Lecture 7 — An Absolute Good

Someone will rightly ask what they mean in calling anything “absolute” if, in both absolute man and this particular man, there exists one and the same nature, that of man. This is the truth, for they differ in no way as man.

On the same supposition, an absolute good, or a good in itself, and a particular good do not differ as good. [83]

It may not be countered that the good in itself is better because it is eternal, since what endures a long time is not necessarily better by nature than a thing that lasts a day. [85]

A more likely explanation seems to have been given by the Pythagoreans, who place unity in their list of goods. In this, apparently, Speusippus followed them. But further discussion of the point will have to wait. [87]

Contrary to what they have asserted, some doubt arises because their words are not said of every good and yet they do so apply. Now, things are said to be good according to one species of good that is sought and desired for its own sake, and things productive or in some way preservative of these or prohibitive of their contraries are said to be good according to an other species. It is obvious, then, that good is predicated in two ways, for some things are sought for their own sake and some for the sake of others. [89]

From the useful, let us separate good things that are good in themselves and examine whether they can be called good according to one idea. [91]

But what would you have enumerated among goods in themselves? Would you include even all the goods sought for themselves alone, as intelligence, sight, and some types of pleasure and honor? These are sometimes sought for the sake of another, but they always have an intrinsic value.

Otherwise nothing else seems an absolute good except the idea or form. Therefore, the idea will be empty. [93]

If things in themselves are demonstrated as absolute good, then the same nature of goodness will have to appear in all of them as the nature of whiteness in snow and in white lead. But, just as we find different natures in honor, prudence, and pleasure, so too we find differences in goodness. The absolute good is not, therefore, something common according to one idea. [94]

In what way, then, are they to be called good? Not as things purely equivocal. Are they at least to be compared as things referring to one principle or as all tending to one end? Or still better, should we say according to analogy? Indeed, as sight is the good of the body so intellect is the good of the soul, and so of other things. [95]

83. Someone will rightly ask. The Philosopher has shown above that there is no common idea of all goods. But because the separated good is called by the Platonists not only the idea or form of good but also absolute good, Aristotle here intends to inquire whether it is properly called by this name.

In regard to to this, he does two things.

First, he shows that the separated good is not properly named absolute good.

Second, at contrary to what (1096b8; [89]), he shows that to postulate a separated good as absolute is inconsistent with saying that it is the common idea or form of all goods.

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that the separated good is not properly called absolute good.

Second, at it may not be countered (1096b3; [85]), he rules out a particular rejoinder.

Third, at a more likely explanation (1096b5; [87]), he compares this doctrine with the Pythagorean view.

84. In regard to the first, we must consider that the separated good, which is the cause of all goods, ought to be placed in a higher degree of goodness than the good things about us, because the separated good is the ultimate end of all. But it seems that, according to this doctrine, it is not a higher degree in goodness than other goods. This is apparent because the Platonists called each of the separated things “absolute” or “in itself,” like “man in himself” and even “horse in itself.” Now, it is clear that one and the same nature belongs to man who lives among us and to man in himself, that is, ideal man. He proves this by the fact that ideal man and man clothed with matter do not differ as man, but they do differ in certain other respects—for example, this particular man has matter. Thus, the notions of animal and man do not differ in animality but rather in man’s rational principle that he has over and above animality. So, too, it seems that the ideal man does not differ from this particular man in the nature of man, but because this particular man has matter in addition to being man. For the same reason, the good that is called absolute will not have goodness different in nature from this particular good, although there can be a difference in other respects than the nature of good.

85. Then, at it may not (1096b3), he rules out a particular answer. Someone could say that the good in itself is better because it is eternal, while the goods here are perishable. Indeed, a thing that lasts longer does seem better and more desirable. To exclude this, he points out that the good in itself being eternal does not mean that it is better. The eternal differs from the non-eternal by reason of duration, and the difference of duration of a thing is outside the nature of the species, as life that lasts only a day and life more enduring are not different by reason of life, but only by duration. So, then, if good be understood as one species, its duration will be outside the nature of good. The longer duration of a thing then does not make that thing any better.

86. If we do not hold that there is one species or idea of good as the Platonists did, but that good, like being, is predicated in every genus, duration itself will be a good of time. It would, in that case, add something to goodness. Hence, what is more lasting will be better. But this cannot be said if the good is one species in itself. It follows, then, that it is not better because eternal.

87. Then, at a more likely explanation (1096b5), he compares this opinion with that of the Pythagoreans. We must consider that, according to the Platonists, the nature of the one and the good is the same, and so they identified one in itself and good in itself. Hence, they were obliged to postulate one first good. The Pythagoreans did not do this, however, but they put one among the things contained in the list of the good under which they placed light, unity, rest, the straight, masculine, right, finite, equal, and the square; and the contraries are darkness, multitude, motion, curved, feminine, left, infinite, unequal, and the rectangular.

88. He says, therefore, that, on this point, the Pythagoreans gave a more likely explanation than the Platonists, because the Pythagoreans were not compelled to hold one nature for the good. Even Speusippus, who was a son of Plato’s sister and his successor in the Academy, did not follow Plato but Pythagoras on this point. He adds that further discussion of the subject will be taken up in the Metaphysics. (Metaphysics 1.5.986a13–986b9; see Aquinas, In I metaph., lec. 8 [124–33]; see also Metaphysics 11.9.1066a13–17 (Aquinas, In XI metaph., lec. 9, [2303]).)

89. Then, at contrary to what (1096b8), he shows that the assertion that the separated good is an absolute good or a good in itself is inconsistent with their view that there is one idea or form of all goods. He does three things on this point.

First, he shows that an absolute good cannot be an idea common to all goods.

Second, at from the useful** (1096b14; [91]), he shows that there cannot be a common idea of all things called good in themselves.

Third, at in what way (1096b26; [95]), he handles a pertinent query.

He says then in the first place that, contrary to what the Platonists assert, there seems to be a subtle hesitation here. When they speak about the good in itself, it does not seem from the obvious meaning of their words that the discussion concerns every good, but as much can be gathered from the context, because there are various species or forms of goods.

90. Those things sought—that is, pursued or chosen, and desired or loved for themselves—are good according to one species or form of goodness.

Those desired insofar as they are good in some way for the sake of others, which in their turn are really good, are called good for another reason.

In a third way, some things are called good because they prevent the contrary evil.

It is clear, therefore, that good is predicated in two ways. Primary goods are good in themselves. As we have already remarked [9–13, 58], they are sought for themselves. Both of the other things called good—the productive or preservative of good and the restrictive of contrary evil—are called good in reference to things good in themselves. It is obvious, then, that the notion of absolute good is not suited to all goods.

91. Then, at from the useful (1096b14), he shows that the notion of absolute good cannot belong to all goods in themselves.

First, he declares his intention. We must consider that those things that are productive or preservative of goods in themselves, or restrictive of contraries, are called good because they are useful, and the nature of absolute good does not belong to the merely useful. Let us, then, separate from these useful things the things that are in themselves good and see whether they can be designated good according to one form, which is called absolute good.

92. Second, at but what would you (1096b16), he investigates this last point by proposing a question: what kinds of things should be considered goods in themselves? He presents this question in two parts.

In the first, he asks whether we are to call absolute whatever goods are sought for themselves alone to the exclusion of all others, so that they are not ordered to any further use. Such would be sight and certain kinds of pleasure and honors. These things are sometimes sought for the sake of something else to which they are useful, but even if they have no use beyond themselves, they are good and desirable in themselves.

The second part of the question asks whether there is any other absolute good besides the idea or form itself.

93. Third, at therefore, the idea (1096b20), he resolves the second part just mentioned. He concludes that, if nothing else be a good in itself except the idea, then the idea will be a kind of exemplar whose likeness will be impressed on others. An exemplar is useless if it has no likeness to something else. Hence, it follows that the idea is useless if there is no other good in itself.

94. Fourth, at if things in themselves (1096b21), he resolves the first part in this way. If all the aforementioned things are good in themselves by partaking of the idea that is itself good, the same nature of goodness must appear in all of them, as we find the same nature of whiteness in snow and in white lead from the fact that they share in the one form. But this apparently is not true of the things mentioned above. Honor, prudence, and pleasure differ in their natures—that is, the nature of honor precisely as honor differs from the nature of prudence as prudence. Moreover, the nature of honor as a good differs from the nature of prudence as it is a good. There is not, then, one nature of goodness in all good things, nor are they all desirable under the same aspect. Hence it remains that what is called absolute good is not something common as one idea or form common to all goods.

95. Then, at in what way (1096b26), he handles a pertinent query. This inquiry belongs here, since predication according to different reasons is made in the first of two ways according to meanings that are without any relation to any one thing. These are purely equivocal, because it happens by chance that the same word has been used by one person for one thing and then by someone else for an entirely different thing, as is plainly evident in the case of different men having the same name.

In another way, one word is used of several things with meanings not entirely different but having some sort of common likeness.

Sometimes they agree in referring to one principle, as a thing is called “military” because it is a soldier’s weapon (like a sword), or his clothing (like a uniform), or his transportation (like a horse).

Sometimes they agree in referring to one end. Thus, medicine is called “healthy” because it produces health, diet is called “healthy” because it preserves health, and urine in its turn is called “healthy” because it is a sign of health.

Sometimes the agreement is according to a different proportion to the same subject, as quality is called “being” because it is a disposition of a being in itself—that is, a substance—and quantity because it is a measure of substance, and so on.

Or the agreement is according to one proportion to different subjects. For instance, sight has the same proportion to the body as intellect to the soul. Hence, as sight is a power of a physical organ, so also is the intellect a power of the soul without the participation of the body.

96. In this fashion, therefore, he affirms that “good” is predicated of many things not with meanings entirely different, as happens with things completely equivocal, but according to analogy or the same proportion, inasmuch as all goods depend on the first principle of goodness—that is, as they are ordered to one end. Aristotle indeed did not intend that the separated good be the idea and notion of all goods, but their principle and end. Likewise, all things are called good by an analogy or the same proportion, just as sight is the good of the body and intellect is the good of the soul. He prefers this third way because it is understood according to goodness inherent in things. The first two ways, however, are ascribed to a separated goodness, from which a thing is not so properly denominated.