D. 16 - Necessity of Christ's suffering and death

Division of the text

After the Master has considered the defects that Christ assumed with the nature, here he asks in what manner those defects were in Christ—namely, whether in Christ there was a necessity of suffering or dying. And this is divided into two parts:

first, he considers the question, showing that Christ assumed a necessity of dying.

And because the necessity of dying pertains to our second state, therefore for the sake of this, he shows, second, that Christ received something from each of the states, at it is here to be noted. (Sent. III. 16, 2(46). 1.)

As regards the first he does three things:

first, he states a puzzle;

second, he resolves it, at to which it may be said; (Sent. III, 16.1(45).2.)

third, he confirms the solution, at hence authority says, in On the Epistle to the Hebrews. (Sent. III, 16.1(45).2.)

Here arise two questions:

the first, about the necessity of his dying, which Christ assumed from the second state [of man], (Q. 1.)

and a second, about the things that Christ had from his final state. (Q. 2.) For he has spoken above about his immunity from sin and fullness grace, which pertain to the other states.

Question 1

The necessity of Christ's death

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether the necessity of dying is only because of sin, or even because of our nature;

second, whether in Christ there was a necessity of dying;

third, whether that necessity was subject to his human will.

Article 1

Whether the necessity of dying was in man only because of sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: In II Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 1; In IV Sent., prol.; d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 3; ST I-II.85.5–6; II-II.164.1; SCG IV.52; De malo, q. 5, aa. 4, 5; Compendium theol., ch. 193; Super Rom. 5, lect. 3; Super Heb. 9, lect. 5.) It appears that the necessity of dying is only in man because of sin.

Obj. 1: Romans 8:10: your bodies are dead because of sin, that is, bound to a necessity of death. Therefore.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in human nature death followed on the fault: death [came into the world] through sin (Rom 5:12). But the necessity of sin was brought upon man through sin alone. Therefore so was the necessity of dying.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, matter according to its nature ought to be proportioned to form. But the form of the human body, namely the rational soul, is incorruptible. Therefore so would be the human body itself, and therefore the necessity of dying is not from our nature, but because of sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the human body most of all reaches an equality of elemental combination, as the philosophers have taught. But where there is such equality, no single contrary can effect a corruption of the combination, since one does not dominate any other. Therefore a man’s body is by its nature incorruptible, and thus the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, punishment is brought in only because of sin. But death and the necessity of dying is a certain punishment, since all fearful things are punitive. Now, the end of all fearful things is death, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a26.) Therefore these things exist only because of sin.

On the contrary, everything composed from contraries holds, according to is nature, a necessity for corruption. But the human body is this sort of thing. Therefore from its nature it has a necessity of dying.

Furthermore, as was proved in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 282b9‒283a29.) what can be naturally generated is corruptible, and possesses a necessity of corruption. But the human body is generated by its nature. Therefore it naturally possesses a necessity of corruption.

Furthermore, the elements in the human body are of the same species as the other parts of the elements. But the elements entering into combination with other bodies are necessarily corruptible according to their nature. Therefore so also are the elements that are in the human body. But when the components are corrupted, the composite is corrupted. Therefore a man’s body in virtue of its nature has a necessity of dying.

I answer that the necessity of dying belongs to man partly because of his nature and partly because of sin. It is from his nature because man’s body is composed from contraries, which are naturally apt to act on, and be acted upon by each other, due to which the dissolution of the composite arises. But nevertheless, in the state of innocence a certain gift was present in the soul, given gratuitously by God, so that the soul—outside the mode of other forms—according to its own mode bestowed on the body an unfailing life, just as it itself is incorruptible, and not a corruptible life that follows the mode of the body. As long as the soul itself remained subject to God, the body would also remain wholly subject to it, nor could any disposition happen in the body that might impede the soul’s enlivening it. But because of sin that gift was taken away, and therefore the human nature was left, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, para. 11 (PG 3:439–42).) in the state that is owed to it from the nature of its principles, following what is said to man: you are dust, and unto dust you shall return (Gen 3:19). And therefore after sin, there was a necessity of dying in man because of sin, as due to a cause that removes what prevents something, which was the grace of innocence. Moreover, it is due to the nature of matter, as due to what through itself induces the necessity of death.

Reply Obj. 1: This is said insofar as what prevents death has been removed through sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin is not present in man from any of his natural principles; indeed, it is contrary to the nature of reason. Whence sin is not like death, which follows from the material principle.

Reply Obj. 3: Matter ought to be proportioned to form, not so that it might have the conditions of the form, but so that it might be disposed to receiving the form according to its own mode. This is why it is not necessary that, if man’s soul is immortal, so too his body would be immortal according to its nature.

Reply Obj. 4: It is impossible that bodily makeup reach so great an equality that none of the contraries predominates. For a combination does not come to be otherwise than by one thing that is dominant acting on the other by reducing it to an intermediate, with the other resisting it. And this is especially necessary in the human body, which heat dominates, on account of the activities of the soul, which needs heat as an instrument, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416b29; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 9, n. 348.)

Reply Obj. 5: Death, or the necessity of dying, is said to be a penalty in comparison to the state of innocence, wherein there was present in man the ability to not die. Nevertheless, if in the beginning of the condition of the human nature the gift of grace spoken of was not given to the human nature, there would indeed have been a necessity of dying. But it would have been a natural defect, not a punishment, as the Master proved above in the previous Distinction, (Sent. III, 5.1(41).6.) from the words of Augustine. And therefore, because the philosophers did not know about that gift, Seneca said that death is man’s nature, not a penalty. (Missing citation; Nicolaï notes that you will die: this is the nature of man, do not take it is found in the appendix of Seneca's works, but it is not the same.)

Article 2

Whether there was a necessity of dying in Christ

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.14.2.) It appears that in Christ there was no necessity of dying.

Obj. 1: For necessity imports coercion. But what is constituted in one’s power is not something coerced. Therefore, since Christ says of himself, I have power to lay it [my life] down (John 10:18), so it does not appear that in him there was a necessity of dying.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ died because he wished it, as is said in Isaiah 43. But in him there was no necessity of so wishing. Therefore there was no necessity of dying.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the necessity of dying comes from sin: your bodies are dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), and the Gloss says, that is, bound to the necessity of death. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 8:10, 6.104 (PL 114:495).) But in Christ there was no sin. Therefore neither was there a necessity of dying.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Master said above, in the preceding Distinction, (Sent. III, 15.3(43).1.) that Hilary removed from Christ the necessity of feeling pain. But death follows the pain of the Passion. Therefore, neither was there in him a necessity of dying.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is more powerful does not suffer with necessity from what is less powerful. But Christ was more powerful than anything else that leads to suffering and death. Therefore he did not have a necessity of dying or of suffering.

On the contrary, God . . . sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8:3). But the condition of sinful flesh is that it has a necessity of dying, which yet is not a sin. Therefore it was in Christ’s flesh.

Furthermore, Hebrews 2 says that in suffering he becomes like his brothers, that is, other men. But the mother from whom Christ took his flesh, and other men, have a necessity of dying and of suffering. Therefore there was such necessity even in Christ.

Furthermore, the necessity of dying or suffering is a defect consequent upon the whole of human nature, nor is it fault importing a diminution of grace, since it is only on the side of the body. But he assumed all such defects, as was shown above. (Above, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore he assumed the necessity of dying.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 13, 22b5–6; Aquinas, Expositio Perihermeneias, lect. 10, n. 9.) the necessary is the same as what is impossible not to be; whence necessity excludes a potential for its opposite. Now, this potential for the opposite is excluded for three reasons. First, by the fact that such a potency is repugnant to that thing’s nature, just as a potency for ceasing to be is repugnant to the divine nature, and therefore we say that God is necessarily eternal. And this is an absolute necessity. Second, [the potency for its opposite] is excluded due to something impeding it, and this is a necessity of coercion. Third, because that of which there is said to be a potential is repugnant to the end intended, such as not to be treated for is repugnant to what is to be healed; whence we say that if something ought to be healed, it cannot not be treated. And this is a necessity on the condition of an end.

Now, the necessity of suffering or dying can be attributed to Christ in two ways. For he can remove the potential for not dying from his human nature, and in this way [the necessity of dying] is truly attributed to him. For human nature, with respect to the state of its possibility, in which state Christ assumed it, does not have the power of not dying. Whence, in Christ, with respect to his human nature, there was a necessity of dying. He can also remove the potential for not dying from Christ by reason of his person, but in this way [the necessity] is falsely attributed to him. For the power of Christ’s divinity could repel anything that can induce death or suffering. Nonetheless, in Christ there was a necessity of suffering even by reason of his person, on condition of the end—namely, if he wished to free the human race by redeeming it. And therefore some say Christ had a need to suffer, looking to his human nature, but some say he had such a necessity only on condition of the end, looking to the divine person. But since death was in Christ by reason of his human nature, therefore just as we concede simply speaking that Christ died, so too in the same way we can concede simply that he had a necessity of dying—and not only due to the final cause, but there was even an absolute necessity that he die, even if he were not killed, as some say. Whence Augustine says, if he had not been killed, he would have died a natural death, (Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum, bk. 2, ch. 29, para. 48 (CSEL 60).) and the work of redemption would have been the same as what he accomplished through his Passion. And with this, he had a necessity of coercion, as regards the violent death that he endured.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Master will say below in Distinction 21, (Sent. III, 21.1(68).8.) Christ said this of the power of the divinity that remained in him.

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that Christ died because he wished it, the word “because” can indicate a cause, and this either with respect to death absolutely speaking—and thus it should be referred to the will of his divinity—or with respect to the death violently impressed on him—and thus it can be referred to his human will, through which he voluntarily offered himself to his persecutors. It can also indicate something concomitant, and in this way too it refers to his human will, through which he accepted death; and this excludes the necessity of dying, since this same thing happened with Peter and other saints.

Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of dying did not come to human nature only because of sin; rather, it also could have also been in human nature for other reasons (as was said above). And therefore Christ was able to assume this defect without sin, and other defects too.

Reply Obj. 4: The Master above wanted to exclude from Christ the necessity of suffering by reason of his person.

Reply Obj. 5: The nails and the lance were more powerful than the body of Christ in a certain respect, inasmuch as the nails were hard, which pertains to a natural power, and Christ’s flesh was soft, which pertains to a natural lack of power, following the Philosopher in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 8, 9a25.)

Article 3

Whether the necessity of dying or suffering in Christ was subject to his human will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel: Compendium theol., ch. 230.) It appears that the necessity of suffering or dying was subject to Christ’s human will.

Obj. 1: For what follows on a preceding will is only what is subject to the will. But Damascene says in the Orthodox Faith 3 (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 20 (PG 94:1083).) that Christ’s natural [powers] followed his will. Therefore if the necessity of dying was present in Christ in any natural way, it was subject to Christ’s will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the lower powers are subject to reason, so too the body is subject to the soul. But in Christ the lower powers obeyed and were wholly subject to reason’s will. Therefore so too was the body, along with all the things that could happen in it, subject to the will of the soul.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Avicenna says (Avicenna, De naturalibus, bk. 6.) that matter is more obedient to a spiritual man’s soul than to contrary agents in nature. But Christ’s soul was the most spiritual. Therefore, since death happened in his body due to a contrary agent, it appears that his human will was able to repel the death brought by those sufferings.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, from his human will, through the grace of health that he possessed so abundantly, he conferred health on others; for example, he says to the leper, I will; be clean (Matt 8:3). But he had the ability to do this no less to his own body than to someone else’s. Therefore in virtue of his human will he was even able to preserve his body from wounding and death.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a greater power was in Christ’s soul than was in any other created thing. But the power of something created can preserve the body from death, for example, the Tree of Life. Therefore much more so was Christ’s soul able to do this.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, due to the strength of his contemplation of God, Moses fasted for forty days, by which it appears that his body was preserved from corruption on account of the power of his soul. But in Christ there was a soul much more powerful than that of Moses, since it had a fuller glory than did Moses (as Heb 3:3 says). Therefore his soul was able to preserve his body immune from every corruption.

On the contrary, the human body is wholly preserved from death only through the grace of innocence, as was in the first state, or through glory, as in the last state. But both of these belong to God alone. Therefore Christ’s soul was not able to preserve his body from corruption, and so the necessity of dying was not subject to it.

Furthermore, the corruptible cannot naturally become incorruptible. But Christ’s soul was not able to do things that are above its nature. Therefore since his body is corruptible, it was not able to preserve it from corruption.

Furthermore, to perform a miracle is a sign of omnipotence. But Christ’s soul did not have omnipotence. Therefore it was not able, by its own power, to perform any miracle. But that a corruptible body not corrupt is the greatest miracle. Therefore this was not subject to the will of Christ’s soul.

I answer that to change the law and course placed in nature belongs only to he who established and ordered nature—which God alone did. And therefore neither a bodily nor a spiritual power, whether of soul or angel—not even Christ’s soul—was able to change a divinely imposed law of nature, except by way of a prayer or intercession. And therefore this was a sign of Christ’s Godhead, that he accomplished signs by commanding them, not by praying for them, as do other saints. And therefore since the death of Christ’s body followed the law and course of nature, as was said, and as the Master teaches in the text, (Sent. III, 16.1(45).2.) it should be said that the necessity of dying within Christ was not subject to his human will, but only to his divine will, as the one opinion says.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene’s words should be understood as about his divine will, which was that of the person.

Reply Obj. 2: Sense powers are naturally apt to be obedient to reason, and to the degree that one’s reason is more perfect in virtue, so too do they obey it more. And because Christ had the most perfect virtue, so powers of this sort were wholly subject to him in virtue of his reason. But the natural powers either of the vegetative soul or even of the body are not naturally apt to obey reason, so the account is not alike.

Reply Obj. 3: Avicenna asserts that the world was made by God by the mediation of the angels, so he asserts that matter obeys the angelic spirit at a nod, and consequently the soul as well, insofar as it is like the angels. However, this is opposed to the faith—and to the sayings of the other philosophers, who say that angels can have an effect on these lower things only by the mediation of the motion of the heavens. And it is also opposed to the faith as regards certain things that the angels can do by using the powers of natural things in moving lower things, as is clear from Book II. (In II Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 5.) Whence the authority of Avicenna should not be upheld in this matter.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ was not able to perform even miracles of healing by virtue of his humanity, but only by virtue of the divinity joined to it.

Reply Obj. 5: The Tree of Life was not able to confer immortality as a principal cause would; rather, it removed something that corruption follows from—namely, the foreign matter that comes with ingested food, as was explained in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 4.)

Reply Obj. 6: Although Moses was not afflicted by his fast during the forty days because his sense powers were suspended on account of his contemplation of God, nonetheless the natural heat acted, and deterioration did occur, though not as much. For when the intellectual powers deeply contemplate something, even the natural powers are impeded in their acts. Or if no corruption occurred, this was only by a miracle, through the divine power.

Question 2

The final state of Christ's body

Next, it is asked whether, along with the necessity of dying, he was also able to have the things that pertain to the state of glory. And because he has already spoken about the things that pertain to the glory of his soul, therefore here the question is about things that pertain to the state of the glory of his body, which he revealed in his transfiguration, in Matthew 17:1–10. And two things are asked about this.

first, whether that brilliance was true or only imaginary;

second, whether it was the brilliance of glory.

Article 1

Whether the brilliance that was in Christ’s body during his transfiguration was true, or was it just imaginary

To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that that brilliance was not truly there.

Obj. 1: For what is said to be “transfigured” into something is what is not that in truth, as when it is said that an angel of Satan transfigures himself into an angel of light (2 Cor 11:14). (For “transfigures” the RSV says “disguises.”) But Christ is said to be transfigured insofar as he demonstrated his brilliance, as is clear in Matthew 17:2. Therefore that clarity was not in him in truth.

Obj. 2: Luke 9:27 says, there are some standing here who will not taste death before they see the kingdom of God, and the Gloss of Bede says, that is, the glorification of the body in the imaginary representation of future beatitude. (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 9:27 (in Glossa ordinaria, 5.825) without reference to Bede, in whose commentary it does not occur; the general sense is found in Bede, Homiliae, bk. 1, hom. 18 (PL 94:98).) But what is imaginary is not true. Therefore that brilliance was not in him in truth.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is impossible that the same body be both opaque and lucid at the same time. But in real truth, Christ’s body was opaque. Therefore in truth there was no brilliance in it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sensible brilliance corrupts vision most of all. But this brilliance was the greatest, since in his Gloss on Matthew 17:2, his face shone like the sun, Jerome says, God is not able to make anything in this life as brilliant. (This quote does not seem to be in Jerome’s gloss, but the Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 17:2, 5.288 (PL 114:143).) Therefore since the eyes of the apostles were not wounded in the vision of this brilliance, this was not a sensible brilliance, but only an imaginary one.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the witnesses of the transfiguration are conformed to the transfiguration. But the Gloss on Moses and Elijah, who appeared in glory (Luke 9:30), says, one should note that Moses’ and Elijah’s bodies or souls did not appear there; rather, those bodies were formed from underlying created things. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 9:30, 5.826 (PL 114:280).) It can also be believed that this was done by an angelic ministry, such that angels assumed their personas. Therefore neither was the brilliance in virtue of which the transfiguration was accomplished a true one, but rather an imaginary.

On the contrary, Augustine says, as was noted above in the preceding Distinction, (Sent. III, 15.2(42).4.) that if one of those who announced the Good News about Christ was not true, neither need one say the others were true. Therefore, if it was not a true brilliance, when the Good News says this, then it is also granted that he did not truly eat, nor did he truly suffer—which is heretical.

Furthermore, in the actions of the truth one should not believe anything was done falsely and deceptively. But if that brilliance was not true, there was a certain deception tricking the eyes. Therefore in no way should one say this.

Furthermore, a Gloss on let us make three booths (Luke 9:33) says that Moses and Elijah were witnesses from heaven. But they were true witnesses only if they were truly there. Therefore they were truly there, and thus that brilliance was truly there.

I answer that that brilliance was sensible, one truly existing in Christ’s body, for the sake of showing the brilliance that he promised would be in the saints after the future resurrection; for he said, the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father (Matt 13:43).

Reply Obj. 1: “Figure” can be taken in two ways. In one way, it means the quality resulting from the boundary of a quantity; and in this way Christ was not said to have been “transfigured,” for his body had the same lineaments. And because the figure of a thing is used as a sign of the thing itself, as is clear in images, which are made principally according to the representation of a thing’s figure, so this name “figure” is carried across so that it is used for any sign whatsoever, according to an assimilation to the other. Now, this can happen both for what is in reality, as one thing is an image or figure of another, and for what is in the imagination only. However, Christ is said to be “transfigured” because he assumed, for a time, a brilliance truly inhering in himself, as a figure of the future brilliance that will be in the saints.

Reply Obj. 2: Bede calls “imaginary” what is not only in the imagination, but is also an image and figure of something else.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not a problem that what is in itself intrinsically opaque might have brilliance in its surface or extension, such as polished bronze, or from something extrinsically induced upon it, as in the reflection of the sun, or something of this sort. And this is the way the brilliance was in Christ—not indeed induced upon him by an extremely luminous body, but miraculously by God himself.

Reply Obj. 4: That brilliance was like the brilliance of the glorified body, which does not corrupt vision, but rather soothes it. Whence in Revelation 21:11 it is compared to the brilliance of jasper, which soothes and delights vision. And this happens because it is of a different genus than is natural brilliance, for it arises from the spiritual brilliance of the soul, which does not corrupt the eye’s proportion to the soul’s power, but rather strengthens it. Whence what Jerome says—that God could not make anything in this life as brilliant—should be understood to have been said because the brilliance of this life, meaning natural brilliance, is proportional to the brilliance of heaven, but rather is in a different genus.

Reply Obj. 5: That Gloss has been punctuated by the masters, so it should be said that each of them appeared there truly, but Elijah in the soul and the body, whereas Moses in the soul only. This could appear to them either in virtue of some assumed body, as when angels appear, or because it is has a capacity, by God’s great ordination, to cause in their eyes a species representing that man whose soul it is.

Article 2

Whether this was the brilliance of glory

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.45.2; Super Matth. 17.) It appears that that brilliance was not glorious.

Obj. 1: For in his Gloss on Matthew 17:2, he was transfigured, Bede says, in that mortal body he shows not his immortality, but a brilliance like his future immortality. (Bede, Commentary on Matthew, bk. 3, ch. 17 (Pl 92:80).) But the glorified brilliance is the brilliance of immortality. Therefore that brilliance was not the glorious one.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing cannot be subject to punishment and glory. But Christ’s body was subject to punishment. Therefore there could not be a glorious brilliance in him.

Obj. 3: One might say that that brilliance overflowed from the glory of his soul.

On the contrary, we have 2 Corinthians 3:7–13, which says that so great was the brilliance in Moses’ face that he could not be looked upon unless he were veiled; and on Matthew 1:25—[Joseph] knew her not until she had borne a son—the Gloss says, Joseph was not able to look on Mary face to face, she whom the Holy Spirit filled. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 1:25, 5.48 (PL 114:72).) But Mary and Moses did not have glorified souls. Therefore it is not true that that brilliance proceeded from the soul’s glorification.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the properties of the glorious body are not only brilliance, but also agility, impassibility, and subtlety. Therefore, if he assumed the brilliance that is a property of a glorified body, he should also have assumed the other properties.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, glorious brilliance is not seen by an unglorified eye. But the eyes of the apostles who saw Christ’s brilliance were not glorified. Therefore that brilliance was not the glorious brilliance.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, glorious brilliance is not natural to a body. But this brilliance was natural to Christ’s body, which is clear from the earlier stated words of Hilary, where he says, but if it is the nature of the Lord’s body alone to be borne in the waters, and to stand upon the waves, and to pass through walls, how can we judge the flesh conceived by the Spirit by comparison with the nature of the human body? (Sent. III, 15.3(43).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 23 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:361).) And the Gloss on Matthew 17 says, the appearance he possessed he showed through his nature, not giving up the flesh that he assumed willingly. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 17:2, 5.288 (PL 114:143).) Therefore that brilliance was not glorious.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, that brilliance was not only in Christ’s body, but even in his clothes, as is clear from the text of the Gospel. But there can be no glorious brilliance in clothes. Therefore neither was it then in Christ’s body.

On the contrary, on Philippians 3:21—*who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body—*a Gloss says, we will become like the brilliance that he had in his transfiguration. (Glossa interlinearis, at Philippians 3:21 (in Glossa ordinaria, 6.600).) But we will become like his glorious brilliance. Therefore at that point he had the glorious brilliance.

Furthermore, a Gloss on Matthew 17 says that he appeared in that brilliance that he will have on the day of judgment. (Glossa interlinearis, at ?? (in Glossa ordinaria, ?.??); Cf. Glossa ordinaria, ....An old Glossa interlinearis; see also the Glossa ordinaria (PL 114:143), which reads In exemplum futurae beatitudinis et claritatis quam videbunt justi, prius sublatis impiis according to the Migne and Vivès editions.) But then he will have the brilliance of glory. Therefore he also appeared in that then.

Furthermore, a brilliance that is not the glorious one does not show forth the glory of the resurrection. But Christ was transfigured for the sake of showing forth the glory of the resurrection, as was said. Therefore it was a glorious brilliance.

I answer that Hugh of Saint Victor (See in fact Innocent III, De Sacro Altaris Mysterio, bk. 4, ch. 12 (PL 217:864); Sermon 14, de tempore (PL 217:382).) says that Christ assumed all the properties or “dowries” of the glorified body, yet bearing a body that could suffer—although in Christ they did not properly have the notion of being dowries. For example, he had subtlety in his birth, when he came forth from a virginal womb, with the closure of her chastity remaining closed; moreover, he had agility when he walked on the waves of the sea; moreover, brilliance in the transfiguration; and impassibility, or inability to suffer, in the [last] supper, when he gave his body to his disciples to eat without it being divided. And this cannot be understood in reference to the very qualities or habits of the glorious body, since they are contrary to the conditions and properties of a passible body.

Now, Christ before the Resurrection always possessed a passible body. Nor was the fact that his body was not divided by disciples when eating it due to his impassibility, but rather because it was not eaten in his proper species, but in the species of bread, under which he divided it. Whence, since contraries cannot be in the same thing simultaneously, he could not then have the qualities of a glorious body. But the acts of those properties were in him, though not as proceeding from something inherent to him, but supernaturally by a divine miracle; as Dionysius says in his Fourth Epistle to Caius, he worked above man the things that belong to the man, and the Virgin supernaturally conceiving demonstrates this, as does the unstable water of material and earthly things sustaining the weight of his feet. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistolae, ep. 4: Caio Monacho (PG 3:1071).)

Therefore, it should be said that that splendor did not arise from some property of the glorious body existing within Christ’s body, but was miraculously and divinely induced within Christ’s body. Yet that splendor was of the same genus as the splendor of glorified bodies, though not as perfect as they will have, just as the charity of the Way is like the charity of heaven. However, in Moses there was a brilliance like the brilliance of heaven the way that faith is like vision, but not of the same genus as it; and this is why his countenance offended those looking on him. But this was not so for Christ’s brilliance. And the reason for this is that Christ’s soul was glorified, but Moses’ soul was not. Whence the glorious brilliance was fittingly attributed to his body, but not to Moses’ body, lest there be glory in the body before there being glory in the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: What is being held in this Gloss is that the habit of brilliance was not present as in immortal bodies, but there was an act of splendor like that, from a divine miracle.

Reply Obj. 2: This is clear from the last reply.

Reply Obj. 3: It cannot be that that brilliance was in the body due to the glory of his soul, since Christ’s soul was still passible insofar as it is the form of the body. Whence he did not let his glory pass to his body, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ shows even the acts of the other dowries, but in a different way, as was said. But nevertheless, he is not said to have been transfigured in reference to them, since the other dowries do not pertain to his look, in reference to which we usually make a judgment about someone’s figure—for example, brilliance, through which something is seen in itself.

Reply Obj. 5: This is understood to be when the body does not wish to show itself as glorified.

Reply Obj. 6: That brilliance is said to have been natural to him inasmuch as that body was ordered to the possession of that brilliance, just as the virtues are said to be natural to the soul—or inasmuch as he was conformed to the soul’s brilliance, or by reason of his divinity.

Reply Obj. 7: There was splendor in his clothes shining forth from the brilliance of the body

Exposition of the text

For other men. (Sent. III, 16.1(45).2.) The likeness here is present inasmuch as the necessity for dying is in other men by their nature, but not inasmuch as it is there because of sin.

There are four states of man. (Sent. III, 16.2(46).1.) Against this, Boethius assigns three. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 8 (PL 64:1353).) It should be said that Boethius assigns the state of human nature principally with respect to conditions of the body, which in the first state was animal, in the second, corruptible, and in the third, spiritual. However, the Master assigns the four states principally with respect to conditions of the soul, as is manifest.

Immunity from sin. (Sent. III, 16.2(46).1.) This is not with respect to the potential for sinning, but with respect to the act of sin. Boethius says that he received from the first state things that pertain to animal life—namely, eating, sleeping, and the like.