D. 14 - Human knowledge and power of Christ

Division of the text

After he considered the fullness of Christ’s perfection with respect to grace and knowledge, here he compares Christ’s perfection insofar as he is a man to the divine perfection.

And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he compares the perfection of Christ’s soul to the divine perfection with respect to his knowledge,

and second, with respect to his power, at but if it is asked why God did not give to it the power of making all things, as he did knowledge of them, it may be answered. (Sent. III, 14.2(40).1.)

The first is divided into two:

first, he states the question;

and second, he answers it, at it pleases some to hold that neither has equal knowledge with God. (Sent. III, 14.1(39).2.)

And this latter part is divided into two:

first, he lays out the view of others;

second, his own view, at responding to them, we say. (Sent. III, 14.1(39).3.)

And regarding this, he does three things.

First, he answers the question and resolves the arguments proposed in favor the first view.

Second, he confirms his own view both through an argument brought in by others, which is opposed to the former ones, at but as for that text of the Apostle which they adduce . . . , it supports our view; (Sent. III, 14.1(39).4.) and also through an authority, at in some sermon of his, Fulgentius also adduces many arguments; (Sent. III, 14.1(39).5.) and from an argument, at the point may also be proved by reason. (Sent. III, 14.1(39).5.)

Third, he teaches one to avoid a certain problem to which that other view leads, if the soul of Christ were to know all things, at but as to their saying . . . , we respond. (Sent. III, 14.1(39).6.)

But if it is asked why God did not give to it the power of making all things, as he did knowledge of them, it may be answered. (Sent. III. 2(40). 1.) Here he relates Christ’s soul to God with respect to its power, and he does three things.

First, he presents the truth.

Second, he objects to the contrary, at but if that soul does not have as much power as God, . . . how then is to be understood Ambrose’s statement? (Sent. III, 14.2(40).2.)

Third, he resolves this, at to this we say. (Sent. III, 14.2(40).3.)

Question 1

Christ's human knowledge and power

Here four things are asked:

firstly, what knowledge did he have;

and because he had divine and human, and the divine was treated in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 35, a. 1.) for that reason here we ask secondly about the perfection of his human knowledge, by which he sees the Word;

thirdly, about the perfection of his knowledge by which he sees things in their proper kinds;

fourthly, about his own power.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there is any created knowledge

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.9.1; De veritate, q. 20, a. 1; Compend. theol., ch. 216.) It appears that in Christ there is not any created knowledge.

Obj. 1: For where there is perfect cognition there is no use for an imperfect cognition, just as someone who knows something by demonstration does not need to know it by a dialectical syllogism. But all created cognition is imperfect relative to the divine knowledge. Therefore since in Christ there is the uncreated knowledge of God, it appears one need not assert that there is any other knowledge in him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a lesser luminary is overwhelmed by a greater luminary. But knowledge is not only like a light but like a luminary that is illuminating things. Therefore the lesser knowledge is overwhelmed by the greater knowledge, and thus a created knowledge should not exist with the uncreated knowledge of God in the same person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every perfection is nobler than what is perfectible by it. But every knowledge is the perfection of the knower. Therefore, since nothing created is nobler than Christ’s soul, there is no created knowledge in it.

On the contrary, there is more congruence between the sensitive and intellectual natures in a man than between the divine and human natures in Christ. But the intellectual cognition in a man does not exclude the sensitive cognition in him, which is less perfect. Therefore neither does the divine cognition in Christ exclude the human.

Furthermore, there is no substance without its own activity, as both Damascene and the Philosopher say. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950); Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a8.) But in Christ there is a created intellect—namely, that of the rational soul. Therefore there is also a created cognition that is its activity.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that if there is in him any created cognition, it is not a habit but only an act. (Parallels: ST III.11.5; De veritate, q. 20, a. 2.) For on Hebrews 2 a Gloss says that in Christ there is nothing higher or more excellent than the nature of the human mind. (Glossa ordinaria, at Hebrews 2:9, 6.813 (PL 114:647), referring to Augustine, Contra Maximinum, bk. 2, ch. 25 (CCSL 87A:660; PL 42:803).) But certain created things, on account of their perfection, do not need any habit to know things, such as the angels, as Maximus says in On the Heavenly Hierarchies of Dionysius. (Maximus, Commentaria in Librum de Coelesti Hierarchia, ch. 7 (PG 4:65).) Therefore much less so does Christ’s soul.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ’s soul is nobler than the agent intellect of any other man. But the agent intellect does not perform its activity by the mediation of any habit. Therefore neither does Christ’s soul know by any habitual knowledge.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural powers do not go forth into act by any mediating habit, as is clear in a fire’s heat, and likewise neither does God. But Christ’s soul approaches closer to a likeness of God than does any other created thing. Therefore it does not have an activity of cognition by the mediation of some habit.

On the contrary, Christ asumed our nature in an integral way. But the potential intellect belongs to the integrity of our nature. Therefore he assumed a potential intellect. But the potential intellect understands perfectly only if it is perfected by some habit. Therefore, since Christ understood perfectly, there was habitual knowledge in him.

Furthermore, Christ truly slept, nor did he then lose anything that he knew. Therefore, since the knowledge of one sleeping is knowledge in habit, it appears that Christ had habitual knowledge.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s soul did not know the Word by any mediating habit. (Parallel: De veritate, q. 20, a. 2.) For cognition requires only that the knowable be united to the knower. But the Word was not united to Christ’s soul by any mediating habit. Therefore he did not know the Word by any mediating habit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the habit of knowledge consists of the species that are likenesses of the very things known. But Christ’s soul does not see the Word through any likeness, but through his very self. Therefore it does not know him through any created habit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, that on account of which something is such and such, is itself such more so. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a29.) Therefore if Christ’s soul knows the Word by some mediating habit, then that habit knows the Word even better, and it will be closer to him than Christ’s soul is—which is a problem.

On the contrary, glory corresponds to grace. But in Christ there was the habit of grace. Therefore so too was the habit of glory. But total glory consists in the vision of the Word, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 90, serm. 2, para. 13 (CCSL 39; PL 37:1170); also, Ps 36, para. 8 (CCSL 38; PL 37:368).) Therefore Christ’s soul knows the Word by some habit.

Furthermore, Christ’s soul and our soul are of the same nature. But our soul cannot rise to seeing God through its natural powers. Therefore neither can Christ’s soul, and thus something must be added to his nature in virtue of which he sees God. And therefore he sees him by some mediating habit.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that one must assert that the habit of knowledge by which he knows the Word is other than that by which he knows things in the Word. (Parallel: De veritate, q. 20, a. 2.) For the Word presents again the things that are known in him as a mirror presents again the forms reflected in it. But when one sees in a mirror, not only is there the mirror’s likeness in him, but also the likenesses of the realities reflected in the mirror. Therefore also in one who sees things in the Word one must assert that the habit of the species of things seen in the Word is other than the habit of the Word itself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every knowledge occurs in virtue of the knower becoming like the thing known, as the philosophers say. Therefore if someone sees other things in the Word, his intellect must become like those things; and thus, since a cognitive habit consists in the aforesaid becoming-like, which happens through the intellectual species, the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, let us assert that someone seeing in the Word ceases to see the Word (as happened to Paul, as is said); it is certain that he does not forget those things that he saw in the Word. Therefore he does not know them in the Word, since he does not see the Word. Therefore he knows them in their proper species, and thus the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, wherever something is such and such on account of another, the latter is so much the more so, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Topics 3.2, 117a18.) But one who sees things in the Word knows them only through the known Word. Therefore there is only one habit.

Furthermore, where the act is one, the habits are not many. But the soul knows the Word and the things that it sees in the Word by the same act. Therefore in respect to this, there are not diverse habits.

Quaestiuncula 5

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that, besides the knowledge by which he knows things in the Word, Christ does not have any other knowledge of things. (Parallels: ST III.9.3; 12.1; De veritate, q. 20, aa. 2, 3; Compend. theol., ch. 216.) For there is only one perfection of a thing that is one both in virtue of the same thing and in relation to the same thing. But Christ has cognition in the Word about created things in virtue of his human nature. Therefore he does not have a different cognition or knowledge of the same things in virtue of his human nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away (1 Cor 13:10). But the cognition by which things are known in the Word is perfect in comparison to any other mode of cognition of things. Therefore along with it there is no other knowledge in Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, because Christ has the vision of a comprehensor, faith, which is the wayfarer’s cognition of divine things, is not present in him. But the knowledge of things in the Word is proper to a comprehensor. Therefore there is no need to for any other cognition that belongs to a wayfarer.

On the contrary, the morning cognition in the angels, by which they know things in the Word, does not exclude their evening knowledge, by which they know things in their own proper natures. But Christ’s soul is more perfect in knowing than is any angel. Therefore it too has two cognitions.

Furthermore, the sensitive soul is more distant from cognition’s perfection in the Word than is intellectual cognition in a thing’s proper genus. But the cognition in the Word does not exclude sensory cognition in Christ. Therefore much less does it exclude the cognition of things in their proper genus.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, since in Christ there is one person and two natures, one must consider whether the things that are attributed to Christ pertain to the notion of the person or to the notion of a nature. And if it pertains to the notion of the person, then one must assert only one in Christ—such as only one existence, one supposit, one hypostasis, and so on. However, if it pertains to a nature, then either to only one or to each of them. Now, if it pertains to only one, then again there is only one—such as one immensity and one soul—but if to each of them, then because the natures in Christ are complete, one must assert two such—such as two wills, two free decisions. Whence, since knowledge pertains to the divine and human natures, one must assert two knowledges in Christ: one created and the other uncreated.

Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is something that follows on human nature in virtue of the soul, which is part of it. Whence, although in Christ there is divine knowledge, which is most perfect, still the human nature is not formally perfected by it, and therefore one must assert that there is a created cognition or knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: The diverse luminaries, through their rays, are naturally apt to inform the same things, and they are of the same notion in illuminating things. This is why the effect of the lesser light is not perceived when the sense is filled by the greater light. But the created and uncreated knowledge are not of one notion, nor do they inform the same thing. Therefore the case is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents one from being of greater dignity than another in a certain respect while being of lesser dignity simply. For example, even the color of Christ’s body is of greater dignity in a certain respect than is his body itself, insofar as the former is related to the latter as act to potency since it is an accidental form of it. Still, Christ’s body is of greater dignity simply. And the created knowledge is similarly related to Christ’s soul.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a passive power can go into act only if it is completed through the form of an active power, through which it comes to be in act. For nothing does anything except insofar as it is in act. However, the impressions of active powers can be in passive ones in two ways. In one way, through the mode of a passive receiving, namely when the passive power is being changed, and in another way, through the mode of a quality and form, when the impression of the active power was already made connatural to the passive power itself; thus, even the Philosopher, in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories 8, 9a28.) distinguishes between an passive receiving and a passible quality.

Now, sensation is a passive power, since it cannot be in act with respect to all the things to which its activity extends by the nature of its power. For nothing can have all colors in act, and therefore vision must be cognitive of all colors insofar as it is in a certain manner potentially all colors. And thus, by passively receiving from colors, it comes to be in act, and becomes like them, and it knows them.

Likewise also, the intellect is able to know all beings, since being and the true are convertible, the latter being the object of the intellect. However, nothing created can be in the act of the entirety of being, since it is a finite being; for this belongs to God alone, who is the font of all beings, in some way possessing within himself in advance all things, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, n. 1 (PG 3:815).) And therefore no created thing can understand without some intellect, which is a passive—that is, receptive—power, and whence neither sensation nor the potential intellect can be active unless they are perfected or moved by their active powers.

But because a sense senses only at the presence of the sensible, thus for its complete activity the impression of its agent merely through the mode of a passive receiving is enough. However, in the intellect for its perfection the impression of its active power is required within it not only through the mode of a passive receiving, but also through the mode of a perfected connatural quality and form; and we call this form a “habit.” And because what is natural remains in a stable way, and is at the ready when a man uses his natural power, and it is pleasant for him to do so, since it befits his nature, therefore it is difficult to change a habit like knowledge, and a man can use it when he wishes, and its activity is pleasant.

However, just as in sensation there is a twofold active power, one as the first agent and mover, the light, and the other as the moved mover, the color made actually visible by the light, so too in the intellect there is something as a first agent, the light of the agent intellect, and as a moved mover, the species made actually intelligible by act itself. And therefore the habit of the intellectual part is constituted by the light and the intelligible species of the things that are known through the species. Therefore, since Christ’s intellect was most perfect in knowing, so there would have to be a habit in Christ, by which he would know, so that in this way the active power’s impression would be in him not merely through the mode of a passive receiving, but also through the mode of a form.

Reply Obj. 1: Man needs the intellectual light for knowing both in the natural cognition of natural things, so that they might become actually intelligible through it when they are potentially intelligible, and in supernatural cognition, so that through an infused light he might be elevated to things above him.

Now, an angel does not need a light in natural cognition, since it does not abstract species from phantasms; rather, it has them innately. Yet it does need it in supernatural cognition; whence Job 25:3 says, is there any number to his armies? Upon whom does his light not arise? And therefore in their natural cognition, angels do not stand in need of a habit insofar as a light is required for the habit, but it is demanded insofar as the species of things are required, because they have a limited existence. This is why it is said in the Book of Causes (Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 10.) that every intelligence is filled with forms.

However, Christ’s soul is not superior to the angels on account of the soul’s nature, since then every soul would be superior to the angels. Likewise, neither is his body nobler than our souls on account of the body’s nature, but rather this is so on account of the union. Whence all things that are added by God in Christ’s soul and in the angels are more eminently in Christ’s soul than in the angels.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual soul is related to things it is going to understand in two ways. In one way, as making them actually intelligible, since not all things in their own natures are actually intelligible, but only immaterial things; whence also material things are made intelligible through their being abstracted from particular matter and from its conditions, so that thereby they might become in a certain manner like the intellect, which is immaterial. In another way, it is compared to the things as knowing them, and in this respect it must be like the things themselves, so that it might have a determinate cognition of them through each thing’s proper notion.

For something to make many things like itself, it suffices that it have in act only that form in virtue of which there is said to be a likeness; for example, fire makes many things like itself through heat. But for something to be like many things, it must actually have the forms of all those many things, for example, if there are the likenesses of diverse things on a wall. And therefore the intellectual soul can make all things actually intelligible through the light’s one nature, which it has in act, without receiving anything else from another. And thus the power that accomplishes this is simply active, and that is called an “agent intellect,” which is not active by the mediation of any habit. But since the soul’s essence is limited, it cannot become like all the essences of things understood through it. Whence this becoming-like must be completed through its receiving something from elsewhere, and therefore the power by which it is perfected is, as it were, passive—insofar as every receiver is called “passive,” and that is called a “potential intellect,” which does work by the mediation of some habit. However, although the potential intellect in Christ is nobler simply due to the union than the agent intellect in us, nonetheless it is not nobler from the notion of the power, just as neither are his senses nobler than our intellect from the notion of the power. Whence it does not follow that if the agent intellect in us is not the subject of any habit, neither is the potential intellect in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural powers operate as regards certain determinate things, which is why in virtue of their own nature they can be in act simply speaking in reference to them. And therefore there need not be anything added to them to produce their effects. But the human soul has an activity that concerns being, simply speaking, and therefore, since it has potentiality in its own existence, its potentiality must be perfected through something added, so that it might operate.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the habit of knowledge is constituted from two things, as was said, namely from the intellectual light and from a likeness of the thing known. However, in the cognition by which Christ’s soul, or any soul, sees the Word through his essence, there cannot be a habit with respect to species, which is the likeness of the thing known.

For because everything that is received in something is in the latter through the mode of the receiver, a likeness of the divine essence that perfectly represents it cannot be received in any created thing, on account of the infinite distance of the created from God. This is why what in God is one and simple created things represent by diverse forms and perfections, each of them falling short from a perfect representation of the divine essence. Now, a likeness of something received in one who sees does not make him see that thing unless it perfectly represents it; for example, the likeness of a color standing in the eye does not make one see the perfect light because in a color there is only a certain dim participation of light. And therefore any intellect that would know the Word through some likeness would not be said to see the Word’s essence. And thus it is clear that Christ’s soul and any other soul that sees the Word through his essence does not see him by some mediating likeness,

Likewise, there cannot be a habit on the side of the light in that vision, with respect to the effect of the intellectual light, whose it is to make things actually intelligible. For immaterial things are actually intelligible in virtue of themselves. But it must be there with respect to the other effect, which is to perfect the potential intellect for knowing, which in us the species illuminated by the light of the agent intellect bring about. But because that vision exceeds every faculty of a created nature, therefore the light of nature does not suffice for this vision, but a light of glory must be added.

Reply Obj. 1: The union by which the Word is united to Christ’s soul in the person is not the same thing as that by which it is united to it as the visible to the one seeing. For the Word is united to the body in the person, yet it is not seen by the body. And therefore, although there falls no medium within that union by which the soul is united to the Word in the person, nonetheless it does not follow that no medium falls in the vision. I am not speaking of the medium as that in which it is seen, like a mirror or a species, but as that under which it is seen, like a light.

Reply Obj. 2: The habit of knowledge consists not only in the species but also in the light, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: That light is not something subsisting, so that it would be capable of union with the Word as knowing the Word, but is that by which the soul becomes formally like the Word, so that it would be capable of the vision of the Word. For example, in grace there is a certain likeness of the soul to God, and this is a nobler soul in a certain respect, and not simply, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that that in which something is seen is the notion of knowing what is seen in it. Now, the notion of knowing something is the form of the thing insofar as it is known, since cognition becomes actual through it. Whence just as one existence arises from matter and form, so too the notion of knowing and the reality known are one known. And on account of this, as such there is one cognition of both according to act and according to act, and thus there are not different habits by which the Word is known and the things that are seen in the Word, just as neither are there different habits by which the middle term and the conclusion of a demonstration are known, insofar as the middle is ordered toward the conclusion.

Reply Obj. 1: When things are seen in a mirror, the species of these things are not impressed in the sense by the things but by the mirror. Whence all such species are impressed in the sense as contained in the one species of the mirror, not because the species of the mirror is different than the species of the thing seen in the mirror. But in the vision of the Word no likeness is impressed by the Word in the soul, through which he would be seen, as was said; rather, he himself through his essence is united to the soul, and therefore in the very essence of the Word other things are seen because the Word’s essence has both the notion of a mirror and the notion of the likeness of a mirror that arises in a vision [caused] by a mirror.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul becomes like things that it knows in the Word, not through certain forms of those things being impressed in the soul, but through the Word himself acting as the form for the seeing soul, insofar as he is seen by it, the Word himself is the likeness of all those things.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the impressions of the things remain when the sensible things are absent, in virtue of which impressions imagination occurs, so too at the absence of the Word in him who ceases to see the Word, there remains an impression of him from the Word. Through this are known the things that he saw in the Word through their species, and this will be as though a trace of the past vision.

Response to Quaestiuncula 5

To the fifth question, it should be said that, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b30.) the potential intellect is in potency to all things intelligible, but everything in potency to any form remains imperfect unless that form comes to be in it. Whence, since Christ’s intellect is not imperfect, the forms of the things to which his potential intellect is in potency must be written in it. But insofar as it knows the Word, there is neither a likeness of the Word depicted in it, nor are the things things that are seen in the Word, as was said. Whence, besides the vision by which he sees things in the Word, he must have another knowledge of things insofar as he knows them through their proper likenesses in their proper natures. And thus we have the three knowledges of Christ: one is divine, which is uncreated, another by which he knows things in the Word and the Word himself, which is the knowledge of a comprehensor, and a third by which he knows a thing in its proper nature, which belongs to him insofar as he is a man considered in merely his natural faculties.

Reply Obj. 1: These two last knowledges are not of one notion, nor of one species. Therefore it is not a problem that they are in the same one and not of the same notion.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle’s word should be understood to be about the perfect and imperfect within the same species. Yet it is not incongruous that there be perfections of diverse species, one of which is greater than the other, in the same person. Or it could be said that the knowledge of things in their proper genus does not have any imperfection on the side of the knower; this is why it is even in the blessed, although that knowledge by which things are seen in the Word is inferior, on account of the less noble medium of knowing. Whence it is unlike faith, which imports an imperfection on the side of the believer.

Reply Obj. 3: And thereby the response to the third is clear.

Article 2

Whether Christ’s soul comprehends the Word by seeing it

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.10.1; De veritate, q. 20, aa. 4, 5; Compend. theol., ch. 216; Super 1 Tim. 6, lect. 3.) It appears Christ’s soul comprehends the Word in seeing him.

Obj. 1: For, as Isidore says, (Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, bk. 1, ch. 3, sent. 1b (CCSL 111).) the Trinity is known to itself alone, and to the assumed man. But the vision by which God is seen belongs to God alone and to no merely created thing, because it is a vision of comprehension. Therefore the assumed man comprehends the Trinity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is greater to be united to God in the existence of the person than in vision. But, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1003).) the entire divine nature was united to the flesh in the person of the Son. Therefore much more was the entire divine nature united to the soul as the visible, and thus Christ’s soul comprehends the Godhead of the Word.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Word is simple, not divisible. But the simple can only be received by someone as comprehended, since it cannot be partly in the receiver and partly not. Therefore since Christ’s soul receives the Word by seeing him, it appears that it comprehends him.

On the contrary, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 147: Ad Paulinam, ch. 9, para. 21 (CSEL 44:295; PL 33:606).) what is properly speaking comprehended is that whose boundaries are beheld. But the boundaries of the Word cannot be beheld, since he is infinite. Therefore he cannot be comprehended by Christ’s soul.

Furthermore, no power of a finite substance is infinite. But Christ’s soul, since it was created, is a finite substance. Therefore his every power is finite, and so is his capacity. But a finite capacity does not comprehend an infinite. Therefore, since the Word is infinite, it cannot be comprehended by Christ’s soul.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he does not know in the Word all the things that the Word knows. (Parallels: ST III.10.2 and 3; De veritate, q. 8, a. 4; Compend. theol., ch. 216; Quodl. III, q. 2, a. 1.) For Mark 13:32 says, of that day . . . no one knows, . . . nor the Son, but only the Father. But he is not speaking of the Son in reference to his divine nature, in virtue of which he has the same knowledge as the Father. Therefore he is speaking of the Son in reference to his human nature. And therefore Christ, in virtue of his soul, does not know all the things that God knows.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God knows an infinity of things. But Christ’s soul, since it is finite, cannot comprehend an infinity of things. Therefore it does not know all the things that God knows.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, from the infinity of the divine power arises the fact that he can do an infinity of things. But Christ’s soul does not comprehend the infinity of the divine power. Therefore it does not comprehend all the things that God can do. But God knows all the things that he can do. Therefore Christ’s soul does not have knowledge of all the things that God knows.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to the degree that an intellect is higher, so can it know more things from one thing; on account of this, the knowledge of superior things is said, in the Book of Causes and by Dionysius, (Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 4; Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13, para. 3 (PG 3:299).) to be more universal than that of inferior things. But the divine intellect is higher than Christ’s soul. Therefore from its very self it can know infinitely more things than can Christ’s soul due to the vision of the divine essence.

On the contrary, Revelation 5:12 says, worthy is the Lamb who was slain, to receive . . . wisdom, on which a Gloss says, that is, all knowledge. (Glossa ordinaria, at Revelation 5:12, 6.1508 (PL 114:721).) Therefore, since the lamb was slain in virtue of his human nature, it appears that Christ has all knowledge in virtue of his human nature.

Furthermore, there is no good that Christ’s soul does not love, since it has perfect charity. But a thing is not loved unless it is known. Therefore there is no good that it does not know. But everything that is, insofar as it is, is good. Therefore it knows all things.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he knows all things as clearly as God does. (Parallels: De veritate, q. 20, a. 4; Compendium theol., ch. 216.) For clearness of vision is impeded by the dimness of the seeing power or of the medium itself. But in Christ’s intellectual power there is no dimness, since his soul is the clearest and purest mirror, and the medium in which God and Christ’s very soul see is the same, namely, the divine essence itself. Therefore Christ’s soul sees no less clearly than does God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if God were to see more clearly than does Christ’s soul, one clarity would infinitely exceed another clarity. But between things infinitely distant there can be an infinity of intermediates. Therefore there can be an infinity of created things seeing more clearly than does Christ’s soul.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a defect in clarity of understanding arises from an intellectual power not being sufficiently capable of understanding a thing, whether this happens due to the excellence of the thing to be understood, which the intellect cannot reach, or due to a defect of it, since the agent intellect cannot perfectly give it the notion of the intelligible, as are things that do not have perfect existence, such as time and motion. But Christ’s soul is sufficiently capable with respect to every created nature. Therefore all things that it sees in the Word it sees at the boundary of clarity, and therefore God does not see more clearly than does Christ’s soul.

On the contrary, to the degree that one’s sight is more acute, so far is that vision clearer. But the divine sight is infinitely more acute and more powerful in understanding than the is sight of Christ’s soul. Therefore it sees infinitely more clearly.

Furthermore, a greater light causes a greater clarity of vision. But the uncreated light, by which God sees, is infinitely greater than the created light of Christ’s soul. Therefore God sees infinitely more clearly.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s soul does not see all things by that one look by which it knows them in the Word. For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Topics 2.10, 114b35.) we know the many, but we understand the one. But Christ’s soul sees things in the Word only by understanding them. Therefore it cannot see all things with one look.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ’s soul sees in the Word all the things that the Word sees. But the Word sees an infinity of things. Therefore also Christ’s soul sees an infinity of things. Therefore if it were actually to see all the things that it sees there, it would traverse an actual infinity, which is not possible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the quantity of a power is commensurate with its activity. But Christ’s soul is finite. Therefore it is not capable of an infinite activity, nor an infinity of activities at once. But if Christ’s soul sees all the infinity of things at once by diverse activities in virtue of the diverse objects, then it has an infinity of activities at once. However, if it does this by one activity, then it has an infinite activity, which is impossible. Therefore it does not actually see at once all the things that it sees in the Word.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the blessed angels do not see simultaneously in act whatever they see in the Word; whence also one illuminates another. But the vision by which Christ’s soul sees in the Word is like that vision. Therefore it does not see simultaneously all the things it sees in the Word.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a1.) that happiness does not consist in a habit, but in an activity. But Christ is perfectly happy and blessed. Therefore he is in the act of [knowing] all the things that he he knows.

Furthermore, whatever things are known are known either by a habit or in act. But Christ does not see the things that he sees in the Word through any habit. Therefore if he does not see them in act, he would know them only in potency.

Furthermore, whatever things are seen in one species are seen at once, just as a man sees at once both a quantity and a color. But all the things that Christ’s soul sees in the Word it sees in the one essence of the Word as in one species. Therefore Christ’s soul sees all things at once.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that what is properly comprehended is what is reached by the intellect according to the entire notion of its knowability, and this is its boundaries being looked upon—but not the boundaries of the thing, since in this way God would not comprehend himself, as he does not have boundaries. Rather, since he knows himself according to every notion by which he is knowable, in this way he is said to comprehend himself. And since each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being, therefore the aforesaid comprehension happens when the efficacy of the intellect in understanding is made equal to the essence of the thing.

Now, in understanding, the intellect holds two things: namely, the intellectual light, by which it is able to understand, and the likeness of the thing understood, by which its intellectual activity is determined to this thing that is known. Therefore whichever of these is exceeded by the thing insofar as it is in its own existence, the intellect does not comprehend that thing.

But there is a difference in this. For if the thing exceeds the very likeness of the intellect by which it understands the thing itself, then the intellect does not attain the vision of that thing’s essence. For, as was said, the intellect is determined to the thing known through that likeness. For example, if an intelligible species represents a man insofar as he is sensible, and not insofar as he is rational, then the essence of the man is not seen; for when anything that is essential to a thing is subtracted, the essence of some other species remains. But if the thing exceeds the light of the intellect, and not the species, then the essence of the thing will be seen, but not in the perfect mode, insofar as it is knowable since, as was said, the efficacy of understanding is due to the intellectual light.

But because the existence that is received in a created thing falls short of the eminence of the Creator’s existence, therefore every created intellect knowing God through any likeness, whether impressed or taken from things, does not see God’s essence. But in order to see God, God’s very essence must be joined to the intellect as a form by which it knows determinately; this is in all the blessed. But since the intellectual light makes one understand simply, therefore every intellect must understand through a light that is in it. Whence the intellectual light that is received in the created intellect, by which he sees God, falls short of the divine existence. And although it would see God’s essence, still it would not see it in a perfect way, and on account of this, comprehending God cannot be communicated to a created intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Isidore is speaking of the perfect cognition of the Trinity, the perfect cognition that the Trinity has simply of its very self. But of it Christ’s soul has a perfect cognition in the genus of a created thing. Or it should be said that he is not speaking about the comprehension of the Trinity itself in virtue of itself, but with respect to all the things the Trinity knows in itself. For Christ’s soul knows all those things in it, but not certain other created things. Or, if it is understood to be about the comprehension of the Trinity in itself, then it belongs to the assumed man not by reason of his human nature, but by reason of the divine.

Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing of the divine nature that is not united to the human nature in the person of the Word, and nonetheless the human nature is not made equal to the divine nature; on account of this, the entire divine nature is said to be united to the human nature, and not contained in the human nature. So likewise, then, because there is nothing of the Word’s nature that Christ’s soul does not see, yet the latter is not made equal to the former, it can be said that Christ’s soul sees the Word’s entire nature, yet it does not comprehend him, since it does not see him entirely. For what is seen entirely is that whose visibility does not exceed the mode of the one seeing it, such that the one seeing sees it as perfectly as the degree in which the thing is perfectly visible. Whence one who has only an opinion about that which knowledge is possible does not know that thing entirely. And therefore no intellect can see the essence of God entirely, since its efficacy is not as great in understanding as is the divine essence’s truth or clarity, in virtue of which it is visible. This belongs to the divine intellect alone, and therefore he alone knows himself entirely.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not denied that the Word is comprehended by Christ’s soul because it sees part of him and does not see another part of him, but because he does see him as perfectly as he is visible. For example, of two men who know one conclusion, one might know it more perfectly, but not because one knows part of the conclusion and is ignorant of the other part, but because one knows it through a more efficacious middle term than does the other.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that some have said that every intellect seeing God sees all the things that God sees. But this is not necessary, because when things are seen in God, God is, as it were, the medium of knowing those things. Now, it is not necessary that one who knows a medium only knows all the things that can be known through that medium unless he knows that medium fully, according to its entire power. And therefore God himself, who knows his very self, knows all the things that are in him in any way, but in diverse ways. For he knows with the knowledge of vision the things that are, will be, or were at some time, since that which has existence outside the one seeing is seen, properly speaking. And although the essence through which he sees is one, nevertheless because he sees them through distinct ideal notions, thereby he has distinct knowledge of them while he knows each of them according to its proper idea—for example, the good—or through the idea of its opposite—for example, an evil. However, the distinction of these notions is due to the diverse relations of the exemplar, namely the divine essence, to the things seen.

But the things that neither are, nor were, nor will be, and yet could be, or could have been, or could still be, although in themselves they are not, have no distinction in themselves, and they are only in the very power of God, in which they are one. Whence there cannot be diverse relations according to which the notions of these possible things might be distinguished. And therefore God does not know them through distinct ideas, but through the knowledge of his power, in which they exist. And therefore he is said to know these things by his simple intelligence, since it is of intelligence to conceive even those things that are not out outside the one conceiving them.

But because everything that does something or can do it does it insofar as it is a being in act, therefore it is impossible that someone know all the things that can be produced by a certain cause unless he comprehends its entity. And since no created intellect comprehends the divine intellect, therefore no created intellect can know all the things that God can do, and these are the things that God knows by his simple intelligence. But the things that are, were, or will be fall short of the infinity of the divine power, since it is capable of doing more. This is why there is nothing to prevent a created intellect from knowing all these things, but anyone knows more of them in the Word to the degree that he beholds the Word more perfectly.

And because Christ’s soul, among created things, most perfectly beholds the Word, it reaches the boundary of this knowledge—namely, that it knows all things that were or are, and not only the things that have been done, but also things known and said. And because it comprehends every created essence, therefore it knows all the things that are in the seed-like power of every created thing in the mode by which God knows the things that are in his own power. Therefore it should be said that it sees in the Word all the things that the Word sees by the knowledge of vision.

Reply Obj. 1: The Son is said “not to know” because he does not make us know, insofar as he was sent to us. Likewise neither does the Holy Spirit, but “only the Father” is said to know, since he was not sent. Whence the Father’s knowledge is understood in reference to what he knows in himself, from which knowledge the Son and Holy Spirit are not excluded, so that in this way it is understood of the Son not only insofar as he is a man, but even insofar as he is God. Or it can be understood of the Son in reference to his human nature, according to the same manner of speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: God does not know an infinity of things through a knowledge of vision, yet if generation were to never cease, which is possible for God to do, he would know them. And were this posited, Christ’s soul would know an infinity of things with a knowledge of vision, as some say. However, now it knows the infinity by his simple intelligence, insofar as it knows all the things that can come to be through the power of a created thing, which are infinite, at least in number. Nor is this impeded by the fact that his substance is finite, and for two reasons.

First, because it would not know this infinity, if generation were to continue forever, through an infinity of things, but through one, that is, the Word. Nor would it comprehend that Word, since from that one thing still many more could be brought forth, for he could make other species. Now, the infinity of things that are in the power of the created things he again knows by comprehending the creatures themselves, which are not infinite. However, the power of the knower is proportioned to the medium of knowing more than to the things known.

Second, because it is possible for a power to be limited as regards its existence, but not as regards the notion of that power, as was said above about grace. (Above,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 2.)* And since the notion of a power is determined to its object, thereby it is possible for some power, finite according to its essence, to be capable of acting on an infinity of objects, but not in an infinite way. For an infinite efficacy in acting can be due only to an infinite essence, since each thing acts insofar as it is a being in act, just as the power of the sun is related to producing an infinity of plants, since however many it produces, its power is never exhausted, yet an infinite efficacy does not act there. So too Christ’s soul, although in its essence it is finite, still nothing prevents from being able to know an infinity of things, but only from being able to know the infinity clearly.

Reply Obj. 3: God can do many things that he never will do, and God knows those things with a knowledge of simple awareness, but not a knowledge of vision. However, the knowledge of Christ’s soul is not equal, even in the number of the things known, to the divine knowledge that is simple awareness, but only to the knowledge of vision, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: From his very essence, God knows what God can do, yet Christ’s soul does not. And therefore in this respect, God knows more things. Besides this, this is relevant in the things that a lesser intellect does not comprehend. For if it comprehends all things, then the lower intellect knows all the things that a higher one [knows], yet not so well. And therefore, since Christ’s soul comprehends created things, it knows all the things that are in the created thing, either actually or in its potency, yet not as clearly as God does.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the clarity or limpidity of a vision happens depends on three things: first, the efficacy of the visual power, since those who have a stronger sense of sight see more clearly; second, on the clarity of the light under which the visible is seen clearly, just as something is seen more clearly in the light of the sun than in the light of the moon; third, on the relation of the visible—or that in which the thing is seen—to the one seeing it, since what is seen at greater remove is seen less clearly. On account of these three things, Christ’s soul cannot see as clearly those things that it sees in the Word as the Word himself does. This is first because it does not have as great a power in understanding; second, because the light under which it sees falls short of the uncreated light; third, because the divine essence, which is the exemplar of the things in which things are seen, is joined to God more than to any created thing, since they are really the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s soul is the clearest mirror among created things, yet it does not reach the divine clarity. Nor does it follow from this that there is any obscurity in it, just as neither is there any blackness in something that is of a lesser white, but just a less intense whiteness.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the clarity of the divine cognition infinitely exceeds the clarity of Christ’s soul’s cognition, yet it does not follow that there can be some other created thing that knows more clearly than does Christ’s soul. For the latter reaches the ultimate grade possible to something created, as was said above about his grace.

Reply Obj. 3: Clarity of understanding derives not only from the intelligible, but also from the one understanding it. Whence, although Christ’s soul knows a thing with respect to all its knowability, still it is known better by God himself, relative to the mode of the one understanding—insofar as he understands the least intelligible with infinite clarity, just as also by the infinite power he creates the smallest thing.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that the reason the philosophers assign for why our intellect cannot understand many things at once is this: that the intellect must be shaped by the species of the intelligible thing. Now, it is impossible that it be shaped by many species at once, just as it is impossible that a body be shaped by many shapes at once. Therefore if certain things are known through one species, nothing prevents one knowing them at once, just as a man understanding what a man is understands animal and rational at the same time. And on account of this, even one who understands a proposition understands at once the predicate and the subject, since he understands them as one thing. And therefore, since Christ’s soul understands all things that exist in one thing, namely the Word, it also knows all things actually at once and with one look. And it is similar for the other blessed, as regards all the things that they see in the Word. But it is otherwise for those who see things through diverse species, which they cannot see at once.

Reply Obj. 1: When many things are understood in one, all of them are as one intelligible. And thereby the Philosopher’s statement is upheld.

Reply Obj. 2: The Word does not see the infinity through the knowledge of vision, as was said, and concerning this it is true that Christ’s soul sees whatever the Word sees. Yet if he were to see the infinity—positing that generation went on forever—it would not follow that it would traverse infinity. For it would not see them by going through them one after another, but both God and Christ’s soul would see them in one simple [look].

Reply Obj. 3: All the things that Christ’s soul sees in the Word it sees with one activity, yet such an activity is not infinite in itself, but only materially. For it goes through an infinity, on the supposition of the aforesaid position about the duration of the universe, just as was said even about the power of understanding.

Reply Obj. 4: One angel is not illuminated by another about the things that it sees illuminated in the Word; rather, it is illuminated about the things that it does not see, but which the superior one does see, either in the Word or in the light of another angel more proportioned to it, in which exist the more particular forms. For example, the lower angels are illuminated by the middle ones about the things that the former do not see in the Word; however, the middle ones see them, either in the Word, or through the illumination of higher angels.

Article 3

Whether Christ’s soul knows all things in virtue of that knowledge by which it knows things in their proper natures

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.11.1; 12.1; De veritate, q. 20, a. 6; Compendium theol., ch. 216.) It appears that Christ’s soul knows all things in virtue of that knowledge by which it knows things in their proper natures.

Obj. 1: For every power that is not brought to act is imperfect. But the potential intellect of Christ’s soul is in potency to all intelligible things, since it is in a certain manner able to become all things, as was said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a14.) Therefore, if it were not to know all things through their proper likenesses, it would remain imperfect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the intellect’s nature, through which it differs from sensation, is this: to the degree that the intellect understands many, and more difficult things, so too can it understand better other, easier things. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b3.) But being of this sort in no way prevents it from being able of receiving all things. Therefore Christ’s soul knows all things even in their proper natures.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, opposite things more than anything else impede each other, so that they cannot be simultaneously. But the species of opposites do not impede each other from being in the soul simultaneously, for a man has knowledge of white and black at the same time. Therefore much less do other species impede each other such that they could not be together. And thus the same thing as before follows.

On the contrary, not all things can be known where not all things are. But all things cannot be in one created habit. Therefore, since the knowledge that Christ has of things in their proper nature is some created habit, he cannot know all things through that habit.

Furthermore, Christ is conformed to us through that knowledge. But we cannot know all things. Therefore neither did Christ know all things through this knowledge.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ has this knowledge to a lesser degree than do the angels. (Parallels: above, a. 1, resp. 2, ad 1; ST III.11.2, 4, 5; De veritate, q. 20, a. 4; Compendium theol., ch. 226.) For to the degree that an intellect is simpler, so far is its natural knowledge greater. But the angelic intellect is simpler that Christ’s soul, since Christ’s intellect does not exceed the boundaries of human nature, beyond which lies the simplicity of the angelic intellect. Therefore the angelic intellect has a greater knowledge than the natural knowledge of Christ’s soul.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that an intellect is closer to matter, so far is it feebler in its knowing. But Christ’s intellect, since it is the form of Christ’s material body, is closer to matter than is an angelic intellect. Therefore it knows more feebly. And thus the same thing as before follows.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Isaac says, (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 299–340.) reason arises in the shadow of intelligence. However, he calls an angel an “intelligence.” Therefore, since Christ has a rational intellect, it appears that his knowledge is inferior to that of the angels.

On the contrary, in Hebrews 2 it is said that Christ was made less than the angels only for the sake of his Passion. (RSV for Hebrews 2:9 reads: we see Jesus, who for a little while was made lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death, so that by the grace of God he might taste death for every one.) Therefore he has a more powerful knowledge than they do.

Furthermore, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:210).) Christ himself teaches the angels as man. Therefore he has a greater knowledge than them.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ did not have knowledge through a mode of synthesis. (Parallels: ST III.11.3 and 5; De veritate, q. 20, a. 3, ad 1.) For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:947).) in Christ we do not ask about counsel or choice. But these things pertain to the synthesis of practical reasoning. Therefore for the same reason there was in him no synthesis as regards speculative matters either.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the discourse of reason is opposed to deiformity. But Christ’s entire soul was deiformed. Therefore he did not have synthesized knowledge.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the discourse of reason, as Isaac says, (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 299–340.) happens because it has a dim light. But there is no dimness or obscurity in Christ’s soul. Therefore neither did he have knowledge through the mode of synthesis.

On the contrary, Christ assumed all natural properties that follow on human nature. Therefore he assumed reason. But the act of reason is to inquire and synthesize. Therefore he had synthetic knowledge.

Furthermore, to object and respond pertain to synthetic knowledge. But Christ exercised the office of objecting and responding, as is said in Luke 2:46–47. Therefore he had synthetic knowledge.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it appears that this knowledge was divided into several habits. (Parallel: ST III.11.6.) For his knowledge was univocal with our knowledge. But our knowledge is about all the things that Christ knew by several habits. Therefore so too was Christ’s knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 431b24.) the sciences are divided the way realities are. But Christ had science, or knowledge, about diverse realities. Therefore he had the diverse habits of the sciences.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sciences are divided according to the diverse notions of knowing. But as far as pertains to this knowledge, he does not know all things by the same species or notion, but by many. Therefore he did not have only one habit of knowledge, but many.

On the contrary, Christ’s knowledge was the most perfect. But to the degree that knowledge is one, so far as is it more perfect, as is clear from Dionysius and the Book of Causes. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12 (PG 3:291); Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 10.) Therefore he knew all things more through one habit.

Furthermore, a knowledge that rules several arts is not divided through those arts, but it is one habit, as is clear of the military knowledge relative to all the sciences subordinate to it. But Christ’s knowledge was ruling, and as it were architectonic, relative to all human knowledge. Therefore he knew through one habit all the things that pertain to this knowledge.

Quaestiuncula 5

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he progressed in this knowledge. (Parallels: ST III.12.2; 15.8; Compendium theol., ch. 216; Super Ioan. 4, lect. 1; Super Heb. 5, lect. 2.) For Hebrews 5:8 says, he learned obedience through what he suffered. But to learn is to progress in knowledge. Therefore he progressed in knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, not to make progress in the things in which someone can make progress is a great defect. But in every knowledge in which someone does not know all things, he can make progress. Therefore, since Christ did not know all things in virtue of this knowledge, it appears that he could make progress, and thus he would make progress in it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, his agent intellect abstracted species from phantasms, and this is its act, otherwise it would have been pointless to have assumed it. But the species abstracted from phantasms is received in his potential intellect. Therefore several species were always received in Christ’s potential intellect. Therefore he progressed in knowledge.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, this is clear from the authority of Ambrose noted above. (Sent. III. 14. 2(40), 2, actually quoting Venerable Bede, Homiliae, bk. 1, hom. 1 (CCSL 122; PL 94:11).)

On the contrary, Damascene says, those who say Christ progressed in wisdom and grace, such that he received addition, do not venerate the union that is according to the hypostasis. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 22 (PG 94:1087).) But that union should be venerated wholly. Therefore we should not say that he progressed in knowledge.

Quaestiuncula 6

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that, for this knowledge, he did receive from the angels. (Parallels: above, d. 13, a. 2, resp. 2; ST III.12.4; 30.2.ad 1.) For Dionysius says that through the angels we see him ordained under the pattern of the laws. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:182).) But one ordained receives something from the one ordaining him. Therefore Christ received something from the angels.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Luke 22:43 says that there appeared to him an angel from heaven, strengthening him. But one being strengthened receives something from the one strengthening him. Therefore Christ too receives from the angel.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ, while he was on earth, wished to be subject to the ordinances of the law, and was born under the law (Gal 4:4). But observance of the law is of less dignity than is the celestial hierarchy. Therefore he should also be subject to the celestial hierarchy. However, the law of the celestial hierarchy is that men receive from the angels, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 3 (PG 3:179).) Therefore he receives from the angels.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, his body receives an impression from the heavenly bodies. Therefore for a like reason it receives from the heavenly spirits.

On the contrary, a superior does not receive from an inferior. But Christ, even according to his human nature, was superior to the angels, and is their head, as was said above. (Above,* d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 2.)* Therefore he does not receive from them.

Furthermore, what one immediately receives from the Word need not be received from the angels. But Christ’s soul immediately receives from the Word united to it. Therefore it does not receive from the angels.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I respond to the first question that the knowledge of things in their proper genus differs from the knowledge of things in the Word not with respect to the things being known, but with respect to the medium of the knowing, which is that in which a thing is known. For the knowledge of things in the Word has the Word himself as the medium of knowing, whereas knowledge of things in their proper genus has the likenesses of the things, which are in the intellect, as the medium of knowing.

Now, the medium of knowing, which is the light under which the thing is seen, is created for both. For this is either a natural light, as in those things that are known through natural reason, or it is the light of grace, as in those things that are known through faith and revelation. However, Christ was perfect in his soul, both according to nature and according to grace. But he would have his soul’s perfection according to nature only if he were to know all things with that kind of knowledge by which they can be known through natural reason. Nor would it be perfect in grace unless it knew all the things that in men or angels pertain to the revelation of grace. And therefore his soul knew all things by this kind of knowledge.

But because a created likeness falls short of representing the uncreated substance, thus it did not know with this kind of knowledge the uncreated essence itself. Nor did it know the other things that pertain to the perfection of the intellectual part [of the soul], whether relative to nature or grace—such as the deeds of particular men and the like, which nonetheless it knew in the Word. And therefore it should be said that by the former kind of knowledge it did not know all things simply.

Reply Obj. 1: From this argument one can conclude only that [Christ’s soul] knew all the things that can be known through natural reason. For just as first matter is in natural potency only to those forms that can be produced by a natural agent, even though God could make other things from that matter, so too the potential intellect is in natural potency only to those things that can be known to the light of the agent intellect. And if it knew only these things, it would not be imperfect. But God, from his beneficence, pours even more fully the light of grace, through which the potential intellect knows even more things.

Reply Obj. 2: Through the things that the intellect understands, a capacity is amplified only in respect of the intelligible things that are of the same genus. For example, however much a man is instructed in the physical sciences, he will never reach the cognition of the things that are of faith or prophesy, unless a fuller light be added to him. And thus, however much his capacity for understanding a thing in its proper genus is amplified, he will never reach the vision of the divine essence, or those things within it.

Reply Obj. 3: It is denied that Christ’s soul knows generically all things of this sort of knowledge not because species impede each other in the intellect, but rather because certain knowable things, like the divine essence, exceed every created species. Indeed, the likenesses and cognitions of certain things do not belong to the human intellect’s perfection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that three things are required for intellectual cognition: namely, the power of the intellect, the light by which it understands, and the likeness of the thing through which the cognition of the thing is made determinate. And one cognition can be more potent than another with respect to these three things.

First, with respect to the efficacy of the knowing—namely, the certitude of the cognition, or the clarity, which is the same thing, that follows from the light itself. And in this way, since Christ had the light of grace more abundantly than did the angels, he had a clearer cognition than did the angels.

Second, one cognition can be more potent than another in virtue of the likeness of the things known, which is measured by the species. And with respect to this too, Christ had a more perfect cognition than did the angels, since the species of more things were infused in him than were created with or infused in the angels. Whence, even as regards things that pertain to the hierarchical illuminations, Christ illuminated the angels, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:210).)

Third, one cognition can be nobler than another in virtue of the kind of cognition, which follows on the intellectual power. And since Christ knew by a potential intellect, the object of which is the phantasms, therefore he knew them with continuous quantity and time, using the phantasms as the objects of the intellect—not as receiving the species from them, but as placing the species on them. This is like what happens in one who has the habit [of knowledge] and actually considers these things. However, the angels do not know by this kind of knowledge, but by a higher one, according to the order of its nature—that is, without continuous quantity and time.

Reply obj. 1: This cognition was in Christ not only according to the proportion of the power that is owed to his human nature, but also insofar as his human nature was perfected through grace, which was more potent in Christ than in the angels. Whence also he had a more perfect knowledge simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: Because the potential intellect is closer to matter, it has a defect in knowing only with respect to the kind of cognition. For because such is its nature that it is united to a body as its form, therefore it knows with such a kind of knowledge, namely, by using the body’s instruments. But the multitude of things known is not due to the nature of the potential intellect, but due to the intelligible species; indeed, the clarity is due to the light of the agent intellect, or due to a superior light.

Reply Obj. 3: That dimness is understood with respect to the fact that it understands with continuous quantity and with time.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that from the very fact that our intellect receives from the phantasms, it follows that it has within it a synthetic knowledge, insofar as one memory arises from many sensations, and one experience from many memories, and one universal principle from many experiences, and it concludes other things from that. And this is how it acquires knowledge, as is said in the Metaphysics 1 and at the end of the Posterior Analytics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980b29‒981a16; Posterior Analytics 2.19, 100a3‒20; see Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 1, n. 17.) Whence the way the intellect is related to the phantasms is the way it is related to synthesis. Now, it is related to the phantasms in two ways: in one way, as as receiving knowledge from them, which happens in those who do not yet have knowledge, in virtue of a motion from things to the soul; in the other way, in virtue of a motion that is from the soul to things, insofar as it uses the phantasms as examples, in which it sees what it contemplates—yet the knowledge of which it already had in a habit.

Likewise also there are two sorts of synthesis: one by which a man proceeds from things known to the inquiry about something unkown—and such synthesis was not present in Christ—and the other according to which a man who, bringing into act the things he holds in a habit, contemplates conclusions from principles as effects from causes—and this synthetic knowledge was in Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is speaking in reference to the first mode of synthesis. This is why he adds, for he did not have any ignorance.

Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason is not opposed to the deiformity that is through grace; rather, the deiformity that is through the order of nature is. For God does not receive knowledge from phantasms, so in this respect the soul, insofar as it the form of a body, falls short of likeness to God more than do the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: That shadow, as was said, refers to the kind of the knowledge, not to the clarity in the knowing.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that from the clarity of the cognition comes the fact that knowledge is more unified and simple, since to the degree that an intellect sees more clearly, so far can it know more things from fewer. Whence, since Christ’s soul had the clearest cognition of all created things, his knowledge was more unified than theirs, and had this knowledge through forms that were more universal than those of any created intellect.

Now, the division of habits in knowing diverse things arises in us because of the intelligible forms in us are minimally universal. This is why we must know diverse things through diverse species. And species diverse in genus make the diverse habits of knowledge. On account of this, the angels, who have a more universal knowledge insofar as it is not received from things, do not have knowledge of things through diverse habits.

Therefore, because Christ’s soul had a more universal knowledge than does any angel, he did not have diverse habits by which he knew things, but by one habit he knew all things that pertain to this knowledge, although by diverse species.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s knowledge, even of things in their proper genera, was much higher than our knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every diversity of things makes a diversity of knowledge, but only a diversity that requires a diverse notion of knowing, the way that natural things are distinguished from mathematical things. But the notion of knowing in Christ was more universal than is that in us, and therefore he was able to know many things through one notion.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every diversity of species makes a diverse habit (otherwise there would need to be as many sciences as there are things in reality). Rather, the diversity of the species that are not traced back to generically the same mode of knowledge does. Indeed, this diversity arises from the fact that the light of our intellect is bound to the particular, and weak. And therefore in Christ there was not such a division of habits, on account of the clarity of his light.

Response to Quaestiuncula 5

To the fifth question, it should be said that, since the eminence of knowledge, as was said, consists in the three things, Christ’s knowledge never grew with respect to the kind of the knowledge. For that kind of knowledge follows on his human nature, which always endured in him. Nor did it grow with regard to the number of things known, since from the first instant of his conception he knew all the things that pertain to this knowledge. However, it did grow with respect to a certain mode of certitude.

For since our soul by nature is a middle between a pure intellect, of the sort the angels have, and sensation, it becomes certain about things in two ways. In one way, from the light of the intellect; this is the sort of certitude found in demonstrations of things that are never seen. In the other way, from sensation, as when someone is certain of the things that he sees with his senses. And this latter certitude is acquired by someone, however much he might also know something through the most certain demonstration, when he sees sensibly what before he did not see; this is why the soul is pleased even in seeing things that it already knew. And this certitude is called “experiential.” And with respect to this, Christ’s knowledge did grow, insofar as he daily saw with his senses things that he had not seen before; however, it did not grow with regard to its essence. (Concerning this solution, it should be carefully noted that Aquinas changed his own opinion in ST III.12.2, when he there proves that some habit of knowing which could be increased by the abstraction of species was in the soul of Christ, although some, such as Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure and Aquinas himself, in resp. ad 2 and below d. 18, a. 3, ad 5, think otherwise.)

Reply Obj. 1: This learning should be referred to experience.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s soul, although it did not know all things in this kind of knowledge, still was not able to progress with respect to it, both because there are some things that cannot be known by this kind of knowledge, such as God’s essence, and because some contingent individuals do not belong to the perfection of knowledge, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: In Christ’s potential intellect no species were newly received through the light of his agent intellect. Rather, [through it] was accomplished a new conversion to the species present in his imagination, as is the case in one who has the habit of knowing those things that he imagines or sees.

Reply Obj. 4: Ambrose understands the progress of Christ’s knowledge with reference to experience, according to the new conversion to a present sensible, or else as the Master considered it above. (Sent. III, 14.2(40).3.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 6

To the sixth question, it should be said that, according to Dionysius’s teaching in the Heavenly Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:210).) the angels from whom the others receive knowledge are full of a more abundant light, as those who more closely contemplate the divine clarity. For the receiver must be in potency relative to the one from whom he receives, and thus is less in the actuality of what he must receive. Whence, since Christ’s soul had the intellectual light more abundantly than do the angels, as is clear from things said above, it is certain that Christ, even when bearing his mortal body, received no knowledge from the angels; rather, he—not only in virtue of his Godhead but even in virtue of his soul—illuminated all the angels, just as he illuminates them even now. For that soul was not of less glory or less knowledge in that state than it is now, since from the beginning of his conception he was a perfect comprehensor.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius himself explains it in the same place, Christ is said to be ordered by the angels not because he received illumination from them, but because others were instructed by angels about deeds to be done that pertained to him—for example, they instructed Joseph about his flight into Egypt, and the return from Egypt, as is said in Matthew 2:12-19. For he himself did not want to instruct them through his very self in these things, so that externally he would not be different from other children, and further, so that the truth of his assumed nature would be shown.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the angels did not illuminate Christ, still they did minister to him, as is clear in Matthew 4:11, and that strengthening pertained to this ministry. For he was not strengthened by way of instruction, but in the way that the conversation and presence of friends and family naturally strengthen someone who is grieving; and by this too the truth of the assumed nature would be apparent.

Reply Obj. 3: God came to free us from death as much as from the burden of the law. And therefore just as he was subject to death on our behalf so that he might free us from death, so too he received things pertaining to the law in his very self to redeem those who were under the law (Gal 4:5). Now, he did not come so that he might lead us from the order of the heavenly hierarchy, so the account is not the same. And furthermore, Christ received none of the things pertaining to the law as regards his soul; rather, bore them externally, only in his body, for example, circumcision and the like, whereas the laws of the heavenly hierarchy pertain to the soul. But Christ’s soul was not subject to any imperfection, the way his body was subject to the ability to suffer.

Reply Obj. 4: And thereby the solution to the fourth objection is clear. For because his body was not yet glorified, it was able to receive an impression from the heavenly bodies, whereas his soul, which was already glorified and exalted above the angels, was not able to receive anything from them.

Article 4

Whether Christ’s soul had omnipotence, as it had the knowledge of all things

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; ST III.13.1.) It appears that Christ’s soul had omnipotence, just as it had knowledge of all things.

Obj. 1: First, because this is what Matthew 28:18 says: all authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me, and it is speaking with reference to his human nature. Therefore he has omnipotence in his human nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ had knowledge of all things. But knowledge is practical and speculative. Therefore he also had practical knowledge about all things. But practical knowledge is that in virtue of which someone knows how to do something, and he is able to do it, since practical knowledge is a cause of things. Therefore Christ’s soul had omnipotence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the human soul is an image of the Trinity through power, will, and knowledge. But Christ’s soul, insofar as it was an image of God, was capable of all knowledge. Therefore for a like reason it was omnipotent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as God’s power is infinite, so too is his knowledge. But the infinity of his knowledge does not prevent the knowledge of all things from being communicated to Christ. Therefore neither does the infinity of his power prevent this omnipotence from being communicated to him.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as in a human soul there is the possibility of receiving all things through the potential intellect, by which it becomes all things, so too in it is the possibility of making all things through its agent intellect, by which it makes it all things. But the knowledge of all things is communicated to Christ insofar as his soul is receptive of all things. Therefore likewise omnipotence should be communicated to him.

On the contrary, a power has the notion of a principle, as the Metaphysics 5 says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 14, n. 955.) But being the principle of all things, which belongs to God alone, could not be communicated to Christ’s soul. Therefore omnipotence could not be communicated to him.

Furthermore, Christ’s soul is conserved in existence though the power of God. But conserving itself in existence could not be communicated to it, since then it would not be a created thing. Therefore omnipotence could not be communicated to him.

Furthermore, the active power of no finite substance is infinite. But Christ’s soul is a finite substance. Therefore infinite power—which is omnipotence—could not be communicated to him.

I answer that anything is active insofar as it is a being in act; this is why to the degree that certain things have existence in a deficient way, so far are they less active. This is clear with first matter, in which there is no active power, since it holds the last grade among beings. And therefore the active power is commensurate with the essence. And on account of this, just as having an infinity of essence could not be communicated to Christ’s soul, so neither could omnipotence be communicated to it, nor can it be communicated to any created thing.

Nonetheless, I believe that every power that can be communicated to any created thing was communicated to Christ’s soul much more abundantly: that is, such that elementary matter is more obedient to Christ’s soul at a nod than to active qualities, or even to a heavenly power, and that he was more capable of moving the heavens than is any angel, if angels indeed move the heavenly spheres.

Reply Obj. 1: Every power was given to Christ from eternity as regards his person, but as regards his human nature this happened only at his very conception. But this is not to say that his human nature, or any part of him, was formed with omnipotence, so that it could be called “omnipotent,” but in the way in which at a certain time properties communicate themselves with the nature, on account of the unity of the hypostasis. Yet in the Resurrection this was manifested, and therefore at that point it was said to be given, according to that manner of speaking in which a thing is said to come to be when it is being made known.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ had knowledge of all things, not only speculative but also practical, but not such that he would do all things, but such that he knew how all things are done by God. Now, practical knowledge, although it is in a way a cause of activity, insofar as it directs one toward action, still it is not a sufficient cause. For nothing is not produced by it unless an active power is applied to the thing. Whence Christ had practical knowledge of all things, but not to the point of practicing it, since he did not order it to activity.

Reply Obj. 3: The universality of things possible to God is commensurate with the divine essence, since he is capable of an infinity of things insofar his existence is not limited. But the universality of the things that he knows by his knowledge of vision is not commensurate with his essence, even if the world were to endure always the way in which it is now. For he could always make much more time than he did, and many more species, and many more genera of things, and many more worlds. And therefore although the knowledge by which God knows all things with a knowledge of vision was communicated to Christ’s soul, still the omnipotence by which God can do all things was not, just as neither was his infinite essence.

Reply Obj. 4: In omnipotence are included all things to which the divine power extends, due to the infinity of his essence in virtue of which it can effect an infinity of things in any way. But in the knowledge of all things said to be communicated to Christ is not included all the things that God can do, as has been said. And therefore omnipotence could be communicated only to one who possesses the infinite essence, just as the knowledge of all things that God can do, simply speaking, is communicated only to one who comprehends the infinite essence, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 5: The power of the agent intellect is not so great that it can make all things, simply speaking, but insofar as it can make all things become intelligible. And therefore the argument is not relevant.

Exposition of the text

The creature is in no way equated to the Creator. (Sent. III, 14.1(39).2, quoting Walter of Mortagne, Epistola ad Hugonem de S. Victore; see Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 33, n. 37 (CSEL 60:260; PL 44:265).) This should be understood in reference to the notion of the thing possessed and in reference to the way of possessing it. For although something the same belongs to God and the created thing, it does not belong in the same way or according to the same notion.

No one knows the things that are God’s, other than the Spirit of God. (Sent. III. 14. 1(39), 2, quoting 1 Cor 2:10.) The Father and the Son, who have the same knowledge as the Holy Spirit, are not being excluded in this.

It was naturally capable of knowledge. (Sent. III, 14.2(40).1.) For the soul was made for knowing all things, but not for doing all things.