Lecture 11 — The Task Before Us

In this way, therefore, the good of happiness has been sketched, for the proper procedure is first to study a subject according to its general notions and afterward to explain it more fully. [131]

It would indeed seem a reasonable mode of procedure to make a sketch of the matter and then to investigate its features one by one. [132]

In this matter, time seems to be, as it were, a good discoverer and a special assistant. Thus, improvements in the arts have been due to successive artists, each making his own contribution. [133]

We must recall what was said before, that the same certitude is not to be expected in all sciences, but in each according to the subject matter, and that the degree of certitude should be suited to the subject taught. [135]

For a carpenter and a geometrician both study a straight line, but for different reasons. The carpenter does so to the extent that this is useful in his work; the geometrician, as a student of truth, wants to learn what a line is and how it differs from other figures. This distinction must be observed in other practical sciences lest they be burdened with discussions that are out of place. [136]

Likewise, we must not seek causes equally in all matters, but in some it suffices to establish a fact. This is the case with the first principles of a science, since a principle is a starting point. Now, we understand some principles by induction, some by observation, some by custom, and others in other ways. [137]

In all cases, we must strive for a thorough knowledge of each set of principles according to their nature and must study how to define them properly. Principles are a great help in understanding what follows. Indeed, a single principle seems to be more than half of the whole, for it furnishes answers to many of our questions. [138]

131. In this way, therefore. After the Philosopher has investigated the definition of happiness itself, he now shows in a twofold fashion what may still remains to be done.

He indicates first what remains to be done;

second, at we must recall (1098a26; [135]), how this should be done.

In regard to the initial point, he does three things.

First, he manifests what has been done and what remains to be done. He says that the final good of man, which is happiness, has been previously sketched [103–130]. By “a sketch,” he means the knowledge acquired through some common principles, which indeed gives a picture of the matter, but not in such a way that the nature of that thing in particular is manifested. The reason for this is, as he himself says, that a thing should first be studied according to its general characteristics—that is, by a general description that is like it and in a way extrinsic to it. Then, with other matters clarified, we must take up what was previously sketched roughly and etch in the lines more sharply. For this reason he himself will take up in greater detail the treatise on happiness toward the end of this work. (10.6–8.1176a30–1179a33 (bk. 10, lecs. 9–13 [2065–136]).)

132. Second, at it would indeed seem (1098a22), he assigns the reason for the statement just made [131], saying that it seems natural for man to advance from the imperfect knowledge that covers a good description of things to a perfect knowledge of them by filling in the details. This he does by investigating first one part and then another, for it is according to man’s nature to proceed by the steps of reason to a knowledge of the truth. Reason has this peculiar characteristic, that it grasps the truth gradually, and as a consequence, man properly perfects himself in knowledge little by little. On the contrary, separated or intellectual substances attain at once to the knowledge of the truth without any such investigation.

133. Third, at in this matter time (1098a23), he shows how a man may be helped in this procedure. He says that time seems to be, as it were, a discoverer of things well suited to sketch a subject and to be of special assistance in the work. The meaning is not that time itself contributes anything, but that this help comes with time. If someone should busy himself investigating the truth for a period, he will be aided in the discovery of the truth by the passage of time. This is true in the case of the same person who will understand subsequently what he had not understood before, and also for different persons, as in the case of a man who learns the things discovered by his predecessors and adds something himself. In this way improvements have been made in the arts, in which a small discovery was made first and afterward notable advances were made by the efforts of various men, each looking upon it as a duty to supply what is lacking in the knowledge of his predecessors.

134. But if, on the contrary, application to study be neglected, time is rather a cause of forgetfulness, as is said in Physics 4. (Physics 4.12.221a32; see Aquinas, In IV phys.. kec. 20, no. 604.) We see indeed that the negligent individual forgets what he knows, and in human history we observe that many sciences that flourished among the ancients gradually have been lost when interest in them ceased.

135. Then, at we must recall (1098a26), he shows how we must follow up the remainder of our task.

First, he presents this in general by recalling to mind what was said in the introduction [32, 36], that we must not look for the same certitude in all subjects, but in each according to the matter, namely, that which is proper to the subject taught.

136. Second, at for a carpenter (1098a29), he makes specific what he has said.

First, he takes up what must be handled differently for different subjects,

and second, at in all cases we must (1098b4; [138]), what must be observed generally in all subjects.

In regard to the first, he gives a threefold difference.

The first of these is the difference between a practical and a speculative science. He says, therefore, that a carpenter, who is a practical man, and a geometrician, who is a theorist, study a straight line for different reasons. A practical man—a carpenter—studies a line insofar as it is useful for his work in sawing wood or in doing anything else of this nature. But the geometrician investigates what a line is—its qualities and its nature—by considering the properties and potentialities. He is interested only in the study of truth. We must proceed in the first way to avoid many discussions that are out of place in practical sciences. For instance, in moral matters, we must steer clear of an exhaustive treatment of the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the neglect of the study of human acts themselves. It is a serious defect in any science to squander time on matter outside the science.

137. He treats a second difference at likewise, we must not (1098a34; [137]). Here he considers the difference between principles and deductions made from them. He says that the cause is not to be sought equally in all matters; otherwise, we would proceed to infinity in demonstrating. But in some cases it is sufficient to show clearly that a thing is so. This is true of principles that are taken for granted in a science, since they are the beginning and cannot be reduced to anything previous. Now, principles themselves are not manifested in the same way. But some are understood by induction from particular examples, such as that every number is even or odd. Some are taken from observation, such as that, in nature, every living thing needs nourishment. Some are taken from custom, such as that, in morals, sensual desires are diminished if we do not give in to them. Still other principles are manifested in still other ways, such as that, in the practical arts, principles are learned by a sort of experience.

138. Then, at in all cases, we must (1098b4), he sets down the procedure to be followed generally in all such matters. He says that a person ought to persist in going over thoroughly each set of principles, both speculatively and practically, in the way a knowledge of their nature demands and in studying how men understand them. Thus, a man will learn how to distinguish one principle from another, and one set of principles from another set. A knowledge of principles is a great help in understanding the conclusions that flow from them. Indeed, a single principle seems to be more than half of the whole, since the content of a science is contained in the principles. He adds that many answers we look for in a science are clear from one principle well understood and completely thought out.