D. 1 - The Incarnation

Division of the text

After the Master has spent Books I and II considering things that are divine in virtue of their coming forth from their beginning, in this book he begins to consider the things that are called “divine” in according to their return to their final end—that is, to God. This part, then, is divided into two parts.

In the first, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3 (Sent. III).) he considers that return to the end from the side of the one who leads them back.

In the second, (Sent. IV.) he considers the things needed by those who are led back, namely, the sacraments, which dispose one toward grace; this is treated in the fourth book.

The first of these (Sent. III.) is divided into two parts.

In the first, (Sent. III, distinctions 1–22.) he considers the one who leads them back as the agent cause—namely, the Incarnate God.

In the second, (Sent. III, distinctions 23–50.) he considers the things that lead them back as formal causes, such as the virtues and the gifts: since it has been shown above that Christ was filled with grace, it is not pointless to inquire whether he had faith and hope, as he had charity. (Sent. III, d. 23, ch. 1 (74), para. 1 (Sent. III, 23.1[74].1).)

The first of these, Distinctions 1–22, is divided into two parts.

In the first, Distinctions 1–6, he considers the divine Incarnation;

in the second, Distinctions 6–23, he treats the characteristics of the incarnate God himself. This begins at Distinction 6: but from the foregoing emerges a question which contains much usefulness. (Sent. III, 6.1(17).1.)

The first of these, Distinctions 1–5, is divided into three parts.

In the first, (Sent. III, distinction 1.) he considers the Incarnation on the part of the one who assumes the flesh, who he is.

In the second, (Sent. III. distinctions 2–4.) he considers it on the part of what was assumed, at Distinction 2: and because the whole human nature was corrupted in man by sin, he took it whole. (Sent. III, 5.1(4).1.)

In the third, (Sent. III, distinctions 5–6.) he considers it on both sides—namely, the sort of thing that it is. This begins at Distinction 5: moreover . . . it is necessary to inquire which of these is more to be granted. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).1.)

The first of these, Distinction 1, is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows through the authority of the Apostle that the person who assumes is the Son.

In the second, he looks for the reason why it is the Son rather than another of the persons, where he says, but it is diligently to be noted why the Son took on flesh, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit. (Sent. III, 1.1.1.)

In the third part, he excludes an objection, at but perhaps some will say. (Sent. III, 1.3.1.)

But it is diligently to be noted why the Son. (Sent. III, 1.1.1.) Here he provides the reason why it was the person of the Son who assumed flesh, and this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he says that it was more suitable that the Son become incarnate, rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit.

In the second, he inquires whether it was possible for the Father or the Holy Spirit to become incarnate, at but if it is asked whether the Father or the Holy Spirit could have become incarnate, or could even do so now, it may be answered affirmatively: that the Father or the Holy Spirit could formerly and can now take on flesh. (Sent. III. 1.2.)

Concerning the first point, he gives three reasons why it was the Son who assumed flesh.

The first is taken from something appropriated to the Son: that he is wisdom.

The second is taken from his origin: that he is from another. This is given, at and so also the Son is sent. (Sent. III, 1.1.3.)

The third is taken from what is proper to him: that he is the Son, at and this was done so that he who was Son of God in divinity should become Son of man in humanity. (Sent. III, 1.1.4.)

Here there are two questions:

first, about the Incarnation;

and second, about the person assuming flesh.

Question 1

The Incarnation itself

Regarding the first, four things are asked:

first, whether it was possible for God to become incarnate;

second, whether it was suitable;

third, whether there would have been an Incarnation if man had not sinned;

fourth, concerning the time of the Incarnation.

Article 1

Whether it was possible for God to become incarnate

To the first we proceed thus. It appears that it was impossible for God to assume flesh.

Obj. 1: For anything that can be united with another is capable of that union. But anything capable of something is brought into act either through a motion or undergoing, and by something else as the first agent, since the same thing cannot be both mover and moved, agent and patient. Therefore, since it is impossible for God to change or undergo anything, and neither can anything be prior to him, it appears that he could not be united with flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is perfect in existence is not united to anything in an essential union. For an essential union is due to act and potency, or form and matter, and both of these are imperfect in existence. Therefore what is perfect in every way cannot be united to another in any way at all, for what is completely perfect admits of no addition, since it lacks nothing. But God is perfect in every way, since he possesses every perfection in advance, as not only Dionysius says but also the Philosopher and his Commentator. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, n. 4, 10 (Patrologia Graeca [PG] 3:818); Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b30–33; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, l. 18, n. 1040; text. 21.) Therefore God himself cannot be united with another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is no proportion between things infinitely distant. Now, where there is no proportion, no union is possible—which is why not everything is capable of being united with anything. Therefore, since God and things created are infinitely distant, it seems that God cannot be united to something created.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the distance between God and anything created is greater than that between two contraries, for contraries agree in genus, while God is not contained in any genus. But two contraries cannot exist together in the same thing. Therefore neither can human nature and the divine nature exist in one person; thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the infinity of the divine power necessitates that it be neither a body nor a power in a body, as was shown. (Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a12–b24.) But God’s power can never be finite; therefore, God can never be a body or a power in a body. But to be incarnate is to be a body, or a power in a body; therefore, God cannot become incarnate.

On the contrary, God can do more than man can say: no word will be impossible for God (Luke 1:37). (The RSV says, with God nothing will be impossible.) But for God to assume human nature, is something that man can say, and this saying neither implies a contradiction nor asserts a defect in God. All the more, then, is God able to do it.

Furthermore, things that have a likeness are easily united. But man was created according to the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26–27). Therefore, in the person, human nature is in a certain way capable of union with divine nature.

Furthermore, among created things, the nature is divided according to a division of supposits. But in the divine, there can be more than one person in the one nature. Therefore with equal reason there can be many natures in one person; thus the same conclusion follows as before.

I answer that a union of two or three things can exist in three ways. In one way, insofar as things are united to each other only through their joining in something else that is one. But conversely, some things are united by their union to each other in a something made one from their being joined. Finally, some are united through their being joined to each other, but not in something one, because nothing results from their being joined.

The first of these occurs in four ways. Either the two things can be joined in one thing that is the same in number: thus the two arms are joined in the chest, or two branches that touch only in the one trunk. Or they may be one in virtue of their species, as Socrates and Plato are joined in man. Or they may be one in genus, as man and donkey are joined in animal. Or they may be one by analogy or proportion, as substance and quality are joined in being; for just as substance is related to the existence appropriate to it, so also is quality related to that existence suitable to its genus. Now, things that are joined to each other in some one thing constituted from their union are like matter and form; for form is joined to matter as its perfection, and both are joined together in their common nature. Similarly, the parts of continuous quantity are joined to each other in such a way that a certain whole arises from them, in which the two parts share. And those things that are united to each other but not in some one thing are like an accident and its subject. What is produced out of these is not something one through itself, of which the subject and its accident could be called parts, as is proved in the Metaphysics 8. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a5–b5.)

Now, because there is no comparison of earthly things to God, as Hilary says in On the Trinity I, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 1, n. 19 (CCSL 62; PL 10:38).) nor will human reason furnish a parallel adequate to divine things. It must be known that none of these modes is entirely suitable to the ineffable union by which God has been united to man. Nonetheless, some of these modes do represent that mode of union in a certain respect. Therefore, one should know that the middle mode by which things are united to each other—such that from them some third thing results—does not belong to God in any way. For two things that are joined together in this way relate to the third as its parts, but the notion of a part, like that of the imperfect, is altogether remote from God.

The first and third ways, however, can belong to God in a certain respect. For on the part of the one assuming, two things can be considered in the Incarnation—namely, the person and the nature. Now, if we consider the person who is assuming, then it is united to the human nature being assumed according to the third mode of being joined; for the divine person does become a person of this human nature, but no third thing arises from these two things. Likewise in the case of Socrates, no third thing arises out of his person and nature, but rather his person subsists in his human nature. However, if we consider the nature of the one assuming, then its union to human nature is according to the first way of being united, inasmuch as the two natures come together in one person, while in their natural properties they are nevertheless distinct. This is why the Incarnation is compared to grafting. For just as, in grafting, in the same trunk where there was one branch by nature another branch is grafted, likewise, in the same person in whom the divine nature existed naturally, a human nature exists by union. However, it is impossible for God and a created thing to share in one genus or species, but it is possible by analogy. But this was the case from the time that created things began to be, and therefore this is not relevant to the present question.

Reply Obj. 1: It sometimes happens among relative things that something is said relatively, not because it is itself referred to another, but because the other is referred to it, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1020b20; 1021a26–32; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 17, nn. 1026–29.) just as the knowable is said relative to knowledge. In such cases, the thing begins to be called what it was not called previously, without any change occurring in it, but only in the other thing. For without any change occurring in the knowable thing, it begins to be known by me through a change in me. Likewise, the thing is said to be knowable not through any passive power that is in it, but through a power that is in the knower.

This is how it is in the point at issue. For the Creator can be referred to the thing created only insofar as the thing created, in which the relation really exists, is referred to him, as was said in Book I, Distinction 30. (In I Sent., d. 30, aa. 1, 3.) For this reason, God is said to be united not through a change of himself, but through a change in that to which he is being united. And likewise, when he is said to be capable of union, this is not said on account of any passive power existing in God, but on account of a power in the creature such that it can be united to him.

Or it could be said that the expression “capable of union” does not mean a passive power, but an active one. Yet this response is unsuitable for two reasons. First, from the very signification of the expression, since “capable of union” signifies what is able to be united, whereas “unitive” signifies what is able to unite. Second, because a power belongs to whatever performs the action, so, because the action of uniting belongs to the whole Trinity without distinction, then if “capable of union” indicates an active power of uniting, it will belong to the whole Trinity without distinction, and will not belong more to the Son, as it says in the text. (See Sent. III, 1.3.1–2.)

Reply Obj. 2: What is perfect in itself is united to something else not in order to acquire any perfection, but to communicate it. Thus God willed to be united to man not for his own sake, since he has nothing that could increase his own perfection, but for man’s sake, who had to be rescued. So too is God in all things through his essence, presence, and power, pouring his goodness upon them all, although nothing is added to him by this.

Reply Obj. 3: “Proportion” is said in two ways. In one way, a proportion is the same as the exactness of the measure of two quantities, and such a proportion can exist only between two finite things, one of which exceeds the other some exact and determinate respect. In another way, a relation of order is called a “proportion,” as when we say that there is a proportion between matter and form because matter is related in an order such that it can be perfected by form, and this is in virtue of a certain capacity for proportion. For just as form can give existence, so too matter can receive that same existence. It is also in this way that a mover and a thing moved should be capable of proportion, and an agent and it patient as well—namely, just as an agent is able to impress upon its patient a certain effect, so the patient is able to receive the same. Nor is it necessary that the passive power of the receiver be commensurate with the active power of the agent, either in number—as by his art one artisan can give to wood many forms, like the form of a chest and the form of a saw, whereas the wood can receive only one of them—nor even in intention—for by his art, the artisan is capable of producing a beautiful carving that nevertheless knotted wood is not capable of receiving. And therefore it is not unfitting that the latter sort of proportion be preserved between God and what is created, even though they are infinitely distant. And therefore the union of the two is possible.

Reply Obj. 4: Contraries can never be united such that they belong to the same thing in the same way, but this is not the way the created thing is united to the Creator. For as Damascene says, whatever was uncreatable remains uncreatable, and whatever was creatable remains creatable. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).)

Reply Obj. 5: There are various ways in which a thing is said to be a “power in a body.” In one way, because it is a form of a body and has no activity except through the mediation of the body. And this is how the sensitive powers, as well as those that are beneath them in dignity, are said to be “powers in the body.” In another way, something is said to be a “power in a body” because it is the form giving existence to the body, although it does not act through the mediation of the body even though its activity needs the body, through which its object is represented to it. And it is in this manner that the potential intellect is a power in a body. In yet another way, what is the form of a body can be called the “power in a body” even though it neither acts through the mediation of the body nor receives anything from the body, the way those who held that the heavens were animated by an intellectual soul spoke about the souls of the spheres. So it is evident that to be a “power in a body” signifies either to be a form of a body or, along with this, in some way to depend upon a body for its activity. But we say neither of these things about God insofar as he is incarnate. Whence, to hold him to be incarnate it need not be that we assert that he is a power in a body or to be in any way limited to a body.

Article 2

Whether it was fitting for God to incarnate

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallels: Summa Theologiae III, q. 1, a. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles IV, cc. 40, 49, 53–55; Compendium Theologiae, cc. 200, 201.) Although it was possible, it appears that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate.

Obj. 1: For just as wickedness is opposed to goodness, so is weakness to majesty. But it is not becoming for the supreme goodness to assume any wickedness. Therefore any and every weakness is unbecoming to the supreme majesty. Now, anyone who is wise avoids what is unbecoming. Therefore, since God is the most wise, he ought in no way assume our nature, which is weak.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sin of man and the sin of the angel were of the same kind, since each one sinned through pride. But God did not remedy the sin of the angels by the assumption of a nature. Hence he ought not to have remedied the sin of man through the Incarnation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, creation corresponds to re-creation. But God did not assume anything created for the creation of man. Hence neither was it fitting for him to become incarnate to re-create him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as it is said in Psalm 145:9, his compassion is over all that he has made. Therefore, it was more becoming that God should show the immensity of his mercy than the severity of his justice. But the forgiveness of sins without making satisfaction pertains to the magnitude of his mercy; this is why we too are instructed by God to forgive our debtors gratuitously. Therefore, too, it was fitting for God to restore human nature gratuitously, and not by requiring satisfaction. Thus it was not suitable for God to become a man in order to make satisfaction on behalf of men.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, since God is merciful to the highest degree, no cruelty should be attributed to him. But it is cruel to require from someone what exceeds his ability. Therefore God does not require of a man a satisfaction that he cannot fulfill. Thus man can make satisfaction by himself, and it was not necessary that God become incarnate.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever can make satisfaction for a greater sin can also make satisfaction for a lesser. But an actual mortal sin is greater than original sin, since it is more voluntary. Therefore, since a man can make satisfaction for a mortal sin, so much the more can he make satisfaction for original sin; thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, in our first parent, original and actual sin were the same thing. But he himself made satisfaction for his actual sin through his repentance. Therefore, he was able to make satisfaction for original sin; and thus the same follows as before.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 4 (PG 3:503), ch. 4, n. 3, ch. 7, n. 3, ch. 8, n. 2.) the law of divinity is to bring back the things that are last through intermediaries. But man had been cast down from God through sin. Therefore, since the angelic nature is a middle between the divine nature and the human, as is shown in Chapter 4 of the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 2 (PG 3:179).) it appears that, although man was not sufficiently able to make satisfaction, this ought to have come about through an angel, and not through God incarnate.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, any created good is finite. But the good of the whole of human nature is created. Furthermore, God is able to make something greater than any finite thing whatsoever. Therefore God can make one created thing whose goodness would outweigh the good of the whole of human nature. Therefore, trough this created thing, God could have made compensation for the corruption of the whole of human nature. Thus it appears that it was not necessary for God to become incarnate in order to restore the human race.

On the contrary, it was not fitting that one of the noblest creatures should entirely fail to attain its end. But human nature is among the noblest of natures. Therefore, since the whole was corrupted in the first parent through sin, and thus deprived of the beatitude for which it had been made, it was fitting that it be restored. But mankind cannot be restored unless sin is forgiven, and it is not just for sin to be forgiven without satisfaction being made. Therefore satisfaction needed to be made for the sin of the whole of human nature. But satisfaction can be made suitably only by the one who should and is able to make the satisfaction. Therefore it ought to have been done in this way. But only man, who sinned, should make the satisfaction, and only God is able to. For, far from being able to make satisfaction on behalf of another, every created thing owes all its existence to God. And thus no created thing can make satisfaction on behalf of man, and neither can he himself do so on his own behalf, since he is rendered unworthy by his sin.

Furthermore, no created thing’s good exceeds the good of human nature, such that it could make recompense for the whole of human nature. Therefore it was fitting that God become man to make satisfaction on man’s behalf.

Furthermore, Wisdom 7:30 says, against wisdom evil does not prevail. But it was through the wickedness of the devil and of man that human nature, which is God’s handiwork, had been cast down as far as it could be cast down into guilt and wretchedness. Therefore it was becoming that the wisdom of God raise human nature up as far as it could be raised up. Therefore, since human nature can be assumed into the unity of a divine person, as was said before, it seems to have been suitable for God to assume human nature.

Furthermore, James 4:6 says, God opposes the proud. But it is through pride that the devil, being envious of man, resolved to make him his slave, and held him in servitude unjustly, since man was created for the service of God. Therefore it was becoming that almighty God oppose the wickedness of the devil, so that not only would he snatch man from the devil’s power, but would also effect a reversal, establishing man as the lord of the devil. But since nothing created is above the angelic nature, which the devil has, this could not be unless the man who did this were lord of the angels—which belongs to God alone. Therefore it was becoming that God become man, so that thus, at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth (Phil 2:10).

I answer that no demonstrative argument can be given for things that belong to faith, since faith is said in Hebrews 11:1 to be about things that are not apparent, and this is especially true of those things that arise from the pure will of God, like the Incarnation. Consequently, no demonstrative argument can be given in proof of the Incarnation, but neither can any be given to the contrary. For, because demonstration makes one know, but there is only knowledge of true things, everything that is demonstrated must be true, and its contrary false. For this reason, it suffices to defend the proposition that the Incarnation is not impossible, as was stated in the first article, and to show that there is a certain fittingness to the Incarnation, which is the purpose of this article.

Therefore one should know that, given the fall of human nature, the suitability of the Incarnation is apparent from three things: the fullness of divine mercy, the unchangeability of God’s justice, and the order befitting his wisdom. Therefore, because God is supremely good and merciful, it was becoming that he not deny to anything what lay in its capacity. Therefore, since human nature had fallen and yet was capable of being restored, it was becoming that he should restore it. Also, because his justice, whose law has ordained that sin is never forgiven without making satisfaction, is unchangeable, it was becoming that he establish in human nature one who was able to make satisfaction—for a mere man was not able to do so by himself, as will be said below. (Below,* ad 5.)* But because he is supremely wise, he should go to the most suitable mode of restoration, whereas the most suitable mode is that nature be restored integrally, and that man should be able to attain easily what he had lost. Now, if he had restored man through an angel, the restoration would not be integral, for then man would always be indebted for his salvation to the angel, and thus could not be made equal to the angel in beatitude. Yet man would have attained this if he had not sinned, just as men do so now through the grace of restoration, so that they are like angels in heaven (Matt 22:30). And for this reason, it was fitting that God himself, rather than an angel, restore man. Likewise, so that there would be an easy way of ascending to God, it was fitting that man rise to God from the things that are known to him in virtue of both his understanding and his affections. And because it is connatural to man, according to his present state of misery, to receive knowledge from visible things and to have affection for them, God fittingly became visible by assuming human nature, so that we might be caught up out of visible things into the love and knowledge of invisible things. (See the Praef. Nativ.)

Reply Obj. 1: What does not befit majesty is a weakness that brings it down and in some way envelops it. But this was not the sort of weakness under discussion, nor did the weakness of humanity diminish the power of his majesty through his Incarnation. For the two natures were united in one person without confusion or the possibility of alteration. And the notions of wickedness and weakness are not alike, for weakness does not by its notion deprive order from its end, and so a weakness could be taken up for the sake of some end. But “wickedness” is said in reference to a disordering from an end, and thereby it destroys all fittingness. For this reason it would have been completely unbecoming for the highest goodness to assume wickedness in any way.

Reply Obj. 2: The sin of man was remediable, but the sin of the angel was not. There are several reasons for this.

The first proceeds from the natural powers of each. In regard to the cognitive power, the angel understands in a full light, through his godlike intellect, so he is able to consider all that pertains to the choice of something, without investigation. As such, the angel has no excuse on account of ignorance, as man does, who only knows the things that should be done by deliberating through his reason, which is, as it were, a certain of dimness of understanding, as Isaac says in the book On Definitions. (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 299–340.) In regard to the affective power, it is because after making its choice, the will of the angel cannot turn back—for the will of the angel is below the divine will, which cannot turn back either before or after, and above the human will, which can turn both before and after. Therefore, the angel adheres unchangeably to the evil that he desired by sinning.

A second reason is taken from the nature of each. For unlike human nature, the nature of the angels is not propagated from one of them, from whom it contracts sin. And therefore neither is it fitting that the angelic nature be restored through one of the angels. This is what the Apostle seems to say in Romans 5:12: as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned.

A third is taken from the sin of each. First, with respect to the kind of sin: because man was arrogant in his appetite for a knowledge that a created nature is capable of, but the angel’s arrogance arose from an appetite for a power that a created nature cannot receive as perfectly as it receives knowledge. It is also for this reason that omniscience, but not omnipotence, was communicated to Christ’s soul. And second, with respect to the circumstance of the sin: because in sinning, man also thought about the possibility of forbearance, and was also deceived in a certain respect, as stated in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 4, a. 2, obj. 3; d. 22, q. 1, aa. 2, 3.) But this was not the case when the angel sinned. And likewise, with respect to the occasion of the sin, wherein the man sinned at the suggestion of another, but the angel did not.

A fourth reason is taken from the divine justice. For all of those to whom the corruption of the first man’s sin was due come did not yet exist in act, but only in power. Thus it was not fitting that, before they existed, they should receive their final damnation like all of the angels who, existing in act, sinned by their own choice.

A fifth reason is taken from the divine mercy. For the entire human nature fell in the one parent, but the entire angelic nature did not fall. For this reason, it was more unbecoming that the entirety of human nature should be abandoned to damnation than that this should happen to the angelic nature, which had not been ruined as a whole.

The sixth and chief reason proceeds from the state of each. For man did not sin at the end of his way as the angel did, for whom the state of being “on the way” ended at his own choice. And this argument harmonizes with Damascene’s statement that what the fall is for the angels, so is death for men, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 94:878).) as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 3: In creation, the thing created stands as the effect brought into existence through the creation. And therefore it is not necessary for the activity of creation to go forth from the thing created in any way, but rather to terminate in it. But in re-creation, the thing created stands as the one making satisfaction, which cannot occur without his own activity. And therefore, although creation is a work that God does not perform through anything created, nonetheless re-creation accomplished through the mode of redemption must be a work of God assuming a created nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Although God is in the highest degree merciful, yet his mercy does not in any way oppose his justice. For mercy that does away with justice should be called foolishness rather than virtue, and this does not befit God. Accordingly, God wished to manifest his infinite mercy in such a way as not to subtract anything from his justice; this he did when he became man for our sake, so that he might make satisfaction for us. This also displayed his mercy to us more fully than if he had forgiven the sin without anyone making satisfaction, inasmuch as he raised our nature up higher and underwent death on our behalf. Nonetheless, mercy in man’s case and God’s are dissimilar for two reasons. First, because God is himself the judge of all things, unlike any man whatsoever, and preservation of the order of justice belongs to him. This is also why that even a [human] judge should not by his own decision forgive wrongs without any punishment. Second, since God is goodness itself, a thing is evil by the very fact that it opposes him; and therefore, since an act ought to be punished only if it is evil, it is fitting that he avenge himself by punishing the sin committed against him. However, it is otherwise with man; and this is why man ought not to deal out punishment as though avenging himself, but as avenging God, if it is his office to do so. Thus it says in Deuteronomy 32:35, according to an alternate text, vengeance is mine, and I will repay.

Reply Obj. 5: The magnitude of a sin may be thought of from two aspects. The first is on the part of God, who is sinned against, and in this way the sin has a certain infinitude, as an offense against God; for a fault is more grave to the degree that the one offended is greater. Or it may be thought of on the part of the good that is corrupted through the sin, and in this way the magnitude of the fault is finite, inasmuch as it is the corruption of a nature. And thereby due satisfaction does require a man’s action proportioned to the magnitude of the fault, inasmuch as it is a certain corruption, and grace, whose power is in a certain way infinite since it suffices for meriting an infinite reward. Through grace, the satisfaction is made proportionate to the magnitude of the fault as an offense against God. And therefore man is not, of himself, sufficient to make satisfaction, because he cannot have grace of himself. Yet God is not cruel for requiring this satisfaction, because, although man cannot possess grace of himself, and thus cannot make satisfaction, he can nonetheless make satisfaction through the grace that God is ready to give.

Reply Obj. 6: The magnitude of original and actual mortal sin can be attended to in two ways: either with respect to their principle, or with respect to the good that is lost through each. Now, the principle of actual sin is one’s own will, while the principle of the original sin in a man is his wounded origin. Whence original sin is in a certain way necessary, but actual sin is wholly voluntary, and so has more of the notion of a fault and is more blameworthy. However, the good that is corrupted through actual sin is the good of this person, which is outweighed by the good of the whole nature corrupted through original sin, since the good of a people is more divine than the good of one man, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b9–10.) Whence too original sin is worse than actual sin. So it can be said that actual sin is the greater fault, while original sin is the greater evil.

Now, as was said above, the action of the one making satisfaction is proportioned to the magnitude of the fault in respect of the good that is corrupted through that fault. And since every action belongs to a person, since acts belong to individuals, in order to make satisfaction for an actual sin, the act of any man whatsoever, together with divine grace, would suffice. However, this would not suffice to make satisfaction for original sin—unless the action of that man were of a greater value than the whole good of human nature. And this could not be the case if he were a mere man. And therefore the one who was to make satisfaction for original sin needed to be God and man.

Or it should be said that, according to some, (See above, ad 5; ST Supplement 13.1.obj. 5.) a mere man is not sufficient to make satisfaction even for actual sin unless the satisfaction made by Christ is presupposed, whose suffering gave efficacy even to the satisfaction made by the patriarchs, who were saved through faith in him.

Reply Obj. 7: In the sin of the first man, a person corrupted a nature, and therefore that sin can be considered in two ways. Insofar as it was the corruption of a personal good, the first man, assisted by God’s grace, made satisfaction for it. But insofar as it was the corruption of the nature, Adam could not make satisfaction for it—nor could any of the patriarchs, except insofar as the corruption of the nature spilled over into his own person. For in this latter respect, the original sin within the patriarchs was absolved through their faith, tithing, circumcision, and sacrifices. And therefore the dead were not admitted to the vision of God until the corruption of their nature was first healed through the satisfaction made by Christ.

Reply Obj. 8: The restoration of the human race was, in a way, accomplished through the mediation of angels, for they themselves announced that the Lord would be born, as is said in Luke 1:13. Nonetheless, an angel was insufficient to fully accomplish this restoration, since he was unable to make satisfaction for the whole of human nature; nor ought he to have done so, since he himself had not sinned. So it was necessary, as said above in the main response, that the restoration of the human race be consummated through the God-man.

Reply Obj. 9: However great its created goodness might be, nothing create can be sufficient to restore the corruption of human nature through the mode of satisfaction. There can be three reasons for this.

First, everything created is in debt to God for all that it is capable of; whence, this leaves to it no capacity for making satisfaction on behalf of another.

Second, in making satisfaction, the one who makes satisfaction must give back something that outweighs, or is at least equal to, what was taken away through the offense. Now, although there is a created nature which is or can be better than human nature, nonetheless no nature in any person considered as created can equal the goodness of the whole of human nature. For the good of the human nature is in a certain way infinite in comparison to supposits, (That is, an individual substance, an instance of a nature (a "primary substance," in Aristotle's Categories); the word comes from sub ("under") and positum ("placed"), to indicate its being placed-under the universal or common nature.) inasmuch as human nature is, through generation, endlessly communicable. However, the good of any created nature whatsoever is both finite in itself, and is rendered finite insofar as it is considered in one determinate supposit. And therefore, since acts belong to supposits, it cannot be that the activity of any created thing is of as great a value as the whole good of human nature, such that it could be a worthy satisfaction for the restoration of that nature.

The third reason is that, as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 4.) human nature in its original condition received certain things through which it was elevated above the state befitting its proper principles—such as a certain immortality that proceeded from grace, not nature, as well as other such things bestowed upon it by the sheer generosity of God—and it lost these through sin. Whence, to restore this nature he elevated it to that loftier level wherein he had previously established it. However, raising any nature to a higher level is only possible to the one who established the natures and ordained their levels; and thus only God was able to restore human nature.

Article 3

Whether God would have been incarnate if man had not sinned

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.1.3; Super I ad Tim. 1, lect. 4.) It appears that God would not have been incarnate if man had not sinned.

Obj. 1: For his work is perfect, as it is said in Deuteronomy 32:4. But perfection is only possible if what is last is united with its beginning, so as to close a sort of circle, as it were, and to make any further addition is impossible. Therefore, since God is himself the first and man is the last of the things created, it was fitting for the perfection of the universe that God become man, even if man had not sinned.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, humility is a perfect virtue, as it says in a Gloss on Matthew 3:15: it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness. But every perfection should be attributed to God. Therefore he possesses the most perfect humility. But the most perfect degree of humility is that someone either join or subject himself to something inferior. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, it would have been fitting that God assume something created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Romans 1:20 says, his invisible nature . . . has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. But God’s power, wisdom, and goodness are infinite. Hence it was becoming that these would be manifested in some effect, even if man had not sinned. But infinite power is manifested only through an infinite effect; infinite wisdom, only through something infinitely beautiful; infinite goodness, only through its infinite communication. But since nothing created is infinite, nor is there in such things an infinite beauty resulting from the shape and proportion of their parts, nor again does anything created receive a communication of the infinite good, it appears that, even without man sinning, it was fitting that God be united to man. For then the notion of an effect would be there on the part of the man, while the infinity would be there on the part of God; and from the joining of the divine nature to a creature the infinite beauty would shine forth; and the infinite good would be communicated to human nature itself—namely, the uncreated person who would subsist in it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the capacity of human nature is in no way increased through sin. But after sin, human nature was found to be capable of a good so great as being assumed by God into the unity of a person. Therefore even before sin it was capable of this dignity. But it belongs to God, who loves with an infinite love those things that exist, to refuse a created thing no good of which it is capable. Therefore even if man had not sinned, he would have assumed a human nature.

Obj. 5: Again, it should not be believed that man obtained any advantage through sin. But the greatest dignity of human nature consists in being assumed into the unity of a divine person. Therefore man did not attain this through his sin; thus the same follows as before.

Obj. 6: Again, since man was created for beatitude, before sin the whole man was able to be made blessed. But for his sensitive part, man’s beatitude will consist in looking upon the humanity he assumed, whereas for his intellectual part it will consist in beholding the divinity that assumes it. For this is how, according to Augustine’s exposition of John 10, man will go in and go out and so find pasture. (This is found in fact in Alcher of Clairvaux, De Spiritu et Anima, c. 9 (PL 40:785), which work had once been ascribed to Augustine.) Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have assumed humanity.

Obj. 7: Again, in explaining the words of Jonah 1:12, it is because of me that this great tempest has come upon you, Bernard says that the devil saw the rational creature was to be assumed into the unity of the person of the Son of God and envied it, and that this envy caused his fall and moved him to tempt man. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on Advent, serm. 1, nn. 2–4 (PL 183:37); Non sic omnino BERNARDUS in loco citato. Sed, dicit diabolum aequalitatem divinam, quae Filii est, appetiisse, et ob hanc superbiam a Patre pro Filio zelante. Illico praecipitatum fuisse; homini vero invidisse et ut peccaret suasisse: tuncdixisse Filium : Propter me angelos perdidit multos, homines universos... Parma « recipiat, quos quodammodo propter me amisisse videtur. Si propter me tempestas haec orta est, etc. » Unde BERNARDUS intelligere videtur Filium incar-natum ob reparationem hominis per diabolum ex invidia perditum, non autemdiabolum ob invidiam assumptionis hominis in unitatem personae Filii Dei peccasse.) But if the Incarnation would not have occurred without man sinning, the devil would not have incited man to sin, since by doing so he would have helped man towards the good for which he envied him. Therefore even if man had not sinned, God would have been incarnate.

On the contrary, when explaining Matthew 18:11, the Son of man came to save the lost, (According to some ancient authorities, this verse is included as Matt 18:11; it can also be found in Luke 19:10.) in his book On the Words of the Apostle, Augustine says, if man had not sinned, the Son of man would not have come. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 174, "De verbis Apostoli," ch. 2 (CCSL 41Bb:509; PL 39:940).) But in this passage, the Lord is speaking of his coming into the flesh. Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have been incarnate.

Furthermore, 1 Timothy 1:15 reads, Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners. Here Augustine’s gloss says that the only cause of Christ’s coming was to save sinners: take away wounds, take away diseases, and there is no cause for medicine. (Augustine’s gloss (PL 114:626) says only, there was no cause for Christ’s coming other than to save sinners.) But if the cause is removed, so too is the effect. Therefore if there had been no sin, the Son of God would not have been incarnate.

Furthermore, in Hebrews 2:14, the Apostle says, since therefore the children share in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same nature, that through death he might destroy him who has the power of death. But according to Romans 5:12, death entered this world through sin. Therefore if there had been no sin, God would not have shared in flesh and blood through the Incarnation.

Furthermore, Gregory says, being born would have benefited us nothing had we not the benefit of being redeemed. (This preface is not in the Sacramentary of Gregory, according to the Migne edition, and it should not be ascribed to him, since it is written in the order of the Ambrosian mass. Whether this has authority is uncertain (PL 78:335).) But there would have been no redemption unless there had been slavery to sin. Therefore, if there had been no sin, the Son of God would not have been born in time.

I answer that the only one who can know the truth of this question is the one who was born and offered up because he willed it. (Moos 1933 references Isaiah 53:7.) For those things that depend solely on God’s will are unknown to us, except insofar as they are made known to us through the authority of the saints by whom God revealed his will. And because in the canon of Scripture, and the things said by the saints explaining it, the only reason indicated for the Incarnation is man’s redemption from the slavery of sin, some have stated with probability that if man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have become man. (Albert the Great, Commentary on the III Sentences, d. 20, a. 4; Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, p. 3, q. 2, memb. 13.) Indeed, this is to be found in the words of Pope Leo, in his homily on the Trinity: for if man, made in the image and likeness of God, had remained in his dignified state, the Creator of the world would not have become a creature, nor would the Eternal submit to temporality, nor would the Son of God, who was equal to God, assume the form of a slave. (Leo the Great, Sermon on Pentecost, ch. 2 (CCSL 138; 138Ae; PL 54:412).) Likewise Augustine, in his prayer to the Blessed Virgin: why would you give birth to the one who knows no sin, for the sake of sinners, if there were none who had sinned? Or why would you become the Mother of the Savior, if there were no need of salvation? Again, in commenting on Matthew 1:21, for he will save his people, Augustine says, if man had not sinned, the Virgin would not have given birth. (No luck finding this quote or the previous one. Moos has no note either.)

But others say that, since what was accomplished through the Incarnation of the Son of God was not only liberation from sin, but the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the whole universe, there would have been an Incarnation for these reasons, even if there had been no sin. This position can also be maintained with probability.

Reply Obj. 1: The universe is perfected in the joining of what is last to the first principle. However, it need not be perfected in a joining that happens in the unity of a person, but in the joining that happens through ordering to an end.

Reply Obj. 2: Some things that belong to man’s perfection would completely detract from God’s perfection. Hence, although humility is a perfect virtue in man, still it need not be present in God, if “humility” is being taken in its proper sense. This is evident from those species of pride that are opposed to humility, the first of which is when someone takes credit for a good that he possesses; in man, who has nothing from himself, this is a vice, but in God, who has nothing from anything outside of him, it belongs to the highest perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: God’s infinite power, wisdom, and goodness are manifested when he makes the least of things created, since everything created leads one to the knowledge of something first and highest that is infinite in every perfection. Nor is it necessary that his infinite power be manifested through an infinite effect, or his infinite goodness through an infinite communication of it. Rather, to show his infinite goodness it suffices that he bestow it upon each thing according to its capacity.

Reply Obj. 4: The capacity of a created thing can be understood in two ways. The first is according to its natural potency, which pertains to its seedlike principle. (For a discussion of seminales rationes, see In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.) In this respect, God does not leave empty any capacity of a created thing, generically speaking, although the capacity of some particular created thing may not be fulfilled, due to some impediment. The second is according to its obediential potency, whereby anything created is able to become what God wills it to be. And in this respect, in human nature there is a capacity for this dignity: that of being assumed into the unity of the divine person. Nor must every capacity like this be fulfilled, just as God need not do whatever he is able to do, but rather what befits the order established by his wisdom.

Reply Obj. 5: As the Apostle says in Romans 5:20, where sin increased, grace abounded all the more. Hence it is not unfitting that God bring forth from sin some good that would not have existed without sin, as is evident in many virtues, such as patience, penitence, and others of this sort. And so in the same way, God was able to bring forth from man’s sin that supreme good, the Incarnation of the Son of God. It is for this reason that Gregory says, O happy fault, that deserved such a one, so great a redeemer. (Gregory the Great, Sacramentarium Gregorianum.)

Reply Obj. 6: The beatitude of the whole man is from the very divinity into which the power of the intellect is immediately drawn—from which intellect glory overflows into the lower parts of the soul, and even into the body itself. However, there will be a certain incidental joy in the vision of Christ’s humanity, just as there will also be in the victory of his Passion. And nevertheless it is affirmed on all sides that if man not sinned, Christ would not have suffered.

Reply Obj. 7: Even if it is held that the devil foresaw that the rational creature was to be assumed by the Son of God, it nevertheless need not be that he foresaw all that would lead up to it. In the same way, as Bernard says in that passage, he foresaw that he was going to be the prince of the evil ones, which followed upon his fall, and yet he did not foresee his fall, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2; Bernard of Clairveaux, Sermones de tempore, serm. 5: "The Twelve Degrees of Humility" (Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq et al.; PL 183:355–56).)

Reply Sed Contra: As for the arguments to the contrary, it could be answered that, according to the second opinion mentioned in the main response, those authorities are speaking of his coming into flesh that is able to suffer for the sake of redemption (for there would have been no redemption unless the servitude to sin had preceded it), and not of his coming into flesh simply speaking.

Article 4

Whether it was fitting for God to delay his Incarnation for so long

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.1.5; SCG IV.53, 55; Super Isiam 2; Super Gal. 4, lect. 2.) It appears that the Son of God should not have delayed his Incarnation so long.

Obj. 1: For the time of the Incarnation is called the time of fullness: thus Galatians 4:4 says, when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son. But “fullness” imports perfection. Therefore, since the perfection of the universe was consummated on the seventh day, as it says in Genesis 2:2, it appears that the Son of God should have been incarnate then.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, love causes the gift and the swiftness with which it is given. But God became incarnate out of the greatest charity. Therefore it appears that he should not have delayed the Incarnation for so long. The first proposition is proved through what it says in Proverbs 3:28, do not say to your neighbor, 'go, and come again, tomorrow I will give it'—when you have it with you. The second proposition is proved through what it says in Jeremiah 31:3, I have loved you with an everlasting love; therefore I have continued my faithfulness to you.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an illness becomes more dangerous the longer the medicine is delayed. But a wise physician avoids the danger of an illness. Therefore it appears that the Son of God ought to have hastened his Incarnation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, 1 Timothy 2:4 says that God desires all men to be saved. But if Christ had been incarnate before, the way to salvation would have been opened to more men, as it says in Matthew 11:21: if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. Therefore it appears that God should have become incarnate before he did.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Boethius says in the Consolation of Philosophy, (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 10 (CCSL 94; PL 63:765).) nature takes its beginning from those things that are more perfect. But God’s work is not less ordered than nature’s work. Therefore, since the Incarnation is the most perfect thing in the works of God, it seems that God should have been incarnate around the time of the beginning.

On the contrary, the perfection of grace is more like the perfection of glory than the perfection of nature. But the perfection of grace is due to the Incarnation, as John 1:17 says: grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. Therefore, since the perfection of glory is due to the end of all time, while the perfection of nature to the beginning, it seems that God should have been incarnate more towards the end of all time rather than around the beginning.

Furthermore, Augustine says, it is an established custom that a betrothed woman not be given in marriage immediately, lest she be held cheaply when given to a husband who did not yearn for his betrothed for very long. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 3, ch. 3, n. 7 (CCSL 32; PL 32:752).) But man ought to prize most highly this benefit, that of the Incarnation. Therefore it was becoming that the human race long for it when it was delayed.

Furthermore, perfection is owed to the end. But the time of the Incarnation is the most perfect time. For in it, the Lord of time was born, which is also why it is called the time of fullness. Therefore it appears that God ought to have been incarnate towards the end of time.

I answer that the most suitable time for the Incarnation was chosen by the one who arranges all times; for all things have their time, as it says in Ecclesiastes 3:1. However, this suitability cannot be fully known by us, since we do not know the proportions of all times. But nonetheless, several reasons can be assigned for why he would have chosen this time for the Incarnation because of its fittingness.

The first is that, because man had sinned through pride, it was necessary that he be restored through humility, and this required him to recognize his own lack in power and knowledge. Now, the deficiency of his knowledge was made known to man in the time of nature’s law, in which many fell into the worst errors of idolatry and into the most abominable deeds without the light of natural reason making any opposition. Furthermore, the deficiency of his power, properly speaking, was made known to man in the time of the written law. For at that time, although instructed by the law, he was not yet able to shake off the yoke of sin. And therefore it was necessary that God become man after these two periods of preparation, as it were, so that he might place his hope of salvation in God alone.

The second reason is that the natural order is to go from the imperfect to the perfect. But the most perfect among God’s works is the Incarnation itself, through which a created thing is united to God in the unity of a person. For this reason, it was necessary that this work come to fufilment not at the beginning of the human race but later, towards the end of all time; thus what was animal would come first, and then what was spiritual, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15:44. Augustine assigns this reason in his On 83 Questions, where he says, it would be absurd if one were to wish that young adulthood be the only age of man, for he would thus abolish the excellences which manifest their succession and order in the other ages. In like manner, it would be absurd to desire a single age for the entire human race. For the race too lives through its own ages, just as one single man does. Nor was it necessary that the divine teacher, by imitating whom the human race might be formed in the most excellent mores, come in every age but only in the age of its young adulthood. (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 44 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:28).) And for this reason the Apostle says in Galatians 3:23 that under the law people were like little children in the custody of a tutor, until the one who had been promised through the prophets came.

The third reason is that a greater distance from the beginning weakens its effect. This is also why certain things are unable to last so as to remain forever the same in number: because they are far distant from the beginning. Therefore, if that greatest of remedies, the Incarnation, had taken place at the beginning of all time, its effect would, with the passing of time, have been less prized among men as their love grew cold. For this reason, from the beginning of the human race the natural law was implanted in men’s minds, through which law men might be subject to God; but afterwards, as the habit of sinning grew strong, the natural law was, for the majority of men, darkened to such a point that it seemed insufficient for governing the human race. That is why another remedy was added then: the Old Law and the things pertaining to it. And when this, too, grew weak in men’s hearts with the lapse of time, it was necessary that another, more perfect remedy be applied through the Incarnation, until that time when the love of many will grow cold. Then, through the Second Coming, faith will give way to vision, and the present state of the Church to the state of glory. Accordingly, Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy, that the hierarchy of the law is related to our hierarchy just as ours is related to the heavenly one. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 2 (PG 3:502).)

Reply Obj. 1: There are three stages of perfection: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory. Now, the perfection of nature existed at the beginning of time, whereas the perfection of glory will be at the end of time. And because the perfection of grace is the middle between these two, Christ, through whom grace has been given, came around the mid-point of time. This is why Habakkuk 3:2 says, I have heard the report of . . . thy work . . . In the midst of the years make it known.

Reply Obj. 2: When love is joined with discernment it does not hasten the gift before it is beneficial to the one to whom it is given. But it was not beneficial for the human race to receive this gift before learning from experience how much it needed it, so that, receiving the gift in this way, the human race would hold it more dearly.

Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual sickness differs from bodily sickness. For healing of a sick body does not require that the sick man recognize the power of the medicine and the danger of the sickness, but this is in the greatest degree necessary for the healing of spiritual sickness, since the spirit is healed through humility and contrition. And so, although bodily medicine is not delayed, nevertheless spiritual medicine can be delayed. Yet it was not delayed in such a way that it was completely lacking from the beginning; for as long as there was a sickness, there was a medicine for it, as Hugh of Saint Victor says, (Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1 (PL 176:317); De spirituali sanitate, sermon 11.) even though that medicine is not wholly sufficient. For a doctor furnishes certain preparatory treatments to someone suffering from bodily illness before he gives the completing medicine, and this was God’s procedure in the healing of the human race.

Reply Obj. 4: Even before Christ’s Incarnation none of those who were eternally preordained perished, and no one who was not predestined would have been saved, regardless of when the Incarnation happened. Nevertheless, if a remedy that is given to the predestined—namely, final grace—were offered to someone who was not predestined, that person would also be saved. But this occurrence is contradictory to what it means for someone not to be predestined. It is just as true to say, “if Christ had preached to someone who was foreknown to be saved, that person would have repented,” as it is to say, “if grace were given to someone, he would repent.” But both conditions are contradictory to the divine foreknowledge of damnation, and therefore to ask why Christ did not preach to someone, or why he did not give grace to someone, is the same as asking for the cause of predestination, which is nothing other than the will of God.

Reply Obj. 5: The perfect comes before the imperfect simply speaking, but when considering the perfect and the imperfect in the same thing, the imperfect comes before the perfect. For movement is from imperfect to perfect, and this happens by way of some perfect agent, because it must be prior. And this is why in the human race an imperfect medicine was applied before the perfect one by the perfect God himself, who is the prince of perfection, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, nn. 1, 2 (PG 3:815).)

Question 2

The person assuming flesh

Next we will inquire about the one who assumes flesh. Concerning this there are five points of inquiry:

first, whether one divine person can assume flesh while another does not;

second, if this is so, why the Son assumed flesh rather than another;

third, whether the Father or the Holy Spirit was able or is able to assume flesh;

fourth, if so, whether they were able to assume the numerically same human nature;

fifth, whether one divine person is able to assume numerically two human natures.

Article 1

Whether one divine person can assume flesh without another

To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.3.4; SCG IV.39.) It appears that one divine person cannot assume flesh without another.

Obj. 1: For Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 10 (PG 94:838).) that within the divine, all things are one except being ungenerated, being generated, and proceeding. But being incarnate is not one of these things. Therefore being incarnate is common to the Three.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as there is one essence of the three persons, so is there is one divine activity. But to assume flesh is a certain divine activity. Therefore it is common to the three persons.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Damascene says that the whole divine nature was incarnate in one of its hypostases. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1003).) But whatever is said about the nature is common to the three. Therefore becoming incarnate is common to the three persons.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever things are one in simple substance, if one is united to something, the others are too. But the three persons are one according to substance, which is common to them, and simple. Therefore if the Son is united to flesh, the Father is also necessarily united to flesh.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the union that arises through the grace of union is greater than one that arises through the grace of adoption. But in union through the grace of adoption, one divine person is not united to the mind without the others. Therefore one divine person cannot assume flesh without the others.

On the contrary, it appears that Dionysius counts the things that pertain to the Incarnation among the things that belong to discrete theology. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, n. 6 (PG 3:643).) Now, these are the things that belong to one divine person without the others. Therefore the Incarnation belongs to one person without the others, and not to all of them.

Furthermore, the Incarnation includes in its understanding being sent, as it says in the text. (Sent. III. 1. prologue.) But for one divine person to be sent, it does not follow that all would be sent. Therefore one person can be incarnate without the others.

Furthermore, a distinction of reason and reality is greater than a distinction of reason alone. But the accounts of diverse things in the divine are distinguished only by reason, while the persons are distinguished both in reason and in reality. Therefore the distinction of the persons is greater in God than the distinction of the accounts of the ideas of things. But God works something by one account that he does not work by another account, for he makes man by one account and by another account he makes a horse, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 46, n. 2 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:30).) Therefore much more can one divine person be incarnate without the others.

I answer that, although the three divine persons are one in essence, still it need not be that if one is joined to flesh, the others are as well. To make this evident, note that when things are joined in something and distinguished in something else, then it is only necessary that they be joined together when the union happens in virtue of what they have in common, whether that be the same in number or not. For example, it is clear that man and donkey have in common being an animal, and therefore anything that shares its genus with donkey also shares this with man. But since man and donkey are distinguished by specific differences, it need not be that everything that belongs to a donkey in its specific difference likewise belongs to a man. And this is also how it is in the powers of the soul, for all are rooted in the soul’s essence, which is one in number. Now, soul is united to the body in two ways—both according to essence, as its form, and according to power, as its mover or operating through it. Therefore it is necessary that the soul, which is united to the eye both as to the soul’s essence, inasmuch as the eye is perfected in its specific being, and as to the visual power’s account, insofar as it is made an instrument of seeing, is also joined to the tongue as to the soul’s essence, but not as to the account of the same power. For the same essence of the soul that is in the eye is in the tongue, but in one it is according to the visual power, while in the other according to the power of taste. And what is more, there is a certain power, intellect, that is joined to no part of the body as to the power’s account, but only as to the essence’s account.

Therefore, I say that the three persons are indeed distinguished in personhood, but they come together in their nature. For this reason whatever might be united to the Son in his nature, of necessity would be united to the Father. However, if something were united to the Son in his person, it is not necessary that it be united to the Father. For we do not hold the Incarnation of the Son to exist in such a way that the union happened within the nature, but only within the person. And therefore it need not be that we consider the Father to be incarnate, just as it need not be that if the visual power were an act of the body, the intellect would be an act of the body, although they come together in the soul’s essence.

Reply Obj. 1: The Incarnation includes in itself one of the Three, for “incarnation” signifies the union in the person of the Son, whose personal property is to be generated.

Reply Obj. 2: “To assume” imports two things: namely, an action and a terminus of union. For “assume” comes from “to take to oneself.” Therefore whatever of action is conveyed in this word, the whole is common to all three: for it is true to say that the whole Trinity united human nature to the Son in his person. But the terminus of union is only the person of the Son, and not that of the Father. And therefore, the Son assumed flesh, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: Becoming incarnate is not said of the nature according to itself, but by reason of the person, insofar as the whole divine nature was incarnate in the one person of the Son. And therefore being incarnate need not be said of the Three, for this is necessary in those things that are said about the nature by reason of the nature itself, and not of those things that are said about the nature by reason of a person. And this is because of the sameness of the essence and the person, as the divine essence is the person of the Son, but the person of the Father is not the person of the Son.

Reply Obj. 4: If it were a union in substance or nature, it would follow that the three persons would be incarnate if one became incarnate. But in fact no union was accomplished in the nature, such that one thing would come to be from divine and human natures. Rather, it is in the person, so that there would be one person subsisting in humanity and divinity. And that is why the argument does not hold, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: In the union that exists through the grace of adoption, it is considered a union only through activity—namely, because God works a certain effect within us. And because this activity is common to the Three, the union must also be common to them, although insofar as the effect is appropriated to one person or another, the Son may be said to be sent into the mind, or the Holy Spirit. But in this singular union of divinity and humanity, not only the activity or efficacy on God’s part should be noted, but also the terminus of the union, as was said. And so it is not similar.

Article 2

Whether it was more fitting for the Son to become incarnate rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit

To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.3.8; SCG IV.42.) It seems that it was not more fitting for the Son to become incarnate rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For just as in the mystery of the Incarnation, wisdom was shown in the grandeur of the reconciliation, so too power was shown in that things infinitely distant were joined together, and also goodness in that he did not look down on the infirmity of the thing he had himself formed, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PG 94:983).) But just as wisdom is attributed to the Son, so is goodness attributed to the Holy Spirit, and power to the Father. Therefore it was not more becoming that the Son become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a victory is attributed to power. But by the Incarnation, victory over the enemy was attained. Therefore the Incarnation was more becoming to the Father, to whom power is appropriated.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the re-creation corresponds to the creation. But creation is appropriated to the Father, which is why when Genesis 1:1 says, in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, the creating God is interpreted as the Father. Therefore, the Incarnation also, by which re-creation is accomplished, most principally would belong to the Father.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Incarnation was ordered to our receiving the adoption of sons (Gal 4:5). But to adopt belongs properly to a father. Therefore it was fitting that the Father become incarnate.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it appears that it would have been more suitable for the Holy Spirit to become incarnate. For a union of things that are closer is more becoming. But the Holy Spirit is the person closest to us, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50; PL 42:921).) Therefore it was more becoming that the Holy Spirit to being incarnate than was the Son.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, becoming incarnate proceeded from the utmost charity that God had for us. But charity properly belongs to the Holy Spirit—or even appropriately, if it is being taken essentially. Therefore it was most powerfully becoming that the Holy Spirit becoming incarnate.

On the contrary, in our minds there are three things representing the three persons: the mind, which represents the Father; knowledge, which is the mind’s word, representing the Son; and love, which represents the Holy Spirit. But among these three, the mind’s word is the most bodily, insofar as it is uttered externally by the voice. Therefore Incarnation is most suitably becoming to the eternal Word, which is the very Son of God.

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b 24–25; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 2, nn. 292–299.) what is first in any genus is the cause of those things that come after. But sonship is found first in the Son of God, just as fatherhood is first in God the Father, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named (Eph 3:15). (RSV reads, “from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named.”) Therefore the Son of God became incarnate most fittingly, so that through him we might receive adoption as sons of God.

Furthermore, the joining of wisdom and humility is most becoming, which is why Proverbs 11:2 says, with the humble is wisdom. But wisdom is appropriated to the Son. Therefore the humility of the Incarnation was most becoming to him.

I answer that the fitness of the Son’s becoming incarnate can be seen both from things proper to him, and from things appropriated to him.

Now, four things can be considered proper to him: namely, that he is a Son, that he is a Word, that he is an image, and that he is the middle person within the Trinity.

However, insofar as he is an image, he has an affinity with the one who needed to be restored—that is, man, who was made according to the image of God (Gen 1:27). And so it was becoming that the uncreated image assume the created image.

Moreover, insofar as he is a Son, he was suited to the mode of reparation, which was fulfilled by the mysteries of the Incarnation and Passion. For insofar as he is from another, which of course is common both to him and to the Holy Spirit, the Father’s authority relative to him is indicated. This is why also prayer, satisfaction, and other things like this that show the authority of the Father befit him in relative to the Father. But insofar as we understand in the Son a determinate mode of origin, it befits him to be born, so that the one who is the Son of God in divinity might be the Son of the Virgin in his humanity—such that there would not be several sons within the Trinity. It also befits him as a natural son, such that through him whose inheritance is natural, others would be adopted as sons and become co-heirs.

But insofar he is the Word, the Incarnation has a certain congruence with the office of preaching and teaching. For a word makes known the one speaking, and he himself has made known the Father: I have manifested thy name to the men whom thou gavest me (John 17:6).

And insofar as he is the middle person in the Trinity, it fits with the ultimate effect, which is the reconciliation of man with God. For it is becoming that the one who is in the middle also to be a mediator.

In addition, four things are found to have been appropriated to the Son: namely, wisdom and power—by the Apostle: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24)—equality, by Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) and splendor and beauty, by Hilary. (Hilary, On the Trinity*, bk. 1, ch. 7, l. 17; bk. 2, ch. 1, l. 20 (CCSL 62; PL 10:51).)*

Now, insofar as he is wisdom, he is suited for our restoration, for it is becoming that what was made in wisdom be restored by wisdom. Also, man had fallen into the slavery from which he needed to be freed by a kind of seduction, so it was becoming that he should be freed from the seducer by wisdom. Also, man himself sinned through his desire for knowledge, and so he was to be freed through wisdom.

However, insofar as he is the power and arm of the Father, he is suited to seizing the victory from the enemy: he has shown strength with his arm (Luke 1:51).

But insofar as he is equality, he also corresponds to the sickness that was to be healed. For both man and the devil had sinned by seeking equality, the former in knowledge, the latter in power.

And insofar as he is splendor and beauty, he is suited to restoration, so that the disfiguring of the image through sin might be undone through him himself. But being incarnate does not befit the Father, especially because of his property of innascibility; for it is not becoming that he who is the Father in the Godhead should be a son in humanity. For then the Son of God the Father would be the grandson of the Virgin, if the Virgin herself were the mother of God the Father. Likewise, this also does not befit the Holy Spirit, otherwise the name “son” should be applicable to more than one divine person.

Reply Obj. 1: In the Incarnation is displayed wisdom, power, and goodness; and therefore bringing about the Incarnation is attributed to the Trinity as a whole. But on the other hand, the work that was due to God incarnate was suitably fulfilled by the Son, for the reasons given. (Resp.) And thus the Trinity as a whole united flesh to the Son alone.

Reply Obj. 2: For the powerful to overcome the less powerful by his power seems to be something violent, rather than something praiseworthy. But to do so by justice and wisdom is praiseworthy; and that is why the Father had to defeat the foe through his Son. Or it could be said that, although power is attributed to the Father, for he is the principle of the entire Godhead, nevertheless the Son is also called the power of the Father, by which he works in creation. For this reason he is also called the Father’s arm, as Gregory explains from Job 40:9: have you an arm like God? (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 32, ch. 5, n. 7 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:639).) That is why God the Father overcame the devil in a becoming way through his Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Three works are appropriated to the three divine persons: creation as the first, to the Father, who is the principle without a principle; glorification, which is the last end, to the Holy Spirit, by reason of his goodness; and re-creation, which is in the middle, to the Son, who is the middle person in the Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4: Although adopting belongs to the Father, nevertheless he fittingly adopted us through his Son, to whom the inheritance belongs. Thereby the adoption itself could be received through the true heir and showed to be firm. Also thereby the adopted sons would have the true Son as their leader to imitate, the ones whom he foreknew would be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom 8:29).

Reply Obj. 5: The Holy Spirit is said to be person closest to us because of his charity, through which all gifts are given to us. But the Son is closer to us in the congruity of the Incarnation, for the reasons given.

Reply Obj. 6: God’s charity is the cause of the Incarnation, and so although the causality of the Incarnation is common to the three persons, it is nevertheless appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as will be said later in Distinction 4. (Below, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) However it does not follow from this that the Holy Spirit should have become incarnate.

Article 3

Whether the Father was able to assume flesh, as well as the Holy Spirit

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.5.) It appears that the Father was not able to assume flesh.

Obj. 1: For as Anselm says, (Anselm, On the Incarnation of the Word, ch. 10 (PL 158:276).) what is in the least degree unfitting is impossible for God. But if the Father were to assume flesh, something unfitting would follow: namely, there would be many sons within the Trinity, which would lead to a certain confusion about the persons. Therefore, the Father was not able to assume flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, opposites cannot be joined in the same thing, not even through a miracle. But there is in the Father an certain property called innascibility, in virtue of which He is said not to be from another; to this property nascibility is opposed. Therefore the Father could not have been born of the Virgin, which he would be said to be, were he to assume flesh.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said in the text, the sending of the Son is the Incarnation itself. But it is incongruous for the Father to be sent, as was maintained in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1.) therefore neither can he become incarnate.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the best things that can happen should always be hoped for from him who is infinite in mercy. But since the whole world was made better through the Incarnation of one divine person, it will be improved even more if the Father should be incarnate as well. Therefore if it is possible for the Father to be incarnate, it should be hoped for, just as the ancient patriarchs hoped for the Incarnation of the Son—which is entirely absurd.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, God’s power does not exceed his will, since each is infinite. But the Father never willed to be incarnate. Therefore neither is he able to be incarnate.

On the contrary, every necessity and impossibility is subject to God, as Anselm says. (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. 2, ch. 18 (PL 158:421).) But nothing is impossible for the one to whose will every impossibility is subjected. Therefore it is not impossible for the Father to be incarnate.

Furthermore, the joining of things equally distant is equally possible. But human nature is equally distant from the three persons, being at an infinite distance from every one of them. Therefore, if the Son was able to assume flesh, so is the Father.

Furthermore, anything of dignity befitting the Son befits the Father as well. But to be able to assume flesh is something of dignity in the Son. Therefore it must also be attributed to the Father.

I answer that, in those who act from a free will, the use of a power follows the will’s command and reason’s ordering. Therefore when something is ascribed to divine power, we must consider whether it is attributed to that power considered in itself—for then he is said to be capable of this from his absolute power—or is attributed to it in its order to his wisdom, foreknowledge, and will—for then he is said to be capable of this from his ordained power.

Therefore, since his absolute power is infinite, everything that is something in itself and that does not tend toward a lack of power must of necessity be attributed to it. Now, I say “something in itself,” because the joining of an affirmation and a negation is nothing, and neither is any understanding produced when “man” and “not-man” are said to be taken together, as though by the force of a single expression. This is why God’s power does not extend as far as allowing an affirmation and a negation to exist together; and the same is true of all things that involve a contradiction. However, I call "tending toward the lack of power” those things that imply that the power’s suffering. For it happens from an active power’s lack of resistance that something is corrupted, or divided, or something of this sort. So too softness is said to be a natural powerlessness because of being easily divisible. And it is for this reason that we do not say that God, in the nature of his Godhead, has the power to suffer, or die, or anything of this sort, just as we do not say that he has the power of being powerless.

Now, when something that he wills to do and which his wisdom holds that he do is attributed to this power considered absolutely, then he is said to be capable of it in virtue of his ordained power. However, when his power, in respect of itself, extends to what is attributed to it, even though his wisdom and will do not hold that it be done in this way, then he is said to be able from his absolute power only. In the latter case, however, one must make a distinction. For among these things, some are inseparably joined to something that is in itself repugnant to the divine wisdom and goodness, such as sinning, lying, and such; these we also say that God is not able to do. But there are certain others that are in no way unfitting to the divine wisdom of themselves, but merely do not befit some ordination of his foreknowledge, which God, according to his own will, has established or foreseen; for example: that man’s head should be his lowest part. God is able to do this, since he is able to establish a different order in things, in virtue of which what now is seen to be unfitting, according to the order now present in things, would then be fitting.

Therefore, in this way there are four distinctions or orders among things that can attributed to the divine power. For certain things are not attributed to that very power absolutely; whence these things he is, simply speaking, not able to do—to suffer, for example, and to make contradictories coexist. But certain others are opposed to his wisdom and goodness in themselves, and we do not say that God is able to do them, except under a condition—namely, if he should will it. For it is not unfitting that the antecedent of a true conditional be impossible. And also certain others are not repugnant in themselves, but only because of something external to them, and it must be conceded absolutely that God is able to do such things from his absolute power; nor should they be denied [from his power] except under a condition—namely, it might be said that he is not able to do this if it is opposed to his will. Finally, there are certain things that are attributed to his power such that they conform to his will and wisdom; and these God must be said to be able to do simply speaking, and to be in no way unable to do them.

Therefore we should say that the Father becoming incarnate is not among those things that are not subject to the absolute power of God, since it neither implies a contradiction, nor does it assert any defect in the incarnate person—for the Father and the Son are of the same dignity, and the same account of personhood belongs to both. Nor is it among those things which of themselves involve something unfitting. Rather, it is among those things that involve unfittingness on account of another ordination established by God’s wisdom. But that the Son be incarnate belongs to the fourth order. And therefore it must be conceded without qualification that the Father was able—speaking of his absolute power—to assume flesh, and the Holy Spirit likewise.

Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible that God should do something and that it be unfitting. Nevertheless, he is able to make it so that something that is unfitting according to one order becomes fitting according to another order. Thus the Father is able to “assume” flesh by forming it, as he formed the body of man from earth. For in this way the name “son” would not belong to the Father. Nor would it even be repugnant of itself if the Father were called “son,” since these names would be attributed to him according to different natures.

Reply Obj. 2: Opposites cannot be in the same thing in the same respect, but nothing prevents them from being in it in diverse respects. Consequently, although innascibility does belong to the Father in virtue of his divine nature, birth could nonetheless be in the same Father in virtue of his human nature—just as it is in the Son to be the father of the Virgin in virtue of his divine nature whose own son he is in virtue of his human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The Incarnation of the Son is called a “sending” because the Son is from another. But if the Father were to be incarnate, his Incarnation could not be called a “sending.” In like manner, the manifestation of the Holy Spirit in the dove is called his visible “sending,” but the Father’s manifestation in the sound of the voice is not called a “sending.”

Reply Obj. 4: The three persons are not a greater goodness than is one alone. And therefore, nothing more would be added to the universe by the Incarnation of all of the persons than by the Incarnation of only one; hence it would have been superfluous. And therefore, although it is possible for the Father to be incarnate, it should not be expected.

Reply Obj. 5: In regard to its essence God’s power is no greater than his will. Yet, his power does extend to more objects than his will. Therefore, if God does not will something, it does not follow that he is not able to do it by his absolute power.

Article 4

Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit could assume numerically the same nature

To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.6.) It seems that the Father and the Holy Spirit cannot assume one and the same nature.

Obj. 1: First, because of what Anselm says in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, that more than one divine person cannot assume one and the same man. (Anselm, De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi, ch. 4 (PL 158:275–276).) But if they assumed one nature, one man would be assumed by more than one person. Therefore the first idea is impossible.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the assumption of the human nature reaches its terminus at a certain union. Now, it is not a union in nature, for then it would be necessary that either only one of them would remain after, as in the union of food with the one who is being fed, or else neither would remain, as is seen in the coming together of elements. But in the Incarnation both natures remain, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 7 (PG 94:1011).) and thus it is clear that it cannot be a union within a nature. Therefore the union must reach its terminus within a person. Therefore there cannot be more than one person assuming the one nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994–998)) in the Incarnation the one uniting and what he is united with share their particular properties, such that whatever is said of the Son of Man could be said of the Son of God. Therefore if the same human nature were assumed by the three persons, then when this man is pointed to, we could call him the Son of God and say of him whatever is said of the Son of God; and vice versa, we could say that the Son of God is this man, and born of a Virgin, and everything else. But holding the same position, we could say that this man is the Father. Therefore being the Father, and whatever belongs to the Father, could be predicated of the Son of God—which would clearly result in a confusion of the persons.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the three persons are distinguished by their relations. Therefore, whatever is attributed to one person first and through itself by reason of his being toward-another, cannot be common to the three persons in any way. But the assuming of a human nature belongs to the Son in virtue of his being toward-another, for it belongs first and through itself to the person, and to the nature only insofar as it is in the person. Therefore to assume this nature cannot be common to the three persons.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as was said in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.) every "whatness" or nature that is not its own existence is divided according to the division of supposits subsisting in it, for it has existence insofar as it is in a supposit. But human nature is a "whatness" or nature that is not its own existence, for that belongs to God alone. Therefore it must be divided according to existence according to the division of supposits subsisting in it. But if all three assumed the human nature, there would be three supposits subsisting in the human nature, and therefore three human natures. Thus, numerically one human nature cannot be assumed by the three persons.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, if the three persons assumed the one human nature, either they would be one man or more than one. But they would not be more than one, for they would have only one soul and one body. Therefore they would be one man, and they could be pointed to: this man is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But that man can only be the supposit of the person of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the person of the Father would be the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as would the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit—which is impossible. Therefore it is impossible for an assumption like this to exist.

On the contrary, human nature is suited to being assumable insofar as it is in the image of God. But numerically same human nature is in the image of the three persons. Therefore the same human nature is able to be asssumed by the three persons.

Furthermore, the different powers of the soul (which are also distinguished absolutely) are more distant from each other than are the divine persons, which are distinguished only in relation to each other. But the soul is united to the same member according to the different powers, which is evident since the organs of the different senses are also organs of touch, which is diffused throughout the whole body. Therefore God also can be united to man in such a way that the three persons may assume one human nature.

Furthermore, a union is easier among things that are most suited to each other. But the human nature assumed by the Son is not less suited to the Father; rather, it is more suited than any other nature. Therefore if the Father could assume another human nature, as was said, (See above, q. 1, a. 2.) even more could he assume the same one.

I answer that it is impossible for the three divine persons to assume one human nature in a unity of one person, because this implies a contradiction. For since the union of God and man could not happen in the nature, as will be proved below in Distinction 5, (See below, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2.) it must happen in the person, such that the personhood of the one assuming and the one being assumed would be the same. For this reason, to assert that he is one person on the side of what is assumed, and three on the side of the ones assuming is self-contradictory. And he likewise cannot be one by the unity of one hypostasis or supposit, at least according to the second opinion stated below in Distinction 6, (Below, d. 6, q. 2, a. 1.) which holds that the union exists not only in the person but also in the supposit or hypostasis.

But that the nature assumed by the three persons might be one by the unity of an individual nature is not impossible, if we are speaking about his absolute power—although it would not be fitting according to the order of divine wisdom, since one person’s becoming incarnate would suffice for the restoration of a thousand worlds. However, I call it a “unity of an individual nature” if one body is assumed with one soul united to it, and one humanity resulted from this union, such that the three persons could share in one assumed nature just as they share in their eternal nature. But on the other hand, some people hold the opposite opinion, and the objections can be answered according to either.

Reply Obj. 1: Anselm is here taking “one man” as meaning one human person, for to hold that there are three persons assuming it is incompatible with this.

Reply Obj. 2: That sort of assumption would be an assumption to something one in person, but not in such a way that the human nature would be united to only one divine person. Rather, it would assumed by each of the three persons into a unity of person, such that the person of the man assumed would not be other than the three persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as though a man of himself, as a man, is a person. Yet there would be a one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit, all assuming the same humanity.

Reply Obj. 3: The sharing of properties is understood in reference to the different nature, so following the stated proposal, this man would not share wtih the Son the properties of the Father, but only the properties of his human nature.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.) in the divine there is a community of reality and a community of notion. Here is nothing common with a community of reality except the absolute reality, but with a community of notion here the name “person,” or “relation” is common. And thus in this manner of community it can belong commonly to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, such that each of them draws numerically the same human nature into a unity of his person.

Reply Obj. 5: The three persons are not distinguished according to their existence; indeed, for them there is one existence, one life, one understanding, since existence pertains only the essence. And therefore it would not be necessary that the human nature assumed by the three persons would be multiplied according to its existence, the way it is multiplied in three human persons, of whom there is not one existence.

Reply Obj. 6: Since substantive terms are signified or consignified in the plural due to the unity or plurality of the forms being signified, then if they were to assume one human nature, the three would be said to be one man—just as they are said to be one God on account of the one divine nature. And just as the whole Trinity is only one true God, according to Augustine, (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 105, para. 3, ln. 7 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1682–83).) and Baruch 3:35: this is our God; no other can be compared to him; so it could be said: “this man alone is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.” And then this term “man” would suppose a thing of a human nature, without a distinction of the three persons, the way that the term “God,” in the expressions mentioned, supposes indistinctly a thing of the divine nature. And this is its natural supposition, and as it were that of the common terms in reference to the three persons. But the supposition by which it stands for the Father or the Son is incidental to it, and as it were distinct terms.

Reply Sed Contra: To the things said to the contrary, one can respond, according to the others, that a unity of supposit would in a certain way follow on the unity of the nature, according to them. And this cannot be. (As was said in the response.)

Article 5

Whether one person can assume two human natures

To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.7.) It appears that one divine person cannot assume two human natures.

Obj. 1: For a common nature is multiplied only according to the multiplicity of its supposits. But one person is only one supposit, as will become clear in Distinction 6. (Below,* d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1.)* Therefore in one person there cannot be two natures of the same species.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the Son of God were to assume several human natures, in virtue of one nature he would be called "Jesus," but in virtue of another he would be called "Peter," and so on. But where the Son of God is supposed Jesus is also supposed, and for the same reason, where the Son of God is supposed Peter is also supposed. Therefore the claim that “Jesus is Peter” is true. But it is impossible that one man can be predicated of another man. Therefore Jesus and Peter are not two men. But it is impossible there be two numerically different human natures unless because they are in two men. Therefore in Jesus and Peter there will not be two human natures, but only one. Therefore from the position that the Son of God assumed two human natures, the contrary—that the he assumed only one nature—also follows, so this position is impossible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, human nature is more distant from the divine than is one human nature from another. But although the Son of God subsists in two natures, the divine and the human, he is nevertheless not two, but one, and he is one thing. Therefore even if he were to subsist in two assumed human natures, nevertheless he could not be said to be two men, and therefore neither would there be two human natures—and thus the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if the Son of God were to assume two human natures, according to one of which he would be called "Peter" and according to the other, "Jesus," it would be necessary that the verb “am, are, is” would be predicated of them in the singular, since each would be one supposit. But it is predicated of the Father and the Son in the plural, as is clear in John 10:30: I and the Father are one. Therefore there is a greater unity here than the unity of the three divine persons—which is impossible. Therefore again the position is not so.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the proposition “the Son of God assumed a man,” is denied, since otherwise he would appear to have assumed a person. But just as the Son of God did not assume a person, so too the Son of God is not two persons. Therefore in no way can it be said that the Son of God is two men. Now, this does follow if he assumed two human natures. Therefore it is impossible.

On the contrary, whatever the Father can do the Son can do. But the Father can assume a different human nature than that which the Son has assumed. Therefore also the Son can assume another nature besides the one he assumed. Therefore one person can assume many natures.

Furthermore, the union by which the Son assumed human nature into the unity of his person manifests a greater goodness and dignity than that unity by which he unites a man’s mind to himself through grace. But this second union that arises through grace is not a union to only one, but to many. For wisdom communicates itself to holy souls, according to Wisdom 7:27. Therefore, since the good is diffusive and communicative, it appears that that union that exists in the unity of the person can be made to many souls in the person of the Son.

Furthermore, the Son’s power is in no way diminished through the Incarnation. But before the Incarnation the Son was able to assume a human nature other than the one he did assume. Therefore he can do this now as well—and thus the same thing follows as before.

I answer that it is conceded by almost everyone that one divine person can assume many human natures, and with good reason. For it is not against the notion of a divine person that it subsists in several natures—otherwise the union of the divine and human natures could not be arise in the one person of the Son. Now, if it be against the notion of a divine person that it would subsist in more than two natures, this could happen only if the entire power of the one person that subsists in the several natures would be limited, and in certain way fulfilled, by the second nature coming to it—which is impossible. For a supervening assumed nature is in no way commensurate with the power of a divine person, since it is as far away from it as is the finite from the infinite. Whence, just as God can always create new things because his power is not exhausted through created things, so too the Son, having assumed whatever nature, can assume still another. For the power of assuming is not limited by the nature assumed.

Reply Obj. 1: Due to one and the same thing is a nature individuated and divided. Whence, since the principle of individuation is matter considered in a certain way under determinate dimensions, human nature is divided and multiplied due to the division of the same. Whence if he were to assume two bodies and two souls, he would have assumed two human natures, although it would not follow that they would be two supposits or two hypostases. For the matter does not constitute the diversity of the supposits by its being divided in any way whatsoever, but only when for each there is found a discrete existence, and each is subsisting through itself. Whence it cannot be said that two hands are two hypostases, but rather they belong together in the same hypostasis of a man. So it is even for the two human natures—because they would not have discrete existences, but rather an existence united in the one person of the Son of God—there would not be a division of those natures according to two supposits, but only through the division of their matter.

Reply Obj. 2: Letting the stated position stand, Peter and Jesus would not be two supposits, but one, and “Peter is Jesus” is true then. And yet Peter and Jesus are not one man, but two men. For the singularity and plurality of substantive terms attends to the unity or plurality of the nature signified by the term, and not to the unity or plurality of the supposits. For although the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three supposits, nevertheless on account of the unity of the divine nature, which this name “God” signifies, they are said to be "one God." So too on the contrary, although Jesus are Peter would be one supposit, nevertheless on account of the plurality of the assumed natures they would be said to be two men. But the diversity of the natures, as long as the unity of the supposit remains, does not prevent them from being predicated of each other, since the identity of the supposit would suffice for the truth of the predication.

Reply Obj. 3: The assumed human nature has in a certain respect the notion of an accident, although simply speaking the union is not accidental, as will be clear below. (Below, d. 6, q. 3, a. 2.) And therefore the Son of God cannot be said to be two account of the assumption of that nature, just as neither can Socrates be said to be two on account of his humanity and his whiteness. But if the Son of God were to assume two human natures, although each of them would have the notion of an accident in comparison to the divine nature, still neither of them would have the notion of an accident in comparison to the other. And thus he would be called many men and not one man, just as white and musical can be said to be two more than man and white can.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as it is in the divine persons that, due to the unity of essence and plurality of persons, whatever is predicated pertaining to the essence there is predicated in the singular, as when we say, “the Father and the Son are one God,” but what pertains to the person is predicated in the plural, such as “the Father and the Son are persons”—so here it is the opposite. For whatever pertains to the nature is predicated in the plural, but what pertains to the person, in the singular. And although there is the highest unity of the three persons, on account of the simplicity of the divine essence, nevertheless it is not unfitting that the Father and the Son do not have a unity to each other that is not found in any created thing—namely, a personal unity. For they are truly distinct in a particular way. Nevertheless one should know that this verb “am, are, is” is predicated in the plural not only on account of the plurality of the really distinct supposits, but also on account of the plurality of supposits of speech. For we say that in the divine the person and the essence are such and such, although the person and the essence here really are in no way different. Therefore much more would this verb “am, are, is” be predicated of Jesus and Peter in the plural, since they differ according to the thing, on account of the diversity of their natures, even though they are not diverse supposits.

Reply Obj. 5: The term placed in the predicate is held formally, which is not necessary of a term at which the act of some verb is terminated. And therefore when one says, “the Son of God is two men,” a plurality of forms or natures is being imported, but when one says, “the Son of God assumed a man,” the word “man” is not being held formally. Whence it stands more for the supposit of “man” than for the supposit’s nature—and therefore there is no likeness.

Exposition of the text

The fullness of time. (Sent. III. 1, prologue, citing Gal 4:4.) One should note that the time of the Incarnation is called “the fullness of time” for many reasons. First, it is so called on account of the perfection of the universe; for when all created things returned to their beginning in man by a human nature having been assumed by God, then the universe came to its greatest completion. So it is said in Ephesians 1:10, as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth. Second, it is called this on account of the abundance of the grace that was poured forth at that time, as it says in John 1:16: and from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace. Third, on account of the fulfillment of the law, as Matthew 5:17: I have come not to abolish them but to fulfill them. Fourth, on account of the magnitude of that which happened in that time, for in that time the Lord of time was born, and thus something greater than time was made, something that fulfilled time. Fifth, because at that time was fulfilled what God foresaw from eternity, and what he foretold through his prophets, according to Romans 1:2.

Made of a woman. (Sent. III. 1. prologue, citing Gal 4:4.) On the contrary, in the Creed we say, begotten, not made. Furthermore, a woman implies a corruption, but Christ was born of the most uncorrupted Virgin, so it was not fittingly said that he was made of a woman. But it should be said to the first point that, in reference to his divine nature, the Son of God was in no way made; rather, he was begotten. But in reference to the human nature that he assumed, he is something created. Nevertheless, Christ cannot be said to be “made” simply speaking, but the Son of God is said to be “made man.” To the second point it should be said that the woman is noted here to designate a sex, not to designate any corruption, just as the rib taken from Adam is said to have been formed into a woman, although Eve at that time was made as a virgin.

Made under the law. (Sent. III. 1. prologue, citing Gal 4:4.) On the contrary, 1 Timothy 1:9 says that the law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless, whereas Christ was most just, so he was not made under the law. But it should be said that something is said to be “under the law” in three ways. First, it is under it as its mover; and in this way those who keep the precepts of the law out of fear of the penalty that the law inflicts, as though burdened and coerced by it. And in this way the just man is not under the law, because he acts out of love of justice, even if there is no law, as is said in Romans 2:14–15. In another way, someone is said to be under the law as regards his cause; and in this way all born in sin are under the law, because the sacraments of the law were instituted to take away sin. In another way, someone is said to be under the law as regards the observance of the law; and in this way Christ was made under the law, for he fulfilled the sacraments and precepts of the law—not by any necessity, as do others, but only by his will.

So as to redeem those who were under the law. (Sent. III. 1. prologue, citing Gal 4:5.) On the contrary, 1 Timothy 2:4 says he desires all men to be saved, and thus he came to redeem not only the Jews, who were under the law, but also for others. But it should be said that although he came to redeem the entire human race, still in a specific way he did this for the redemption of the sons of Israel, because he preached to them in person; whence Matthew 15:24 says, I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And through them the word of life was poured out among the nations; whence Isaiah 27:6 says, Jacob shall take root, Israel shall blossom and put forth shoots, and fill the whole world with fruit. This is the evangelizing woman spoken of in Luke 15:8–10. Note also that divine wisdom is called a woman not on account of any weakness, but on account of its fertility, as in Sirach 24:19, eat your fill of my produce.

Nor that the same Trinity descended over Jesus in the form of a dove. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 1, ch. 3, para. 2 (Sent. III, 1.3.2), quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 4, n. 8; bk. 4, ch. 21, n. 30 (CCSL 50; PL 42:824, 909).) On the contrary, in that dove there was nothing that would not be common to the whole Trinity, since it was not assumed into a unity of any person, since the whole Trinity did this with a shared operation; and the whole Trinity was in it the way it is in all created things, through its essence, presence, and power. And thus it appears that it pertained to the whole Trinity.

But it should be said that that dove can be considered in two ways. For it can be considered insofar as it is real thing, whether it was the animal or only something bearing the likeness of the animal; and in this way it pertains to the whole Trinity as its common effect. Or it can be considered insofar as it is a sign; and in this way it pertains only to the Holy Spirit, whose invisible sending forth is indicated through the arrival of the dove. About this visible sending and others we have spoken in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1.)