Lecture 8 — Happiness Not Sought in the Separated Good

But perhaps we should now leave these subjects, for a precise determination of them properly belongs to another branch of philosophy. The same, too, may be said about the idea. [97]

Even if there is some one good univocally predicated or if a separated good in itself does exist, it is obvious that it is not a thing produced or possessed by man. Now it is a good of this kind that we are looking for. [98]

Perhaps some will think it better for the sake of the goods produced or possessed to obtain a knowledge of the separated good. Using this as a guide, we will have a more thorough understanding of the objects that are good for us, and thus enlightened, we may acquire them. [99]

This reasoning certainly has some probability, although it does not seem to square with what we observed in the sciences. While sciences tend to some good and seek the necessary, they all neglect to use a knowledge of the separated good.

But it is not reasonable to suppose that all artists and scientists would be ignorant of and would fail to seek a thing so advantageous to themselves. [100]

Indeed, the separated good would be useless. What help does a knowledge of it afford a weaver and a carpenter in the practice of their trades? Or how is a man a better doctor or a better soldier by studying the idea itself? A doctor surely is not intent on health so understood, but on the health of man in the concrete, or even better perhaps on the health of this man. It is the individual man whom a doctor intends to cure. Enough has now been said on these topics. [101]

97. But perhaps we should now leave. After the Philosopher has explained that there is no common idea of good, now he shows that, even if there were, it would not follow that happiness would have to be sought according to it.

In regard to this, he does three things.

First, he presents a proof of his position.

Second, at perhaps some will think (1096b35; [99]), he gives an apparent rejoinder.

Third, at this reasoning certainly (1097a3; [100]), he refutes it.

He says first that this, namely the manner of predicating good according to one or different reasons, must now be put aside because more accurate study of the matter properly belongs to another branch of philosophy, namely, metaphysics. Likewise, the consideration of the idea of good is not pertinent to our purpose. As reason for these statements, he maintains that, if there were one good univocally predicated of all, or even if a separated good did exist in itself, it would obviously not be a thing produced or possessed by man. Now it is precisely such a thing we are seeking.

98. We are looking for the happiness that is the end of human acts. The end of man, however, is either something he does or some external thing. This can be the end of man because either it is produced, as a house is the end of building, or it is possessed, as a thing that is used. Now, it is clear that the common or separated good cannot be the operation itself of man, nor is it something produced by man. Moreover, it does not seem to be something possessed by man as he possesses things used in this life. Obviously, then, the common or separated good is not the good of man that is the object of our present search.

99. Then, at perhaps some will think (1096b35), he gives an apparent rejoinder. Someone might say that the separated good, although not produced or possessed by man, nevertheless is the pattern of all the good produced and possessed. Now, one who wishes to understand the copies ought to know the pattern. So it would seem that one should know the separated good itself for the sake of the goods produced and possessed. The reason is that, having the separated good as a guide, we will be better able to know, and consequently, better able to acquire, the things that are good for us, as an artist looking at a model is better able to paint a likeness.

100. Then, at this reasoning certainly (1097a3), he refutes this response by two reasons.

The first he takes from ordinary observation. While the reason given seems probable, he says that it does not appear to be in agreement with what we observe in other sciences. All sciences and arts tend to some good, as we said above [8], and to attain the end aimed at, each uses what is necessary for itself. None of them, though, use the knowledge of this separated good. This would not be reasonable if some advantage could be derived from it. Therefore, the knowledge of this separated good contributes nothing to the goods produced and possessed.

101. He offers a second reason at indeed, the separated good would be useless (1097a8). This is taken from the very nature of the thing. He states that the good under consideration is altogether useless for the sciences and the arts, both in regard to their exercise, since a weaver or a carpenter is in no way aided in the practice of his art by a knowledge of that separated good, and in regard to the acquisition of a science or an art. No one becomes a better physician or a better soldier because he has studied the separated form of good. The reason he assigns is that an exemplar, at which it is necessary to gaze, must be in conformity with the work produced. Art, however, does not produce some good in common or an abstract good, but a good that is concrete and individual. A physician does not intend health in the abstract, but in the concrete, the health of this particular man. He does not give medicine to mankind in general, but to this individual man. We must conclude, then, that the knowledge of a universal and separated good is not needed either for the acquisition or for the exercise of the sciences.

102. On this note, he concludes his discussion of the opinions offered about happiness.