D. 12 - Defects of Christ's human nature as created

Division of the text

After the Master shows that the name “created” is not predicated of Christ simply, but with a determination, here he looks into the defects that follow upon the human nature insofar as it is a created thing. And this is divided into two parts:

first, he considers the defect that follows commonly on every created thing, namely, beginning to exist;

second, he considers the defects that follow the human nature specifically, at it is also usual to ask whether God could have taken on another human nature or from other than the stock of Adam. (Sent. III, 12.2(35).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things:

first, he proposes the question;

second, he objects to each part of it, at concerning this, Augustine speaks as follows; (Sent. III, 12.1(34).2.)

and third, he responds to it, at and so, in no way departing from these authorities, we say that that man, insofar as he is a man, had a beginning. (Sent. III, 12.1(34).3.)

It is also usual to ask whether God could have taken on another human nature . . . (Sent. III, 12.2(35).1.) Here he treats the defects that pertain to the human nature only.

And it is divided into two parts:

first, he asks about the defect of a fault;

second, about a defect of the nature, which is the female sex, at it is also usual for some to ask, if only for effect, whether God could have taken human nature according to the female sex. (Sent. III, 12.4(37).1.)

Regarding the first, he does two things:

first, he asks about the defect of fault as regards his origin, namely, whether he could have assumed flesh otherwise than from sinners;

second, about the defect of fault with respect to his action, namely, whether he could sin, at and so, it is not undeservedly asked whether that man might have been able to sin. (Sent. III, 12.3(36).1.)

And regarding the latter he does three things:

first, he proposes the question;

second, he answers it, at here there is need to distinguish; (Sent. III, 12.3(36).2.)

and third, he objects to this answer, at but some strive to prove that, even when united to the Word, it is able to sin. (Sent. III, 12.3(36).3.)

And first he objects by argument;

and second, by authority, at they also adduce authority to prove the same point. (Sent. III, 12.3(36).4.) And he resolves both, as is clear in the text.

It is also usual for some to ask, if only for effect, whether God could have taken human nature according to the female sex. (Sent. III, 12.4(37).1.) Here he asks about the defect of the nature that is the female sex,

and first he proposes the question,

second, resolves it, at some judge that he could have taken human form in the female sex as he did in the male. (Sent. III, 12.4(37).1.)

In the latter he asks three things:

first, about its beginning; (Q. 1.)

second, about the power for sinning; (Q. 2.)

and third, about the congruity of the assumption with regard to the female sex. (Q. 3.) Yet we have spoken about the congruity of the assumption with respect to Adam’s stock in Distinction 2. (In II Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.)

Question 1

Christ's beginning as man

About the first, two things are asked:

first, whether this man, meaning Christ, began to exist;

second, whether he began to be God.

Article 1

Whether “this man began to exist” is true

To the first, we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.16.9; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3.) It appears that “this man began to exist” is true.

Obj. 1: For everything that was not always, and is, began to be. But as Augustine says in the text, (Sent. III, 12.1(34).2, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 105, para. 7 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1907).) the Mediator of God and men, Christ the man, did not exist before the world existed. Therefore he began to exist.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “this man” points to the supposit of both natures, divine and human. But by reason of his divine nature it can be said that “this man always was.” Therefore, since beginning to exist belongs to his human nature, just as also existing from eternity belongs to his divine, by reason of the human nature it can be said that “this man began to exist.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, before the world came to be, it was true to say that “no man exists,” but “some man exists” and “this man exists” were false. However, now these things are true. Therefore this man began to exist.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what begins to exist in some species, begins to exist simply. But this man began to exist in the human species. Therefore he began to exist simply.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to be born in time is to change from non-existence to existence. But this man was born in time. Therefore he changed from non-existence to existence. But every such thing began to exist. Therefore this man began to exist.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, “this man” stands for the composite person. But the composite person was not from eternity, since when the composition does not exist, the composite thing cannot exist. Therefore this man did not always exist, so he began to exist.

On the contrary, nothing eternal began to exist. But “this man” supposes the eternal supposit. Therefore he did not begin to exist.

Furthermore, everything that began to exist was a created thing. But this man is not a created thing, as was said above. (Above, d. 11, a. 3.) Therefore this man did not begin to exist.

Furthermore, in John 8:58 the man we are talking about says, before Abraham was, I am. And for a like reason he could truly say, “before the world came to be, I am.” But such a one did not begin to exist. Therefore this man did not begin to exist.

I answer that some make a distinction about “this man began to exist” from the fact that the pronoun “this” can indicate the person of the Word or an individual man. And in the first way, the statement is false, but in the second, it is true.

But when “this man” is said, the pronoun “this” can indicate only what is supposed by the name “man.” Now, what is supposed by the name “man” is nothing other than the person of the Word, according to the second opinion. Whence, according to that opinion, the statement cannot stand. For although it asserts that in Christ there is some individual besides the person of the Word, namely the human nature, still that individual is not what is supposed by the name “man,” nor is it predicated of Christ, as has been said. (Above, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1.) And therefore it is clear that this distinction is sound with respect to the first opinion.

And therefore, having set this aside, some say that this word “begins” can indicate a beginning for the supposit, simply speaking—and in this way, the statement is false, since that supposit is eternal—or for the supposit by reason of the form signified—and in this way, it is true. And they put forward an example of this: “a white shield begins to exist today,” supposing that yesterday’s shield is being made white today.

But this claim appears to be ineffectual, for two reasons. First, because even if the human nature is something like an accident in Christ, still this name “man” is not an adjective but a substantive, even if the human nature were supervening merely accidentally. And in such things, the mode of signifying is more relevant than is the property of the thing signified. Second, because even were it granted that “man” is an adjective, a predicate must belong to what is coupled with or supposed by the name in the subject position, or else by reason of something that is in [the subject]. Now, those predicates that are naturally apt to belong to a supposit itself are predicated simply of it by reason of something in it, whether as a part, or as an accident or nature, only if it belongs to it in virtue of itself. For it would follow that an affirmation and a negation would be verified of the same thing, if that what is truly denied of something by reason of itself, is also verified of it by reason of something existing in it. And this is clear in the proposed matter.

For when “this man” is said, always existing belongs to what it supposes. This is why the negation cannot be verified of it, such that it would be said, “was not always,” simply speaking. And consequently neither could something that would imply the aforesaid negation, such as the verb “beginning.”

This is why it should be said that the statement “this man began to exist” is false simply speaking, and true in a certain respect—namely, with the determination of the human nature, just as “this man is a created thing” is also false, unless a determination be added to it. And thereby also it is tropological, as the Master said above. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).4.) Whence here he does not intend to distinguish it as manifold, but to say only how it can be true and false.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the rule given by the Master in the preceding Distinction, (Sent. III, 12.2(33).2–4.) one should understand that authority with the determination, although for the sake of brevity is it not added.

Reply Obj. 2: Although that supposit is stands under both natures, still in certain respects it is related to the divine nature and to the human in different ways. For it is the same in reality with the divine nature, and it is constituted in existence through it, according to our mode of understanding. Whence as long as the divine nature existed, the supposit itself existed. However, it is not related in this way to the human nature, and therefore it need not be that, upon the beginning of the human nature, the supposit itself began.

Reply Obj. 3: From eternity it would have been true to say “no man exists,” since the eternal supposit was not yet supposed to a human nature. This is why it could not be taken as a distributed expression, as it can now, on account of the union. Whence although from eternity it would not be true to say, “some man is eternal,” still in a way it is true to say “someone” or “this man is from eternity.”

Reply Obj. 4: To be born in time from his mother is naturally apt to belong to the supposit only by reason of the body, as was said above. (Above,* d. 8, a. 3.)* And therefore by reason of it, it is verified of the supposit simply speaking. But to begin to exist cannot be verified of it by reason of the body simply speaking, but with the determination. And therefore this is true simply: “this man is born in time,” whereas this is not: “this man began to exist,” but it is true in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 5: In other supposits, which are supposits of only one nature, it follows that if they begin to exist in some species, they begin to exist simply speaking. But this is not so in the proposed matter. Whence in this respect the human nature in Christ has a likeness with an accident. And therefore just as “this man began to be white, therefore he began to be” does not follow, so too neither does “this one began to be a man, therefore he began to be” follow.

Reply Obj. 6: Because the composition did not always exist, therefore “the person was always composite” is false. But nevertheless “the composite person always existed” is true, because for the truth of a proposition it is enough that the predicate belongs to the subject. Nor is must it belong to the subject by reason of the form signified or attached, unless it be a predication through itself. And therefore, because to have always existed belongs to the person, although not by reason of the composition, this is true simply: “the composite person always existed.” But for the truth of a proposition it is required that the whole that is in the predicate belong to the subject. And therefore the composition that the name “composite” signifies does not belong to the person from eternity, and therefore “this person was always composed” is false.

Article 2

Whether Christ began to be God

To the second question, I say that the judgment about “the man began to be God” is the same as that about “the man was made God,” and the same reasons can be given for each. And therefore one should look above, to Distinction 7, (Above, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.) where it was asked "whether man was made God."

Question 2

Christ's power to sin

Next we ask about the power to sin, and regarding this two things are asked:

first, whether this man was able to sin;

second, whether he had the power to sin.

Article 1

Whether Christ was able to sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.15.1; 31.7.) It appears that he was able to sin.

Obj. 1: For Bernard says (Bernard, Sermones de diuersis, serm. 60, para. 1 (PL 183:683).) that the Son of God descended as far as he was able to descend, outside of sin. But the last grade regarding sin is being able to sin. Therefore he was able to sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no praise should be withheld from Christ the man. But in the praise of the just man it is said: who has had the power to transgress and did not transgress (Sir 31:10). Therefore this should belong to Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as sin requires the will, so too does merit. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, Retractationum libri duo, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 49; PL 32:597).) no one sins in what he cannot avoid. Therefore also, no one merits or is praised concerning what he cannot reject. Therefore if Christ was not able to sin, he should not be praised for the fact that he did not sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Topics* 4.5, 126a34–39.)* that God and the devoted man are able to do warped things. But in Christ there is found no reason why he would be unable to sin other than because he is God, and because he was perfectly good. Therefore he was able to sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ says, if I said, I do not know him, I should be a liar like you (John 8:55). But he was able to say those words without the addition, just as he said them with the addition. Therefore he was able to lie, and therefore also to sin.

On the contrary, Hebrews 2:9 says, we see Jesus, who for a little while was made lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honor, and a Gloss says, because only God is greater than the nature of the human mind, which God assumed and which in no way was able to be warped by sin. (Taken from Augustine, Contra Maximinum, bk. 2, ch. 25 (CCSL 87A:660; PL 42:803).) But for whoever can sin, his mind can be warped by sin. Therefore Christ was not able to sin.

Furthermore, this is the perfection of a glorified nature: that it can no longer sin. But Christ from the instant of his conception was a true comprehensor. Therefore he was never able to sin.

Furthermore, whatever that man did, God could be said to have done. Therefore if that man were to have sinned, it would follow that God would have sinned—which is impossible. Therefore the same as the first.

I answer that, simply speaking, Christ was in no way able to sin. This is why Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 20 (PG 94:1082).) that the Lord Jesus is impeccable. For he can be considered insofar as he is a wayfarer, or insofar as he is a comprehensor, or insofar as he is God.

Insofar as he is a wayfarer, he appears to be our general directing us according to the right path. Now, in every genus the first thing regulating it cannot be twisted, since otherwise there would be a deviation in all things that are regulated in virtue of it. And therefore Christ himself had such a fullness of glory that he, even as a wayfarer, could not sin. This is why even those who were close to him, such as the apostles, even while still wayfarers, were also strengthened so that they were unable to sin mortally, though they were able to sin venially. But insofar as he was a comprehensor, his mind was wholly joined to the end, so that he could act only in accordance with the order to the end, as was said of the confirmed angels in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1.) However, insofar as he was God, and his soul and body were, as it were, the organ of the Godhead, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1074).) so much did the Godhead rule his soul, and his soul his body. Whence sin was unable to befall him, just as neither can God sin.

Nevertheless, in a conditional sense it can be granted that he was able to sin: namely, if he were to wish it—although the antecedent is impossible. For the truth of a conditional statement does requires neither the truth of the antecedent nor that of the consequent, but only the necessary relation of the one to the other.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as God was not able to descend to the point of sinning, and therefore Christ never sinned, so too he was not able to descend to the point that he could sin, and therefore Christ was never able to sin. And even if God were able to descend to this point, still it was not fitting for him, since this would have more impeded than aided the end of the Incarnation, according to which he is our general and the king of our works.

Reply Obj. 2: Something can pertain to the praise of an inferior thing that, if attributed to a superior thing, would rather be degrading, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 25 (PG 3:727).) For example, rage is praiseworthy in a dog, but degrading in a man. This is why even the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b18–20; 10.8, 1178b10‒15.) that the praise of men, when transferred to the gods, appears to be mockery. Still, that being able to sin pertains to praise is accidental, insofar it shows that the work that is praised was not done by necessity. But although the power to sin is removed from Christ, still in him there is no coercion, which is contrary to the voluntary, and destroys the notion of praise.

Reply Obj. 3: The powerlessness of coercion, which is opposed to the voluntary, takes a way the notion of merit and demerit. But the powerlessness that comes from perfection in goodness, or in evil, does not. For it does not remove the voluntary, but rather asserts a will confirmed in one thing.

Reply Obj. 4: As Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonedes, Guide for the Perplexed.) the Philosopher’s statement should understood conditionally: namely, that he would be able if he willed to do so.

Reply Obj. 5: Those words mean that Christ would have been able to do so, if he had willed it—but he was not able to will it.

Article 2

Whether Christ had the power to sin

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ did not have the ability, or power, to sin.

Obj. 1: For relative to every ability there is someone with who is able. But Christ was not able to sin. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the ability to sin, according to Anselm, (Anselm, De libertate arbitrii, ch. 1 (PL 158:489).) is neither the freedom of decision nor a part of freedom; rather, it diminishes freedom. But in Christ freedom was not diminished. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the ability to sin is the root and principle of sin. But in Christ the principle and root of sin was absent. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Christ, even as man, was maximally like God. But God is not able to sin, nor does he have the ability to sin. Therefore neither does Christ insofar as he is a man.

On the contrary (5), the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 126a37.) that the abilities of depraved men are choice-worthy. But Christ had all the good things of men. Therefore so too the ability to sin.

Furthermore (6), as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) the Son of God assumed whatever he planted in our nature. Now, he planted in it the ability to sin, since the ability to sin is from God, although the will to sin is not from him. Therefore he had the ability to sin.

Furthermore (7), the ability to sin is the ability by which one sins. Now, this is free decision. Therefore, since Christ had free decision, insofar as he was a man, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1071).) it must be that he had the ability to sin.

Furthermore (8), Christ’s soul is a created thing. But according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:867).) every created thing is changeable, either with respect to choice or with respect to substance. Therefore Christ’s soul can be changed with respect to choice, since he had the ability to choose. But the changeability of choice is the ability to sin. Therefore Christ had the ability to sin.

I answer that an act is related to an ability, or power, in two ways: because an act goes forth from a power and because a power is specified through an act. And therefore since a “power” is said to be something of an action, such as the “power of seeing,” it can be understood in two ways. For by it can be designated the power’s order to the act, according to which the act is taken as the effect of the power, or by “power” is designated the very thing being specified by the act, insofar as the act is taken in the place of a [specific] difference. In the first way, it cannot be said that one who has impaired vision has the power of seeing, just we cannot say that he can see. In the second way, it can be said that he has the power of seeing, just as that he has the visual power.

However, this distinction, as is clear from things said, is relevant in the acts by which powers, or abilities, are specified. Now, of this sort are the acts to which the powers are ordered. But free decision is not ordered to sin; rather, it falls into sin from its falling short. This is why sinning does not specify the power of free decision. And therefore when it is said that someone has the power to sin, it is not understood that he has free decision, but that he has it as ordered to sin, such that he can sin.

And therefore, just as it is not said of Christ that he can sin, so too he does not have ability to sin, properly speaking, and according to itself. But it can be granted in the following sense: he is said to “have the power to sin” insofar as he has the power that, in others, is the power to sin.

Rep. Obj. 1–4: And granting it this way, it is easy to respond to the first four arguments.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The abilities of evil men are choice-worthy in an incidental way—not because they are those of evil men, but because the same abilities are for good things. However, they would be more choice-worthy if they were for only good things.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The power to sin, as sin, is not from God, as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1.) except only as relative to the power’s subject.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Free decision, as is clear from things said, cannot be called a “power to sin,” simply speaking, except in those who can sin.

Reply Sed Contra 8: That changeability in Christ is perfected through his fullness of grace, just as also the potency of matter is bounded by the act of a form that takes away the entire potentiality of matter, as is clear in the heavens.

Question 3

Christ's sex

Next, we ask about the fittingness regarding his sex, and about this two things are asked:

first, in which sex he should assume the human nature;

second, from which sex he should assume it—namely, from a man or from a woman.

Article 1

Whether Christ ought to take on a certain sex

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first let us proceed as follows. It appears that he should not have taken on a certain sex.

Obj. 1: For Christ’s very body prefigures his mystical body. But in the mystical body, which is the Church, there is no difference of sexes, since the Apostle says, there is neither male nor female . . . in Christ (Gal 3:28). Therefore neither should he have assumed a sex.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sex is ordered to physical generation. But Christ did not come so that he would be the principle of the human race through a physical generation, but a spiritual one. Therefore he should not have taken on a sex.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a created spirit is related indifferently to the sexes. But the uncreated Spirit is more distant from the difference of sex than is a created spirit. Therefore God himself is related indifferently to each sex. Therefore he should have assumed either both sexes or neither.

On the contrary, Christ ought to have become like his brethren in natural attributes, as is said in Hebrews 2. (Esp. vv. 14–17.) But sex is among the natural attributes of man. Therefore he ought to have assumed sex.

Furthermore, what cannot be assumed cannot be cured, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) But sex especially needed cure, since original sin rules in it most of all. Therefore he ought to have assumed sex.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he ought to have assumed the female sex. (Parallel: ST III.31.4.ad 1.) For the restoration corresponds to the destruction. But the first destruction was brought about through a woman. Therefore also the principle of the restoration ought to occur through a woman. But the principle is Christ. Therefore, the rest follows.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ assumed the defects of our nature. But the weakness of the female sex is a certain defect. Therefore he ought to have assumed it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a certain sermon on virgins it is said that the weaker the little vessel that reports from the army their triumph, so much the greater is God praised. (The general sense of this quotation is found in Communis Unious Sanctae Martyris (bk. 2, lect. 4), attributed to John Chrysostomus, as is noted in Brev. Fratrum Praedicatorum.) But in Christ’s victory God should be praised most. Therefore it would be becoming that he assume the weaker sex, that is, the female.

On the contrary, Christ was the head of the Church. But a woman is not the head of a man, but vice versa, according to the Apostle. (1 Cor 11:3.) Therefore he should not have been a woman.

Furthermore, according to Joel 2, (Probably vv. 23–29.) Christ was promised as the teacher of the Church. But teaching in the Church does not befit a woman, as is clear in 1 Corinthians 14:34–35. Therefore Christ should not have assumed the female sex.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I respond that Christ came for the restoration of human nature, which he restored by assuming it. Therefore it was necessary that he assume whatever essentially follows on human nature—namely, all the properties and parts of the human nature, among which is also sex. And therefore it was fitting that he assumed a sex.

Reply Obj. 1: In the mystical body there is said to be no male or female, not because there is no difference of sexes, but because both sexes belong to the mystical body itself without distinction. For the mystical body is not one person, as Christ himself is. Whence there could not be both sexes in him, since that would be monstrous and unnatural.

Reply Obj. 2: He did not assume sex for its use, but for the perfection of the nature—just as it will also be in the saints after the resurrection, when they will neither marry nor be married.

Reply Obj. 3: He is equally related to each sex as regards power, but not as regards its fittingness.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that we are not speaking here of God’s power, because he was able to assume any sort of body that he wished. However, we are speaking of fittingness, since Christ came as a teacher and ruler and champion of the human race, which are not things appropriate to a woman. Therefore neither was it appropriate that he assume the female sex.

Reply Obj. 1: The restoration ought to correspond to the destruction through its opposite. Thus, just as the principle of the perdition was the weaker nature, so the principle of the restoration should be the stronger nature, just as healing in a man’s body is through the power of the heart, which has a stronger health. Or it should be said that original sin did not enter the world through the woman, but through the man, as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 21, q. 2, a. 3.) even though sin had its beginning from the woman. In the same way, too, the work of our salvation had its perfection through a man, while in a certain way it was initiated by a woman, namely the Blessed Virgin.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not assume all our defects, but those that were suited to that assuming’s end, namely the work of redemption, as will be explained below. (Below, d. 15, q. 1, aa. 1, 2.)

Reply Obj. 3: The praise of God is not only due to the weakness of the victor, but also due to the magnitude of the victory and the fittingness of the battle, with respect to which God is praised most in Christ’s victory.

Article 2

Whether he ought to have assumed flesh from both sexes

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that he should have assumed flesh from both sexes.

Obj. 1: For, as the Apostle says, he had to be made like his brethren in every respect (Heb 2:17), and especially in natural attributes. But all men are naturally generated from both sexes. Therefore Christ too should have taken flesh from both sexes.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, only things in human nature that pertain to sin appear to be repugnant to Christ. But the coupling of the sexes can happen without any sin, and without any corruption at all, since it would have occurred in paradise before sin, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 3 (CSEL 28.1:272; PL 34:395).) Therefore he should have assumed flesh through the coupling of the sexes.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ chiefly came to take away original sin. But original sin is passed on through the coupling of the sexes. Therefore he should have assumed flesh through a coupling of the sexes.

On the contrary, Anselm says (Anselm, De conceptu uirginali et de originali peccato, ch. 18 (PL 158:451).) that it was becoming that Christ’s mother should sparkle with a greater purity than any that could be conceived, under God. But the greatest purity is virginal purity. Therefore he ought to be born of a virgin, and thus, not through a coupling of the sexes.

Furthermore, it would follow that Christ would have had two fathers, which no one has.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he should have assumed his body from only a male. (Parallel: ST III.31.4.) For the restoration should correspond to the creation. But in the creation of the human race something was formed from only the male. Therefore so too it should be in the restoration.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what generates is like what is generated. But Christ had to be of the masculine sex. Therefore he should have assumed his body from the male.

On the contrary, Christ came to save both sexes. But he himself was a male. Therefore he should take his flesh from a woman.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, in no way was it fitting that he should have assumed flesh from the coupling of the sexes. First, on account of his mother’s dignity, so she would be most pure, and thus was a virgin. Second, on account of his Father’s dignity, such that there be no other father of his Son. Third, on account of the dignity of the one conceived, since it was fitting that his flesh would be formed only by the Holy Spirit. Fourth, on account of the unity of the person, to which that flesh was assumed; whence it was fitting that, just as it was assumed through an infinite power, so it would be formed through that infinite power. But this could not have been the case if he was conceived through the coupling of the sexes, since either the seed of the male would have been present for no purpose, or it would have been the agent in the conception.

Reply Obj. 1: He had to become like his brethren in the things that do not derogate from his dignity, or from the perfection of the nature assumed, or from the things that serve the work of redemption. But this is not that sort of thing.

Reply Obj. 2: The coupling of the sexes, although it could have been done without sin, still cannot occur in the state of our corrupted nature without being vitiated by lust, which is a principle of sin. However, Christ did not come to restore our nature with respect to the nature’s act, since this will occur in our glorious resurrection, but with respect to a person’s act.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as Christ took away our fault through his own innocence, so too the conception of the one who came to destroy the defect of conception needed to be most pure.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that it was becoming that he assumed his flesh from a woman. First, so that both sexes might be glorified in Christ’s Incarnation, as was touched on in the objection [to the contrary]. Second, for the completion of the universe, since the generation of a man from only a woman had never happened, but generation of a woman from a man had, namely in Eve, and of a man from both, as in Abel and others, and a man from neither, as in Adam. Third, so that he would have a natural relation to the human race, for if he were born of a man not through the man’s action, he would not be his son, nor a natural offspring of Abraham, as he is the natural son of the Virgin from the fact that he took his flesh from her.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not necessary that the restoration be like the creation in all ways, but to the extent that it reaches the end of restoration.

Reply Obj. 2: The generator need not become like what it generates in sex, but it must in the nature of the species.

Exposition of the text

Here there is need to distinguish. (Sent. III, 12.3(36).2.) The Master says this not because the statement is false simply speaking, but so that he might show how much truth it can have.

Or of it as if not united to the Word. (Sent. III, 12.3(36).2.) It is clear that the fact that this could have been otherwise does not change anything about the truth that it is so, nor is this consideration of human nature as not united [to the Word] something real; rather, it is only in the intellect.

Some judge that he could have taken human form in the female sex. (Sent. III, 12.4(37).4.) He says this with a doubt on account of the incongruity towards which the third opinion led, as was explained above in Distinction 6. And yet, it should be granted simply that he was able to assume the female sex, speaking absolutely about his power, although it was not fitting this way.