Lecture 18 — Happiness, a Good Deserving Honor

Having settled these matters, we must investigate whether happiness is one of the goods to be praised or, more properly, to be honored. It is obviously not in the genus of potentiality. [213]

Now a thing that is praiseworthy has a certain proportion in itself and some sort of relation to another. [215]

Thus, we generally praise the just, the brave, and the good man, and even virtue itself, because of the works and actions. We praise also the physically strong, the swift, and the like as possessing a certain natural ability, and as ordered in some way to a thing good in itself and desirable. [216]

Our point is obvious too from the praises of the gods, for such praises would be ridiculous if judged by our standard. This happens because praises are given by reason of relation to another, as we have indicated. [218]

If praise belongs to things of this kind, clearly something greater and better than praise is given to the best. [219]

This seems to be true, for we call gods blessed and happy, as we do the most god-like among men. We speak in a similar way of goods, for no one praises happiness as he praises a just man, but he ascribes to happiness something better and more divine, namely, blessedness. [220]

Apparently Eudoxus put pleasure in the first place for a good reason. He thought that this is intimated from the fact that pleasure is a good not praised but is better than things praised, such as God and any good in itself. To things of this kind, other things are referred. [221]

Praise surely belongs to virtue, since doers of good works are praised for activity of body and of soul in accord with virtue. But perhaps a consideration of this subject more properly belongs to those who labor over the study of laudatory statements. It is obvious now to us from our discussion that happiness is a perfect good and one to be honored. [222]

This appears to be true also from the nature of a principle. Now, men do all that they do for the sake of happiness. But we look upon such a principle and cause of good as something divine and a thing to be honored. [223]

213. Having settled these matters. After the Philosopher has shown what happiness is, here he inquires about a certain property of happiness.

First, he asks a question;

second, he ascertains the truth, at now a thing that is praiseworthy (1101b12; [215]).

He says that, after determining the preceding matters, it is necessary to examine whether happiness is of the number of goods to be honored or to be praised. He proves that happiness must be contained under the one or the other kind of good by the fact that happiness is not in the genus of potentiality. A man is not praised or honored because he has the potentiality to good, but because he is somehow disposed to good.

214. To have an understanding of this question, we must consider that honor and praise differ in a twofold manner.

First, they differ on the part of that in which honor or praise consists. In this respect, honor is more extensive than praise. Honor signifies testimony manifesting a person’s excellence either by word or by deed, as when one genuflects to another or rises for him. But praise consists only in words.

Second, praise and honor differ in regard to that for which they are given, for both are given on account of some excellence. Now there are two kinds of excellence. One is absolute, and in this sense, honor is due to it. But the other is an excellence in relation to some end, and in this sense, praise is due.

215. Then, at now a thing that is (1101b12), he answers the question.

First, he shows that happiness is of the number of goods to be honored because it is a thing perfect and best.

Second, he shows the same thing from the fact that happiness has the nature of a principle, at this appears to be true also (1102a2; [223]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows to whom praise is given.

Second, he concludes that something better than praise is given to the best.

In regard to the initial point, he does two things.

First, he presents his proposition.

Second, he proves the proposition at thus, we generally praise the just (1101b14; [216]).

He says first that everything that is praised seems to be praiseworthy for two reasons simultaneously: because it has a certain kind of disposition in itself and because it has a relation of some sort to another.

216. Then, at thus, we generally praise (1101b14), he proves the proposition:

first, from human praises;

second, from divine praises at our point is obvious too from the praises of the gods (1101b18; [218]).

In regard to the first, we must consider that a man is praised both because of virtue of mind and because of power or strength of body. By reason of virtue of mind, a man (for instance, one who is just or brave or virtuous in any way) is praised for having virtue. The virtue also is praised, and this is because of something else, namely, virtuous works and actions. The virtuous man and virtue itself, then, are praised insofar as they are ordered to do the work of virtue.

Second, a man is praised by reason of power or strength of body because he is strong in fighting, swift in running, and so forth. This happens because the athlete is, in a way, ordered to something good in itself and desirable as worthy of achievement.

217. We must pay attention to the difference between virtues or powers of mind and body. It is sufficient in the praise of virtue of soul that a man be well disposed to the proper act of the virtue. The reason is that the good of man consists in the very act of virtue, for instance, for running or for wrestling. Human goodness does not consist in such things, since a man can run, wrestle, or fight for both a good and an evil purpose. Consequently, when speaking of the praises of the virtues of the soul, he said they are praised because of works and actions (that flow from them). But in speaking of the powers of the body, he indicated that they are praised in relation to something else.

218. Then, at our point is obvious too (1101b18), he explains what is meant by divine praises. If something be praiseworthy absolutely and not as related to some other thing, it follows that the thing is praiseworthy in all circumstances. But this is clearly false in the case of praises given to separated substances that he calls gods. It would seem ridiculous to praise them for things that are praised in men, for instance, because they are not overcome by concupiscence or fear. This is so because praises are given by reason of a relation to something else, as has been pointed out [214].

219. Then, at if praise (1101b21), he concludes his proposition from what has been said.

First, he puts the conclusion this way. Praise is given to the things whose goodness is considered in relation to something else. But the best things are not ordered to anything else, but rather other things are ordered to them. Therefore, something better than praise is given to the best. In a somewhat similar way, there is no science for the study of speculative principles, but something higher than science, understanding. Science is concerned with conclusions that are known by means of principles. Likewise, praise is concerned with things whose goodness is for the sake of others. But honor, a thing better than praise, is concerned with things to which other things are ordered.

220. Second, at this seems to be true (1101b23), he proves the previous conclusion from what is commonly held:

first, in regard to the things of which there is something better than praise;

second, in regard to the things of which there is praise at praise surely belongs (1101b31; [222]).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

To prove his proposition, he first presents what seems to be commonly held,

and second, what seemed so to Eudoxus at apparently Eudoxus (1101b27; [221]).

He says first that it seems commonly held that there is something better than praise for the best. This is made clear from the fact that those ascribing to the gods, as it were, something better than praise call them blessed and happy. They say the same, too, of the best among men who have a certain likeness to the gods by reason of excellence. As we ascribe something better than praise to the best among men, so also to the best of goods like happiness. No one praises happiness in the way he praises a just or virtuous man. Something better is ascribed to happiness when we call it blessedness.

221. Then, at apparently Eudoxus (1101b27; [221]), he reduces the saying of Eudoxus to the same argument. Now Eudoxus called pleasure the first fruits of good, saying that pleasure is the supreme good, thinking this is intimated from the following. Pleasure is a good that is not praised because it is something better in itself than the things that are praised. No one, indeed, is praised on account of pleasure—for instance, God and any other good in itself. This is because things whose goodness is praised are referred to things good in themselves. Things that are praised are praised precisely because they are somehow related to the things that are good in themselves.

222. Then, at praise surely (1101b31), he proves what he said in respect of the things to which praise is given. He says that praise belongs to virtue, which makes us doers of good works, for a person is praised because of activity of body or soul, as was just mentioned [216–17]. But a consideration of the words used by men in bestowing compliments pertains more properly to rhetoricians, who labor over the study of laudatory statements. It belongs to the kind of subject that deals with praise or dispraise—one of the three falling under the study of rhetoric, as is clear from the Philosopher (Rhetoric 1.3, 1358b21–1359a5.) and from Cicero in his Rhetoric. (De oratore 2.10–11.) So far as we are concerned, it is obvious from the above [220] that happiness is of the number of goods to be honored because it is a perfect good.

223. Then, at this appears to be true also (1102a2), he proves his proposition from the nature of a principle. We look upon the principle and the cause of goods as a thing to be honored, for it is, as it were, something divine, since God is the first principle of all good. But happiness is the principle of all human good because men do all that they do by reason of happiness. Now the end in things to be done and things to be desired has the nature of a principle, because the nature of the means is understood from the end. Hence, it follows that happiness is a good to be honored.