Lecture 13 — Some Place Happiness in Virtue with Pleasure; Others Say External Goods Are Necessary for Happiness

The life of those who act in accord with virtue is itself pleasurable. [154]

Now pleasure is an activity proper to a living being. And everyone finds pleasure in what he is fond of, as a lover of horses finds pleasure in horses and a lover of shows in shows. In the same way, a man who loves justice finds pleasure in just deeds; and, in general, one who loves virtue finds pleasure in virtuous activity. [155]

Many experience pleasure in things that are in opposition to one another because the pleasure is not in accord with human nature. Men who love the good, however, find pleasure in the things that are inherently pleasurable. Of this kind are virtuous operations that therefore are pleasurable not only to virtuous men but also by their very natures. [156]

This type of life then has no need of pleasure as an accessory, but is pleasurable in itself. [157]

It should be added that every virtuous person rejoices in virtuous acts, for no one will call a man just who does not enjoy doing just deeds; no one will call a man generous who does not enjoy giving generously. Similarly, we speak of men in other virtuous activities. From this it is clear that actions in accord with virtue are pleasurable in themselves. [158]

Granting this, such actions are noble and good. In fact, they have each of these qualities in the highest degree, if a good man judge truly in this matter, as we have said he does. Therefore, happiness is the best, the noblest, and the most pleasurable of all things. [159]

These qualities do not belong to different things as the inscription at Delos has it: the best is the just thing, the most desired is health, and the sweetest is the heart’s desire. But they are all found together in the most virtuous actions. We say that happiness consists in all these or in the best of these. [161]

It seems, however, that happiness stands in need of external goods, as we have said. [162]

For it is impossible, or at least difficult, for an indigent man to perform certain virtuous actions. Many good deeds become feasible, as we have pointed out, by the aid of friends and money and political influence. Then, too, the lack of other blessings, like noble birth, good children, and physical beauty, spoil a man’s happiness. One who is extremely ugly, lowborn, or alone in the world and without children cannot be entirely happy. Much less is he happy who is cursed with wayward children or evil associates or who has lost friends by death. In our opinion, then, it seems that happiness has need of external prosperity to a degree. [163]

For this reason, some have identified good fortune with happiness. Others, however, prefer to place happiness in virtue. [164]

154. The life of those who act in accord with virtue. After the Philosopher has shown how the first opinion, which places happiness in virtue, is in agreement with the definition given above, and how it differs from it, he now does the same regarding the second opinion, which holds that happiness consists in virtue together with pleasure.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows how this position harmonizes with his own opinion.

Second, at this type of life (1099a15; [157]), he shows how it differs.

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he states his proposition;

second, he gives evidence for his statement at now pleasure is (1099a7; [155]).

He says, therefore, first that the life of those who act virtuously is itself pleasurable. Happiness, then, which we place in an operation of virtue, does not lack pleasure, which, in their judgment, happiness requires.

155. Then, at now pleasure is (1099a7), he proves his statement.

First, he shows that virtuous actions should be pleasurable.

Second, at many experience (1099a11; [156]), he shows that this pleasure is preferable to others.

He says first that pleasure is an activity proper to animals. Although we may attribute a natural appetite to inanimate things, we attribute pleasure only to a being having perception. From this, we see that pleasure properly belongs to the activities of a soul, one of which is happiness. Now, in activities of this kind, everyone finds pleasure in what he is fond of. As a lover desires the thing which is absent, so he takes pleasure in it when it is present. In this way, a lover of horses finds pleasure in a horses; and a lover of shows, in a show. Hence, it is evident that every virtuous person loves the activities of his own virtue as something agreeable to him. To the extent that the just man loves justice, he will take pleasure in doing just deeds. It is universally true that virtuous operations are pleasurable to virtuous persons who love virtue.

156. Then, at many experience (1099a11), he shows that this pleasure is preferable to others. He explains that the things pleasurable to the majority of men are contrary to one another. Prodigality, for instance, is a source of pleasure to the spendthrift, while hoarding delights the miser. This happens because these pleasures are not in accord with human nature common to all men—in other words, with reason—but rather with the corruption of an appetite departing from reason. But to men loving the good of virtue, these things are pleasurable that are inherently so—that is, that are agreeable to man according to reason, the perfection of his nature. Because of this, all virtuous men take pleasure in the same things—operations according to virtue—that are naturally pleasurable to men according to right reason. These are pleasurable not only to men but also in their very nature. But evil actions give pleasure to men who get used to them by corrupt habits. Since, then, what is such of itself and by nature is preferable, pleasure arising from virtuous operation will be more delightful than other pleasures.

157. Then, at this type of life (1099a15; [157]), he shows in what respect this opinion may not be true. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he states a proposition.

Second, at it should be added (1099a17; [158]), he gives evidence for his statement.

We must, therefore, consider in regard to the first that those who hold that happiness consists in virtue together with pleasure seemed to intimate that virtue may have need of some extrinsic pleasure for the perfection of happiness. Aristotle disagrees here, saying that the life of those who act in accord with virtue does not need pleasure as an extrinsic addition. That life is pleasurable in itself.

158. Then, at it should be added (1099a17), he gives evidence for what he has affirmed.

In regard to this, he does three things.

First, he proves that virtuous life is pleasurable in itself.

Second, at granting this, such actions (1099a22; [159]), he proves that it has nobility and goodness in a high degree.

Third, at these qualities do not (1099a25; [161]), he excludes a false opinion.

He says first that, to the reasons proving that virtuous actions are naturally pleasurable [154–6], we must add that pleasure necessarily belongs to virtue and pertains to its very nature. There is no virtuous person who does not enjoy the good deeds he does. He proves this inductively by saying that no one will call that man just who does not rejoice in doing just deeds. A similar observation may be made of the generous man and of a man practicing any virtue. The reason is that the act of a virtuous man is agreeable to him according to a proper habit, and as a consequence, he derives pleasure from it. From this it is clear that virtuous actions are pleasurable in themselves and do not require pleasure external to them.

159. Then, at granting this (1099a22), he shows that actions in accord with virtue are not only pleasurable but also noble and good. Actions indeed are pleasurable to an agent when they are agreeable to him by reason of a proper habit. They are noble or beautiful because of a right order of circumstances as of parts, for beauty consists in a fitting arrangement of parts. They are good because ordered to the end.

160. He adds that each of these three qualities belongs to virtuous actions in a high degree. He proves this by the judgment of a good man. Such a man, since he has the right feeling for human works, judges them correctly. In another field, the man with a healthy sense of taste will make correct judgment on flavors. But a good man judges that actions in accord with virtue are eminently pleasurable, noble and, good, so much so that he puts them before any other pleasures, beauties, or goods. Since, therefore, happiness consists in virtuous actions, it follows that happiness is the best, most beautiful, and most pleasant.

161. Then, at these qualities do not belong (1099a25), he excludes from his doctrine a certain opinion. To understand this, we must recall the inscription in Apollo’s temple at Delos: The best is what is most just. The most desired is to be healthy. The most delightful is that which one desires to enjoy. But the Philosopher says that these three qualities do not belong to different things, but all three belong to virtuous actions, in all of which or in the best of which happiness consists. Therefore, there is one—happiness—that is the best, most beautiful, most desired, or most delightful.

162. Then, at it seems, however (1099a31), he comes to the third opinion, which held that external goods are necessary to happiness.

In regard to this, he does three things.

First, he brings out in what way this opinion may conform to the truth.

Second, at for it is impossible (1099a32; [163]), he gives evidence for his statement.

Third, at for this reason some (1099b6; [164]), he draws a conclusion from the premises.

He says first that the third opinion given above [149] seems true in this, that happiness has need of external good, as was indicated previously [111].

163. Then, at for it is impossible (1099a32), he gives evidence for his statement. In this matter, we must consider that happiness needs certain external goods as instruments to perform the good deeds in which happiness consists. Touching on this, he says that it is impossible or difficult for a man who does not possess the means for gifts and expenditures to practice certain virtuous acts. In many works of virtue, we make use of friends, wealth, and political power, as in the case of someone who is a ruler or an official. There are some external goods that lend a beauty to happiness insofar as they make a man pleasing in the eyes of others, giving him a kind of splendor.

At this point, he adds that a lack of certain externals clouds a man’s happiness, making him, as it were, contemptible in the eyes of others, as is evident in a man who lacks noble birth, good children, or even physical beauty. A man is not entirely happy when he is ugly, since this makes him contemptible and despised in the eyes of others. The same is true of one who is lowborn or who does not have good children, or of those living as though solitary, being conjoined to the flesh; for a man is held in contempt on account of all of these. Much less is he happy who has wicked sons or friends, for this limits his virtuous activity. Likewise, it is incompatible with happiness to have lost good friends by death, for such a loss means grief of heart. So it seems, then, that happiness has some need of goods of fortune.

164. Then, at for this reason (1099b6), he comes to the conclusion that, although happiness consists in virtuous actions, nevertheless it needs external goods to some extent. Such externals are called goods of fortune because they often fall into a man’s lap or, in bad luck, desert him. For this reason, some have held that good fortune and happiness are identical. But others have identified happiness with virtue, as was said above [66–8].