D. 21 - Exclusive diction in the divine

Division of the text

Having shown the equality of the persons, therefore, because the Master made use of certain expressions in his proposition wherein exclusive diction was added to personal terms—for example, when it is said that the Father alone has as much power as all three do together, and the like) (This is not an exact quotation in the previous distinctions, though the exclusive diction is used of the Father’s greatness (or magnitude) in Peter Lombard’s Sentences, bk. 1, d. 19, ch. 12 (83), para. 1 (Sent. I, 1.19.12[83].1), and of his power in Sent. I, 20.1(84).2.)—in this part he inquires about the truth of expressions of this sort, how exclusive diction of this sort can be joined to the divine names. Therefore this is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether exclusive diction can be joined to a personal name placed in the subject along with a personal predicate; in the second, he asks whether it can be joined to a personal name when what is essential is being predicated of him, such as “the Father alone is God,” at after these, it is asked whether, as it is said, the Father alone is father, or the Son alone is son, it can also be said: the Father alone is God, or the Son alone is God. (Sent. I, 21.2(88).1.)

And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows that such expressions should not be conceded simply speaking, as when one says, “the Father alone is God”; in the second, he shows that according to a certain understanding they can be conceded, and if they are conceded, nothing incongruous follows, at ‘And yet,’ as Augustine says, ‘although the above were to be said of the Father alone, it does not follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit would be excluded.’ (Sent. I, 21.3(89).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, cc. 7, 9 (Patrologia Latina [PL] 42:929, 930).)

The first is divided into two: in the first he shows that exclusive diction cannot be asserted on the side of the subject, when an essential name is being predicated of a person, such as when one says, “the Father alone is God”; in the second, he shows that neither can it be added on the side of the predicate, as when one says, “the Father is God alone,” even though some say the contrary, the statements of whom he refutes with the authorities of Augustine, at and some want to take ‘alone’ here only with regard to the subject. (Sent. I, 21.2(88).4.)

And this latter is divided in two: in the first, he shows that an essential name joined to exclusive diction cannot be predicated of the individual persons, as when one says, “the Father is God alone,” and “the Son is God alone”—rather, it is said of all of them together, as when one says, “the Trinity is God alone”; in the second, he asks how such predication can be true about the Trinity, at but it is again asked how we call the Trinity itself ‘God alone.’ (Sent. I, 21.3(89).1.)

Here two things are asked:

first, whether exclusive diction can be added in the divine on the side of the subject; (Q. 1.)

second, whether it can be added on the side of the predicate. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Whether there can be exclusive diction in the divine on the side of the subject

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether it can be added to an essential term that is the subject when the predicate is essential or personal;

second, whether it can be added to a personal term when the predicate is essential.

Article 1

Whether the propositions, “God alone is God” and “God alone is Father,” are false

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ST) I, q. 31, a. 3.) It seems that “God alone is God” is false.

Obj. 1: For every adjective asserts its reality about what stands under it. But “alone” is an adjective. Therefore when one says, “God alone,” he implies a solitude about God. But as Hilary says, and was noted above, we must confess, then, that he is neither solitary, nor diverse. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, para. 18 (PL 10:111).) Therefore it seems that “God alone is God” is false.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, this name “God” has the nature of a common term inasmuch as what is said of God is said either of all the persons, as when one says, “God creates,” or it is said of at least one of them, as when one says, “God begets.” Whence under the name “God” in the subject position a descent to one of the persons can happen. Therefore, if “God alone is God” is true, any of these will also be true: “the Father alone is God,” or “the Son alone is God,” or “the Holy Spirit alone is God.” But each of these is false. Therefore so is the first.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 22, 178a39‒b1.) “alone” is the same as “not with another.” But it does not befit God—especially after the creation of things—that he be with no other; for by creating things he has led them into a participation of his own existence. Therefore in no way can one say “God alone.”

On the contrary (4), the proper is what belongs to one alone. But to be divine or omnipotent is proper to God. Therefore God alone is God, or omnipotent.

Quaestiuncula 2

Moreover, one asks whether “God alone is Father” is true, for it seems to be false.

Obj. 1: For what is found in another cannot be in one alone. But paternity is not only in God, but also in men, and even in a certain way in angels, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 2 (Patrologia Graeca [PG] 3:646).) Therefore it cannot be said that God alone is Father.

On the contrary, of whatever the common is predicated with precision, the proper is also predicated with precision, if it be predicated of it. For if body alone is colored, it follows that body alone is white, if we grant that white is predicated of body. But “God” relative to the three persons is common, as was said above from the words of Damascene. (Above, d. 19, q. 4, a. 2.) Therefore it follows that, if God alone is God, then, since God is a Father, God alone is a Father.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, following the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 22, 178a39‒b1.) “alone” is the same thing as what is not with another, wherein companionship is being removed. Therefore this word “alone” can remove companionship simply speaking, or with respect to someone. And it is said to remove companionship simply speaking when the association of another that is of the same nature and condition with him is taken away; for example, we say, “the man is alone in the house” even when there are many other animals there, and we say “the religious goes alone” when he travels without a brother of his order, even if many others go there simultaneously. And in this way “alone” is the same thing as “solitary.” And it is also categorematic diction implying solitude in reference to its subject, just like any other adjective, and thus in no way can it be taken in divine things. For one person always has the companionship of society with another person who is connatural to and like himself.

However, if “alone” excludes companionship in some determinate respect, then this is syncategorematic diction, bringing in a certain order or bearing of one to another, by reason of an implied negation, rather than implying a certain form. And in reference to this I say that this, “God alone creates,” does this in two ways. For it removes the companionship of another from the form of the subject, with the understood implication of “the one that is,” or “he who is”; and in this way the meaning is “God alone, that is, he who is God in such a way that besides him no other is God, creates,” and in this way this is true. Or it removes companionship in the participation of the predicate, and in this sense this is also true; for the meaning is that no one else besides God creates. And the judgment about “the Father alone is Father,” or “the Father alone begets,” is the same. For all expressions of this sort are false in the first sense, and true in the other two.

Reply Obj. 1: The reply to the first object is clear, as it proceeds according to the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2: As the sophists say, exclusive diction immobilizes the term to which it is joined, by reason of an implicit negation. Whence “man alone is rational, so Socrates alone is rational” does not follow. For not everything that is other than Socrates is other than man. This is why the implicit negation in exclusive diction extends farther when it is joined to the proper than when it is joined to the common. But it is true that by reason of affirmation there can be a descent to the proper. Whence, because “God alone is God” has two interpretations—one affirmative, God is God, and one negative, anyone other than God is not God—a descent can occur under the affirmative, as when one says, “the Father is God,” but not under the negative, “anyone other than the Father is not God.”

Reply Obj. 3: As has been said in the body, this word “alone” takes away companionship. And although upon the existence of created things, companionship cannot be removed from God with respect to existence, nonetheless companionship can be removed with respect to his own proper activity—namely, creation—and with respect to his own proper nature. This is why, following Hilary, when one removes the distinction of persons, and also the existence of created things, God is said to be solitary. For although “God alone is” would not be true, still “God is alone,” that is, solitary, would be true.

Reply Sed Contra 4: This we concede, as it proceeds according to the third meaning.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what is asked further—whether “God alone is a Father” is true—one should respond that it can be judged according to three senses. For if this word “alone” implies solitude in God, the expression is false. But if it brings in an exclusion from the form of the subject, then it is true, and the meaning is: “God, besides whom there is no other, is a Father.” However, if it removes companionship from the participation of the predicate, then I say it is twofold. For in the name “father” one can understand only the property of paternity insofar as the predicate is held formally—and then it is false, since paternity is not only in God, but also in men. Or one can understand the very person subsisting by a distinct paternity—and then it is true, and in this way it is proved and disproved. Yet it must be noted that paternity is not univocally of the same account in God and in created things, even though it is the same account analogically—which indeed has something identical in the account but also something diverse. So too if the predicate is taken formally. Nevertheless, “God alone is a Father” can in a certain way be true, and according to the same mode of speaking in which it is said, no one is good but God alone (Luke 18:19).

Article 2

Whether the proposition, “the Father alone is God,” is true

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.31.4; Commentary on Matthew, ch. 11.) It seems that “the Father alone is God,” or “the Son alone is God” is true.

Obj. 1: For just as to be God belongs to the three persons, so too does to be the most high. But it is written, about the Son, you alone are the most high. (In the Gloria of the Mass.) Therefore one can also say, “the Son alone is God.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “the Father alone is God” has two interpretations: an indefinite one, or singular, which can be converted as a particular affirmative, as “the Father is God”; and another universal negative, as “no one other than the Father is God.” And each of them can be converted simply. (“Conversion” in this context means that the subject and the predicate can be switched: “no man is a lion” converts to “no lion is a man.” Simple conversion is when the inversion is equal in universality, as in the previous example. An example of non-simple (or partial) conversion would be found in the statement “all men are animals,” which can convert only partially to “some animals are men.”) But “God alone is Father” is true in a certain sense. Therefore, by a simple conversion, “the Father alone is God” is true.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if “the Father alone is God” is false, this will be only because the other divine persons are excluded by the exclusive diction from participation in the predicate. But the Son and the Holy Spirit are not excluded by exclusive diction joined to the Father. Therefore “the Father alone is God” is simply speaking true. The middle premise is proved through the authority of Augustine in the text, which says, although the above were to be said of the Father alone, it does not follow that Son and Holy Spirit would be excluded, because ‘these three are one.’ (Sent. I, 21.3(89).2, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 13, para. 1 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL] 87A; PL 42:869), quoting 1 John 5:7.) This is also proved through argument, as follows. The Son’s union with the Father is greater than that of a part to its whole. But exclusive diction joined to a whole does not exclude its part; for it does not follow that if Socrates alone is white, therefore his foot is not white. Therefore, since exclusive diction occurs by reason of diversity, it seems that the Son is not excluded by exclusive diction joined to the Father.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, exclusive diction removes companionship only of what is separate from that to which it is joined. But the Son is in the Father, as was proved above. (Above, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, when one says, “the Father alone,” the Son is not being excluded.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, exclusive diction joined to the antecedent does not exclude the consequent; for “man alone runs, therefore animal does not run” does not follow, and neither does “animal alone does not run, therefore man does not run.” But the Son follows on the Father, for if the Father is, the Son is, and vice versa, as was above drawn from Ambrose. (Sent. I, 9.2(30).6, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PL 16:539).) Therefore it seems that when one says, “the Father alone,” the Son is not being excluded, or vice versa. And so “the Father alone is God” will be true.

On the contrary, there is what is noted in the text. (Sent. I, 21.2(88).2.)

Furthermore, there is one interpretation for the proposition, “the Father alone is God,” namely, “no one other than the Father is God.” But this is false, since the Son, who is someone other than the Father, is God. Therefore “the Father alone is God” is false.

I answer that, according to some, exclusive diction joined to one member of a pair of relatives among created things does not exclude the other; for “only the Father exists, therefore the Son does not exist” does not follow, for one of the relatives follows on the other. But this seems to be false, since exclusive diction joined to a supposit excludes every other supposit. Whence, since the Son is a supposit other than the Father, the Son is being excluded when one says, “the Father alone.” Nor is this impeded by the fact that one of them cannot exist without the other, since a generation also cannot exist without alteration and a change of place, and yet when one says, “only generation,” he is excluding every other change. Furthermore, although relatives follow on each other in existence, still they do not follow on each other in the other categories; for “if the father is musical, then the son is musical” does not follow. And furthermore, since “alone” is a determination of a supposit, it excludes every other supposit. But the correlation of relatives does not take away the diversity of the supposits. Whence there is no reason why, with respect to these predicates, one would not be excluded by an exclusion joined to the other.

And therefore one should say that exclusive diction joined to the Father does exclude the Son, as far as pertains to the opposition of relation. Nevertheless, one should understand that this stands in diverse ways in created things and in the divine, in two respects. The first is because, in created things, a father and a son are not one in essence, so the son is someone other, and something other, than the father; but this is not true in the divine. The second is because in created things paternity adds a new existence that is an incidental existence, and not the same thing as the existence of the subject, whereas in the divine, the paternity does not add any existence that is in reality other than the existence of the essence, in which the Father and the Son share.

Therefore when we are speaking of human affairs, saying, “the father alone,” the son is being excluded in all ways, since the son is someone other and something other than the father. And further, if he were one in essence with his father, he would still be excluded by it, insofar as he is someone other than his father, according to the existence of the relation added to the essence. So in a certain respect he would be something other than the son, even though they agree in essence. But in the divine, the Father and the Son are one in essence and yet are distinguished by relations, and nevertheless these relations do not add anything real to the essence. Whence by reason of that distinction the Son can in no way be said to be something other than the Father, but only someone other.

Whence, when one says, “only the Father,” the exclusion of an “other” can be understood as grammatically masculine, and in this way the Son is being excluded. And this is considered more proper than of an “other” as neuter by the consignification of the words. Or “other” can be understood as a neuter, and then the Son is not being excluded, since the Son is not something other than the Father, since the divine essence that is in the Son is the whole that is the Father, and not some part of it.

Therefore, following this, “the Father alone is God” should be distinguished through the three aforesaid senses. For if “alone” implies a solitude in the Father, it is false. But if it excludes from the form of the subject, then it is true, and the meaning is, “he who is the Father, besides whom no one else is the Father, is God.” However, if it makes an exclusion from participation in the predicate, then this is in two ways. For because “alone” is the same thing as “not with another,” either it excludes someone else in the masculine—and then it is false, and in this first sense Augustine denies it—or it excludes something else—and then it is true, since the Son, who is not something other than the Father, is not being excluded. And in this way it can be conceded, as is clear from Augustine’s words, stated above.

Reply Obj. 1: “The Son alone is most high” should be distinguished just as the first one was, and in one sense it is true, and in another it is false. And further, you alone are the most high, Jesus Christ should be understood with the whole that follows it, with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father. And that the Son alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit is the most high is true absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: “God alone is the Father,” interpreted as “God is the Father,” is convertible simply speaking as “the Father is God.” Likewise, the other interpretation, “no one other than God is the Father,” is convertible simply speaking, but its conversion is not “no one other than the Father is God,” since there is not the same thing in the subject and in the predicate. Rather, the conversion is more “the Father is no one other than God,” which is true in a certain way, as was said above in the body. And it does not follow from this that the Father alone is God.

Reply Obj. 3: When one says, “the Father alone,” the Son is being excluded if “alone” signifies the same thing as “not with another” in the masculine, but if it signifies the same thing as “not with another” in the neuter, he is not being excluded. And in this way one understands Augustine’s statement, as is clear from his saying that “because these three are one thing.”

Reply Obj. 4–5: And as regards what is objected about a part and a consequent, and about one being in the other, it is clear that this does not follow. For a part is not another supposit than its whole; indeed, it is included in the supposit of the whole. Likewise the consequent, which is animal, is not something other than the man in supposit. And therefore although the Father is in the Son through the unity of the essence and as regards the understanding of the relation, nonetheless the relation, insofar as it has the account of opposition, distinguishes the Father from the Son according to supposit.

Question 2

Whether there can be exclusive diction in the divine on the side of the predicate

Next, one asks how, in the divine, exclusive diction can be added on the side of the predicate. And two things are asked about this:

first, whether “the Trinity is God alone” is true;

second, whether “the Father is God alone” is true.

Article 1

Whether that proposition, “the Trinity is God alone,” is true

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that “the Trinity is God alone” is false.

Obj. 1: For “alone” is a disposition of a subject, just like “every.” But the word “every” is not congruently added to the predicate. Therefore it seems that the case is the same for the word “alone.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 10, 20b1.) transposed names and verbs signify the same thing. Therefore, if “the Trinity is God alone” is true, then “the Trinity is an alone God” will also be true.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, this word “alone” is syncategorematic, and indicates a negation. But a negation should precede a composition, or the thing that is negated, whereas when one says, “the Father is God alone,” no affirmation follows it. Therefore this expression seems to be false, or incongruous; so the same as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, terms in the predicate are taken formally. But solitude does not befit form, since form in and of itself is communicable. Therefore it seems that “alone” should not be placed on the side of the predicate; so the same as before.

On the contrary, it is said in the text. (Sent. I, 21.3(89).1.)

I answer that these exclusive words, “alone” and “only,” differ in that “only,” while it is an adverb, determines the verb’s act in a way similar to “alone,” since an adverb is an adjective of a verb. Whence, since a verb by reason of the composition joins the predicate to the subject, and relates to each of them, these adverbs can congruously be joined both to the subject and to the predicate. But this word “alone,” since it is a name depriving a thing of companionship, is a determination of what can have companionship. However, companionship is had with that to which something belongs, and this is signified as the subject. Whence, “alone” is properly the disposition of the subject.

Therefore, following these things, they say that “the Trinity is God alone” is improper, since if the word “alone” is being taken properly, it is not something added to a predicate. However, if it is taken for the word “only,” it is superfluous to add it to an essential or substantial predicate, as if one were to say, “Socrates is only man.” For exclusive diction can exclude only a nature extraneous to that to which it is joined. And this is understood even from the substantial predicate itself, for in the statement “Socrates is man,” it is already understood that he is not a donkey or a horse. And likewise they say that it is superfluous to add it when one says, “the Trinity is only God,” unless one adds “one,” or some incidental term that could be present or not. For then one would be excluding the opposite of unity, which is plurality. And they say that Augustine does not intend, when I say, “God alone,” to say that it is being predicated of the Trinity, as the Master implied, but rather that, when one says, “God alone,” the Trinity is being supposed, and not the Father or the Son.

But this does not seem very necessary. For although the word “alone” is a disposition of a subject, nonetheless it need not always be added to the subject. For even something else that is placed in the predicate can be signified as the supposit of some nature or property, by reason of which companionship can be taken away from it, as if one were to say, “Socrates is a man sitting alone.” Likewise, I say in the proposed matter that the name “God” is predicated of the three persons in a different way than the name “man” is predicated of Socrates and Plato. For only what is common to them is predicated of each of them, and the only thing they have in common is human nature, which considered in itself is not a subsisting thing; and therefore it is certain that the term “man” does not predicate any subsisting reality, but only the inhering nature, and as inhering. And therefore there can be no addition of the word “alone,” which deprives man of companionship. For it does not belong to a common nature that it itself would have companionship; rather, companionship is had within that nature.

But the term “God” predicates the divine nature of the three persons, which also is in itself something possessing subsistent existence, even if no distinction of persons is understood. Whence, even though it predicates the divine nature as the divine nature and not as a subsisting thing, nevertheless what it predicates is a subsisting thing. And therefore it has an account as that in which there is companionship, insofar as it is signified as that-in-which it is, and as that of which there is companionship, according to something belonging to it, insofar as it is signified as what-it-is. Whence the word “alone” can be added in the predicate, as to a subsisting reality, and it would exclude all extraneous things from the participation in the predicated form, so that the meaning of “the Trinity is God alone” is “the Trinity is that God besides whom no one else is God.” And its truth will be more expressive if something else is added, like if one were to say, “the Trinity is alone the true God,” or “alone the one God.”

Reply Obj. 1: This word “every” and the word “alone” are dispositions of the subject in diverse ways. For by the word “every,” by reason of its distribution, is indicated a certain division of the subject, and a multiplication, by reason of the things it contains. This is why it is incongruous to add it to things of which one cannot have a multitude of supposits, like terms for singulars. And on account of this, it cannot be placed on the side of the predicate, since a predicate is taken formally, and in a common form supposits are united, not distinguished. However, “alone” does not signify any division, but only removes companionship with respect to something that belongs to a subsisting thing. Whence, if some subsisting reality were predicated, “alone” can be fittingly added to it, as when the name “God” is predicated.

Reply Obj. 2: When this word “alone” on the side of the predicate comes after its substantive, it always implies solitude. For then companionship is being excluded simply speaking, and not merely with respect to something determinate, since nothing comes after it. And therefore, even though “the Trinity is God alone” be granted, still it should not be granted, properly speaking, that “the Trinity is an alone God.” And this happens by reason of the implied negation. Whence the judgment about the name “alone” and about the name “white” is not the same, for a negation placed after the term is different from one placed before it.

Reply Obj. 3: In the proposition, “the Trinity is God alone,” or “the true God alone,” the composition is understood in two ways: one is principal, which is indicated by the verb, and the other is understood in the name “God,” insofar as having Godhead is signified. Whence, by reason of this composition, an exclusion can arise, insofar as something is excluded from participating in the predicated form that belongs to the subsisting reality being predicated.

Reply Obj. 4: The name “God” does not predicate the divine nature merely through the mode of a form, like other substantial predicates, insofar as the divine nature is signified as that-by-which-he-exists; rather, it also predicates it as a subsisting reality, insofar as it is signified as that-which-exists. And in accordance with this, “alone” can be added to it. For it was said above (Above, d. 19, q. 4, a. 2.) that the name “God” partly has the account of a common term, and partly the account of a singular term.

Article 2

Whether the Father is God alone

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father is God alone.

Obj. 1: For everything predicated of the three persons taken together is an essential predicate. But “God alone” is said this way, for one says, “the Trinity is God alone.” Therefore it seems that, because every essential predicate can be said of the Father, so too one can say, “the Father is God alone.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Father is God, and is not something other than God. Therefore he is God alone.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is certain that there is but one God alone besides whom there is no other. But this God, besides whom there is no other, is the Father. Therefore the Father is the one God alone.

On the contrary, there is what is said in the text. (Sent. I, 20.2(88).4.)

I answer that when one says, “the Father is God alone,” this word “alone,” although it is placed on the side of the predicate, still can be understood to be on the side of the subject, just as when one says, “he is a white man,” “the man is white” is understood. For then the judgment about this will be the same as what was said about “the Father is God alone,” in the previous article. However, if it is understood on the side of the predicate, then it can be understood in one way, such that the word “alone” takes the place of “only”—and then it will be true. Nor will it be a superfluous addition, since the Son, even though he is God, is yet not only God, for he is also man; and this cannot be said of the Father, even though he was able to assume human nature. But this is not how it is being taken here.

However, if the word “alone” is being taken properly, then this expression holds some propriety insofar as the predicate “God” predicates not only the nature of the Godhead as form, but as a subsisting thing. Therefore I say that when one says, “the Father is God alone,” the expression has two aspects.

For the word “alone” can exclude everything other than the Father from the participation of the form of the predicate—and then it will be true. For in this way neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit will be excluded, for they are not something other than the supposit of the Father.

However, if it excludes someone other, in the masculine sense, then it is false. However, in this sense “the Trinity is God alone” is true, since if the word “God” predicates not only the nature, but even the supposit, then when it is predicated of the Trinity, it predicates the supposit of the whole Trinity. And therefore even if an exclusion occurs by reason of a different supposit, it is true. For no other supposit outside the Trinity is God, just as neither is there any other nature. But when one says, “the Father is God,” the word “God” predicates the supposit of the Father, so if there arises an exclusion with respect to a supposit other than the Father, then it is false. And in this sense, “the Father is God alone” is denied. However, if it is with respect to something other in nature than the Father, then it is true.

Reply Obj. 1: Insofar as the word “alone” excludes an extraneous supposit, and not merely an extraneous nature, the implicit negation extends to more things when one says, “the Father is God alone,” than when one says, “the Trinity is God alone.” For when one says, “the Father is God alone,” there is also excluded the supposits of the Son and the Holy Spirit. And therefore this is false insofar as “the Father is God alone” is understood, even though “the Trinity is God alone” is true. Nor is this by reason of an essential predication, but rather by reason of the negation excluding that supposit.

Reply Obj. 2: If the word “alone” is taken properly, that is not its meaning; but it would be more its meaning if “alone” were taken for “only.” And in this sense, it is granted.

Reply Obj. 3: If the word “alone” is taken properly, that argument proves not that “the Father is God alone” is true, but rather that “God alone is the Father” is true, and this according to the sense granted above. However, if it is assumed as “the Father is that God, besides which there is no other,” then this proposition is manifold. For this relative, “which,” can refer to the distinct supposit of the Father, such that the meaning is, “besides which Father there is no other.” And if it is understood as “there is no other God,” it is true, since the Son is not a God other than the Father.” However, if it is understood as “besides the Father there is no other who is God,” then it is false, since the Son is someone other than the Father, and yet he is God. But if the relative is referring to the supposit in an indistinct way, insofar as the name “God” supposes this, when one says, “God is one,” then it is true in every sense. And in this way it is clear that what was proposed does not conclude, except through the mode by which the aforesaid proposition was conceded in the distinction made above.

Exposition of the text

No one knows the Father, except the Son. (Sent. I, 21.3(89).2, quoting Matthew 11:27.) It seems that Augustine interprets this poorly, because “no one” is the same thing as “no man,” but the Father and the Holy Spirit are not contained under “man,” as the name “man” is not predicated of them; and thus it is unfitting that Augustine adds, it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Spirit is separated because they are inseparable. (Sent. I, 21.3(89).2, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 13, para. 1 (PL 42:769).) To this some say that this word “except” is not added to make an exception, but in opposition, so that the meaning is, “no mere man knows the Father with a knowledge of comprehension, but only the Son does.” But it is better to say that the word “no one” holds one thing from its proper signification, and something else from the name’s usage. From what is proper to its signification, it has it that “no one” signifies the same thing as “no man,” and in this way the person of the Father, or that of the Holy Spirit, is not being included under this distribution. But because a man exists insofar as he has intellect, nor is there anything manifest to us according to sensation that has intellect, except man, therefore from common usage, “no one” distributes in such a way as to cover every intellectual nature. And in this way, under distribution a descent to the divine, angelic, and human persons can occur.