true of a thing because “it is” was true of it.

186. But some were unwilling to call a man happy because of the changes in the present life, inasmuch as they were under the impression that happiness was something permanent and not easily changeable; otherwise, it would not satisfy the natural desire. For, everyone naturally desires to remain secure in the good he possesses. But the wheel of fortune very often turns for the same persons, so that they change from good fortune to bad and conversely. Thus, it is evident that, if in judging about happiness, we should follow the consideration of fortune and should say of someone that he is happy in this life, very often we will say of one and the same person that he is happy and again that he is unhappy. In this way, we will be saying that a person is happy after the manner of a chameleon, an animal that changes color in keeping with different surroundings. We will be declaring that the happy are insecure in their happiness, which is contrary to the nature of happiness.