D. 20 - Causes of the Passion

Division of the text

Having considered how we are freed from evils through Christ’s Passion, here the Master considers the causes of the Passion.

It is divided into two parts:

first, he assigns the cause of the Passion’s fittingness;

second, he considers its efficient cause, at and so Christ is the priest, as he is also the victim and the price of our reconciliation. (Sent. III, 20.5(66).1.)

The first is divided in two:

in the first, he says why it is fitting in terms of our benefit;

in the second, why in terms of the suitability of its justice, at there is also another reason. (Sent. III, 20.2(63).2.)

In regard to the latter, he does three things:

first, he assigns the fitness of the Passion from God’s justice;

second, he treats the order of justice, at but by what righteousness? Jesus Christ’s; (Sent. III, 20.3(64).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), bk. 13, ch. 14, ln. 2.)

third, he shows that, even setting aside this order, no injustice would arise, so that thereby a more commendable process of justice might be apparent, inasmuch as none was more necessary, at and if those three should come to court, namely God, man, and the devil, the devil and man would have no objection to make against God. (Sent. III, 20.4(65).1.)

And so Christ is the priest, as he is also the victim and the price of our reconciliation. (Sent. III, 20.5(66).1.) Here he considers the efficient cause of the Passion,

and first with respect to the efficient cause’s action itself;

second, with respect to the deed done, at and so the Passion is termed the work of Christ and of the Jews, . . . and also the work of God. (Sent. III, 20.6(67).1.)

And as regards the first he does two things:

first, he shows how the deed that was done proceeded from diverse causes;

second, he asks whether the very deed done is licit or evil, at but since Christ’s Passion is the work of God, and so good, and since Judas and the Jews brought it about, the question is raised whether it is to be granted that their deed in this matter was good. (Sent. III, 20.6(67).2.)

Question 1

The fittingness and efficient cause of the Passion

Here five things are asked:

first, about human nature’s ability to be restored;

second, whether anyone other than Christ was able to make satisfaction for human nature;

third, whether satisfaction can fittingly be made through Christ’s Passion;

fourth, whether the human race could have been freed in any other manner;

fifth, about Christ’s Passion through its comparison to its efficient cause.

Article 1

Whether human nature ought to have been restored

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.1.2‒3.) It appears that human nature ought not to have been restored.

Obj. 1: For man’s sin was not more grave than that of the angels. but after the sin of the angels their natural goods remained whole, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) Therefore in man the nature remained whole, and thus did not need restoration.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what follows human nature is found in all who possess human nature. But not all men should have been restored, since many were foreseen to be damned. Therefore restoration is not owed to human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an angelic nature is not less precious than the human nature. But after their sin the angelic nature was not restored. Therefore neither should the human nature be restored.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the first man merited through sin that he and his posterity be eternally separated from the divine vision. But it pertains to the justice of God that he render to each individual according to the latter’s merits. Therefore he should render to the human nature and the human race that it be eternally excluded from the divine vision; and thus, human nature should not have been restored.

On the contrary, it is not becoming to divine wisdom that something he has created be cheated of its end, for then it would have been made in vain. But the end for which human nature was made is that it might see God and be fulfilled in him. Therefore since it was able to reach this end only if it was restored, since through the first man’s sin it deviated from the order to this end, it was fitting that it be restored.

Furthermore, it is not becoming that any perfection be lacking from the universe. But the blessed rational creature, composed of soul and body, belongs to the perfection of the universe. Therefore for the perfection of the universe it was fitting that such a nature, the human, be restored to beatitude, after having been led from it through sin.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it should not have been restored through making satisfaction. (Parallels: ST III.48.2‒4.) For a thing is restored through the same things as the things through which was is constituted. But human nature was constituted by only the word of God, for he spoke and they were made. (Ps 148:5.) Therefore he should have been restored by merely the word and command of God, and not through making any satisfaction for the creature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as in the work of creation his power is manifested most, so in the work of restoration the divine mercy is manifested most. But it is a greater mercy to forgive sin without any penalty of making satisfaction than it is to require satisfaction. Therefore the human nature should have been restored without any making of satisfaction.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, he who commits the sin is the one to whom the making of satisfaction belongs. But the human nature was not corrupted through any act that the nature committed, but through the act of a person. Therefore no satisfaction should be required for the nature, but only for the person.

On the contrary, a fault is put into order through a penalty. But if sin were forgiven without any making of satisfaction, the fault would remain without penalty. Therefore something would remain disordered in the universe—which is unfitting.

Furthermore, making satisfaction is the medicine of sin. But it does not befit the wise physician to remove a disease without using medicine. Therefore it was not becoming for God restore human nature without making satisfaction.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it was not necessary that human nature be restored in the way said. For God alone can restore a nature. But in God there is no necessity, just as there is no coercion. Therefore it was not necessary that the human nature be restored in the way said.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that something is more necessary so too is it less voluntary, and to the degree that it is less voluntary, so too is it less worthy of gratitude. But the work of human restoration is the work that most of all deserves our gratitude to God. Therefore it is in no way necessary.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it pertains to God’s mercy that he punish sin less than condignly, diminishing something of the penalty owed to the sin. But for whatever reason it forgives the part, it can also forgive the whole. Therefore it is not necessary that it restore human nature through making satisfaction.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, for the same reason are the gifts of grace given and debts forgiven gratuitously; this is why just as a judge cannot give one’s things to another, so too he cannot dismiss an offense done to another without a penalty. However, the prince, to whom all things belong, can relax penalties. But God gratuitously gives gifts to men, and neither does any disorder follow from this. Therefore he can also dismiss the penalties owed, especially because the penalty is owed from the fact that he himself is offended by the fault.

On the contrary, it is impossible that something be done in vain by the wise, omnipotent, and best artisan. But if the human nature were not restored, it would have been made in vain. Therefore it is necessary that it be restored.

Furthermore, it is impossible that there be something disordered in the universe. But if the punishment either of making satisfaction or of condemnation were not applied to the fault of the human nature, there would be something disordered in the universe. Therefore it is necessary, if human nature is to be restored from its damnation, that this happen through a mode of satisfaction, since a fault is put into order through its punishment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that it was most fitting that human nature be restored to that from which it fell. For it was fitting with respect to God himself, because in this is manifested God’s mercy, power, and wisdom: his mercy or goodness because he did not despise the weakness of our form, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PG 94:984).) his power insofar as he himself conquered all our defects by his own power, and his wisdom inasmuch as he is seen to have done nothing in vain. It was also fitting with respect to human nature, since it had fallen generally. Likewise also [it was fitting] for the perfection of the universe, the whole of which is in a certain way ordered to man’s salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: “Natural” is said in two ways: in one way, as what follows from the principles of a species; and this is not changed by sin, neither in man nor in demon, just as neither is the species itself. In another way, that toward which the nature is ordered is called “natural”; and in this respect the natural is taken away by sin, inasmuch as the beatitude toward which the nature is ordered is taken away, and its capacity for it is diminished. And in this way the nature was corrupted, since it was no longer able to be led to beatitude by anything of that corrupted nature, unless that nature were to be restored.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that not all men are restored is not due to an insufficiency in the restorative medicine, since it is sufficient in and of itself for the restoration of all who possess human nature, or even can possess it. Rather, this is due to a defect of those who impede the effect of restoration within their very selves, just as even in those born blind, the lack of vision, which follows on human nature, is caused by a defect of their matter.

Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the angel had not totally collapsed, and further, the sinning angel was immediately confirmed in evil, unlike man. Therefore the human nature ought to be restored, but not the angelic nature. Many things have also been noted above about this. (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 2.)

Reply Obj. 4: The exclusion from the vision of God can be called “eternal” for two reasons. Either because in the one who is excluded there is neither power to end this exclusion nor disposition to receive the effect of such termination; and in this way in the obstinate who are in hell it becomes eternal, so they will never be restored. Or it is called “eternal” because in the one excluded there is no power to end the exclusion but there is a disposition to receive the effect of such termination, and in this way a man, even through actual mortal sin, merits eternal exclusion while he is in this life. But when he departs from this life, if he goes without grace, the exclusion becomes eternal in the first sense.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that it was also fitting that human nature be restored through one making satisfaction. First, on the side of God, because the divine justice is manifested in the fault being washed away through the penalty. Second, on the side of man, who, by making satisfaction, is more perfectly made whole; for he would not be of as a great a glory, after sin, as he was in the state of innocence, if he were not fully to make satisfaction. For it is more glorious for man that he, by making satisfaction, fully expurgate the sin he had committed than would be if it had been dismissed without any satisfaction, just as it is also more glorious for man that he possess eternal life from merit than if he attained it without merit. For what one merits he has in a certain way from himself, inasmuch as he merited it. Likewise, satisfaction makes the one making satisfaction be in a certain way the cause of his own purification. Third, it is fitting even on the side of the universe, so that the fault be put into order through the penalty of making satisfaction; and in this way nothing remains disordered in the universe.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing’s existence precedes its activity, and therefore it cannot be that someone establishes himself in existence through his own activity, nor that he in any way be the cause of his very self. Rather, just as a man is the cause of his own corruption by sinning, so also it is becoming that he in a certain manner be the cause of his own purification by making satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 2: In the fact that God wished to restore man by making satisfaction, his mercy is manifested most of all. For he wished not only to remove from him the fault, but also to lead human nature as a whole back to its pristine dignity, which dignity perpetually endures in the nature but the penalty surpasses a little. This is why his mercy is manifested in leading us to eternal dignity more than in dismissing the temporal fault.

Reply Obj. 3: It does not belong to a nature, insofar as it is considered in bare contemplation, to act; rather, to act belongs to a person subsisting in that nature. Therefore just as the sin of the nature is induced by the action of the person sinning, so too it necessary that the act of the person making satisfaction makes satisfaction for the nature.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the restoration of the human nature was done by God. Whence it can be considered in two ways: namely, on the side of God, and on the side of the restored nature itself. Now, on the side of God three sorts of necessity can be considered. One is a necessity of coercion, and in this respect in no way can it be attributed to God, since nothing violent or outside his nature can happen in him, since he is immutable, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015b14; Aquinas, In Metaph. bk. 5, lect. 6, n. 841.) Another is an absolute necessity, and this is in God relative to the things within him that follow his own nature, since it is impossible that they be other than they are—such as that it is necessary that God exist, be good, and the like. But this is not a necessity of God in relation to his effects, since he does not act by a necessity of his nature, but from the freedom of his will. The third necessity is that from a supposition—not of the end, since there is no doubt that God, to accomplish some end, could bring in many paths other than even those that now have been determined for that end—but rather, from the supposition of something that is within him, namely, his foreknowledge or will, which cannot change. In virtue of this, it is said that it is necessary that the predestined by saved; and some call this the “necessity of immutability.” And in this way it was necessary, on the side of God, that human nature be restored, because he foresaw and ordered it to restoration. But this necessity, as was said, is a necessity of condition, not an absolute one, that is, a necessity of what follows, not of following.

Likewise, on the side of man necessity can be considered in three ways. One necessity is absolute, which relative to things that are naturally present within man, such as it is necessary that man be risible, and the like; and in this way it is not necessary that human nature be restored. Another is a necessity of coercion, and this is relative to things that a man does when coerced by a greater power, and this is involuntary either simply speaking or in a certain respect; and such was not the necessity in human nature in reference to its restoration, since God does not coerce one to virtue. The third necessity is on the supposition of an end, such as that it is necessary for a man to have a ship if he ought to go across the sea; and by this necessity it was necessary that human nature be restored—namely, if it should be admitted to the vision of God.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every necessity is one of coercion, as is clear from things said. And therefore the argument commits the fallacy of the consequent.

Reply Obj. 2: The necessity that is from the supposition of a will immutably willing something does not diminish the notion of the voluntary. Rather, it augments it so much more to the degree that it is given as more firmly adhering to what was willed, such that it cannot be moved from it.

Reply Obj. 3: With respect to God’s power, God could dismiss sin without any penalty, nor would this be unjust, were he to do it. But on the side of the one who sinned, according to the order that God has now placed in things, sin cannot be fittingly dismissed without a penalty. Nor does it follow that, if part of the penalty is fittingly dismissed, then also the whole would be fittingly dismissed, and this for two reasons. First, because an effect has something from both the agent and the recipient. This is why just as in the bestowal of divine gifts, the gift—on the side of the giver—elevates the recipient above his state, whereas—on the side of the recipient—it is beneath the mode in which God infuses it, so too in the forgiveness of sins it is necessary that there be something on the side of the one offering mercy, such that something of the penalty owed is dismissed, and something on the side of the recipient, such that he is punished in some respect. Second, because the remission of the penalty that arises for other men, especially a satisfactory penalty, is founded on the satisfactory power of Christ, which was superabundant for removing all penalties in and of itself. Whence it was necessary that the partial satisfaction be founded on the condign satisfaction of Christ, as the imperfect in any genus arises from the perfect.

Reply Obj. 4: In him to whom God gives his gratuitous gifts there is nothing repugnant to those gifts that makes the bestowal of gifts inappropriate. But in him who has sinned there is something repugnant to being unpunished, and therefore on the side of the created thing, it is not like.

Article 2

Whether any merely created thing could have made satisfaction for human nature

To the second we turn as follows. It appears that a merely created thing was able to make satisfaction for human nature.

Obj. 1: For just as satisfaction is owed for sin, so too giving thanks is owed to a benefit. But giving thanks to God to the degree that a man is able to render it, is sufficient, even if it is not equal to the benefits. For, as the Philosopher says, according to his ability, a man’s service to the gods and his fathers appears to be just, although not according to equality. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.14, 1163b16–18.) Therefore it appears that in a similar way the satisfaction that a man can render is sufficient to expiate sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the good is more capable of action than is evil, since evil acts in the power of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).) But one merely created thing was able, through his action, to infect the entire human nature. Therefore much more so can a merely created thing, through one good act, make satisfaction for the entire human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it appears to be a thing of great cruelty if a lord or judge exacts from someone more than he is capable of. But all cruelty is far from God. Therefore he does not exact from anyone more than he is capable of. Therefore a mere man was able to make the satisfaction that God required of man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the nature is restored only in individuals, as was said above. But one man is as good as the nature that is in him. Therefore one man could make satisfaction for the human nature that is in him, and all men for the human nature present in all individuals.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the angelic nature is above the human. But what is better can be received as recompense for what is less good. Therefore an angel could have made satisfaction for the human nature.

On the contrary, only the one who was able to establish a thing can restore it. But God alone was able to establish human nature, so he alone can restore it. Therefore for someone restoring the nature by making satisfaction, it had to be God.

Furthermore, in the state of his creation man was of so great a dignity that by reason of his beatitude he was a debtor to no creature. But he is a debtor and obliged by reason of his beatitude to him who restored him to beatitude. Therefore if his restoration were made through any merely created thing, man would not have been brought back to his pristine dignity.

Furthermore, no one can render on behalf of another what it owes on its own behalf. But every created thing owes to God all that it is. Therefore no merely created thing can sufficiently make satisfaction for another.

I answer that, as was said, for the sin of human nature, a condign satisfaction must be made, both because otherwise man would not be restored to his pristine dignity, and because it is fitting that it be the one first perfect thing within the genus of making satisfaction, on which all other imperfect satisfactions are founded.

Now, so that the satisfaction might be condign it had to have infinite strength, since the sin for which the satisfaction was made had a certain infinity. This was for three reasons: first, from the infinity of the divine majesty, inasmuch as it was offended through the contempt of disobedience, for the greater the one against whom one sins, the graver the fault. Second, from the good that was removed by the sin, which is infinite—that is, God himself, by participation of whom men become blessed. Third, from the very nature that was corrupted, which possessed a certain infinity inasmuch as the supposits in it could be multiplied to infinity.

However, the action of a merely created thing cannot have an infinite efficacy, and therefore nothing merely created was able sufficiently to make satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible that man be brought to the point that he no longer owes thanksgiving to God as having all that he is from him. Therefore it is not required that the thanksgiving be of equal value with the gifts that have been received. But it is possible for man to be of as great a dignity as he was in the state of innocence. And therefore for the sake of perfect restoration, through which all that can be restored is restored, it was required that the satisfaction be of equal value with the fault.

Reply Obj. 2: In comparing the good and the evil corresponding proportionally to their effects, the good is of greater power than evil, since the good acts in its own strength, but evil acts only through the strength of the good. Nevertheless, man is more easily capable of evil action than of perfectly good action, for more things are required for the good than for evil, which arises from any single defect. (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:730).) And therefore the first man was capable of an evil act that was proportionate to corrupting the entire human nature, but he was not capable of a good act so perfect that it would have been proportionate to restoration.

Reply Obj. 3: It would be cruelty in a lord to require more than the servant was capable of unless he were also to give the servant that whereby he was able to pay what was being required. Whence in this most of all is his mercy commended: that he required from man perfect satisfaction so that might be perfectly restored, and because man was not able to do this through himself, he gave him his own Son, who was.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the nature is not corrupted, nor in need of restoration, except insofar as it is in the person, nonetheless a certain corruption is owed to the natur—not as determined in this person, but as in all who received human nature through the wounded origin in Adam. Whence one man alone cannot make satisfaction for this common corruption, and neither could even all together. For the nature exceeds even all those who possess the nature, since it can extend to more.

Reply Obj. 5: Although an angel is superior to man with respect to its nature, still this is not so with respect to glory, in which we will be equal to the angels. And therefore an angel cannot restore man to glory; in fact, since it is something created, even what it is capable of it owes to God.

Article 3

Whether the satisfaction should have been made through Christ’s Passion

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.48.2; 48.6.ad 3; SCG IV.55.ad 23, 24.) It appears that the satisfaction should not have been made through Christ’s Passion.

Obj. 1: For a lesser sin is not expiated through a greater one—rather, it is aggravated. But the sin of those who murdered Christ was greater than the eating of the forbidden fruit by which human nature was corrupted. Therefore the corruption of human nature cannot be expiated through Christ’s suffering.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing bodily is of equal power with something spiritual. But Christ’s life, which he gave through his suffering, was a bodily life. Therefore it was not sufficient recompense for the spiritual life that was lost through sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sin of the first man, through which human nature was corrupted, was a sin of arrogance, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1.) But Christ’s humility was greater in the assumption of human nature, when he emptied himself, taking on the form of a servant than was Adam’s arrogance. Therefore from the very assumption of human nature sufficient satisfaction was made on man’s behalf, and thus it was not fitting that Christ suffer.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Bernard says that one drop of Christ’s blood was a sufficient price of our redemption. (source) But some of Christ’s blood was poured out in his circumcision. Therefore he need not have suffered more.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, there can be so great a contrition in us sinners that the entire sin is forgiven, both with respect to the penalty and with respect to the fault. But in Christ, from the instant of his conception, there was the most perfect charity, which gives contrition the power of expurgating sin. Therefore Christ, from the instant of his conception, sufficiently made satisfaction for all our sins, and thus he need not have made satisfaction through suffering death.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the penalty by which one is punished takes its quantity, relative to a power of making satisfaction, from the condition of the one who suffers it. But Christ, insofar as he is both God and man, has infinite dignity. Therefore every penalty that he endures—whether hunger, fatigue, or the like—was sufficient to make satisfaction for the entire human race. Therefore it was not necessary that he suffer death.

On the contrary, it was fitting that he . . . should make the pioneer of their salvation perfect through suffering (Heb 2:10).

Furthermore, man owed a death. Therefore if [Christ] ought to make satisfaction for others by making recompense, it was necessary that he pay a death, though he did not owe it.

Furthermore, Christ not only ought to conquer the enemy, but even to give us an example of conquest. Therefore he ought to be the victor in the most difficult things. But to endure death is the most difficult thing. Therefore he ought to free us through suffering death.

I answer that Christ made satisfaction not merely for one man but for the entire human race. Whence, it ought to include two conditions, such that it would be universal in some way with respect to all satisfactions, and such that it would be the exemplar of all particular satisfactions.

Now, it was not universal as something predicated of many things, as though multiplied through many particular satisfactions, but rather as possessing power with respect to all of them. Whence he need not assume in himself all the penalties that could follow from sin in any way, but only that penalty toward which they are all ordered, and which contains all penalties within itself, in its power, although not in act. However, the end of all fearful things is death, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b26.) And therefore he ought to make satisfaction through suffering death.

And inasmuch as he was the exemplar in respect to our making satisfaction, it ought to have a magnitude that exceeds all other ways of making satisfaction. For an exemplar ought to stand out before whatever is to be modeled on it. And therefore he ought to make satisfaction according to the greatest of penalties, namely, death.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s Passion was not satisfying because of those who murdered Christ, but because of the one suffering it, who willed to suffer from the greatest charity. And in virtue of this it was accepted by God.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s bodily life had a certain infinite strength from its union with divinity, insofar as it was not the life of a mere man, but of God and man. And therefore it was able to be a sufficient recompense for a spiritual life, and especially by reason of the remarkable charity from which it was offered.

Reply Obj. 3: In Adam’s sin there was not only arrogance, but also delight, and therefore in its satisfaction there ought not only to be humility, which was accomplished in the Incarnation, but also the bitterness of pain, which happens in suffering.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the drop of blood that bled in the circumcision would be sufficient for every satisfaction, considering the condition of the divine person, nevertheless it would not be sufficient relative to the kind of penalty. For the human race was obligated to death, for which it was necessary that a death be paid.

Reply Obj. 5: Contrition has its power not only from the charity, but also from the pain. And therefore he destroys the fault by reason of his charity, but [his Passion] is counted as making satisfaction for the penalty by reason of its pain.

Reply Obj. 6: The other penalties that Christ endured, although they were sufficient to make satisfaction on behalf of human nature, considering the condition of the one suffering, nonetheless this is not the case when considering the kind of penalty. For all other penalties were not contained in those penalties, as they were in the suffering of death.

Article 4

Whether any other manner of making satisfaction was possible

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.46.1‒2.) It appears that no other mode of satisfaction was possible.

Obj. 1: For Hebrews 2:10 says, it was fitting that he . . . should make . . . [him] perfect through suffering, and the Gloss says, unless Christ suffered, man would not be redeemed. (Glossa ordinaria, at Hebrews 2:10, ?.?? (PL 114:647).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Anselm, in his book Why God Became Man, has said, the cup was unable to pass away unless he drank of it, not because he did not want to avoid death, but because otherwise the world could not be saved. (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. 2, ch. 10 (PL 158:375).) Therefore it appears that there was no other way possible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the least unfitting thing is impossible for God. But to forgive sin without the appropriate satisfaction being made is unfitting, as was said. Therefore since the appropriate satisfaction could be made only through this mode, it appears that no other mode was possible.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what belongs to the faith cannot be false. But the ancient patriarchs believed that the Christ would suffer. Therefore it could not have happened otherwise.

On the contrary, in Morals Gregory says, he who made us from nothing was also able to call us back even without his death and suffering. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 20, ch. 36 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:179).)

Furthermore, with God nothing will be impossible (Luke 1:37). Therefore he would have been able to free us in some other way.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that another mode would have been more fitting. (Parallels: ST III.46.2‒4; Compendium theol., ch. 228; Contra errores Graecorum, ch. 7; In Symbolorum apostolorum, a. 4; Super Matth. 27; Super Ioan. 3, lect. 2; 12, lect. 5; Super Heb. 2, lect. 4.) For if Christ had submitted himself to a natural death, the human race would still have been redeemed, for he would have paid a death that he did not owe. But this would have happened without anyone sinning. Therefore it appears that this would have been a more fitting way, since each thing is more fitting to the degree that fewer unfitting things follow upon it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the devil invaded us wholly unjustly, nor did he have a claim on us. But nothing is more fitting than that force be repelled by force. Therefore it would have been the most fitting mode if, by his power, he would have snatched us away from the power of the devil, rather than by redeeming us.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, he came to free man from the power of the demon, not from the power of a man. Therefore it would have been more fitting had he suffered from the demon than from man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Christ came so that he might draw men to himself. But more would have followed him if he had entered by a path delights rather than through the path by which he exited this world, the path of suffering. Therefore it appears that that would have been a more fitting mode.

On the contrary, on the psalm that says, but thou dost not answer (Ps 22:2), the Gloss says, there was no more fitting mode of our redemption than that man, who fell through his arrogance, might rise through his humility. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, in Psalm 21:6 (PL 191:230); Cassiodorus, Exposition of the Psalms (PL 70); Glossa interlinearis, at Psalm 21:6 (in Glossa ordinaria, 3.574).)

Furthermore, it belongs to him who is best to bring forth the best things. Therefore if God is the best, he chose the best way of our liberation.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, insofar as it is from the side of God, another mode of our liberation was possible, for his power is not limited, and this, had he chosen it, it would have been most fitting. Nevertheless, it would not have had the notion of redemption, but only of liberation, since the liberation would not have been accomplished through the payment of the price. However, from the side of man, there was no other mode possible than the one that God gave him, since he was not able to make satisfaction by himself, but only by divine favor. But from our side and that of God together, there was indeed another mode possible, but none so fitting.

Reply Obj. 1: If man were to have been freed in another way, he would not have been redeemed, since redemption imports a sufficient satisfaction being made. But still he could have been freed in another way.

Reply Obj. 2: Anselm is speaking in reference to our side, having supposed the ordination of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it is unfitting on our side, according to the order that God has placed in things, that sin be forgiven without satisfaction being made, nonetheless if he were to have done that, it would have been most fitting. For if he had done this, he simultaneously would have placed something fitting in things.

Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the patriarchs was in the suffering of the Christ to come on the supposition of the ordination of God that it would occur. On this supposition Christ’s Passion has a necessity, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, insofar as it is from our side, no more fitting mode was possible. But nevertheless, the power is not taken away from God—whose power is not limited—that he could have made a more fitting mode. But this would be in virtue of a different order having been placed in things.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ ought to have made satisfaction, with respect to sufficiency, for all sins—not only for original, but also for actual sin, for which violent death is inflicted. And therefore, so that his satisfaction might embrace all [sin], it was becoming that he might die the most shameful death, as regards the kind of death, such that in death he might descend not only lower than the angels, but even beneath men in his kind of death, with respect to its bitterness together with its shamefulness. Nor does the sin of others take away anything from the fitness of the satisfaction, since the making of satisfaction from suffering is not accomplished for the one inflicting the suffering, but for the one suffering it.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the devil unjustly imprisoned us, nonetheless we are justly imprisoned by him, suffering on account of our own fault his tyranny. This is why, from our side, it was fitting that he snatch us away by making satisfaction, and not only that he justly liberate us, which would have been the case had he used violence, even though he would have freed us justly.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the sin of man was committed by a man, at the instigation of the devil, so too it was fitting, so that the medicine might correspond to the disease, that Christ be killed by man, at the persuasion of the devil.

Reply Obj. 4: Satisfaction should be penal, and therefore, so that he might make satisfaction on our behalf, it was necessary that he endure penalties in this world and not use pleasant things. Or it should be said that Christ came so that he might call us back from earthly goods, because of which men withdrew from God, to heavenly goods. And therefore it was becoming that he set aside earthly goods insofar as he was giving us an example of despising them.

Article 5

Whether God the Father handed the Son over to suffering

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.47.3; SCG IV.55.ad 16; Super Ioan. 3, lect. 3; Super Rom. 8, lect. 6.) It appears that God the Father did not hand the Son over to suffering.

Obj. 1: For it is the greatest cruelty to hand over an innocent son. But Christ was most innocent. Therefore, since there is no cruelty in God, it appears that he did not hand over Christ to suffering.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the Father handed Christ over to death, this would only be because Christ died out of obedience to the Father. But whoever does something out of obedience does it out of an obligation. Therefore Christ owed something to death, and thus his death was not most gratuitously given to God, for being owed diminishes the gratuitousness of an act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if the Father handed over the Son, then he wanted him to die. But the Jews also wanted this. Therefore they conformed their will to the divine will, and thus did not sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b22‒25.) that to attain a good end through evil means is [the advice] of an evil counselor. But the divine counsel is the best. Therefore if Christ died by the counsel of the will of the Father, this counsel would not be fulfilled by the intermediate evil deeds of the Jews—which nevertheless is false. Therefore the Father did not hand over the Son to suffering.

On the contrary, he did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all (Rom 8:32).

Furthermore, every penalty is from God. But Christ’s Passion was a certain penalty. Therefore it was from God.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s Passion was not good. For according to Boethius, if something’s generation is a good, its corruption is evil. (Boethius, Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 64:939).) But Christ’s generation was the best. Therefore his suffering death was the worst.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every injustice is an evil. But Christ suffered unjustly: but he trusted to him who judges unjustly (1 Pet 2:23). (The RSV has “justly” for “unjustly.”) Therefore that suffering of Christ was evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the same matter in natural things cannot exist under contrary forms, so too in moral matters one act cannot be good and evil. But Christ’s suffering was the work of the Jews, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 20.5(66).2.) Therefore, since the work of the Jews was evil, Christ’s Passion cannot be good.

On the contrary, nothing is accepted by God unless it is good. But Christ’s death was accepted by God; for he gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God (Eph 5:2). Therefore Christ’s Passion was good.

Furthermore, everything that arises from charity is good. But Christ suffered and died from the greatest charity. Therefore his suffering was the best.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that there are three things to consider in Christ’s suffering: one on the side of the one suffering, namely, one who suffered voluntarily out of charity; another on the side of those who murdered him, who murdered him from a depraved will; and a third on the side of those for whom he suffered, namely, the effect of salvation in the entire human race. And according to this, in three ways did the Father—in fact the entire Trinity—hand him over. In one way, by preordaining his suffering for the salvation of the human race. In a second way, by giving Christ the man the will and the charity from which he willed to suffer. And third, by giving him the power and not restraining the will of the murderers, as is said in John 19:11: you would have no power over me unless it had been given you from above.

Reply Obj. 1: God the Father did not hand Christ over to death by forcing him to die, but rather by giving him the good will by which he wished to die. And therefore it does not follow that there was any cruelty in God.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not owe a death due to any necessity, but out of his love for men, by which he willed man’s salvation, and out of his love for God, by which he wished to fulfill his will, as Matthew 26:39 says: not as I will, but as thou wilt. And this obligation does not diminish in any way the gratuitousness of his act.

Reply Obj. 3: The conformity of the human will to the divine lies not in simply willing what God wills, but in willing it in the same way—that is, from charity, as God wills it, whether for the same end or in willing what God wants us to will. And in this way the Jews did not conform their will to the divine, because they murdered Christ from their depravity, in order to impede the salvation that they saw would follow from his preaching.

Reply Obj. 4: To do something evil for the sake of attaining a good end belongs to the advice of an evil counselor, but to use the evil of others, which one does not do himself, for a good end, this is belongs to the greatest wisdom.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a judgment about a thing is absolute when the thing itself is considered insofar as it is actually existing in the nature of things. And this is when it is considered with all the circumstances that are present in it. But when a thing is considered according to something in the thing, without a consideration of other things, that judgment is not about the thing simply, but in a certain respect.

Therefore if his suffering be considered insofar as it is in the one suffering, with all its circumstances—namely, Christ’s charity, and its efficacy—then in this way it should be called good simply speaking. However, if it be considered only insofar as it is suffering—namely, insofar as he gives up his life, considering nothing else—then in this way it is an evil, in the genus of an evil of nature. Whence it should be said that it is good simply speaking, but evil in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s suffering, insofar as it leads to corruption, is thereby an evil; and this is to consider it [only] in a certain respect. But insofar as it is a willed suffering, and one ordained to human salvation, in this way it is the best thing.

Reply Obj. 2: It was unjustly accomplished by those who murdered him, but on the side of the one suffering it proceeds from the most just will.

Reply Obj. 3: The deed actively committed by the Jews is an evil simply speaking, but the suffering, which is the deed that was brought about, is good simply speaking, insofar as it is within the one suffering. However, it could be called evil in a certain respect, insofar as it is within their action as in a cause, and insofar as it corrupts a nature; and thus one is not asserting contraries of the same thing.

Exposition of the text

Because in this way the devil is overcome by righteousness, not by power. (Sent. III, 20.2(63).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 13 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1028).) On the contrary, God’s justice cannot be without his power, nor conversely. It should be said that this should be understood to mean not by his power only. But if he had overcome the devil even by his power alone, it would still be justice on the side of God freeing us, but not on our side.

The author of sin immediately invaded him. (Sent. III, 20.2(63).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50A), bk. 13, cc. 12–13 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1028).) On the contrary, the devil sinned more than man did, so he should be invaded more than man. It should be said to this that the judge’s sentence invaded both of them, according to the mode of fault, but the author of sin also invaded man. This is both because man subjected himself to him, and because man was under the angels from the order of nature, whence he is given to man also for his exercise.

He brought about salvation only for the predestined. (Sent. III, 20.5(66).1.) On the contrary, some who are not predestined also receive grace. It should be said that he is speaking of final salvation, through which a man is freed from every evil.

Here a distinction is to be drawn, (Sent. III, 20.6(67).2.) for this can be understood as of the one doing the deed—and in this way they worked evil—or as of the deed being done—and in this way they worked the good.