D. 9 - What belongs to the human nature on account of the union

Division of the text

After the Master has considered what belongs to the divine nature from its union with the human, here he considers what belongs to the human nature from its union with the divine—namely, that it be adored with the adoration of latria.

Now, this part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he states the question.

In the second, he considers it, at and so it seems to some that the flesh or soul of Christ is not to be adored by the adoration which is latria. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).2.)

And this latter is divided into two parts insofar as he notes two opinions.

The second begins at but it pleases others that Christ’s humanity is to be adored in one adoration with the Word. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).3.)

And this latter is divided into three:

in the first, he asserts the solution;

in the second, he answers an objection made to the contrary, at nor is the one who does this liable to the charge of idolatry; (Sent. III, 9.1(28).3.)

in the third, he confirms the solution, at concerning this, John speaks as follows. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).4.)

There are two questions here.

For first one asks about latria, (Q. 1.)

and second about dulia. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Latria

About the first three things are asked:

first, what is latria;

second, to what is it owed;

third, if it is held that it is owed to God alone, how should it be shown to him.

Article 1

Whether latria is a virtue or a gift

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST I-II.60.3; II-II.81.2.) It appears that latria is not a virtue.

Obj. 1: For every virtue consists in the free will. But servitude is opposed to freedom. Therefore since latria is a servitude, as is said in the text, (Sent. III, 9.1(28).1; Silano translates this as “service.”) it appears that it is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every virtue consists principally in an act of the will. But latria consists in an exterior act, namely in the offering of sacrifices. Therefore it appears that it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to latria pertains the offering of reverence to God. However, this pertains to the gift of fear. Therefore latria is a gift and not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, latria by another name is called “piety,” as is noted in the text. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).2.) But piety is a gift. Therefore latria is not a virtue, but a gift.

On the contrary, a property of a virtue, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1101b11–17.) is praiseworthiness. But the act of latria is most of all praiseworthy. Therefore latria is a virtue.

Furthermore, every act that falls within a precept of the law is an act of virtue, for the intention of the legislator is to induce men toward virtue, as is said in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103b3–5.) But the act of latria is commanded by the first mandate [of the law]. Therefore latria is a virtue.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Further, it appears that it is a general virtue. (Parallels: ST II-II.81.4; Super De Trinitate, q. 3, a. 2.) For Augustine says, a true sacrifice is every work that is done so that we might be joined to God in holy society. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 10, ch. 6 (CCSL 47; PL 41:283).) But every work of virtue is like this. Therefore every work of a virtue is a true sacrifice. But to offer sacrifice to God properly pertains to latria. Therefore to pertain all the acts of the virtues, and so it is general virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by every work of virtue one serves God: So you also, when you have done all that is commanded you, say, 'we are unworthy servants' (Luke 17:10). But latria is service owed to God. Therefore every work of the virtues pertains to latria. And thus the same thing as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever does something for someone’s glory, offers reverence to them. But the Apostle teaches, do all things for the glory of God (1 Cor 10:31). Therefore through all the works of virtue done rightly reverence is offered to God. But to offer reverence to God pertains to latria. Therefore it is general virtue.

On the contrary, general virtue is not commanded by a special precept of the law, but by the entire law, as is clear in legal justice. But latria is commanded by a special precept, namely through the first one of the first tablet. Therefore it is a specific virtue.

Furthermore, to a special vice is opposed a specific virtue, whence the Philosopher proves (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a25–b30.) that justice is a special virtue on account of avarice being opposed to it, which is a specific vice. But to latria is opposed a specific vice, namely idolatry. Therefore it is a specific virtue.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it appears that it is a theological virtue. (Parallels: ST II-II.81.5; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 12, ad 11; Super de Trinitate, q. 3, a. 2.) For Augustine says, if it is asked, 'How is God worshiped?' we answer, 'By faith, hope, and love.' (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, cc. 2, 3 (CCSL 46; PL 40:232).) But latria is called the “worship of God,” as is stated in the text. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).1.) Therefore latria is faith, hope, and love, which are the theological virtues.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a theological virtue is one that has God as its object, just as faith is that by which one believes God, and so for the others. But latria has God as its object, since he is worshiped by means of it. Therefore latria is a theological virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every cardinal virtue holds to the mean between the too much and the too little. But latria is not this sort of thing, since God cannot be worshiped excessively. Therefore latria is not a cardinal virtue, but a theological one.

On the contrary, no theological virtue has an exterior act. But the act of latria is to offer sacrifice, which is an exterior act. Therefore it is not a theological virtue.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it is asked, to which cardinal virtue is it traced back. (Parallel: ST II-II.81.1.) And it appears that it is not traced back to justice, to which it most appears to belong. For justice, as the specific virtue that is one of the four cardinal virtues, consists in the communal sharing of the active life, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9.) But in the present life, for us there is no communal sharing with God. Whence it is said in Daniel 2:11: none can show it to the king except the gods, whose dwelling is not with the flesh. Therefore it cannot be a species of justice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.6, 1134b9–17.) what is between a lord and a servant is not properly called “justice,” just as neither is there justice of one to himself. For what a servant is and what he has belong to his lord. Likewise, neither is there justice of a father to his son, who is, as it were, a part of him. But we ourselves are related to God as servants to a lord, and sons to a father. Therefore our relation to God is not one of justice. And thus, latria is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, justice properly consists in an equality, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b7–30.) But it is not possible for us to be equal with God in our works. Therefore there can be no justice for us in reference to God; and thus the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, Cicero asserts in his Rhetoric (Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur De inuentione, bk. 2, ch. 53.) that religion is a species of justice. But religion, as he takes it, is the same thing as latria, since religion, according to him, is what offers worship and ritual to a superior of a certain nature (which they call the divine). Therefore latria is a species of justice.

Furthermore, to return what is owed is an act of justice. But latria is the worship owed to God; whence one offers to God what is owed to him. Therefore latria is a part of justice.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that when something common is found in many things, if it is found in some of them in a special manner, it also takes a special name, just as a curved nose is called “snub.”

Likewise, although subservience can be offered to diverse things, in a certain special and supreme way it is owed to God, since in him is the supreme notion of majesty and lordship. And therefore the service and subservience that is owed to him is named and spoken of with a special name, “latria.” However, this name is taken in three ways: sometimes for what is offered to God in subservience, such as a sacrifice, genuflections, and things of this sort; sometimes for the very act of offering such; and sometimes for the habit by which one offers subservience.

And in the first mode, latria is not the virtue, but the matter of the virtue; in the second mode, it is the act of the virtue; and in the third mode, it is the virtue. And this virtue is named with four names. For it is called “piety” with respect to the affect of the devotion, which occurs first. It is also called “theosebia"—that is, “divine worship"—or “eusebia"—that is, “good worship”—with respect to the attentive intention, for that is said to be “worshiped” to which one is zealously attentive, like a field or a river or whatever else. It is also called “latria,” that is, “servitude,” with respect to the works that are offered in recognition of the lordship that belongs to God by right of creation. And it is also called “religion,” with respect to the determination of the works to which a man determines himself in obligating himself to the worship of God. Yet by these names one and the same virtue is being named in reference to the diverse things that come together in it.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b25–28; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 3, nn. 58–59.) the free man is he who is for the sake of himself, whence he who is for the sake of another is called a “servant,” and “service” is what is done for the sake of that other. But to act for the sake of another is of two sorts: either as for the sake of an end, as a servant does not acquire for himself but for his lord, or as on account of a mover, as a servant works not by his own motion, but is moved as the lord’s instrument. Therefore with respect to the second, servitude does take away the freedom of will, and consequently virtue, but with respect to the first, it does not, since even by his own will a man can do for the sake of another what he owes to himself. And with respect to this latria is called “servitude.”

Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is a virtue because of an interior act, namely because of a choice, still it is a determinate virtue because of an exterior act. For our choice is determined through the exterior act that is elicited, according to which a virtue attains its proper object or matter, from which the act or habit is specified. Therefore certain virtues have exterior acts and not only interior ones, as is clear with fortitude and justice.

Reply Obj. 3: To reverence as such is an act of fear, but to show reverence, insofar as it is owed to God, is properly latria. This is why it does not follow that latria is the same thing as the gift of fear, just as also to fight manfully is the act of fortitude as such, but to fight in the army of the king as a soldier is owed him on account of the fief that he holds from him, and this is an act of justice.

Reply Obj. 4: Piety, insofar as it is the gift, consists in a certain good will over and above the human mode for all men. But piety, insofar as it is being taken here, consists in a certain devotion to God, to whom latria is shown. This will be made more clear below, in the treatment of the gifts. (In III Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 2.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a certain virtue is called “general” in four ways. In one way, because it is predicated of every virtue, such as legal justice, which is convertible with “virtue,” and is also the same thing in subject [as virtue], but differs from it in notion, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1130a9–14.) And in this way it is called “general” with respect to its own essence. In a second way a virtue is called “general” insofar as the other virtues depend on participating in its act. And in this way prudence is called a “general virtue,” since all the other moral virtues participate in a rightness of choice from it, and thus its act is blended with the acts of all the other virtues. Nonetheless, in itself, prudence is a specific virtue insofar as it contains a specific notion of the object, namely, what is choiceworthy relative to the deed. In a third way, a virtue is called “general” insofar as it operates as regards the acts of all the virtues, such that all of them enter into it, for its matter; for example, magnanimity, which works great things in all the virtues, as it says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b27–30; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 4, lect. 8.) And yet in itself it is a specific virtue, since it attends to a specific notion of the object in all things, namely, what is worthy of great honor. Fourth, a certain virtue is called “general” insofar as different virtues come together for it, since the acts of many virtues are needed before its acts; for example, other virtues are needed in advance for magnanimity, since no one can be worthy of great things unless he is virtuous.

Therefore the first generality is as that of the universal; the second, as the generality of a cause giving existence; the third, as the generality of one moving something by a command; the fourth, as that of an integral whole embracing many things.

Therefore one should say the following: Latria considered in itself is a special virtue, because it holds a special notion of its object and acts—namely, that something be offered to to God in recognition of one’s servitude, just as a fief-holder returns something to his lord in recognition of his lordship. This is why it has an act and object that is formally one and special, according to the aforesaid notion, although materially the acts are many and the objects are many. However, it can be called “general” in the last two ways. For it can use the acts of the other virtues materially under the aforesaid notion of its proper object, and also many other virtues are needed for its act, such as faith, which shows one to whom he should offer it, and in this way many others virtues can come together for it. However, although it uses materially the acts of the other virtues under the notion of its proper act, nonetheless it uses some acts that are not proper to any other virtue, as elicited by it, such as offering sacrifices, making professions, and things of this sort—except perhaps insofar as these are commanded by charity and are shown from faith. However, they are not elicited [by these virtues]. And such acts appear properly to be the acts of latria.

Reply Obj. 1: Offering sacrifices is only about those things that pertain to latria as eliciting them. This is why the statement that every work by which we are joined to God is a sacrifice is said metaphorically, insofar as it pleases God, to whom sacrifice is offered.

Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to serve God and another to offer him something in recognition of your servitude. For the first is common to every virtue, but the second is proper to latria, whence latria includes service in the notion of its object. And on account of this, service belongs to it through itself, and it is named from the act of serving. However, it is accidental to the other virtues, and it does not pertain to their proper notions.

Reply Obj. 3: Insofar as the acts of the other virtues are done for the glory of God, they are in this way assumed by latria materially, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that those virtues are properly called “theological” that have God as their object and end. Whence no theological virtue properly speaking has its act centered on a created thing, for charity is nothing in a man unless he loves God. However, the object about which latria acts is one that renders to God something that is not God in recognition of servitude. This is why it is not a theological virtue, but is traced back to the cardinal virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be worshiped by faith, hope, and charity not as though worship is elicited by these virtues, but because these virtues order one toward worship, or even because the acts of these virtues materially enter into the worship, in the way explained. (Above, resp. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: When one says, “I worship” or “I adore God,” although the act might appear to go forth into God as into an object, nevertheless it goes into some other thing as into an object, and into God as into an end. For to worship God is to offer something to God in declaration of one’s servitude.

Reply Obj. 3: The too-much and the too-little, between which we find the mean of moral virtue, is not meant with respect to any absolute quantity, but in comparison to right reason—namely, such that something happens according to how it ought, given all the circumstances. This is how it happens that in some circumstances, a certain virtue establishes that something should be done in the greatest way; for example, magnanimity, which is about the greatest honors, and magnificence, which is about the greatest expenses. This is also why it is not excessive in latria that God be worshiped exceedingly. But it is excessive in the following circumstances: offering the worship of latria to someone to whom worship should not be shown, and this is idolatry, or in a way that one should not, and this is superstition, which is religion observed beyond the right way.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b30–1131a9.) justice as a specific virtue consists in the goods that men share with each other in this life, such as money, honors, and things of this sort, insofar as one can share things of this sort with another. In these things a judge establishes an equality, according to the law, so that each person has what is owed to him, neither more nor less; and justice consists in this equality. This is why justice, so taken, as he himself says, is only in those who are naturally situated to be ruled by the same law, and are under the same ruler, and are equally ruled. Whence, according to him, such justice is not present in a lord relative to his servant, nor in a father relative to his son, since a servant and a son are things of theirs. This is why justice is not relative to them, just as neither is there justice relative to one’s very self. Still, there is there a certain mode of justice here, insofar as a lord renders to his servant what is owed to him, or vice versa; this is called “just lordship.” And it is in this way that latria is related to justice, since it consists in one rendering to God what is owed to him. Whence it is traced back to justice not as a species is traced back to its genus, but as a virtue connected to a principal virtue, [and] that participates in the mode of the mode of the principal.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And by this, the response to the two first objections, which proceed according to that path, is clear

Reply Obj. 3: The aforesaid mode of justice—that is, of a son to his father, and of a man to God—requires equality not in such a way that it is shown as befits the dignity of the recipient, but rather, as befits the capacity of the one rendering it. Whence, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.14, 1163b15–17.) that one need not render what is befits their dignity in all things, such as in those honors that [are owed] to gods and parents, for no one makes a return to them as befits their dignity. However, a servant is seen to be just as befits his ability.

Article 2

Whether one should show latria to Christ’s humanity

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, resp. 4, ad 1; a. 3, resp. 3; ST III.25.1, 2; 58.3; De veritate, q. 29, a. 4, ad 4; Super Galat. 4, lect. 4.) It appears that latria should not be shown to Christ’s humanity.

Obj. 1: For it is said in a Gloss: 'worship at his footstool' (Ps 99:5): Christ’s flesh should not be adored with the adoration of latria that is owed to God alone.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Christ the things that pertain to his nature are distinct. But reverence is owed not only to the person but also to the nature. Therefore, since the human nature is other than the divine nature, a different reverence is owed to it. Therefore latria, which is owed to God alone, is not owed to it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as has been said, latria is shown to God insofar as he himself, in virtue of creation, is Lord. But to create does not belong to Christ’s humanity. Therefore latria should not be shown to it.

On the contrary, just as the rational soul and the flesh are one man, so too God and the man are one Christ. (“Quicumque” (Athanasian Creed) (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 40; PG 28:1582).) But the same reverence is shown to a man’s soul and his flesh. Therefore the same reverence should be shown to the Son of God and the humanity he has assumed. And thus, it should be adored with latria.

Furthermore, the same thing is clear from the authorities and examples noted in the text. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).4–6.)

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that neither should a worship of latria be shown to images of Christ. (Parallels: ST II-II.81.3.ad 3; 94.3.ad 1; III.25.3–5.)

You shall not make for yourself a graven image nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven above (Exod 20:4). Therefore much less is is licit to adore an image of Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, idolaters were laughed at in Scripture for no other reason than that they worshiped the works of their own hands, to which the makers themselves were superior. But likewise the images that the Church adores are the works of human hands. Therefore it appears to lead to a similar derision.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, only things that were determined by the law of God should be done in divine worship. But there is not found in Sacred Scripture any institution about the adoration of images. Therefore it appears to have been exceedingly presumptuous to introduce the adoration of images.

On the contrary, an image as such leads one to the thing of which it is an image. But the one shown in the images that we adore is Christ, who should be adored with an adoration of latria. Therefore so too his image.

Furthermore, Basil says (Basil, Liber de Spiritu Sancto, ch. 18, n. 45 (PG 32:150).) that the honor of an image is referred to its 'prototype'—that is, to the principal figure, the one it is an image of. Therefore the same honor should be shown to both. And thus, the same thing as before follows.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that latria should not be shown to the Blessed Virgin. (Parallels: below, d. 22, q. 3, a. 3, resp. 3, ad 3; ST II-II.103.4.ad 2; III.25.5.) For Damascene says that the honor of a mother is carried back to her son. (Moos gives no source.) Therefore if the Son should be adored with latria, so too the mother.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, about her it is sung, and may he make his mother, along with himself, a participant in the reign of the Father; and all call her the “Lady of the universe” and the “Queen of the angels.” But latria is shown to God insofar as he is Lord and King. Therefore so too one must show latria to the Virgin Mother.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine proves (De assumptione beatae Virginis, ch. 3 (PL 40:1144); although attributed to Augustine, the authorship of this work is uncertain.) that the Virgin’s body did not return to dust, since it was of the same nature as the Son’s body, which was taken from her own. Therefore if the Son’s body should be adored with an adoration of latria, it appears that so too with the mother.

On the contrary, the Blessed Virgin is merely a created thing. But latria is owed to the Creator alone. Therefore latria is not owed to her.

Furthermore, she herself adores God with latria. But it does not belong to the same person to show latria and to receive it, just as neither is the same one created and creator. Therefore latria should not be shown to the Blessed Virgin.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that latria should not be shown to the cross. (Parallels: ST II-II.103.4.ad 3; III.25.4.) For just as he suffered on the cross in virtue of his humanity, so his throne is heaven in virtue of his divinity. But heaven should not be adored by latria on account of this. Therefore much less the cross, since latria is owed to Christ by reason of his divinity, not by reason of his humanity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an inanimate thing is of less dignity than a human being. But a human being should show the honor of latria only to one who is above man. Therefore the cross should not be adored with latria.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Blessed Virgin has a greater affinity with Christ than does his cross. But the Virgin is not adored with latria. Therefore much less the cross.

On the contrary, the relics of other saints are honored with the same honor as the saints themselves. But the cross is among the relics of Christ. Therefore it should be adored with latria just as Christ is.

Furthermore, the cross is an image of Christ crucified. But the image of Christ crucified should be adored with latria. Therefore so too the cross.

Quaestiuncula 5

Obj. 1: Moreover, it is asked whether the honor of latria should be shown to the saints. And it seems so. For latria is shown to God by reason of his divinity. But the saints are called “gods” by participation. Therefore latria should be shown to them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a divinely impressed image is nobler than a manmade one. But the images of God that a man makes are adored with latria. Therefore much more so should saints be, in whom God has impressed and reformed his image.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is read that Abraham, in Genesis 18:2, as Augustine says, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 16, para. 29 (CCSL 48; PL 41:508).) adored the three men, who were angels, with an adoration of latria. Therefore it appears that so too should should other saints be shown latria.

On the contrary, we read in Acts 14:14 about Paul and Barnabas, who forbade those who wanted to sacrifice to them, and in Esther 13:14 we read that Mordecai did not want to adore Haman, lest he appear to transfer the honor of God to men.

Quaestiuncula 6

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that without sin one can show latria to anything created. For we read, in Revelation 22:9, that John wanted to adore the angel, and the latter forbade him from doing so. However, he would not have forbade it if he wanted to adore him with dulia, since this is owed to the holy angels. Therefore he wanted to adore him with latria, and thus it appears that this can be done without sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a work is judged according to the intention. But someone adoring an angel who appears in the form of Christ has a good intention, believing him to be Christ. Therefore he does not sin in adoring him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone who believes an unconsecrated host is consecrated adores it with the adoration of latria. For ignorance about the deed excuses it—although nevertheless it is idolatry, for the Decretal says (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881), bk. 3, tit. 41, c. 7, "De homine," 2:1374.) that a priest who does not consecrate, and feigns consecration, renders the people idolatrous. Therefore it appears that without sin a person can show latria to something created.

On the contrary, if someone shows to another what he ought to show to his temporal lord in recognition of his lordship, he is guilty of infidelity about that. Therefore much more so does one sin who devotes to something created the worship he owes to God.

Quaestiuncula 7

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that, if latria is also shown to something created, both this and the latria shown to God are called this univocally. For matter does not make diverse species. But the worship shown to God and that shown to something created appear to differ only materially. Therefore it is not different in species, and they are called “latria” univocally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “beatitude” is said univocally, even though some seek it where it is, that is, in God, and others where it is not, such as in riches. Therefore likewise “latria” will be said univocally, whether it is shown to the one to whom it ought to be shown, or to one to whom it ought not.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every worship owed to God is latria. But idolatry is worship owed to God shown to an idol. Therefore it is latria. And thus, the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, the same thing, taken univocally, cannot be both a virtue and a vice. But the latria that is shown to God is a virtue, but that shown to something created is a vice. Therefore it is not being said univocally.

Furthermore, “God” is not said univocally of the true God and of an idol. But each man is moved by the divinity of that to which he shows latria. Therefore it appears that neither is “latria” said of them univocally.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that the mode in which something is honored is of two sorts: for something is honored by reason of itself, and by reason of another.

For, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b10–13.) praise and honor differ insofar as praise is owed to someone on account of a goodness that he has from his order toward another, and when he does an act befitting the end, whereas honor is owed to someone on account of a goodness that he has in virtue of himself. Whence, according to itself praise is owed to a man on account of his acts of virtue, which are ordered toward happiness, whereas honor is owed to God and divine things. This is why praise is owed only to the act or to the agent who is master of the act, as acting by choice; so too is honor, although the honor is also owed to the act as is the praise, but it is owed more to the agent.

Therefore that is honored by reason of itself to which belongs acting by choice, but that is honored by reason of another which belongs to the notion of the honorable. This is why honor is owed to a part of a man, considered in itself, only by reason of another. However, what acting belongs to is a person or supposit, since acts are done by individuals.

Whence, with respect to the first mode of honor, honor is not owed to Christ’s humanity separately from the divine person; rather, it is adored in and with the person. And therefore in this respect the honor of latria is owed to it. However, with respect to the second mode of honor, which is shown to parts and even to inanimate things, reverence and honor through themselves are owed to it. And therefore latria is not owed to it, but rather an exceeding dulia is, on account of the singular mode of dignity that it has from union with the Word. Therefore it is clear that the honor by which something is honored by reason of itself does not pertain to Christ’s humanity, as considered through itself, but only insofar as with a single honor it is honored together with the supposit it is in. And in this way latria is owed to it. But the honor that is owed to it by reason of another pertains to it even considered in itself, and in this way dulia is owed to it.

And because something is said to be honored more properly in the first mode than in the second mode, therefore it is said more properly that Christ’s humanity may be adored with latria than with dulia, and this is according to the second opinion. But according to the first opinion, it would said more properly that it should be adored with dulia. For the first opinion claims for his humanity another acting supposit besides the eternal supposit to which the latria is owed.

Reply Obj. 1: The humanity can be considered in two ways: either insofar it is understood as not joined with the Word—and in this way latria is not owed to it, but this consideration is only in the intellect—or insofar as is understood as united to the Word—and in this way it can be honored by the same honor as the Word, and thus latria is owed to it, or with another honor, and thus dulia is owed to it. And the aforesaid Gloss is speaking in this way.

Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not owed to something by reason of itself unless it is a person. Whence the argument proceeds from false premises.

Reply Obj. 3: Although to create is not something belonging to Christ’s humanity, nonetheless it does belong to the person of the Word, together with which it is adored.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that an image can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it is a certain thing—and thus no honor is owed to it, just as none is owed to any other stone or piece of wood—or insofar as it is an image. And because the motion toward an image insofar as it is an image is the same as that toward the thing it is an image of, therefore a single honor is owed to the image and to what it is an image of. And therefore since Christ is adored with latria, so too is his image.

Reply Obj. 1: Before Christ’s Incarnation, because God is incorporeal, no image could be proposed for him, as is said in Isaiah 40:18. Therefore it was prohibited in the Old Law that images be made for adoration, and especially because they were prone to idolatry, because the entire world was set upon idolatry. But after God was made man, he could have an image, since he had a bodily shape by reason of his assumed humanity, which might be adored together with him. And this is why making images has been permitted in the New Law.

Reply Obj. 2: Idolaters believed that within the images themselves there was some divine presence that is acquired by the images themselves from the power of the stars under which the images were made; thus, Hermes [Trismegistus] said that it was given to men to make gods, as Augustine records in the City of God. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 8, ch. 23 (CCSL 47; PL 41:247).) This is why they served the images not only as images but as the realities, and furthermore not only as images of God but as images of created things, like the sun and the moon. Whence it is clear that this is not a similar case.

Reply Obj. 3: The apostles handed on many things that were not written in the canon, one of which concerns the use of images. This is why Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 16 (PG 94:1174); note that in this passage Damascene does not speak of the image as painted by St. Luke, but only of the image of Christ directed by King Abagarus.) that Luke painted an image of Christ and the Blessed Virgin, and it is said in the Ecclesiastical History (Evagrius Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica, bk. 4, ch. 27 (PG 86:2746–48).) that Christ gave directions for his own image to Abagarus the king [of Edessa]. However, there are three reasons for the institution of images in the Church. First, they are for the instruction of common folk, who are instructed by them as though by their books. Second, they were instituted so that the mystery of the Incarnation and the examples of the saints might be held better in the memory when they are daily present before our eyes. Third, they are there for exciting the feeling of devotion, which is more effectively provoked by the eyes than by the ears.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that since the Blessed Virgin is in virtue of herself an acting person, honor is owed to her in virtue of herself. Whence she is adored with an adoration other than that of her Son, so she cannot be adored with latria but with dulia. Nevertheless, since she is honored not only by reason of herself, but also by reason of her Son, as the Mother of God, therefore insofar as she pertains to Christ she is honored with hyperdulia.

Reply Obj. 1: The honor of the mother is referred to the Son not as to a subject, namely, such that it would be one motion toward the mother and the son, as is the case with images. Rather, it is referred to the Son as to an end, since the mother is honored for the sake of the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: God is Lord and King insofar as he is the Creator, but the Virgin is not a creatrix, but is, as it were, the mother of the Creator. Whence it is not necessary that she be adored with latria.

Reply Obj. 3: Incorruption, which is opposed to returning to dust, is owed to Christ even by reason of the flesh that he assumed from the Virgin, but latria is not. And therefore the account is not alike.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that the cross of Christ, even the one on which Christ hung, can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as it is an image of the one crucified, and thus it is adored with the same adoration as is the one crucified, namely latria; this is why we address it as the one crucified, saying: Hail, O cross, our single hope. (source in the mass? Exaltation of the cross or Good Friday liturgy?) Or it can be considered insofar as a kind of thing, and thus, since it does not belong to the person of the Word as a part of him, it cannot be adored with the same adoration as the Word is; rather, insofar as it is a certain thing in the character of Christ himself, it is adored with hyperdulia. (Cf. ST III.25.4, obj. 2.) But the other crosses are adored only as images, and therefore they are adored only with latria.

Reply Obj. 1: Although heaven is God’s throne, nonetheless it is not united to him in his person, as is Christ’s flesh. Whence heaven is honored with neither latria nor hyperdulia, nor even dulia, since it is not a living thing. But Christ’s humanity is adored with either latria or hyperdulia, and so too the things that refer back to Christ’s humanity, such as the cross, his clothes, and things of this sort.

Reply Obj. 2: The cross, insofar as it is considered as a certain thing in itself, is of less dignity than a man, nor is it adored in its own notion, but in the notion of another, the one crucified upon it.

Reply Obj. 3: If the honor that is shown to the cross is considered as a certain thing in the notion of Christ, it is not as great as what is shown to the Virgin. But a certain honor is shown to the cross, insofar as it is an image, that is not shown to the mother.

Response to Quaestiuncula 5

To the fifth question, it should be said that God is the beginning and end of all things, and insofar he is the first principle we adore him with latria, but insofar as he is the last end we are fulfilled by him. However, in returning to him we are aided by other rational creatures, namely angels and men, and therefore although we should be fulfilled by God alone, still we can be fulfilled by a man in God, as the Apostle says, (Perhaps Romans 15:29, 32: “I know that when I come to you I shall come in the fullness of the blessing of Christ. . . so that by God’s will I may come to you with joy and be refreshed in your company.”) and Augustine. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 33 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32)) But in going forth from him as from the creating beginning, we are not aided by any created thing, since he created us immediately. And therefore the honor of latria should be shown to him alone, not to anyone in him, however great is his participation of goodness—unless he is honored with him in a single honor, like Christ’s flesh and his images.

Reply Obj. 1: By that participation the saints are not made to be the first principle of our existence. And therefore latria is not owed to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Men are images of God by a participation in his goodness that produces an express likeness of him, and this gives a thing goodness in itself; and therefore by reason of this the thing itself should be honored according to itself. But painted images are not images through a likeness in their nature, but through being instituted for the sake of signifying something. This is also why they acquire only an honor related to another.

Reply Obj. 3: Those angels did not appear to Abraham in their proper natures, but in certain bodies assumed as images. Whence, insofar as they were images representing the Trinity, they could be adored with latria, but not insofar as they represented the angels themselves.

Response to Quaestiuncula 6

To the sixth question, it should be said that, since created things should not be shown latria, if it is shown to one, it is shown to something it should not be shown to. And this makes it the vice contrary to latria, as going past the mean. Whence this cannot occur without sin.

Reply Obj. 1: John wanted to adore the angel with dulia, but was prohibited on account of three things: first, to show the dignity of John himself, who was of greater dignity than many angels; second, to avoid the appearance of idolatry; and third, to show the exaltation above the angels of the human nature in the man assumed.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel appearing under the appearance of Christ can be adored without sin only if the condition is actually explicit. For it is not enough that it be only habitual, since the very strangeness of something unusual requires one’s consideration and attention. This is like what is said of the Blessed Virgin in Luke 1:29, that she considered in her mind what sort of greeting this might be.

Reply Obj. 3: One who adores an unconsecrated host must adore it in a conditional way, namely if it is consecrated. Yet it is not necessary that this condition always be actually explicit, but it is enough that one holds it habitually. Thus, someone adoring it does not sin, since according to his intention he does not adore what is merely a created thing, but Christ. However, the priest, for his part, makes the people commit idolatry, since he offers the merely created thing for their adoration.

Response to Quaestiuncula 7

To the seventh question, it should be said that whenever a certain name is given to some act or accident insofar as it is determined to some one thing, it can be said of something else only improperly or metaphorically. For example, “snubness” is given to the curvature of the nose, so it cannot be said that the cross is “snub” or that wood is “curved” except metaphorically. Likewise, since “latria” is a name given to the servitude of the divine, whatever other servitude might be shown to another cannot be called “latria” except improperly or metaphorically. This is why “latria” is not said univocally of the worship of God and of idolatry.

Reply Obj. 1: The matter included in the notion of the species does indeed make for diverse species, and it impedes univocal naming. This is clear in the example brought in above about the curvature of the nose. And so it is in the proposed matter.

Reply Obj. 2: This name “beatitude” signifies something for the sake of which all other things are to be chosen, and which is itself chosen only for its own sake as a thing possessing the fullness of every good, without [signifying] that it concerns a certain matter. And therefore “beatitude” always remains something said univocally, although it is sought in diverse things. But it is not this way in the proposed matter, since the name “latria” does concern a matter.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that idolatry is the worship owed to God shown to an idol, the expression “shown to an idol” reduces the preceding account. Whence it does not follow that therefore it is latria, just as plowing is the cutting that is appropriate to land, but if someone cuts water with a plowshare with that cutting that is owed to land, this is nevertheless called “plowing” only equivocally.

Article 3

Whether latria is owed to God by reason of his power, wisdom, or goodness

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. It appears that latria is owed to God by reason of his power.

Obj. 1: For servitude relates to lordship. But God is called “Lord” on account of his power of coercing the created thing subject to him, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii, or De Trinitate, ch. 5 (PL 64:1253–54).) Therefore, since latria is servitude, it appears that it is owed to God by reason of his power.

Obj. 2: It also appears that it is by reason of his wisdom. For latria is owed to him as God. But “God,” according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:838).) is said from the fact that he sees all things, (Theos as coming from theoria (beholding, seeing).) which pertains to wisdom. Therefore it appears that latria is owed to him by reason of his wisdom.

Obj. 3: It also appears that it is by reason of his goodness. For we show him latria insofar as we exist due to him. But we exist because he is good, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) Therefore latria is owed to him by reason of his goodness.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the latria is owed to the Father is other than that owed to the Son. For latria directs faith. But the faith has one article about the Father, and another about the Son. Therefore a different latria should be shown to each.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, honor, as has been said, (Above, a. 2, resp. 1.) is owed to the acting person. But the Father and the Son are two persons. Therefore two honors are owed to them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to Christ’s humanity is shown the one honor that is shown the Word. But it appears that this cannot be understood to be by reason of the natures, since the natures are distinct. Therefore it is understood to be by reason of the person. But the person of the Father is other than that of the Son. Therefore also a different honor is owed to each.

On the contrary, even with the distinction of the persons removed, latria is still owed to God. Therefore it is owed to him by reason of his nature. But the nature is one, so then the latria is also one.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that latria should not be shown to God in virtue of any bodily rituals. For as the Apostle says in Galatians 4:3 that the men under the Old Law, serving under the elements of this world, were as though children placed under a pedagogue. But, as he also says in v. 4, since the coming of the fullness of time, we are no longer under the pedagogue. Therefore we should not show God latria according to bodily acts.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is written: God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth (John 4:24). Therefore it is not necessary that we worship him with bodily acts, whether by genuflecting or singing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God is everywhere. Therefore we should not adore him more toward the east than toward any other direction.

On the contrary, we have both our spirit and our body from God. But we adore him insofar as we are from him. Therefore we should adore him both spiritually and corporeally.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that latria professes the servitude that we owe God because he made us. Whence latria is owed to him as Creator, insofar as he himself is the end and first origin of our existence; this is why in a Gloss on Psalm 7:1, O Lord my God, in thee do I take refuge, it says: he is God by creation, to whom latria is owed. (Glossa interlinearis, at Psalm 7:1 (in Glossa ordinaria, 3.481).) And because he is Creator insofar as he is good, wise, and powerful, and insofar as he is all things of this sort, therefore by reason of all of them latria is owed to him, and not according to only one of them.

Whence the response to the objections is clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one Creator, therefore one latria is owed to them, since latria is owed to God as Creator.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith is owed to God insofar as he is a knowable reality. And because whatever things are distinguished according to a reality can be thought about separately, but are not convertible, therefore the three persons, who are three diverse realities, hold diverse articles of the faith. But all three persons are one Creator, so also one latria is owed to them.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine nature subsists through itself, even if the distinct persons that the faith supposes are set aside. Whence, even if the distinction of persons were set aside, agency belongs to him, and consequently so does latria.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the two natures are distinct in themselves, still they are united in the person. And because one honor is owed to the divine nature and person, therefore consequently one honor is owed to the divine nature and the human, to which is owed the one honor owed to the divine person.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that in us there are three kinds of goods: the spiritual, the bodily, and the extrinsic. And because all of these things in us are from God, therefore we owe latria to God in virtue of all of them: in virtue of the spirit we show him the love we owe him, in virtue of the body, prostrations and song, in virtue of external things, sacrifices, candles, and things of this sort. We show God these things not on account of some need of his, but in recognition that all things that we have are from him, and just as we recognize him in all of these things, so too we honor him by all of them.

Reply Obj. 1: Bodily things in the Old Law were merely bodily, since they did not contain grace, yet they were signs of spiritual things. But the bodily things that we offer God are not merely bodily; rather, they are sacraments containing grace, and sacramental things. This is why the observance of the New Law and the Old are not alike.

Reply Obj. 2: Although God is spirit, he is nonetheless the Creator of the body, and therefore we ought to serve him principally in the spirit, but secondarily also in the body. And therefore we also pray vocally, so that not only the spirit but even the fleshly tongue submits to him, so that we might excite ourselves and others to the praise of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God is everywhere, nonetheless it has been instituted by the Church that the sacrifice of the Mass be offered toward the east for three reasons. First, on account of its significance, since for us the illumination of the mind is from God, just as physical light is from the east; second, because it is the nobler part of the world, and everything that is nobler around us we owe to God; and third, on account of certain notable deeds of God that happen in the east: for he moves the heaven, the motion of which begins from the east; he established paradise itself in the east; and he will come for judgment from the east, just as he ascended toward the east.

Question 2

Dulia

Next, two things are asked about dulia. And about this three things are asked:

first, what it is;

second, whether it has diverse species;

third, to whom is it owed.

Article 1

Whether latria and dulia are the same

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST II-II.103.3–4; In Psalmos 40.) It appears that dulia is the same thing as latria.

Obj. 1: For only one honor is owed to God. But dulia and latria are owed to him, as a Gloss on Psalm 7:1, O Lord my God, in thee do I take refuge, says: Lord of all things by power, to which dulia is owed, God of all things by creation, to which latria is owed. (Not Glossa ordinaria.) Therefore dulia and latria are the same thing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is the same virtue of charity by which we love God and neighbor. But we honor God by latria and neighbor by dulia. Therefore they are the same virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a difference in matter does not divide species, as is said in the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054b28–29; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 10, lect. 4, nn. 2108–2109.) But the honor owed to God and neighbor differ only in matter. Therefore they are not diverse in species; and thus the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 4: Degrees of more and less do not divide species. Therefore although God should be honored more than neighbor, they are not on account of this diverse in species.

On the contrary, wisdom and knowledge are diverse goods because the one is about eternal things and the other about temporal things. Therefore for a similar reason latria and dulia are diverse virtues.

Furthermore, habits are distinguished through their acts, and the acts through their objects. But dulia and latria have diverse objects. Therefore they are diverse virtues.

I answer that honor is owed to someone by reason of an excellence that is in him. However, the divine excellence and the human are not of one notion, and therefore their honor is not of one notion. Whence latria and dulia must differ in species.

Reply Obj. 1: “Dulia,” with respect to the proper sense of the word, speaks of servitude in common, to whomever it might be owed. And since honor or servitude is owed to God in a more perfect way, therefore the common name “dulia” is contracted and in a certain way appropriated to the honor of a created thing, since it does not add any difference pertaining to dignity over and above the common meaning. This is like the name “property,” which is contracted to what is accidental but convertible [with its subject], while what is essential but convertible [with its subject] is given its own name, “definition.” And since every reason for honor found in a created thing is in God, but not vice versa, thus latria is owed to him in virtue of what is proper to him, but so is dulia, in virtue of what is by analogy common to him and the created thing.

Reply Obj. 2: The object of charity, because it is a theological virtue, is the divine goodness, which is the same thing whether it be considered in itself or in another. And therefore the love of God and of neighbor pertains to one virtue. But honor is shown to an absolute excellence, which is not of one notion in God and creatures, but different notions.

Reply Obj. 3: This is not only a material difference but a formal one, since a different notion of reverence and honor is found in God and in man. And therefore it causes a diversity in species .

Reply Obj. 4: Degrees of more and less do not cause a diversity in species, but sometimes they follow one—namely, when a diversity of the things that do diversify species causes degrees of more and less.

Article 2

Whether dulia has diverse species

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST II-II.103.4.) It appears that dulia does not have diverse species.

Obj. 1: For dulia is not divided from latria. But latria is not divided by species. Therefore neither is latria.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, dulia attends to created goodness and excellence. But this is found commonly in all the things to which dulia is owed. Therefore it does not have diverse species.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as dulia has to do with a debt of honor, so does obedience has to do with a debt of command. But obedience does not differ in species in virtue of the diverse ones to whom it is owed. Therefore neither does dulia.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since dulia is owed to diverse ones according to the infinity of grades of excellence, if it has diverse species according to the diverse ones to whom it is owed, there would an infinity of species of dulia. But this is impossible. Therefore dulia does not have many species.

On the contrary, dulia is owed to God and the created thing, as is clear from things said. (Above, a. 1.) But there is not the same notion of honor in both. Therefore there are diverse species of dulia.

Furthermore, dulia is shown to inanimate things, such as the cross, relics, and also men. But there cannot be one notion of honor in them. Therefore dulia has diverse species.

I answer that habits are divided through their acts, and acts through their objects. Whence, where one finds a diverse notion of the object, there must be acts and habits differing in species. Therefore, since honor is owed someone by some reason of excellence that he has, and the excellence is not of the same notion in diverse things, therefore it must be that there is a different notion of honor for them, and specifically different virtues that show diverse honors. For it is not the same honor that is owed to a father, to a king, and to a teacher, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.2, 1165a21–29.) However, among all the other notions of excellence, that by which a created thing is honored by reason of its union to its Creator is the chief one, as is Christ’s humanity and the things that pertain to it. And therefore it is named with the special name “hyperdulia,” as though it were above dulia and approaching latria.

Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of the Creator is of one notion, and therefore there is only one latria, which attends to this excellence. Nor is it the same for dulia, since in created things there are diverse notions of excellence.

Reply Obj. 2: Created excellence is not of specifically one notion, although it is one in genus. And therefore also dulia is divided into species.

Reply Obj. 3: Obedience has to do with lordship, insofar as the servant is, as it were, an instrument of the lord, and is moved at his command. But dulia does not consider only one notion of excellence, but all.

Reply Obj. 4: The grades of excellence can be taken in two ways: either with respect to quantity only—and thus they are infinite and do not cause diverse species of dulia—or with respect to notion—and thus they do make diverse species, and are not infinite.

Articule 3

Whether sinners should be honored with dulia

To the third we proceed thus. It appears that sinners should not be honored with dulia.

Obj. 1: For the honor of dulia, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.5, 1095b26–29; 4.3, 1123b35.) is the reverence shown to someone in testimony of his virtue. But sinners, even prelates, do not have virtue. Therefore those who honor them offer a false testimony, which is a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: (Gregory the Great, Regulae Pastoralis Liber, part. 1, ch. 2 (PL 77:16).) the example of a fault is powerfully enlarged when a sinner is honored for the reverence of the order. However, it should not happen that a fault be presented as an example. Therefore neither should a prelate who is a sinner be honored.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a good subject is more like God than is an evil prelate. But honor is shown a man only insofar as he has a likeness with God, since honor is owed only to divine things, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b30.) Therefore an evil prelate should be honored less than a good subject.

On the contrary (4), Abraham honored the sinners inhabiting Shechem, when he wanted to buy the double cave (Gen 23:17).

Furthermore (5), it appears that dulia should be shown to the demons. For the divine image remains in them, since the natural goods given to them remain most luminous, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) But dulia is shown to a man by reason of the image. Therefore it should be shown even to demons.

Furthermore (6), it appears that it is shown to irrational things. For in them there is a vestige that is God’s likeness, like an image, although it is not as expressive. However, degrees of more and less do not distinguish species. Therefore dulia is owed to them.

On the contrary (7), it appears that it should not even be shown to all good men. For dulia is servitude, but we do not owe servitude to all good men. Therefore neither do we owe dulia.

I answer that dulia indicates the reverence and honor that can be shown to a created thing. However, since honor, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b30.) is owed only to things divine, it is owed properly and directly only to one has the grace and virtue that does divine things. But someone has virtue in many ways: either as actually virtuous, and honor is owed to this one directly and properly and according to himself; or as having a natural aptitude to virtue, and in this way honor should be shown to anyone possessing the image—unless he be confirmed in evil, since in such a one the order to virtue is in bondage; or as ordered toward one who leads to and preserves virtue, and in this way it is owed to all prelates, who are ordained for the sake of directing others to virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Sinners, although they do not have virtue in act, still have it in ability. And prelates have it even insofar as they are ordered toward causing it or preserving it.

Reply Obj. 2: Dulia should not be shown to a prelate when he is in the act of the sin, since something contrary to the honor is apparent in him. But dulia should be shown to him before and after, since one does not know what state he is in.

Reply Obj. 3: In virtue of itself a greater reverence is owed to a good subject, but a greater one is owed to an evil prelate in the notion of being placed above others. This is for three reasons: first, because a prelate bears the position of God, so God is being honored in him; second, because he is a public person, and the goodness of the Church or republic is being honored in him, which is greater than the merit of an individual person; third, because being placed above others stands to virtue as an efficient cause of virtue in others, and it is a greater dignity to be the cause of another’s virtue than to be virtuous, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1169a33–34.)

Reply Sed Contra 4: We grant the fourth argument.

Reply Sed Contra 5: In the demons the natural aptitude to virtue is tied off, and therefore dulia should not be shown to them.

Reply Sed Contra 6: A likeness of vestige does not indicate an aptitude for virtue, the way the likeness of an image does, so dulia is not owed to it.

Reply Sed Contra 7: We do not serve the saints as obligated to them, but with a servitude of reverence, since they are our leaders, either by teaching, or by leadership, or by intercession and example. And the notion of servitude is preserved in this, insofar as one acts for the sake of another as one’s end, but not as one acts on account of another who moves us by coercion or command.

Exposition of the text

In love, the offer of sacrifice, and reverence. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).2.) The “love” refers to the interior honor shown to God, “sacrifice” to the exterior goods that are taken up unto the honor of him; and “reverence” insofar as we give our body to him in submission, as in prostrations and things of this sort.

In one adoration with his untainted flesh. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).4, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 8 (PG 94:1014).) Therefore it appears that the Son should be adored more than the Father or than even himself before the Incarnation. It should be said that his humanity is adored with latria only on account of the divinity, and therefore it does not make him more adorable, but rather there are more things in him to be adored. For what is added, as was said above, (Above, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 1; a. 3, resp. 2; d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.) does not add to the divine goodness.

No one eats of his flesh without first adoring it. (Sent. III, 9.1(28).6, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 90, serm. 2, para. 2 (CCSL 38; PL 37:1264).) This is speaking of spiritual eating, which cannot be done without reverence, not of sacramental, since someone can eat it irreverently. Or it should be said that he is speaking with respect to what ought to occur according to the institution of the Church, which proposes Christ’s flesh for adoration before it offers it for eating, and not insofar as this can be done in an abusive way.