Lecture 17 — The Fortune of Friends and Happiness of the Dead

It seems quite foreign to the nature of friendship and contrary to the common opinion to say that changes in the fortunes of descendants and of friends have no influence on man’s happiness. [203]

Many and vastly different things happen in fortune. Since some of these touch us closely and others remotely, it would be a long, even an endless, task to determine the extent of each. It will be enough to discuss the subject in broad and general terms. Some of the fortunes affecting a man himself are of sufficient importance to better the conditions of life while others are of lesser moment. We can affirm the same of the events that happen to friends generally. [204]

It makes much more difference that an experience should happen to the living or the dead than that certain injustices and evils should be indicated as happening before the action of the drama or should be committed in the course of the drama. We must take this difference into consideration. [206]

Perhaps we should rather inquire whether the dead share in any prosperity or adversity. It seems from what has been said that, if any event, either good or bad, affects the dead, it will be fleeting and insignificant in itself or in its effect upon them. If this be the case, then the event will not be so great or of such a nature as to make happy those who are not happy, or to take away happiness from those who have it. [209]

The good actions done by friends, therefore, do have some influence on the dead. Misfortunes too seem to affect them. But all these take place in such a way and to such an extent that they do not make the happy unhappy or produce any other like changes. [210]

203. It seems quite foreign. After the Philosopher has solved the principal doubt concerning the change of fortune for the happy man, here he settles a doubt raised above [183] about the change of fortune in regard to friends.

On this point he does two things.

First, he compares the good fortunes and misfortunes happening to friends with those that happen to a man himself.

Second, at it makes much more (1101a31; [206]), he compares the events that happen to the dead with what happens to the living.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he proposes that the things that happen to one’s friends affect the man himself.

Second, at many and vastly different (1101a24; [204]), he shows what the things are and what their nature is.

He affirms, first, that to say that the prosperity of great grandchildren or of descendants in general and of all friends would have no effect on the happiness of a man, living or dead, seems to be incongruous for two reasons: primarily, indeed, because it would be contrary to the nature of friendship, that is, a union among friends to such an extent that one considers as his own what belongs to the other; then, too, because this would be contrary to the common opinion, which cannot be entirely false.

204. Then, at many vastly different things (1101a24), he shows what events may affect the happiness of a friend and the nature of these events. He says that many and vastly different things happen in prosperity or adversity, in kind, in quantity, in time, and in other respects. Some of them touch us closely and others remotely. If, then, we should wish to determine in every case which of them affect the man himself and which do not, the task would be a long one—in fact almost endless—because differences happen in an infinite variety of ways.

205. With regard to the fortunes affecting a man himself, it is sufficient to note in general, and, so to speak, typically, by way of distinctive qualities or superficial likeness, that some acts of fortune are of sufficient weight and influence to change the condition of human life and do contribute to happiness. Others, however, are of lesser moment and help man’s life but little. The same thing takes place in the events that happen to any of our friends, except that things of lesser moment happening to blood-relatives affect us more.

206. Then, at it makes much more difference (1101a31), he shows in what manner the changing fortunes of friends affect a person—it is rather evident how this touches a man while he lives, and even how this may affect the dead.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows in what way there is a difference in regard to this about the living and the dead.

Second, he inquires whether the lot of friends affect the dead, since it is clear they do affect the living. This he does at perhaps we should rather inquire (1101a34; [209]).

On the first point, we must consider that the dead are outside the present life, the happiness of which Aristotle here intends to inquire about, as appears from what has been previously said [180]. They have contact with this life only as they remain in the memories of the living. The dead, therefore, may be compared in this way to the living—when we consider this life—as the events actually happening now are compared to those that took place long ago and are now recounted—for example, the Trojan war or any incident of this kind.

207. He then remarks that it makes a great difference whether a particular misfortune befalls men while they are living or after they are dead—a far greater difference than it makes in a tragedy whether certain evil deeds like murder, robbery, or any other kind of misfortune be recounted by the playwrights as preceding the action of the drama or are performed in the course of it. The reason is that, in the first case [the living and the dead], the same misfortunes affect them, but in a different way because of their different states, for some are actually engaged in human affairs while others exist only in memory. But, in the second case [in tragedies], the converse is true, for the dramatis personae are all engaged in human affairs but some of the trials befalling them are recounted as here and now taking place, while others as having previously occurred. Because happiness refers rather to persons than to things happening externally, the Philosopher says that the first difference (which refers to the living and the dead), precisely as it pertains to the point at issue, namely, a change of happiness, is of more importance than the second (which refers to actions in tragedies). And by reason of a similar inference concerning the difference of events, he says that we must consider the difference in our question.

208. Now it is clear that, even though a recitation of past evils in a way influences the hearer who is in some measure affected by them, it does not do so to the extent of changing his condition. Consequently, much less do fortunes change the condition of the dead. This is brought out by the Philosopher to clear up, as it were, the statement made above [184] that concluded that, if something affects men who are not conscious, it affects also the dead.

209. Then, at perhaps we should rather inquire (1101a34), he inquires last whether things happening to friends affect the dead in some way.

First, he examines the proposition;

second, he brings to a conclusion his chief proposal at the good actions done by friends (1101b5; [210]).

He says first that we should rather inquire whether the dead in any way share in the prosperity and adversity that take place in this life. That a man is not changed from happiness to unhappiness or the other way round seems sufficiently established. The reason is that, if an event taking place here, either good or bad, affects the dead, it will be fleeting and insignificant in itself or in its effect on them. But if this is the case, it will not be so great or of such a nature as to make them happy who are not happy or to take away happiness from them who have it. It has been said already [194] that trifling happenings do not cause a change in life. If, then, an insignificant event among the things that happen affects the dead, it follows that their condition of happiness will not be changed.

210. Then, at the good actions done by friends (1101b5), he concludes his opinion. He says that the good actions done by friends or the evil befalling them seem to have some influence on the dead, and misfortunes too seem to affect them. But these take place in such a manner and to such an extent that they do not make the happy unhappy or the unhappy happy, nor do they change the dead in such things as wisdom or virtue or the like. However, the construction can be conditioned by the words if this be the case. Then the statement do have some influence will be properly conditional, and the conjunctive particle will be superfluous.

211. It seems that Aristotle intends that the things said here are to be understood of the dead not as they are in themselves, but as they live in the memory of men. In this way, what happens to their friends after death seems to affect the dead such that their memory and glory become more distinct or more obscure. But this, he says, is indeed a fleeting thing, because nothing is more fleeting than what exists only in the opinion of men. He says also that it is an insignificant thing especially for the dead themselves, because it belongs to them only to the extent they are remembered by men.

212. But the questions of whether the souls of men survive in some fashion after death and of whether they are aware of or are changed in any way by what occurs in this life do not pertain to our purpose, since the Philosopher here is treating of the happiness of the present life, as is evident from what was said above [206]. Consequently, inquiries of this kind, which need to be considered at some length, must be omitted at this point lest, in this science, which is practical, many discussions outside its scope be carried on—a procedure that the Philosopher condemned [136]. Elsewhere we have treated these subjects more fully.