Lecture 9 — The Nature of Happiness

Let us return again to a consideration of the good we are seeking in order to find out what it is. It seems that the good differs in different operations and arts. In medicine it is one good, in war it is another, and in other arts, still other goods. As the thing sought in every activity, the good is the end for the sake of which other things are done. This will be health in medicine, victory in war, a building in architecture, and something else in some other art. In every activity and choice, there is an end, with the agent doing everything he does for the sake of that end. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good intended. If there are many ends, there will be many goods, and in this case, our discussion will go beyond the many until it arrives at that supreme good. [103]

We must make a considerable effort to give this a fuller explanation. Apparently there are many ends, some of which we choose for the sake of something else, like riches, flutes, and in general all instruments. It is obvious, then, that not all ends are perfect. But the ultimate end appears to be perfect. Therefore, if there be only one of this kind, it will be what we are looking for. If there are a number of goods, then it is the most perfect of these. Now we call that object that is desired for its own sake more perfect than one that is desired for some further purpose. That which is never desired for any further utility is more perfect than the things desirable in themselves and for the sake of this further purpose. In the event that the object is perfect without qualification, it will always be desirable for itself and never for anything beyond itself. Happiness, in fact, seems especially to be of this nature, for we choose it in every case for itself and never for something else. Honor and pleasure and knowledge and every virtue we do indeed choose for themselves, for we would choose every one of them even if no advantage accrued to us. But we choose them also on account of happiness, because we hope to become happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of these goods or for any other good whatsoever. [107]

The same seems to follow from the viewpoint of self-sufficiency, for the perfect good apparently is self-sufficient. We call it self-sufficienty as adequate not only for a man living a solitary life by himself but also for his parents, children, wife, friends in general, and fellow citizens, because this good naturally will include man’s social life. But some limitation must be placed on the number provided for, since the extension to relatives, neighbors, and friends might go on without limit. We must return to examine this question later. Now, we call that self-sufficient which, taken alone, makes life desirable and lacking nothing. In our opinion, happiness is of this nature. [112]

Moreover, happiness without further addition will be the most desirable of all things. With any addition, it will certainly be more desirable even though the addition be ever so slight. The reason is that the addition has increased the good, and a greater good is always more desirable. Therefore, happiness as the end of all human actions is the perfect self-sufficient good. [115]

103. Let us return again to a consideration. After the Philosopher has thoroughly discussed the opinions of others about happiness, he now gives his own opinion on the subject.

He divides this treatment into two parts.

In the first, he shows what happiness is.

In the second, at having settled these matters (1101b10; [213]), he treats a particular property of happiness.

He makes a twofold division of the first part.

In the first division, he shows what happiness is.

In the second, at many changes take place (1100a5; [177]), he solves a particular problem.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows what happiness is.

Second, at in our study of the principles (1098b9; [139]), he shows that everything said about happiness is in agreement with this doctrine.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he proposes some general notions and conditions of happiness that are obvious to nearly everyone.

Second, at but to say that happiness (1097b22; [118]), he inquires into the nature of happiness.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he states that happiness is the ultimate end.

Second, at we must make (1097a24; [107]), he lays down the conditions belonging to the ultimate end.

104. Therefore, he says first that, after completing the treatise on the opinions of others [43–102], we must again return to a consideration of the good that is the subject of our inquiry—happiness—to find out what it is. Our first consideration about it must be that, in different activities and arts, the good sought differs. In the medical art, the good sought is health, and in the military art victory, and in other arts some other good.

105. If it be asked what good is sought in every art and in every activity, we must know that it is the object for the sake of which all other things are done. In medicine, everything is done on account of health; in war, everything is done on account of victory; and in architecture, everything is done for the sake of the building to be constructed. Likewise, in every other activity the good sought is some one thing for the sake of which all other things are done. This good, the object of every activity or choice, is called “the end,” for the end is nothing else than that for the sake of which other things are done.

106. If, therefore, there should be some end immediately apparent to which all the products of all arts and human activities are directed, such an end will be the good unqualifiedly sought, that is, the thing intended in all human operations. But if at this point many goods arise to which the different ends of different arts are ordered, our reason will have to inquire beyond this number until it arrives at this one thing, that is, some obvious good. There must be, indeed, one ultimate end for man precisely as man because of the unity of human nature, just as there is one end for a physician as physician because of the unity of the art of medicine. This ultimate end of man is called the human good, which is happiness.

107. Then, at we must make (1097a24), he lays down two conditions of the ultimate end:

the first is that it be a perfect thing;

the second, that it be self-sufficient, at the same seems to follow (1097b6; [112]).

The ultimate end is the ultimate term of desire’s natural inclination. But in order that something be the ultimate term of natural inclination, two things are required.

First, that it be a thing actually having a species and not on the way to having a species. The generation of fire, for instance, is not terminated at the disposition to the form, but at the form itself. Now a thing that has form is perfect, but a thing that is merely disposed to a form is imperfect. Therefore, the good that is the ultimate end must be a perfect good.

Second, the term of the natural inclination must be integral, since nature is not deficient in necessary things. Hence, the end of human generation is not a deformed man, but a perfect man. Likewise, the ultimate end that is the term of desire must be self-sufficient as an integral good.

108. In regard to the perfection of a final good, we must consider that, as an agent moves toward the end, so the end moves the desire of the agent. Hence, the gradations of the ends must be in proportion to the gradations of the agent. Now an agent may be of three kinds.

One, the most imperfect, does not operate by its own form, but only insofar as moved by another, as a hammer forges a blade. Hence, the effect in the acquired form is not like this agent, but like the one who moves the agent.

Another, a perfect agent, operates indeed according to its form, such that the effect is like it, as fire gives off heat, but nevertheless it must be moved by some prior principal agent. In this respect it partakes imperfectly of the nature of an instrument.

A third agent, the most perfect, operates according to its own form and is not moved by any other.

109. The same is true in the order of ends. There we find an object desired not on account of some formal goodness existing in itself, but only as useful for something else like bitter medicine. We find also that an object is indeed desirable on account of what it is, but besides, it is desired for something else, like sweet-tasting medicine. This is better than the first. But the most perfect good is that which is so desired for its own sake that it is never desired for the sake of anything else. Here, then, the Philosopher distinguishes three degrees of good. He says, as we have just stated [107–9], that we must give a more complete explanation of the ultimate end by examining the conditions required for it.

110. There are also, it seems, many degrees of ends. Some of these we choose purely for the sake of something else, such as riches, which are sought for their utility in human living. A flute, on which music is made, is another example. All such instruments are ends sought merely because of their usefulness. It is obvious that such ends are imperfect. The best end—namely, the ultimate end—must be perfect. Therefore, if there is only one such end, it must be the ultimate end we are looking for. If, however, there are many perfect ends, the most perfect of these should be the best and the ultimate. What is desirable in itself is more perfect than what is desirable because of another. It clearly follows, then, that what is never desired for some thing beyond itself is more perfect than the things that, although sought for themselves, are also sought as a means.

111. Therefore, that is absolutely perfect which is always desirable for itself and never for another. But happiness appears to be of this nature, for we never seek it for something else, but always for itself. We do choose honor, pleasure, knowledge, and virtue for themselves. We would choose them or have a desire for them even if no other good would come to us through them. In fact, we choose them for happiness precisely because we think we will be happy in having them. But no one chooses happiness for them or for anything else. We conclude, then, that happiness is the most perfect good, and consequently the ultimate and best end.

112. Then, at the same seems, he treats the self-sufficiency of happiness,

first in regard to that which pertains to the nature of sufficiency,

and second, at moreover, happiness (1097b16; [115]), as regards the prefix “self.”

He says first that the same conclusion seems to follow from self-sufficiency as does from perfection: happiness is the best and the ultimate end. Indeed, the latter two follow one another, for the perfect good seems to be self-sufficient. If it is not sufficient in some particular, it does not perfectly satisfy desire, and so it will not be the perfect good. It is called a self-sufficient good not because it suffices merely for one man living a solitary life, but also for his parents, children, wife, friends, and fellow citizens as well, so that it will adequately provide the necessities in temporal matters and instruction and counsel in spiritual matters for them. Such extension is required because man is a social animal, and his desire is not satisfied in providing for himself, but he wants to be in a position to take care of others. This, however, must be understood within limits.

113. If someone should want to extend such care not only to his own relatives and friends but even to the friends of his friends, this would go on indefinitely such that no one could have a sufficiency, and therefore no one could be happy if happiness would require such infinite sufficiency. In this work, the Philosopher speaks of happiness as it is attainable in this life, for happiness in a future life is entirely beyond the investigation of reason. To what extent a man needs a sufficiency to be happy will have to be investigated again elsewhere, namely, in domestic ethics or in political science.

114. Because he has already shown [112–13] that the perfect good called happiness ought to be sufficient not for one man alone but for all whose care is incumbent upon him, next he explains the nature of what is called self-sufficient. He says that the self-sufficient is that which, even when had by itself, makes life desirable and free from want. Happiness does this eminently, otherwise it would not terminate the inclination of desire if something that man needed remained outside it. Certainly everyone in need desires to have what he lacks. Hence, it is clear that happiness is a self-sufficient good.

115. Then, at moreover, happiness (1097b16), he explains the nature of self-sufficiency as regards the expression “self.” A thing is said to be self-sufficient when, taken apart from other things, it is sufficient. This can happen in two ways.

First, this happens in such a manner that the perfect good, which is called self-sufficient, would be incapable of receiving an increase of goodness from another—a condition of the being that is totally good, God. As an additional part is not greater than the whole, since the part itself is included in the whole, so too any good whatsoever added to God does not increase his goodness, because the addition is good only by participating in the divine goodness. Likewise, a thing taken alone, no addition being made, is said to be sufficient in that it has everything a man absolutely needs.

116. In this sense, happiness, the subject of our present discussion, has self-sufficiency, because of itself it furnishes everything that is absolutely necessary, but it does not supply everything that can come to a man. Man can be made better by an additional good. But a man’s desire for this does not remain unsatisfied, because a desire controlled by reason, such as a truly happy man should have, is undisturbed by the things that are unnecessary even though attainable. Happiness, therefore, has this quality above everything else; it is desirable even when not augmented by other goods. However, if it does receive an addition, be it ever so small, surely that is even more desirable. The reason is that, by the accession, a superabundance or an increase of good is effected, and because something is a greater good, it is more desirable.

117. Last, he repeats in the epilogue the conclusion of what has been established [104–16]: since happiness is the ultimate end of all our activities, it is the perfect good and self-sufficient.