Lecture 19 — Happiness and Virtue

If, then, happiness is a kind of operation according to perfect virtue, we must investigate the question of virtue. In this way, we shall perhaps make a more profound study of happiness. [224]

Now political science really seems to be concerned especially with the attainment of virtue. Its object is to produce good citizens obedient to the laws, as is exemplified by the lawmakers of the Cretes and the Spartans, and others like them. If this investigation belongs to political science, the study will be obviously conducted according to the disposition we made in the beginning. [225]

The virtue we are investigating, then, will be human virtue, for we were seeking human good and human happiness. Now, we call that virtue “human” that is proper not to the body, but to the soul. Besides, we say that happiness is an activity of the soul. Since this is so, obviously the statesman must know to some extent the things pertaining to the soul, as he who is to heal the eyes or the whole body should know something about physiology. In fact, the knowledge of the statesman should be greater insofar as political science is nobler and more important than medicine. But skillful physicians make it their business to know much about the body. Therefore, the statesman must study the soul. [226]

The soul must be studied for the sake of the objects investigated and to the extent that suffices for them. To make a more exhaustive study would be a greater task than the subject requires. [228]

Certain things about the soul are adequately treated in extraneous discourses. We should use these—for instance, the distinction of the soul into irrational and rational. [229]

But whether the parts are distinct as particles of a body or anything physically divisible, or whether the parts are indivisible in nature and distinguishable according to reason alone, as the convex and concave of the circumference of a circle, is irrelevant to the present question. [230]

224. If, then, happiness. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on happiness, he begins the consideration of virtue.

First, he premises certain things necessary for the study of virtue.

Second, he will begin to define virtue in the beginning of book 2 at virtue is of two kinds (1103a14; [245]).

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that it pertains to this science to study virtue.

Second, at the virtue we are (1102a13; [226]), he assumes certain things we must know about the parts of the soul.

Third, at virtue is divided (1103a3; [243]), he divides virtue according to the division of the parts of the soul.

He proves the initial point in two ways.

First, by a reason taken from the doctrine on happiness. It was pointed out previously [128, 130, 150, 160, 164, 175, 187, 190] that happiness is an action according to perfect virtue. Hence, we can study happiness better by means of knowledge of virtue. In keeping with this, he completes the treatise on happiness when he finishes the study of all the virtues in book 10 [1953–2180]. Since, then, the principal object of this science is the good of man, which is happiness, an inquiry into virtue fittingly comes within the scope of this science.

225. Second, at now political science (1102a7), he proves the proposition from the particular nature of this science. Political science seems really to make a special study of virtue and its attainment. Indeed, the object of political science is to produce good citizens obedient to the laws (as is evident from the lawmakers of the Cretes and the Spartans, who had model states, and from others framing similar laws to make men virtuous). But the study of the present science is connected with political science because its principles are given here. Obviously, then, a consideration of virtue will be suitable to this science. Accordingly, in the introduction [25–31], we placed political science, which investigates the ultimate end of human actions, above all other sciences.

226. Then, at the virtue (1102a13), he takes up certain questions pertaining to the parts of the soul, which are necessary for the knowledge of virtues. On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows it is necessary that such things be discussed in this science.

Second, he takes them up at certain things about the soul (1102a26; [229]).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that it is necessary in this science to consider certain questions about the parts of the soul.

Second, at the soul must be studied (1102a23; [228]), he shows how we must consider these questions.

First, since it is our intention to investigate virtue, we understand that we are speaking of human virtue. We have just now noted [224] that we are looking for human good and human happiness in this science. If, therefore, we seek virtue for the sake of happiness, we necessarily seek human virtue. But that virtue is peculiarly human which is proper to the soul, for it does not belong to the body, nor is it shared in common with other beings. Pertinent here is what we said before that happiness is an activity of the soul [123–6].

227. In the study of the soul whose virtue he seeks, the statesman is compared to the physician who studies the body seeking its health. Obviously, then, the statesman must know to some extent the things belonging to the soul, as the physician who treats the eyes and the whole body must study something about the eyes and the whole body. The obligation of the statesman to study the soul whose virtue he seeks is greater because political science is more important than the science of medicine—a fact we know from what was said previously [25–30]. Consequently, the study of political science must be more thorough. We see that skillful physicians study many things that will give them a knowledge of the body and not merely what concerns cures. Hence, a statesman gives some thought to the soul.

228. Then, at the soul must be studied (1102a23), he shows in what way the statesman ought to investigate these things. In this science, he says, the soul must be studied for the sake of these, that is, the virtues and human actions that are the principle objects here investigated. Therefore, the study of the soul must be such as suffices for the things chiefly sought. If a man should wish to make a more exhaustive study, he will be imposing a greater task than the object of our investigation requires. So, too, in all other things sought for the sake of an end, the extent of them must be measured according to the end itself.

229. Then, at certain things about the soul (1102a26), he takes up the things we must consider here about the parts of the soul.

First, he divides the parts of the soul into rational and irrational.

Second, at one part of the irrational soul (1102a32; [231]), he subdivides the irrational.

Third, at if, however, we must (1103a1; [242]), he will subdivide the rational part of the soul.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he gives the division.

Second, at **but whether the parts **(1102a28; [230]), he says that a certain question must be left unanswered.

He says first that certain things about the soul have been adequately treated in the book De anima, which he calls extraneous discussions because he wrote the book as an epistle to persons living at a considerable distance. The books that he was accustomed to teach his students (auditors) were called reports or notes (auditions), as the books of the Physics are entitled On the Audition of Classes about Nature; or they are called extraneous for the better reason that they are outside the scope of the immediate science. However, here we must use the things discussed in that book, for instance, one part of the soul is rational, another part irrational, as is asserted in De anima. (De anima 3.9.432a27; see Aquinas, In III de an., lec. 14, no. 796–97.)

230. Then, at but whether the parts (1102a28; [230]), he asks a certain question which is to be left unanswered intentionally. Are the two parts of the soul, rational and irrational, distinct from one another in their subject according to location and position, as particles of a body or of some other divisible continuum? Plato located the rational part or power in the brain, the emotional part in the heart, and the assimilative part in the liver. Or perhaps these two parts are not divided according to subject, but only in concept, as in the circumference of a circle, where the curved, or convex, and concave are not distinguished by subject, but in concept alone. He says that, so far as it concerns us at present, it does not matter which opinion is held. Hence, he leaves the question unanswered because it does not pertain to our present purpose.