Lecture 6 — Happiness and a Separated Good

Perhaps it will be better to investigate thoroughly the existence of the universal good and to inquire about its nature, [74]

even if the investigation has become unpleasant owing to the fact that the doctrine of ideas was introduced by good friends. [75]

However, it seems indeed better, and in fact especially obligatory on philosophers, to sacrifice even the rights of friendship for the sake of truth. While it is commendable to have love for both, we ought to honor truth as sacred above friends. [76]

Those who hold this opinion did not postulate ideas in which priority and posteriority were found. On this account, they made no provision for an idea of numbers. Now, good is found in the category of substance and quality and relation. But being in itself—that is, substance—is naturally prior to being in reference to something else, for the latter is likened to an offspring of being and an accident of it. Therefore, there will not be any common idea for these. [79]

Furthermore, good is convertible with being. For good is predicated of substance, such as God and intellect. It is predicated of quality (such as virtues), of quantity (such as the mean), of relation (such as the useful), of time (such as the opportune), of place (such as a summer-house), and so on. Hence it is obvious that one common idea of good that is universal does not exist. Otherwise, good would not be found in every category but in one alone. [81]

Moreover, because a single science treats things falling under one idea, there would have to be a single science of all good things. But we have many sciences, even of things contained in one category like time, for the opportune is studied in war by strategy, in disease by medicine, and in exercise by gymnastics. [82]

74. Perhaps it will be better. After the Philosopher has rejected the opinion of those who place happiness in one of the obvious goods, here he disproves the opinion of those placing it in a separate good.

In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows the necessity of discussing this opinion.

Second, he begins to disprove it, at those who hold this opinion (1096a17; [79]).

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he suggests the advantage of this inquiry.

Second, at even if the investigation (1096a12; [75]), he points out what may seem an unpleasant aspect of the investigation.

Third, at **however, it seems **(1096a14; [76]), he shows that this should not deter us from seeking the truth.

In regard to the first, we must consider that the separated good, in which the Platonists asserted that man’s happiness consists, was called a universal good. By participation in it, all things are said to be good. Hence, he says that perhaps it is better to investigate thoroughly the existence of this universal good and inquire what its nature is than it is to discuss the opinions mentioned before. The investigation of the good is more philosophical and more properly belongs to the discussion of the true good and the ultimate end than do the opinions considered in themselves. If, however, they be considered according to our stated intention of inquiring about the opinions mentioned above, it would seem to be more in agreement with our plan. On this account, he uses perhaps, an adverb indicating doubt.

75. Then, at **even if the investigation **(1096a12), he states what might deter him from an investigation of this opinion. He says that the investigation is made reluctantly because the opinion was introduced by friends of his, the Platonists. He himself was a disciple of Plato, and by rejecting this opinion, he might seem to disparage his teacher. He raises the point here rather than in his other works where he likewise rejects the opinion of Plato because the repudiation of the opinion of a friend is not contrary to truth, which is the principal object in speculative sciences. It is, however, contrary to good morals, the subject discussed in this book.

76. Then, at **however, it seems indeed better **(1096a14), he shows that this consideration ought not to deter him. The reason is that it seems to be better, meaning more honorable and in agreement with good morals, and indeed obligatory, that a man should not hesitate to oppose his friends for the sake of truth. It is so necessary for good morals that, without it, virtue cannot be preserved. Unless a man prefer truth to his friends, it follows that he will make false judgment and bear false witness in their defense. This is contrary to virtue. While reason prescribes that all men should prefer truth to their friends, this holds in a special way for the philosophers, whose calling is to study wisdom, which is knowledge of the truth.

77. That truth should be preferred to friends he proves in this way. He is the greater friend for whom we ought to have the greater consideration. Although we should have friendship for both truth and our fellow man, we ought rather to love truth, because we should love our fellow man especially on account of truth and virtue, as will be shown in book 8 [1575–77]. Now, truth is a most excellent friend of the sort to whom the homage of honor is due. Besides, truth is a divine thing, for it is found first and chiefly in God. He concludes, therefore, that it is virtuous to honor truth above friends.

78. Andronicus the Peripatetic says that piety makes men faithful to and observant of the things of God. Along the same line is the judgment of Plato, who, in rejecting the opinion of his teacher Socrates, says a man ought to care more for truth than anything else. Somewhere else too he affirms that, while Socrates is certainly his friend, truth is still more so. In yet another place, he says that we should have some care for the views of Socrates but more for truth.

79. Then, at those who hold his opinion (1096a17), he rejects the position of Plato, who maintains that the happiness of man consists in a common idea or form of good. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows there is no one common idea or form of good.

Second, at but perhaps we should (1096b30; [97]), he shows that, even if there were, human happiness would not consist in it.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that there cannot be one common idea of good.

Second, at someone will rightly (1096a34; [83]), he examines the manner of speaking used by the Platonists when they talk about this idea.

In regard to the first, we must consider that Aristotle does not intend to reject the opinion insofar as Plato maintained a separated good on which all good would depend. In the Metaphysics, (Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11–1076a4; see Aquinas, In XII metaph., lec. 12 [2627–63].) Aristotle expressly mentions a good, separated from the universe, to which the whole universe is ordered as an army is ordered to the good of the general. He does reject the opinion insofar as Plato held that the separated good is an idea common to all goods. He uses three reasons to disprove the opinion.

80. The first of these is taken from the argument of the Platonists themselves, who did not postulate an idea for these classes of things in which priority and posteriority are found, as is the case with numbers, for two is naturally prior to three. So the Platonists did not hold that number in general would have a separated idea. They did, though, place separated ideas for individual numbers, such as two, three, and so on. The reason for this is that the things in which priority and posteriority are found do not seem to be of one order, and consequently do not partake of one idea. But among good things, there is priority and posteriority. This is clear from the fact that good is found in the quod quid est or substance, and likewise in quality and also in other genera. Now, it is evident that what is being in itself, such as substance, is naturally prior to all those things that have being only in relation to substance—as quantity, which is the measure of substance; quality, which is the disposition of substance; and relation, which is the reference of substance. The same is true in other categories that are all, as it were, the offspring of being or substance. This is being in the full sense, and from it are engendered and derived all other genera, which are called being to the extent that they are accidents of a substance. From this he concludes that there cannot be a common idea of good.

81. He lays down the second reason at furthermore, good (1096a23). To understand this, we must know that Plato held the idea to be the ratio (or nature) and essence of all things that partake of the idea. It follows from this that there cannot be one idea of things not having a common nature. But the various categories do not have one common nature, for nothing is predicated of them univocally. Now good, like being, with which it is convertible, is found in every category. Thus, the quod quid est or substance, God, in whom there is no evil, is called good; the intellect, which is always true, is called good. In quality, good is predicated of virtue, which makes its possessor good; in quantity, of the mean, which is the good in everything subject to measure. In relation, good is predicated of the useful, which is good relative to a proper end. In time, it is predicated of the opportune; and in place, of a location suitable for walking, as a summer-house. The same may be said of other categories. It is clear, therefore, that there is not some one good that is the idea or the common notion of all goods. Otherwise, good would not be found in every category but in one alone.

82. He gives the third reason at moreover, because (1096a29). To understand this, we must know the following. Things existing outside the mind, according to Plato, acquire the form of genus or species by participating in the idea, such that the mind does not know a stone except by participating in the idea of stone. The mind in this way partakes of science and knowledge of those things when the forms or ideas of them are impressed in it. It follows that there is a single science of all the things that partake of one idea. If, therefore, there be one idea of all goods, it will belong to the study of one science. But we see that this is false even in regard to the goods belonging to a single category. He adds this for fear that someone may specify sciences according to the diversity of categories. We see, however, that strategy studies the opportune in war, medicine studies it in disease, and gymnastics in exercise. It remains, then, that there is not one common idea of all goods.