D. 21 - Temptation of our first parents

Division of the text

After he has considered the establishment of human nature, here the Master considers its fall through sin. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he examines the fall of human nature in our first parents with regard to their actual sin.

In the second, he discusses the fall of human nature in their descendants, at it has been indicated in the above—if only partially . . . —how the first man sinned. . . . To these matters, it is to be added that sin and punishment both passed down to his posterity through him. (Peter Lombard (ca. 1096–1160 AD), Sentences, bk. 2, d. 30, ch. 1 (191), para. 1 (Sent. II, 30.1[191].1).)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines the principle of sin in our first parents.

In the second, he determines the principle by which they received assistance against sin, at and in respect to the spirit, man was rational. (Sent. II, 23.2(137).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he addresses the enemy’s temptation, who was the principle of sin extrinsically.

In the second, he inquires as to what was the intrinsic principle, at here it seems that it is to be diligently investigated. (Sent. II, 22.1(130).1.)

Then he inquires about the divine permission, which was a cause without which the sin would not have happened, at moreover, it is usual to ask. (Sent. II, 23.1(136).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the manner and order of the temptation.

In the second, he draws a conclusion about the gravity of the fault from the manner of the temptation, at furthermore, it is to be known that there are two kinds of temptation. (Sent. II, 21.6(127).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows the motive for the temptation.

Second, he shows the order of temptation, at and so he tempted the woman. (Sent. II, 21.1(122).2.)

Third, he shows the form of the temptation, at and the temptation was done in this way. (Sent. II, 21.5(126).1.)

Concerning the second, he does two things.

First, he shows why he wished to tempt the man through the woman.

Second, he shows why he wished to tempt the woman through a serpent: but because he could not harm her by violence, he turned to deceit. (Sent. II, 21.2(123).1.)

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he assigns the reason for what was said.

Second, he removes two doubts:

the first, at ‘and so the serpent is said to be more cunning than all the other animals;’ (Sent. II, 21.3(124).1, quoting Genesis 3:1.)

the other, at here it is usual to ask why the woman did not draw back in horror from the serpent. (Sent. II, 21.4(125).4.)

Concerning the third, he does two things.

First, he shows how shrewd the tempter was in investigating the condition of the one tempted.

Second, how shrewd he was in persuading her to what he intended, at in order to support his inducements more fully . . . the devil removed the evil which the woman feared by denying it, and added a promise. (Sent. II, 21.5(126).5.)

Furthermore, it is to be known that there are two kinds of temptation. (Sent. II, 21.6(127).1.) Here he shows the manner of fault from the temptation itself.

Concerning this he does three things.

First, he distinguishes manners of temptation and which of them is graver, namely, that which is from the flesh.

Second, he shows that the sin of Adam has a certain gravity, since he fell only through the impulse of an external temptation; and yet it is also able to be forgiven, since he was tempted through another, at and so humankind, which fell when pressed by exterior temptation alone, deserved to be punished more severely as the pressure by which it had been cast down was the lighter. (Sent. II, 21.7(128).1.)

Third, he removes some doubts, at it is also to be noted. (Sent. II, 21.8(129).1.)

Concerning the second, he does two things.

First, he sets out the argument he principally intends, namely why man’s sin is able to be forgiven, as deduced from the aforementioned.

Second, he adds another, at moreover, because the angelic nature did not entirely perish, but in part remained, it was not redeemed. (Sent. II, 21.7(128).2.)

Concerning the third, he does two things, following up on the two questions he raises, which are clear through itself in the text.

The second begins at if it is asked how they were able to speak . . . we say that God made them such. (Sent. II, 21.8(129).2; see Augustine (354–430 AD), On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 16, n. 35 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 28.1:256; PL 34:386).)

Here there are two questions.

The first is on temptation in general. (Q. 1.)

The second is on the temptation of our first parents. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Temptation in general

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, to whom does it belong to tempt;

second, whether every temptation, taken in a passive sense, involves sin;

third, whether temptation should be desired.

Article 1

Whether God tempts anyone

Concerning the first, we proceed as follows. It seems that it does not belong to God to tempt. (The Latin tentare or temptare means primarily “to test, to put to the trial.” The Greek and Hebrew words in Scripture that are usually translated as “to tempt” have the same primary meaning, as did the English word “tempt” in times past. This original meaning of the word “tempt” can still be seen in the related words “attempt” and “tentative,” and in references to “tempting God” or “tempting fate,” which can mean putting God or fate to the test at great risk to oneself. Contemporary English associates the word “tempt” above all with leading someone into sin, for reasons that will become clear in the text that follows.)

Obj. 1: For temptation is for the sake of gaining experience of something unknown. But God is ignorant of nothing. Therefore, it does not belong to him to tempt.

Obj. 2: Again, it seems that neither does it belong to a demon to tempt. For the intention of a demon is to deceive. But it does not belong to a tempter precisely as a tempter to deceive, but rather to test. Therefore, to tempt is not properly the office of a demon.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems that neither does it befit the flesh. For flesh cannot have a share in knowledge. But to test or tempt does not pertain to something that does not know. Therefore, no one is properly tempted to sin by the flesh.

Obj. 4: Again, it seems that it neither befits the world. For no one tempts someone whom he regards as lowly, since temptation is applied in doubtful matters. But the world regards the saints as lowly. Therefore, the world does not tempt them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is said: for fear that somehow the tempter had tempted you (1 Thess 3:5), referring to the devil, whose office it is to tempt. Therefore, it seems that neither the world, nor the flesh, nor God tempts.

On the contrary, it is said: God tempted Abraham (Gen 22:1). (The Revised Standard Version (RSV) reads tested instead of tempted.) Again, it is said: each person is tempted . . . by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). (RSV reads desire instead of concupiscence.) But concupiscence is a sin that dwells in the flesh. Therefore, there is some temptation in the flesh.

I answer that three elements come together in the complete account of temptation. First, that through the temptation knowledge of something doubtful be received. Second, that this be intended by the one tempting. Third, that the very one tempting wish to receive knowledge of this matter.

In this way, temptation is found among men insofar as man tempts man in order to gain experience of knowledge or something else in him.

But there is another kind of temptation that preserves two of these elements, namely, the manifestation of the unknown and the intention of this. This is the way in which God is said to tempt, as is clear in the temptation of Abraham. For the command to immolate his son is called his “temptation,” since through this his quality of obedience and faith was manifested, and God also intended this manifestation. But the third of the aforementioned elements was lacking in this temptation. For God did not tempt Abraham in order to receive the knowledge of his faith that he already had before, but rather so that it would be made manifest to others as an example.

Finally, there is another kind of temptation that preserves only one of the aforementioned elements, namely, the manifestation of the one tempted. In this way, the flesh or the world are said to “tempt,” since in them the strength or weakness of the mind is manifestly known, as the strength of a soldier is known in war, even though his enemies do not attack him in order to know this, but instead to conquer. Hence the attack itself is called a “testing” of his strength.

Now, this is either from an intrinsic principle—namely, the corruption of the flesh—and in this way, temptation of the flesh is spoken of, or it is from an extrinsic principle, and this latter is in two ways. For that which is extrinsic either attacks in the manner of an object, and this is the way in which there is temptation from the world, whose things lure the hearts of men into sin; or it is in the manner of an agent, who draws someone into sin by persuasion, threat, flattery, and so forth. This is the way in which there is said to be temptation from the enemy, namely, the devil, and from those who are his members.

Reply Obj. 1: God does not tempt so that something unknown to him may be come manifest, but rather so that it may be manifested to others, as has been said. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 2: There are two ends in temptation by a demon. One is the last end: namely, to lead someone to sin. In this regard it has the account of a temptation insofar as any attack is called a “temptation.” The other is the proximate end: namely, to test to what vice someone is most prone in order to draw him to it in an attack. In this way, it preserves the account of a temptation with regard to the first manner. Hence Hugh of Saint Victor, defining the temptation of the devil, says this: to tempt is to test with cleverness and to prove someone before a violent assault by certain wheedling attempts. (Hugh of Saint Victor (ca. 1096–1141 AD), Allegories in the New Testament (Allegoriae in Novum Testamentum), bk. 2, ch. 13 (PL 175:786). This work is of doubtful authenticity.)

Reply Obj. 3–4: The solution to the third and fourth objection is clear through what has already been said, that in this case the notion of temptation does not include all three elements.

Reply Obj. 5: Only the devil is said to tempt, not because he himself is always the immediate tempter, but because he first tempted man, and this temptation paved the way for other temptations.

Or we may say otherwise, that the devil alone is said to tempt because it befits him alone and his members to attack virtue with the intention of slaying man through sin. Now, the flesh intends not this, but rather the enjoyment of a delightful object of knowledge. Or else it is because he uses the things of the world and the flesh as instruments to tempt man.

Article 2

Whether temptation by the devil is a sin

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that temptation from the enemy is also a sin.

Obj. 1: For a lesser power cannot repel the intention of a greater power. But the power of a demon is greater than the power of a man, as is said: there is no power upon earth that can be compared with him (Job 41:33). (RSV reads upon earth there is not his like, a creature without fear.) Therefore, since the intention of a demon is to lead men to sin, it seems that man always sins when he is tempted by a demon.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since violence excuses from sin, where there is greater violence, there is less sin. But, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 21.6(127).3.) temptation from the flesh is graver than that from the enemy. Therefore, since temptation from the flesh is a sin, as it says in the text, all the more will that which is from the enemy be a sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what cannot be avoided is not our sin. But as long as we live in this mortal life, we cannot altogether avoid temptation of the flesh. Therefore, it is not in our power, yet it is still a sin. Therefore, temptation from the enemy, even though it is not in our power, will be a sin, since it tends to the same illicit object.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the devil can only tempt by making an impression on man. But since he is the father of iniquity and of lies: he is a liar and the father of lies (John 8:44), an impression from him can only be a sin. Therefore, it seems that whenever he tempts, he imprints a sin on man.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the motion of the concupiscible power tending to the illicit is the temptation of the flesh, which is called a “sin” in the text. (Sent. II, 21.6(127).3.) But the concupiscible power, since it is attached to a bodily organ, can be compelled and changed through changing the organ. Therefore, it seems that by tempting us a demon can make us sin. Thus, temptation that is only from the enemy will be a sin.

On the contrary, as it says (Matt 4), Christ was tempted by the devil. But sin had no place in him. Hence he says: the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me (John 14:30). Therefore, not every temptation from the enemy is a sin.

Furthermore, as Augustine says: no one sins in what he cannot avoid. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 3, ch. 18 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL] 29; Patrologia Latina [PL] 32:1295); see Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:597).) But man can in no way avoid being tempted by the enemy. Therefore, temptation from the enemy is not a sin.

I answer that one’s sin does not consist in another’s act, but in his own proper act, as it says: the soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:20). Now, in the temptation of the flesh, the illicit appetite itself, on the basis of which someone is said to be tempted, is the act of the one tempted. For the flesh does not desire by itself, but rather the composite. Thus, such temptation is a sin in the one who is tempted. However, the temptation that is from the world or from the enemy is from an extrinsic principle. Hence the act does not belong to the one being tempted; rather, it is only an undergoing. For this reason there is no sin in such temptation unless it is through a consensual delight, since at that point the one tempted begins to cooperate with the tempter.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though a demon’s power is greater than man’s power simply, in a certain respect it is not greater, namely, with regard to acts of free decision, which cannot be compelled. For the man himself is master of these acts, not the demon. Thus, a man can resist the temptation of the enemy.

Reply Obj. 2: The temptation of the flesh is said to be graver insofar as it is closer to the one tempted, to the extent that through it man is in a certain way divided by different inner and outer desires. Nor is there in this case absolute violence. For the inner man is not compelled to follow the motion of the outer man. Hence the account of sin still remains, and more so than in the case of temptation by the enemy, insofar as the desire itself is the act of the one tempted, and in a certain way in his power.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though man cannot avoid every temptation of the flesh so as to have none of it, he can still avoid this or that individual temptation. Thus, it is in a certain way in his power. But temptation from the enemy is in no way in his power.

Reply Obj. 4: A demon has the power to make an impression on the imagination, to represent certain sensible objects externally, or even to disturb the imagination internally. Now, how this can be has been said above in the treatment of the angels. (Above: d. 8, q. 1, a. 5.) Thus, insofar as a demon makes an impression on us in this manner, it is said to tempt. However, this impression does not have the account of sin on this basis, since it does not lie in an appetite, but in apprehension alone. But it does tend toward sin inasmuch as it pertains to the account of what is tempting.

Reply Obj. 5: The motion of the concupiscible power can arise in two ways. Either it can arise from the quality of the organ, such as when the body is warmed, the motion of desire arises without any image. This motion is purely natural and does not have the account of sin. And the strength of a demon is capable of this due to the power of its nature, which is capable of transmuting bodily things unless restrained by divine power. The other motion of the concupiscible power is that which arises from the apprehension of something delightful. From this perspective the concupiscible appetite has some freedom, at least in man, insofar as it can obey the command of reason forbidding it. In this way, there can be sin in the concupiscible part. But the devil cannot force this motion.

Article 3

Whether temptation is to be desired

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST III.41.2, ad 2; Commentary on Matthew, ch. 4.) It seems that temptation should be desired.

Obj. 1: First, this is through the fact that it is said: count it all joy, my brethren, when you meet various trials (Jas 1:2). But that which we should rejoice over when we have it is what we should desire when we do not have it. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that in which someone’s good is made manifest should be desired. But the virtue of the mind is shown forth in temptations and in a certain way flourishes in them. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is the matter and organ of virtue is to be desired. But, as Augustine says, temptation that is not consented to is matter for exercising virtue. (See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 6 (CSEL 28.1:339; PL 34:432); see also The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, bk. 2, ch. 9 (PL 34:1282); Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Corinthians 12:7, 6.449 (PL 114:568).) Therefore, it should be desired.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that without which we cannot arrive at the kingdom should be desired with the greatest zeal. But temptation is such a thing. For only one who has legitimately competed will be crowned (2 Tim 2:5). But there is no spiritual combat without temptation. Therefore, temptation should be desired.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as it is written (2 Cor 12:7–8), Paul prayed for the thorn in his flesh, whereby we understand the temptation of the flesh, to be removed. But on that passage a Gloss says that in so praying he did not know what he was praying for. (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Corinthians 12:8, 6.450: hinc intelligimus etiam sanctos ignoranter nonnunquam alia inimpetrabilia postulasse; Jerome (ca. 342–420 AD), Commentary on 2 Corinthians, at 12:8 (PL 30:803).) Therefore, it seems that we should not desire to be outside temptation.

On the contrary, we should desire what we pray for. But the Lord teaches us to pray: and lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13). Therefore, we should desire that temptations be removed from us.

Furthermore, just as our will should be conformed to the divine will, so also should it be out of harmony with the enemy’s will. But the enemy wills and seeks to tempt us, as is related: behold Satan demanded to have you, that he might sift you like wheat (Luke 22:31). Therefore, we should not will temptation.

I answer that, since the good is the object of the will and desire, the way something is good is the way we should fall in love with it. Now, among goods there is found a kind of good that is good simply and essentially, such as noble goods, which are desired as ends for their own sake, even if they lead to something else. For all noble goods are attended by some usefulness, except the last, which is the end of ends, which should be desired for its own sake.

There is yet another kind of good that, if considered absolutely, does not have goodness in itself by which it is desired. But rather, it is desired if, on the basis of its order to the end, it is allotted a certain goodness, which is given the name of “benefit.” These should only be desired for the sake of something else: for example, the amputation of a limb for the sake of health, and other such things.

But it should be known there are two ways in which it happens that something is ordered to obtaining an end: essentially and incidentally. (Per accidens is traditionally translated as “accidentally” or “by accident,” and this is rarely confusing to those familiar with the technical meaning. However, because the meaning of “accident” and “accidentally” in ordinary English now signifies more narrowly an unfortunate chance occurrence, this translation will often opt for the more generic “incidentally.” However, the noun or adjective accidens, when used by itself in its technical sense to mean an incidental attribute, has usually been rendered as “accident,” since an accident is literally what “falls on top of” (ad, “on” + cado, “fall”) what exists substantially.) I call it “essential” when, in and of itself, it leads to the due end. However, it is “incidental” when in and of itself it leads to something else, but due to the fact that another cause comes into play, it leads to the end itself, as when someone eats poison in order to die and health ends up resulting from it. Since, then, an incidental cause is not proportionate to the effect—rather, only an essential cause is—from an incidental ordering to the end we should not say that there is a desirable good, understood simply, but only when all the factors that determine this effect come together.

I say, then, that temptation through itself is ordered to man’s perdition and is only ordered to salvation incidentally, namely, due to the fact that it is overcome through the help of divine grace. Thus, to be tempted should not be desired simply. Rather, we should simultaneously desire to be tempted and to overcome temptation. But because victory is very doubtful due to our weakness, temptation is more safely fled than sought.

Reply Obj. 1: Blessed James is speaking about the temptation of tribulations, for which he exhorts patience so that among them his readers may preserve equanimity and joy of mind. For they cannot overcome them by any other means than patience. Hence joy is itself a kind of victory, which pertains not to the temptations as such, but rather to patience, which overcomes temptation.

Reply Obj. 2: Man’s good only shines forth in temptations on the presupposition of something else, namely victory over them, with which they are to be desired.

Reply Obj. 3: They are not the matter of virtue as ordered to virtue through themselves, but only incidentally.

Reply Obj. 4: Temptations are only necessary in order to reach the kingdom by a conditional necessity, that is, in such a way that if temptations should come, one will not arrive at the kingdom unless they are overcome. But it is not absolutely necessary for temptations to come, except in accord with the corruption of the present state, from which there follows the struggle of the flesh against the spirit, which is called “temptation.”

Reply Obj. 5: Paul, praying for the thorn in his flesh to be removed, prayed rightly, provided his thorn is considered absolutely. But because, when the outcome of the struggle in which he was going to be the victor is taken into consideration, the removal of the thorn was not expedient for him, though he himself was not certain of this outcome, he is said not to have known what he was praying for. Hence when he was made certain of victory by the word of the Lord saying: my grace is sufficient for you (2 Cor 12:9), he patiently bore the thorn.

Question 2

The temptation of our first parents

Then the question is asked specifically about the temptation of our first parents. Concerning this three questions are asked:

first, about the stages of the temptation;

second, about the magnitude of the sin that followed the temptation;

third, whether Adam could have sinned venially before sinning mortally.

Article 1

Whether the devil tempted Eve out of envy and in the form of a serpent

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the stages of temptation were not as they are described in the text. (Sent. II, 21.5(126)‒6(127).)

Obj. 1: For envy is with respect to a superior. Hence it is said: envy slays the little one (Job 5:2). (RSV reads jealousy slays the simple.) But Adam was not superior to the demon, at least in the demon’s own estimation, since he was exceedingly prideful. Therefore, there is no motive to temptation due to envy.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the first state the soul had command altogether over the body. Therefore, the differences on the part of the body in no way overflowed into the soul. But woman differed from man in disposition of body. Hence the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.9, 1058b22.) says that male and female differ by material differences. Therefore, there was at that time no necessity that the woman be less wise or strong than the man. Thus, there seems to be no reason why the devil would have proceeded in tempting the man through the woman.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, temptation is a resemblance to the good in order to deceive, as Cassiodorus says in On the Psalms. (Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (ca. 485– 585 AD), In origine super Psalmos, quoted in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2, dist. 21, a. 1.) Therefore, if that iniquitous persuader arranged to tempt man, he should have assumed the form of a good persuader, namely, an angel.

Obj. 4: One might say that he was not permitted to do so lest man be deceived, violently as it were.

On the contrary, it pertains to a pious guardian to offer the help of greater defense to those who are weaker. Therefore, since after sin, when human nature is weaker, Satan is not prevented from transforming himself into an angel of light, as it says (2 Cor 11:14), all the more should he not have been prevented then.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, actually considering the precept withdraws one from sin, and in this way impedes the effect of temptation. Therefore, if the tempter came for the purpose of leading into sin, it seems unfitting that he quoted the precept to the woman, recalling it to her memory.

On the contrary, it is said: through the devil’s envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24). Thus, it seems that the devil was moved to tempt out of envy.

Furthermore, as Augustine says, the order of internal temptation that now exists in us represents the order of temptation found in our first parents. But in us temptation begins from sensuality and is led to higher reason through lower reason. Therefore, since sensuality represents the serpent, lower reason the woman, and higher reason the man, it seems that such an order of temptation in the first sin was most appropriate, so that in it a likeness of the sins to follow might be shown.

I answer that, as the Master has said, (Sent. II, 7.10(42).1.) demons are capable of some things through the power of their nature that they cannot do because God or the angels prevent them. So, too, their keenness of intellect and wickedness of will are impeded in many cases such that they do not do everything they wish, even what they keenly see to be fitting for their intended end. Hence in the temptation of our first parents, the devil did something he wished to do, namely, he began the temptation with the woman and came under the guise of a strange form. However, the fact that he came in the form of a serpent was not something he chose on his own, but rather was from the divine permission, which prohibited him from assuming other appearances under which he could hide more effectively, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 21.4(125).1.)

Reply Obj. 1: The devil envied the human being, whom he reckoned was going to be higher than him, if humans should ascend to the place from which he himself had descended. In this respect he regarded the human as already superior, since the human was prepared for the possession of the good that the demon had lost forever. Nor does this take away anything of his pride, since pride is in the desire for excellence rather than the perception of it, except insofar as perception is born from the desire for excellence, which closes the eyes of the mind. Hence the proud frequently perceive others as superior to themselves in many things, yet think that those things are owed much more to themselves on account of other goods in which they seem to excel others. Thus, it is from pride itself that the zeal of envy arises. Hence Augustine says: by loving his own excellence, each one either envies his equals because they are regarded as equal to him, or his inferiors lest they be regarded as equal to him, or his superiors because he is not regarded as equal to them. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 14 (CSEL 28.1:346; PL 34:436).)

Reply Obj. 2: The obedience of the body to the soul in the first state is one thing, and its obedience in the last state is another. For in the first state the body was subject to the soul in such a way that nothing could occur in the body that would be contrary to the good of the soul, either with regard to existence or with regard to activity. Yet this does not take away the fact that even at that time there would have been differences in the dignity of souls on the basis of bodily differences, since there must be a proportion of soul to body, as of form to matter and of mover to moved. Thus, woman was more imperfect than man even with regard to the soul. However, in the last state the subjection will be such that the quality of the body also follows on the virtue of the mind. Hence it will be on the basis of the differences of merit that the soul of one will have greater dignity than another, and one body will be more glorious than another. Hence there will not then be a difference due to sexual differences.

Reply Obj. 3: As it says in the text, (Sent. II, 21.4(121).1.) he would readily have chosen another appearance in which to appear, especially that of a good angel, but he was not permitted to do so.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though in his first state a person would have been bolder, after sin he became more cautious through the experience of evil. Hence a person knows better how to resist the deceptions of the enemy that he daily experiences. Or else it is because it followed as a penalty of sin that the human being, who of his own accord subjected himself to the devil, would be more violently assaulted by him.

Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3 and 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b28; 7.2, 1145b21–1146b5.) every wicked person is, in a certain way, ignorant. For, in the one sinning, the reason’s judgment must be corrupted, since it chooses evil in place of good. Now, this occurs in two ways: either as regards the universal or as regards the particular. As the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b13–19.) right judgment of the particular is corrupted by delight as well as other passions, which could not have existed in humans at that time apart from the rule of reason. Thus, it would have to have been that judgment was corrupted as regards the universal. And thus, the tempter called the precept back to memory in order to corrupt right judgment by false persuasions and in this way incline to sin.

Or we may say, as Augustine says, that the serpent first asked and the woman responded so that the woman would be without excuse in trespassing and so that it could not in any way be said that she had forgotten what God had commanded, although even forgetting the precept, most of all this one and most necessary precept, would have pertained to the greatest fault of damnable negligence. Nevertheless, the transgression of the precept is more evident by being held in memory, and God, as being present and offering assistance in the very precept, is himself spurned. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 30 (CSEL 28.1:362; PL 34:445).)

Article 2

Whether the sin of Adam was graver than all other sins

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST II-II.158.3.) It seems that the sin of Adam was graver than all other sins.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says in the City of God: one who has great ease in not sinning has great iniquity in sinning. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 15 (CCSL 48; PL 41:423).) But Adam was more easily able to avoid sin than anyone who followed him. Therefore, he sinned more gravely.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that something is evil due to the fact that it takes away from the good. (Augustine, De natura boni, ch. 6 (CSEL 25:857; PL 42:553).) But the sin of the first man took away more from the good than any subsequent sins have, by corrupting the whole of human nature. Therefore, it was worse than the rest.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a greater fault is due a greater punishment. But Adam’s sin was punished most severely by God, since the punishment extends to all his descendants. Therefore, it was graver than the rest.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it was even unforgivable. For the good of grace exceeds the good of nature. Now, the angels fell through sin from a state of natural endowments alone, according to the opinion of those who say that they were only created in a state of natural endowments, whereas man fell even from the state of grace. Therefore, since the higher the level the graver the fall, it seems that Adam’s sin was even more unforgivable than that of the demons.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, good is more potent than evil. But Adam corrupted the whole of human nature through sin, since it was in him as its origin. Therefore, if he could have repented and in this way obtained a remedy for his sin, it seems that he could have reintegrated the whole of human nature. But this is false, since only the Son of God could do this. Therefore, the same follows as before.

On the contrary, that which has more reasons why it is evil is more evil. But Adam sinned by doing what was evil only because it was prohibited, whereas many sin by doing what is evil in both ways: both in itself and because it is prohibited. Therefore, it seems that there are many whose sins are graver than the sin of Adam.

Furthermore, a sin out of certain malice is more grave than a sin through ignorance. But man’s first sin was in a certain way through ignorance, as will be clear below. (Below: d. 22, q. 2.) Therefore, it seems that there are many other sins graver than it, which are carried out due to a definite malice.

I answer that we can consider many factors in a sin from which it can derive gravity. Sometimes a sin is graver in one respect and lighter in another. But we must consider as graver simply that which is found to be graver in more, and in more important respects, especially with regard to the species of sin. For magnitude following on the species of sin is more essential than magnitude following on the circumstances of sin.

Therefore, in this regard we should say that the sin of Adam was graver than others with respect to the fact that he fell when impelled by a lesser temptation, one that he could have more easily resisted. But with regard to the species of sin and other circumstances that can aggravate a sin more, there are many graver sins that have since followed.

Reply Obj. 1: And in this way, the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that this sin brought greater harm was incidental, that is, due to its occurrence in an integral nature. Hence it does not follow that it was graver than the rest, since the sins that have followed could also have done the same if they had occurred in such a nature, just as when a mortal sin does not deprive someone of grace because it is not there, though it would deprive him if grace were present.

Reply Obj. 3: The punishment of Adam’s sin is spoken of in two ways. One punishment is due to it inasmuch as it is an individual and personal sin. And in this way, a graver punishment was due to many other sins. The other is due to it indirectly by reason of the original infection of sin created from it. And in this way, the greatest punishment followed the first sin. But the gravity of this punishment is not commensurate with the magnitude of the first sin as a personal sin, but rather as corrupting the nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though grace exceeds nature, nonetheless because natural potency is what serves the substance of an act (one informed by grace), the lack of a natural good excuses a sinful act even more than lack of grace. For grace does not elevate a man in such a way that he immediately elicits an act of God-like understanding, and yet angels have this by nature. And thus, superiority of nature leads rather to a more unforgiveable sin than abundance of grace. But the reason why an angel’s sin is unforgivable and not a man’s has been spoken of above in the treatment of the angels. (Above: d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, resp.)

Reply Obj. 5: Just as man can lose grace by himself and yet cannot recover grace by himself, since grace exceeds the power of nature, so also man could lose the integrity of innocence, which exceeded the condition of nature, as has been said, (Above: d. 20, q. 2, a. 3.) and yet was not able to recover it, with the exception of him who was above nature. For the grace that afterwards is believed to have been given to Adam only extended to personal acts. Hence it could not elevate nature to what is above it, namely, to original justice and impassibility, which were above the condition of the principles of human nature.

Article 3

Whether in the state of innocence Adam could have sinned venially

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.89.3; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 2, a. 8, ad 1; q. 7, a. 3, ad 13; a. 7.) It seems that in the first state Adam could have sinned venially.

Obj. 1: For disposition precedes perfection. But a venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Therefore, it seems that he sinned venially prior to sinning mortally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision stands in relation to opposites, especially if it is not confirmed. But in the first state man’s free decision was not confirmed. Therefore, just as he was able not to sin venially, so also he was able to sin venially.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever can do what is greater can do what is less. But it is greater to sin mortally than to sin venially. Therefore, since he was able to sin mortally, he could also sin venially.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, mortal sin is more opposed to uprightness and grace than venial sin. But the uprightness of innocence did not impede his being able to sin mortally. Therefore, all the less did it impede his ability to sin venially as well.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is impossible for one to believe or esteem something of whose contrary he is certain. But Adam, as Augustine says, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 9 (CCSL 48; PL 41:420).) believed that the sin he would commit was venial. Therefore, he himself did not know that he was unable to sin venially. But if he had been unable, he would have known that he was unable. For this belonged to his nobility, and it is incongruous for us to possess the most noble habits and they would be hidden to us, as the Philosopher says in the Posterior Analytics 2. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b24–27.) Therefore, Adam was able to sin venially.

Obj. 6: It might be said that he was not able to sin venially because the lower powers would not have been able to be turned away if higher reason had not first been turned away.

On the contrary, in higher reason there is not only mortal sin, but also venial sin. Therefore, it would have been possible for there to be a disordering in the higher reason through a venial sin, as when one feels some motion of infidelity.

On the contrary, in us venial sin is caused due to propensity to sin and due to a certain impulse of corrupt flesh. But all this has arisen through sin. Therefore, it seems that before mortal sin, there could not have been venial sin.

Furthermore, a small motive does not move great virtue. But venial sin has a small motive, one in which the appetite does not rest as in an end. Therefore, since human virtue in the first state was quite strong, it seems that it could not have been moved through venial sin.

I answer that, as has been said above, (Above: d. 20, q. 2, a. 3.) the uprightness of the first state was such that the higher part of reason was subject to God, to it were subject the lower powers, and the body was subject to them, in such a way that the first subjection was the cause of the second, and so forth. But if the cause remained, the effect would remain. Hence just as man, as long as he was subordinate to God, could suffer the occurrence of nothing contrary to the soul in the parts of his body, so also nothing could occur in the powers of the soul that higher reason did not order to God. But what is rightly ordered to God is not a venial sin. And thus, venial sin could not have occurred in the first state, as neither could death, unless the order of the mind to God were first taken away, and this could not happen without mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of disposition. One kind is necessary for the being of that to which it disposes. And this kind of disposition always precedes that to which it disposes, as heat precedes the form of fire. The other kind of disposition is ordered to the facility of that to which it disposes, which can exist without it, though not as easily, as when wood is soaked in oil in order for it to catch fire more quickly. And it is in this way that venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: In the first state Adam had the freedom of choice to sin venially, but this could not proceed to act without his first sinning mortally. And the reason for this has been stated.

Or it may be said that when we compare free decision to its object, it was not confirmed, whereas when we compare one order to another, it had a sort of confirmation, namely, that the lower order would follow the higher without change.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a difference between active potencies and passive potencies. For in active potencies, what is capable of more is capable of less, as one who can carry one hundred pounds can also carry ten. But in passive potencies the converse is true. For one who can undergo from what is small can also undergo from what is greater, as when someone is able to be conquered by one person he can also be conquered by two, but these are not convertible. And the potential to sin is this kind of potency. For one who sins is conquered by concupiscence for his sin.

Reply Obj. 4: The uprightness of original justice was so opposed to mortal fault that it could not exist together with it, though mortal fault that was opposed to it could bring about its deprivation. But a venial fault could neither bring about the deprivation of original justice, whose principle was in the ordering of the higher part to God, from whom venial sin does not separate one, nor could it exist together with original justice on account of the ordering of the lower under the higher.

Reply Obj. 5: Even if Adam was not able to sin venially, he was still able not to be certain of this fact. For the fact that the most noble habits are not hidden to us applies to habits of the cognitive part, concerning whose perfection there is certitude, not to habits of the affective part, which are hidden, as is clear in the case of charity. And besides, if he had known this as a universal truth, he would have been able not to consider it in a particular case.

Or, better, we can say that venial sin is spoken of in three ways. First, venial from the genus, such as an idle word. Second, venial from the cause, such as what is performed out of weakness or ignorance, which have a kind of excusability. Third, venial from the outcome, as when a subsequent confession makes a preceding mortal fault to be venial, as Ambrose says, (See Ambrose of Milan (ca. 339–397 AD), De paradiso, bk. 1, ch. 14, paras. 71–72 (CSEL 32.1:328; PL 14:310–11); bk. 1, ch. 5 (CSEL 32.1:285; PL 14:286–87); De interpellatione Job et David, bk. 1, ch. 6 (CSEL 32.2:222; PL 14:843–44); De apologia David, verse 12 (PL 14:911–16).) since the guilt of temporal punishment remains. Therefore, since Augustine says that he believed the sin was venial, this is understood as meaning venial from the cause, which is sometimes also mortal simply.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as in the speculative intellective part, the highest part is that which adheres to principles that are known through themselves, so also in practical reason the highest part is that which clings to the end, since the end in practical matters is like a first indemonstrable principle in speculative ones, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 and 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b16; 7.8, 1151a15–19.) And this part can only be disordered through mortal sin, which sets up a contrary end. But the whole order of original justice depended on the ordering of this part. And thus, there could have been no de-ordering in it if he had not first sinned mortally.

Exposition of the text

The devil tempted through the serpent in whom he spoke. (Sent. II, 21.2(123).2.) The manner in which good or wicked angels can speak in assumed bodies has been treated of above. (Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2 (In II Sent.), d. 8, q. 1, a. 4.)

‘The serpent is said to be more cunning.’ (Sent. II, 21.3(124).1, quoting Genesis 3:1.) This seems to be false, since any animal that the devil assumed would have had the same cleverness if he was not crafty by his own cleverness, as he adds.

But it should be said that in the things that were visibly carried out, those which are not seen could be understood. Now, even if a serpent would not have the craftiness to harm man spiritually, it does have the craftiness to harm him in a bodily way. Hence the outward craftiness of the serpent denotes the spiritual craftiness of the demon. And thus, it is said to be more clever than the other animals on account of the demon’s craftiness by which it was moved and through which the devil was designated.

‘In the same way that he speaks through the possessed and the insane.’ (Sent. II, 21.4(125).2, quoting Strabo, In Genesim 3:1.) The possessed, or “energumens,” are called this as “laboring inwardly,” from en (“in”) and ergon (“labor”). The insane, “fanatics,” are so called from the fact that they received replies from demons in the “fana” or temples of the idols. But both are taken here for those seized by a demon.

Avarice is the immoderate desire of having. (Sent. II, 21.5(126).6.) What is said here of avarice should not be understood of it as a specific vice, one of the seven capital vices. For in this way, it does not differ from pride, which is an immoderate appetite for one’s own excellence. Rather, here avarice is taken as being a general vice leading to all sins, which consist in the appetite for any natural goods, like curiosity, pride, and things of this sort, a distinction that Augustine makes. (See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 15, para. 19 (CSEL 28.1:347; PL 34:436–37).)