Lecture 12 — Confirmation of the Definition

In our study of the principles, we must carefully examine not only the conclusions and the premises from which the argument proceeds, but also the considered views of others. Everything indeed will fall into agreement with what is true, and the truth will be quickly seen to be at variance with the false. [139]

Goods have been classified as external, of the soul, and of the body. Among these, we hold that the goods of the soul are the best and most properly called goods. We attribute vital actions and operations to the soul. Therefore, our opinion must be sound, for it is in agreement with that ancient one held by the philosophers. [141]

It was stated accurately, then, that we identify the end with certain acts and operations. Thus, happiness will be accounted one of the goods of the soul, and not an external good. [144]

This coincides with the common notion that one who lives well and does well is a happy man. As a matter of fact, a good life appears to be nothing else but good activity. [145]

Everything that philosophers have looked for in happiness seems to be found in our notion of it. [146]

Some have taught that happiness consists in virtue either generally, or specifically in prudence or in wisdom. Others say it consists in all or one of these virtues accompanied by pleasure, or at least not without pleasure. Still others would include an abundance of external goods. [147]

The rank and file together with some ancient philosophers held this last opinion, while a distinguished minority chose virtue. It is likely that no one was entirely wrong, but each was right on one or more points. [150]

Our definition of happiness is acceptable to those who hold that happiness consists in all or in one of the virtues, for virtuous activity clearly is something belonging to it. [151]

But besides, it makes a great difference whether the chief good be placed in possession or use, in habit or activity, because a habit may exist in a person not actually performing any good—for instance, in one who is asleep or otherwise not engaged in any way whatsoever. This is not possible with an activity, for a man having it necessarily is active, and if the activity be virtuous, he will act virtuously. [152]

At the Olympic games, the best looking and strongest athletes do not receive the crown, but the victorious competitors. So, too, among those who are good and best in virtuous living, those who perform righteous deeds become illustrious. [153]

139. In our study of the principles. After the Philosopher has shown in general what happiness is, he proposes here to confirm the view he has just given by what is said by others on happiness.

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he indicates his intention.

Then, at goods have been (1098b12; [141]), he begins to carry it out.

He says first that it is most important to have a principle thoroughly understood. The principle in practical matters is the ultimate end. To ensure a more careful study of it, we must examine not only the conclusions and the premises from which the discussion of the reasoner proceeds, but also the observations of others concerning the principle itself, namely, the ultimate end or happiness. He then assigns the reason for this procedure, that everything harmonizes with the truth. This is so because, as will be said in book 6 [1143], truth is the good of the intellect. Good, as explained later [320], is achieved only in the concurrence of all the factors pertaining to the perfection of the thing.

140. Evil, on the contrary, comes about in a variety of ways by the defect of any single necessary qualification. No evil, however, can be found in which the good is completely corrupted, as will be shown in book 4 [808]. So, not only all good things are in agreement with the good, but even evil things, in that they retain something of good. In a similar way, all false things are in agreement with the truth insofar as they retain some likeness of truth. It is not possible that the mind holding a false opinion is completely deprived of the knowledge of the truth, because by means of the true it immediately judges something false as lacking in the truth. This is what he understands by saying that the true is at variance with the false, somewhat like a right angle with an oblique angle.

141. Then, at goods have been classified (1098b12), he begins to carry out his intention:

first, as regards those things which have been said by others about happiness;

second, at this—that happiness is a virtuous activity (1099b28; [174]), as regards those things which he has affirmed about happiness.

In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows that the consensus of others is in agreement with his view.

Second, at everything that philosophers (1098b22; [146]), he shows that the points on which others disagree substantiate his view.

In regard to the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows that what is commonly said by philosophers is in harmony with the given description of happiness.

Second, at this coincides with (1098b20; [145]), he shows that the same is true from what is generally affirmed by everyone.

He proves the first observation in two ways.

142. First, he divides human goods into three classes.

Of these, some are external, as riches, honors, friends, and such like.

Others are interior, and these are divided again into two kinds.

For some of them pertain to the body, such as strength, beauty, and health;

others pertain to the soul, such as knowledge, virtue, and the like. These are the chief goods, for external things are for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul, as matter for form and as an instrument for a principal agent. Now the common view of all philosophers is that the goods of the soul are the most important.

143. The Stoics and the Peripatetics held divergent views about some goods. The Stoics were of the opinion that some goods are not human goods because they do not make man better. The Peripatetics, that is, the followers of Aristotle, asserted indeed that external goods are the least of goods—the goods of the body being, as it were, means—but the chief goods in their judgment were the goods of the soul, by which man is made good. Other goods, however, according to them, are called “good” insofar as they serve as means toward the principal goods. Thus, happiness, since it is the chief good, must be numbered among the goods of the soul. Hence, it is evident that the placing of happiness in an operation of the rational soul, as we said above [110–26], is in agreement with this ancient opinion common to all philosophers, that the most important goods are those belonging to the soul.

144. Second, at it was stated accurately (1098b18), he proves the same thing in a different way. The soul, he says, has two kinds of operations.

Some of these pass into external matter, as weaving and building. Operations of this sort are not ends, but things done for ends, that is, woven cloth and a completed house.

Other operations of the soul, however, remain in the agent himself, as understanding and willing. Operations of this kind are ends.

When we said that happiness is an operation and not a product, it was correctly stated that acts and operations themselves are ends [119–20]. Thus, happiness is classified as one of the goods belonging to the soul and not an external good. Now, in an immanent action, the operation itself is a perfection and a good of the agent, but in a transient action, the perfection and the good are found in the external effect. Hence, the aforesaid view is in agreement with the position of the philosophers who hold that goods of the soul are the chief goods, and not only because we said happiness was concerned with the operation of the soul, but also in that we place happiness in the operation itself.

145. Then, at this coincides (1098b20), he shows that the things generally agreed on about happiness fit in with our view, for it was said above [45, 128] that everyone identifies living a good life and doing well with being happy. What we said is in agreement with this understanding or notion of happiness, because a good life appears to be good activity and happiness seems to be of this nature. Those things truly are said to live which of themselves are moved to activity.

146. Then, at everything that philosophers (1098b22), he shows that even the things in which others differ are in agreement with the aforesaid view. On this point, he does three things.

First, he brings forward the points on which men differ about happiness.

Second, at our definition of happiness (1098b30), he shows that each of these is in agreement with the above view.

Finally, at next we investigate (1099b9; [165]), he asks and answers a certain question concerning the premises.

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he states what he wishes to show, that everything that was looked for in happiness by various philosophers in various ways seems to be found in our notion, that is, to be preserved in his view.

147. Second, at some have taught (1098b23), he gives different views on happiness.

The first of these is that happiness consists in virtue. This has three variations.

Some taught that any virtue, especially moral virtue, which perfects the appetite under the control of the reason, constitutes happiness.

To others, it seemed that happiness consists in prudence, which perfects the practical reason.

Still others thought that happiness is found in wisdom, which is the ultimate perfection of the speculative reason.

148. The second opinion holds that all or any of these may constitute happiness provided that pleasure be added. This is understood in two senses.

Some maintained that virtue and pleasure almost in equal measure constitute happiness.

Others, while placing happiness in virtue primarily, assign a secondary role to pleasure.

149. A third opinion adds to these elements of happiness a full measure of external goods, like riches and other material goods.

150. Third, at the rank and file (1098b27), he indicates the difference in the persons holding the foregoing views. He says that the majority—that is, the common people and some men of antiquity who were not grounded well in such matters—held some of these opinions, such as pleasure and riches being necessary for happiness. But others, the minority but distinguished and famous men, held that happiness consists rather in goods of the soul. It is likely that none of these was entirely wrong, but that each of them was right on some points.

151. Then, at our definition of happiness (1098b30), he shows that these views are in agreement with what he previously assigned to happiness.

First, he shows that this is true of the first opinion, which held that virtue is happiness.

Second, at the life of those (1099a7; [154]), he shows that it is true of the second opinion, which adds pleasure.

Third, at it seems, however (1099a31; [162]), he shows that it is true of the third opinion, which adds external goods.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that the first opinion given is in agreement with his.

Second, he shows how his opinion is better.

He affirms, therefore, that the definition of happiness given above as an activity according to virtue [130] is acceptable to those who held that all virtue or one virtue constitutes happiness. It is evident that virtuous activity is something belonging to virtue.

152. Then, at but besides, it makes a great difference (1098b31), he shows that his own view is better:

first, from reason;

second, from a custom among men, by the words at the Olympic games (1099a3; [153]).

He says first that it makes a great deal of difference in external goods whether the most important good is in the possession of a thing or in its use—which is obviously better than possession. It is the same, too, with a habit of virtue and its operation or in its use, which is of greater value than the habit. A habit can exist in a person who is not actually doing any good act, as in one who is asleep or not engaged in any way whatsoever. But this is not possible with an operation. It necessarily follows that that man should operate in whom there is an operation, and that he should produce a good effect if there be in him a virtuous operation. Consequently, a virtuous operation is more perfect than virtue itself.

153. Then, when he says at the Olympic games (1099a3), he proves the same thing by a custom among men. Concerning this, we must know that, in Macedonia, there is a very high mountain called Olympus where certain competitive sports, called Olympic games, were held. In these, not the strongest and best looking athletes received the crown, but only the winning contestants, for those who did not compete were ineligible for the prize. So also, of those who are good and best in virtuous living, only those are illustrious and happy who actually perform good deeds. Hence, it is better to say that happiness is a virtuous operation, rather than that it is virtue itself.