D. 18 - Christ's merit as ordered to the good

Division of the text

After the Master has considered Christ’s will, which was the principle of his meriting, here he considers his merit itself.

Now, this part is divided into two:

first, he considers the merit of Christ himself insofar as it is ordered toward attaining a good;

second, he considers it insofar as it is ordered to removing an evil, in Distinction 19, at and so let us now ask how, by his death, we are redeemed from the devil, from sin, and from punishment. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).1.)

Moreover, the first is divided into two parts:

first, he considers Christ’s merit insofar as he merited something for himself;

second, his merit insofar as he merited for us, at to what end did he will to suffer? (Sent. III, 18.5(54).1.)

The first is divided into two:

first, he shows what he merited for himself;

second, he asks whether he could have had this without merit, at if we ask whether Christ. (Sent. III, 18.4(53).1.)

The first is divided into two:

first, he shows what he merited for himself in his very self;

second, what he merited in others, namely, manifestation, at nor did he merit only the glory of impassibility, and immortality, but also that to him should be given 'the name that is above all other names.' (Sent. III, 18.3(52).1, quoting Phil 2:8–9)

The first is divided into two:

first, he shows how Christ merited for himself the glorification of his body, and the impassibility of the soul and body in the instant of his conception;

second, he shows how he merited this through the Passion, at nor did Christ merit these things only. (Sent. III, 18.2(51).1.)

As regards the first of these, he does two things:

first, he determines the truth;

second, he proposes a certain doubt, at authority offers us no certainty as to whether the soul became impassible when the flesh became immortal. (Sent. III, 18.1(50).5.)

To what end, then, did he will to suffer and die? (Sent. III, 18.5(54).1.) Here he shows what he merited for us through his Passion. Regarding this, he does two things:

first, he enumerates the benefits that arise for us from Christ’s Passion;

second, he follows out one, which pertains to the attainment of the good, at God had decreed 'in mystery.' (Sent. III, 18.5(54).2, quoting Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in Pauli epistulam ad Romanos (recensio gamma), ch. 5, v. 14 (CSEL 81.1; PL 17:94).)

Question 1

The merit of Christ

Here six things are asked:

first, whether in Christ there was any activity besides the divine;

second, whether he was able to merit through that;

third, whether he merited from the instant of his conception;

fourth, what he merited;

fifth, whether he was able to merit through his Passion;

sixth, whether he merited the opening of the gates.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there is any activity besides the divine

To the first let us proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.19.1; SCG IV.36; De veritate, q. 20, a.1, ad 2: De unione Verbi, q. 1, a. 1, ad 16; a. 5; Compendium theol., ch. 212.) It appears that in Christ there is only one action.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius names Christ’s action “theandric,” that is, “God-human.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistolae, letter 4, Caio Monacho (PG 3:1071).) Now, this signifies not diverse actions but one. Therefore in Christ there is only one action of the divinity and the humanity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a17; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 1, n. 21.) actions are of singular supposits. But in Christ there is only one supposit. Therefore there is only one action.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what exists is what acts. But in Christ, on account of the unity of the hypostasis, there is only one existence. Therefore there is only one action.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there is only one action of the instrument and the principal agent. But, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 19 (PG 94:1079).) his flesh is divinity’s instrument. Therefore there is one action of Christ in virtue of his divinity and humanity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, where the deed is the same thing, the action is also the same. But in Christ the divinity’s and the humanity’s accomplished work is the same thing; for example, the cleansing of the leper, whom the divinity cleansed by the bodily touch, as is said in Matthew 8:3. Therefore in him there is only one action.

On the contrary, just as the unity of the action relates to the unity of the nature, so does the plurality of the one to the plurality of the other. But in the divine persons there is one action, on account of the unity of the nature. Therefore also in the person of Christ there are diverse actions on account of the diversity of the natures.

Furthermore, in Christ the divine and human natures are more distant than are the diverse powers of Christ’s soul. But in Christ there are diverse actions of the diverse powers. Therefore much more are there diverse actions of the two natures.

Furthermore, the action of the divine nature is the divine essence itself, and it is eternal. Now, the action of the human nature in him is an accident, and something measured by time. Therefore there are two actions in Christ.

I answer that some have denied that there are two actions in Christ, and to assert this diverse men have been moved by diverse arguments.

For some Eutychians said that in Christ there is only one nature composed from the divine and the human, and therefore it followed also that Christ had only one composite action. But from this it follows that his action would be neither divine nor human, nor would he be like us or the Father, and thus the work of redemption—for which both a divine action and a human one is required—would be frustrated. Whence this is heretical, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.)

Others denied that there are two actions in Christ, saying that in comparison with the divine, the human activity should not be called an “action,” but rather a “passion” or “undergoing.” Damascene rebuts this, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 19 (PG 94:1079).) because if for this reason Christ’s human activity should not be called an “action”—that is, because his action is divine—for the same reason his human nature would not be good, because the divine nature is good. For it need not be that, if the divine nature exceeds the human in goodness, therefore the human nature is evil or not good.

But others see that an action depends on a nature, which is the principle of action, and that from which a person acts. Therefore they want that in Christ one should not say that there is one action, lest we might appear to assert a unity of nature—and likewise, nor are they many, lest we might appear to assert a plurality of persons. But from this it follows, as Damascene says, that Christ is neither of one nor of two natures, which is absurd.

And on account of this, it should be said that one must simply concede that in Christ there are two actions, because upon the diversity of causes there follows a diversity in effects. Now, the cause of an action is the species, as is said in the Physics 3, (Aristotle, Physics 3.2, 202a9; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 3, lect. 4, n. 6.) for each thing acts by reason of some form it has. And therefore where there are diverse forms, there are also diverse actions, just as fire dries and heats through its heat and dryness, and a man hears and sees through sight and hearing. And likewise, by reason of his diverse natures Christ has diverse actions.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius calls Christ’s action God-human, not because there is simply one action of the Godhead and the humanity in Christ, but because the actions of the two natures are united in three respects. First, with respect to the very supposit performing the divine and human action, which supposit is one. Second, they are united with respect to the one effect, which according to Damascene is called “the work performed,” or the apotelesma, for example, the cleansing of the leper. Third, with respect to the fact that the human action of Christ himself participated in something of the perfection of the divine nature, just as his intellect understood more eminently than others, due to the power of the divine intellect joined to him in the person. However, the divine action was in no way weakened by its partnership with the human.

Reply Obj. 2: Although acting belongs to the supposit, still the form or nature is the internal principle or cause of the supposit’s acting, just as it is of the other properties in the supposit. Whence, just as the same supposit is the subject of diverse properties on account of its diverse principles causing those properties, so too the same supposit has diverse actions on account of the diverse forms or natures.

Reply Obj. 3: The unity of a thing follows on its existence; this is why, “a being” is said of a thing in the same way as “one,” which is convertible with “a being,” is said of it. Now, a thing does not have its unity from its action. And therefore it cannot be that it is one supposit and its existence is not one, but it can be that it is one supposit and its action is not one.

Reply Obj. 4: The action of the principal agent and its instrument cannot be by its essence numerically the same action, for the same accident cannot be in diverse subjects. Rather, it is called “one” in a certain respect—namely, inasmuch as the instrument does not act except as moved by the principal agent, and it acts in the power of the principal agent. And in this way, in the very action of Christ’s humanity there is a certain power inasmuch as his humanity itself is an instrument of the Godhead.

Reply Obj. 5: The unity of an action depends not only on its terminus, but also on many other causes. And therefore it need not be that, if the deed is one, then the action is the same. However, it can happen that the same deed is caused by diverse actions in four ways.

In one way, when one agent is not sufficient to complete the effect, but only many together are; for example, many men together drag a ship that no one of them could drag by himself. And in this way all of them are, as it were, one agent—not simply speaking, but by a unity of aggregation. And likewise, their action is not only simply speaking, but as though one collected from many.

In another way, when one agent can complete the effect, but not by one activity at once, but by many successive activities, as is the case in the generation of the acquired habits. And in this way, the last action completing the effect acts in the power of all the preceding ones disposing toward that effect.

And neither of these two ways was how there were multiple actions in Christ for one effect.

In a third way, when the effect is not one simply, but one in subject, as a cauterized wound; and therefore the actions causing it are diverse things simply, yet they come together in a supposit—namely, the thing cutting and cauterizing. And they are caused by essentially diverse forms—namely, by the sharpness of the iron and by its heat.

In a fourth way, when two actions are of diverse ordered agents, one of which moves the other, and the other is the instrument of the one.

And these last two modes are present in Christ, insofar as his diverse actions were terminated at the same accomplished work.

Article 2

Whether Christ was able to merit

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.19.3; De veritate, q. 29, a. 6; Compendium theol., ch. 231.) It appears that Christ did not merit.

Obj. 1: For Christ was always a comprehensor. But a comprehensor, who is at the goal, does not merit, because merit is the path to the goal. Therefore Christ did not merit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a merit and a reward cannot be the same thing, just as neither can a cause and its effect. But the act of perfect charity is reward, since it is fruition itself. Therefore, because in Christ there was complete charity, he was not able to merit through it—and thus in no way did he merit, since charity is the principle of every merit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ’s soul was beatified from the beginning of his conception, just as it is now. But it does not merit now. Therefore neither was it ever able to merit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever merits, by meriting, progresses in virtue of the principle of the meriting; for charity grows through merit. But Christ’s charity could not grow, nor could he progress in spiritual goods. Therefore he did not merit.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, we do not merit in virtue of our natural properties, because they are determined to one. But in Christ his free decision was determined to the good. Therefore he was not able to merit through his free decision—and therefore he could not merit in any way, since every merit is from a free decision.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, no one merits what is his own; and on account of this, with human beings, sons do not merit from their parents, though servants do, because the things that are the father’s belong to the son by right of inheritance. But all things that are the Father’s are Christ’s, as is said in Matthew 11:27 and John 16:15. Therefore he did not merit with the Father.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, no one merits from his very self. But whoever merits, merits something from the Son of God. Therefore, since Christ is the Son of God, he himself could in no way merit.

On the contrary, on Psalm 16:1, preserve me, O God, for in thee I take refuge, a Gloss says, behold the merit by which one ought to be preserved, (source) and it is speaking about Christ. Therefore Christ merited something.

Furthermore, every wayfarer who possesses charity merits. But Christ was of this sort. Therefore.

Furthermore, wherever there is difficulty in the acts of the virtues there is merit. But Christ had difficulty in virtuous actions, not on the side of his soul, but on the side of his body, which was afflicted. Therefore he merited.

I answer that in justice two persons are required, the one doing the justice and the one receiving justice. Now, of the one doing the justice, the proper action is to render to each one what is his, whereas of the one receiving justice, the proper action is to be rendered what is owed to him through justice. And this latter is properly to merit. This is also why what is rendered according to justice is called a “reward.” But because justice renders to each one what is owed to him, both in good and in bad things, whereas things that are good simply speaking are the things that pertain to eternal life, and things that are bad simply speaking pertain to eternal misery, therefore according to theologians “merit” is said properly in reference to these things. However, “merit” is more properly said in reference to the good things, and “demerit” in reference to the bad things.

Therefore three things are necessary for someone to merit: namely, the agent who merits, the action through which he merits, and the reward that he merits. And therefore three things are required for the merit. The first is according to the relation of the one meriting to the reward, namely, such that he who merits be in the state of acquiring the reward; and on account of this, those who are wholly at the goal merit nothing, since they can acquire nothing. The second is from the relation of the one acting to the action, namely, such that he is the lord of his action—otherwise his action would not make him worthy of receiving something, nor would he be praised. This is why things done by a necessity of nature or by violence do not merit. The third is according to the relation of the action to the reward, namely, such that it is equal to the reward—not according to an equality of quantity, since this is required in commutative justice, which consists in buying and selling—but according to an equality of proportion, which is required in distributive justice, in virtue of which the eternal God apportions eternal rewards.

Now, an action proportionate to eternal life is an action done from charity, and therefore through it, someone merits condignly the things that pertain to eternal life. However, good works that are not done from charity fall short of this proportion, and therefore through them someone does not condignly merit eternal life; rather, someone is improperly said to “merit” insofar as they have a certain likeness to activity formed by charity. And if indeed there is that likeness in the substance of the act and in the intention, insofar as when someone in a state of mortal sin gives alms for the sake of God, it is called a “merit of congruence”; but if there is a likeness in the substance of the act, and not in the intention, this is called an “interpreted merit,” for example, when someone gives alms to a poor man on account of vane glory. And these three things are found in Christ. For although in a certain respect he was at the goal of perfection—namely, with respect to the activities of his soul, by which he was blessed and a comprehensor—still in a certain respect he suffered a defect in the things that pertain to glory, namely, inasmuch as he was able to suffer in soul and body, and inasmuch as he was mortal in his body. And therefore in virtue of this, he was a wayfarer in the state of acquiring. Likewise also, his every act was informed by charity, and again, he was lord of his acts through a freedom of will. And therefore by his every act he merited.

Reply Obj. 1: Although he was a comprehensor in a certain respect, he was also a wayfarer in another respect, and by the latter he was able to merit.

Reply Obj. 2: The same thing cannot be a merit and a reward at the same time relative to the same thing and in the same respect. Whence the very motion of charity of Christ the man, in which consists his reward relative to the beatitude of the soul, can be a merit relative to the beatitude of the body. This does not happen in the other blessed souls, because they are not in a state of acquiring in reference to something of their own, and therefore neither do they merit for themselves or others. For what they now obtain for us happens because of what, while they were alive before, they merited that they might obtain.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ now is only a comprehensor, but then he was both a wayfarer and a comprehensor, and therefore he was then able to merit, but no longer.

Reply Obj. 4: He who merits need not progress with respect to the notion of meriting—for this happens to him because the root of the meriting, namely charity—is not itself something he merits. Rather, it is necessary that everyone who merits progress with respect to the reward that he merits, such that he causes it to be owed to him, either simply speaking or in some respect in which it was not owed to him before.

Reply Obj. 5: Christ’s free decision was not determined to numerically one thing, but to generically one thing—namely, the good. For he could not do evil. But nevertheless, he can do this and not do this, and this does not exclude the freedom of decision, since to be able to sin is not a freedom of decision, nor a part of freedom, as Anselm says. (Anselm, Dialogo de libertate arbitrii, ch. 1 (PL 158:489).) And this determination of the perfection of free decision happens insofar as, through the possession of grace and glory, it is at the end to which it is naturally ordered—the good. For free decision, although in us it is related to good and evil, it is nevertheless not for the sake of evil, but for the sake of the good. Or it should be said that, even if it were determined to numerically one thing, such as to loving God—which he cannot not do—still he does not lose freedom thereby, or the notion of praise or merit, for he stretches toward it not by any coercion but spontaneously, and thus he is the lord of his own acts.

Reply Obj. 6: Christ did not merit in in virtue of his divinity, in virtue of which he has all things as his own. Rather, he merits in virtue of his humanity, from which not all things are his own.

Reply Obj. 7: This is clear from the last reply. For we merit from the Son of God by reason of his divinity, from which part he himself did not merit.

Article 3

Whether Christ was able to merit from the instant of his conception

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.34.3; De veritate, q. 29, a. 8.) It appears that Christ was not able to merit in the instant of his conception.

Obj. 1: For no one merits except by acting. But a thing’s existence is prior to its acting. Therefore in the first instant of his conception, when Christ first had existence according to his human nature, he was not able to merit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a meritorious work occurs with deliberation, since it comes from the choice of a free decision, which follows on taking counsel. But deliberation, since it is a motion, requires time. Therefore in the first instant of conception he was not able to merit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever Christ had in the first instant of his conception, he had from another, and not from himself. But he himself was the cause of his own merit. Therefore he did not merit in the first instant of his conception.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as merit is through free decision, so too is sin. But the devil was not able to sin in the first instant of his creation. Therefore neither was Christ’s soul able to merit in the first instant of its creation. But the first instant of his conception was the first instant of the creation of his soul. Therefore in that instant he was not able to merit.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, with respect to his body, Christ as an infant was like other infants. But other infants, on account of the feebleness of their bodily organs, did not have a perfect imagination, nor a use of free decision. Therefore consequently neither did Christ, and thus it appears that he could not then merit.

On the contrary, Christ was a man in the first instant of his conception: the Lord has created a new thing on the earth: a woman protects a man (Jer 31:22). (The Latin for circumdabit virum could also be translated “encloses a man.”) But meriting belongs to a perfect man. Therefore Christ in the first instant of his conception was able to merit.

Furthermore, a soul perfected with the first and second perfection is more perfect than one perfected only with the first perfection. But no spiritual perfection was added to Christ. Therefore since an activity is a second perfection, and habit is a first perfection, whenever he had the habit of a virtue, he had its act. But he merited by the act of virtue. Therefore Christ merited in the instant of his conception.

I answer that we ought to attribute to Christ, in reference to his soul, every spiritual perfection that can be attributed to him. Whence, since a meritorious act could have perfected him in the first instant of his conception, one should say that he merited in the first instant of his conception.

For something in its first instant of existence being unable to have its action occurs only in three ways. First, because it lacks some perfection that is required for acting; for example, a puppy in the first instant of its birth cannot see, since it does not have complete organs for seeing. In another way, on account of some extrinsic impediment; for example, water generated in a certain enclosed space is impeded from being able to move with its proper motion. Third, due to the nature of an activity that is successive, and then in the first instant in which the thing exists, it begins that action, yet that action does not exist within that instant but over time. For example, it is clear that the first instant in which a fire is a fire, which is the last instant of its generation, is the first instant of its upward motion; yet its motion is not in that instant, since motion is successive. Now, it is certain that no perfection necessary for meritorious action on the side of the agent himself is lacking in Christ; further, there was nothing that could impede him; and the motion of charity, by which he was moved, was indivisible and not successive. Therefore in the first instant of his conception he was able to merit.

However, some say that in the first instant of his conception he did not merit, as regards the use of the virtues, but he had merit only in its root—namely, in the habit of charity and the other virtues because of which he was worthy of glory; but with respect to the use of the virtues he did not merit in that instant, but after that instant. And they are moved to this by the arguments introduced in the objections. But the first opinion sets me more at ease, and I respond in accordance with it to the arguments made against it.

Reply Obj. 1: Existence is prior in its nature to acting, but not necessarily prior in time.

Reply Obj. 2: Deliberation and taking counsel, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b11.) are not about the end, but about the things that are for the sake of the end, when it is not certain which things are expedient for the intended end. Now, something is merited in the very intention of the end, whence one does not need deliberation for merit, even in other men, as regards the desire for the end. And furthermore, in Christ he did not need deliberation even with regard to things that are for the end, since he was certain about them.

Reply Obj. 3: That which Christ possessed in the first instant of his conception, namely merit, he had both from another, inasmuch as grace is required, and from his very self, inasmuch as merit proceeds from a free decision. For it is not always necessary that the cause precede the effect in time, but sometimes it is enough that it precede it by its nature.

Reply Obj. 4: The will’s motion towards a good end is natural to it. Whence, in the first instant of its creation it can have a motion toward a good end, since we do not need deliberation for desiring a naturally desired end; and there can be merit in this. But sin happens because the will moves toward something that does not befit the naturally desired end. Whence this must arise from a false connection of it to the end; and therefore a connection of what has an apparent goodness to what is through itself a naturally desired good is required for sin. This is why in the first instant of creation the mind could not sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Christ [in his first instant] did not have knowledge taken from the senses, but infused knowledge; and thus, the habit of perfect knowledge was able to exist even with the weakness of the organs. And it is said further, the infirmity of his body did not overflow into his mind, just as the glory of his mind did not destroy the weakness of his body. Therefore the imperfection of his bodily organs did not destroy the use of reason in him.

Article 4

Whether Christ merited immortality for himself

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.19.3; De veritate, q. 29, a. 6; Compendium theol., ch. 231.) It appears that Christ did not merit for himself the immortality of his body.

Obj. 1: For meriting is for an outsider, one to whom the reward is owed only through the merit; for example, being adopted happens to an outsider, to whom the inheritance is owed only through an adoption. But to attain the goods of his Father, which are Christ’s own, Christ is not said to be adopted, as though he were an outsider. Therefore for the same reason neither does he merit immortality, or anything of this sort.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the reward is of the same dignity as the merit. But the good motion of Christ’s soul, by which he merited, is worth more than anything bodily. Therefore he did not merit the immortality of the body.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ did not owe a death, since he had no sin, which is what makes us owe death. Therefore since no one merits the avoidance of some evil that he is not obligated to, it appears that he did not merit immortality.

On the contrary, there is what is said in the text, (Sent. III, 18.1(50).2.) that the brilliance of his body is the reward of its humiliation. But the immortality of the body pertains to the brilliance of the body. Therefore he merited even immortality.

Furthermore, no created thing has the goods of glory without merit. But immortality pertains to glory. Therefore Christ merited it.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ did not merit his soul’s inability to suffer. For what is natural to us we do not merit. But the soul, in virtue of its own nature, is unable to suffer. Therefore it did not merit impassibility.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is present in something accidentally will not be in it if it is removed accidentally. But the soul suffers just as it also is moved, accidentally—namely, through the body. Therefore from the fact that it is separated from the body it becomes unable to suffer. But Christ did not merit the soul being separated from the body, since sin is what merits death, as is said in Romans 6. (See especially Romans 6:20–23.) Therefore he did not merit the impassibility of his soul.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the impassibility of the soul pertains to the beatitude of the soul, just as the impassibility of the body pertains to the beatitude of the body. But Christ’s soul was beatified from the beginning. Therefore he did not merit the impassibility of the soul.

On the contrary, after the Resurrection Christ’s soul was unable to suffer. But before that it was able to suffer. Therefore just as he merited the glory of the Resurrection, so too he merited the impassibility of his soul.

Furthermore, the souls of the damned are able to suffer, since they did not merit impassibility. Therefore, since Christ’s soul was not able to suffer after the Resurrection, it appears that he merited impassibility.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not merit exaltation. (Parallels: ST III.19.3; De veritate, q. 29, a. 6; Compendium theol., ch. 231.) For in human nature’s being assumed it was exalted, and the name of divinity is owed to it. But he did not merit that assumption, as was said above in Distinction 4. (Above, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, resp. 1, ad 1.) Therefore neither did he merit exaltation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the name that is above every name is the name at which every knee bends. But this name is “Jesus,” as is said in Philippians 2:9–11. Therefore, since he did not merit this name, as it was given him before his conception, it appears that he did not merit the name that is above every name.

Obj. 3: One might say that he merited with respect to his manifestation.

On the contrary, this was already manifest before. Whence before this demons confessed him, and children and prophets foretold him. Therefore he did not merit this.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a merit is ordered to a reward. But to do something for the esteem of men pertains to vane glory, which was not present in him. Therefore he did not merit as regards his manifestation before men.

On the contrary, Luke 14:11 says, he who humbles himself will be exalted. But Christ humbled himself. Therefore he merited being exalted.

Furthermore, through the things that he did, he made himself worthy of the sort of an exaltation that is his manifestation before men. Therefore he merited this exaltation for himself.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he also merited the substantial prize of the soul, namely, divine fruition. For the greater prize is for the greater merit. But Christ’s merit was greater than the merits of all the saints. Therefore also the greater was the reward that he merited. Now, nothing greater falls under merit than the fruition of God, which the saints merit. Therefore he too merited it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is more glorious to have something through one’s very self than to have all things from another. But one who merits in a certain manner has something through oneself. Therefore, since Christ had the divine fruition most gloriously, it appears that he merited it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to those who assert that the angels were created in only natural conditions, the merit and the prize were together in them. But nothing prevents Christ having merited the divine fruition except that he had it from the instant of his conception. Therefore it appears that he could merit it in the very instant of his conception, such that there was both the merit and the prize in him together.

On the contrary, no one merits insofar as he is a comprehensor. But as regards fruition, Christ was a comprehensor. Therefore he did not merit fruition.

Furthermore, from the fact that his intellect was joined to God in his person, fruition was owed to him. But he did not merit the union. Therefore neither did he merit the fruition.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, as was said, (Above, a. 2.) merit according to itself is the activity of one who receives justice, in virtue of which he makes his own what should be rendered to him. Now, nothing is given to someone who [already] possesses it in the way in which he possesses it, nor does someone make his own what is [already] his own in the way it is his own. Whence four things are required for merit, in the way theologians speak of it, in its order to things that are good simply speaking, relative to what someone is said to “merit.” The first is that it is among things pertaining to beatitude. The second is that what should be rendered, through the merit, by the mediation of justice is not [already] possessed. Third, that which someone makes owed to him through his merit is not [already] owed. Fourth, what someone is said to merit follows the merit itself, at least by the order of nature; and therefore grace, which is the principle of meriting, and other natural things that are required for merit, do not fall under merit.

Now, these four things are found in Christ’s immortality. For it is among things that pertain to the beatitude of the body. He also did not always possess it, since he assumed a mortal body at the beginning. Further, it was not owed to him by reason of his nature, although it would be owed to him by reason of his person. Last, the immortality was not required for the meriting. And on account of this he merited immortality.

Reply Obj. 1: Although immortality—and all the other goods that are within the power of the Father—were in the power of the Son with respect to the divine person, still this was not so by reason of the human nature. Whence in meriting, we make ourselves owed something that was not owed to us by our nature or our person, whereas Christ in meriting made something owed to his [human] nature that was not owed to his nature, although it was owed to his person. Nor is this like adoption, since adoption looks to a person, just as filiation does, whereas merit consists in an activity, which is difference in reference to the difference of the nature, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the act of the mind by which Christ merited was simply better than the immortality of his body, nonetheless the latter is better as regards his state, insofar as it pertain to the state of beatitude. In fact, the act of the mind, insofar as merit consists in it, pertains to the state of the wayfarer. Or it should be said that this is true as regards the substantial reward of the soul, and not as regards the others.

Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ did not need to die because of sin, still he did need to from his natural principles, as was said above. (Above, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.) And therefore immortality was not owed to the human nature in Christ. Or it should be said that the lack of fault, although it removes the merit of death, still does not give an immortality by which it is impossible to die, the sort of immortality that Christ merited. This is clear in Adam, in his first state, in whom the such an immortality was not present.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the soul is said to be “able to suffer” in two ways. In one way, according to divine justice, as it suffers in hell from the bodily fire; and this is common to the soul and to every created spirit considered only in things that are natural to it. In another way, the soul is said to be able to suffer in virtue of its nature, and this is either by accident, from the suffering of the body—as was said above, (Above, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3.) that the body’s wound in a certain manner touches the soul insofar as the latter is the form of the former—or through its own activity, whether that be common to the soul and body, such as delights and sorrows, which happen in the sensitive part, or it be proper to the soul itself, such as in delights and sorrows of the intellectual part. Now, because the soul in virtue of its nature is the body’s form, whereas it belongs to form that it be proportioned to its matter, therefore in the soul’s very nature, even when existing without the body, it is naturally apt to suffer at the suffering of the body; however, it does not actually suffer without the body relative to those sufferings that can naturally be present in it, either due to the body or with the body. Now, this aptitude is not taken away by grace, that through which its nature is reformed. For although through grace a man is reformed with respect to his personal acts, nonetheless he is reformed with respect to his nature only through glory, which destroys all the defects of his nature. A sign of this is that those reformed through grace do actually suffer a natural defect, for they generate in original sin.

Whence one must say that the habit of glory takes away from the soul this natural aptitude, through which habit the soul is perfected not only in its powers relative to personal acts, but inasmuch as it is a certain nature. Whence from the soul itself being glorified, glory overflows into the body. Also, the possession of glory excludes also the sorrow of the intellectual part, and even the possibility of sinning, through which the possibility of suffering due to divine justice exists. Whence it is certain that the soul’s inability to suffer pertains to its glory, and that Christ did not have the glory of the soul inasmuch as it is the nature of a body from the beginning of his conception, since his body was able to suffer. However, he did have a glorified soul with respect to the activities by which he enjoyed God. Therefore just as he merited the immortality of his body, so too he also merited the impassibility of his soul.

Reply Obj. 1: According to its nature the soul is impassible such that it cannot suffer without the body, with respect to “sufferings” properly so called, about which we are speaking now. Nevertheless, according to its nature it is passible—that is, capable of suffering these sufferings in the body and through the body. Whence this determination can determine its passibility either with respect to potency, and thus the proposition is false, or with respect to act, and thus it is true, since the passible is what is able to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2: Although suffering might be present in the soul accidentally, still the aptitude toward suffering together with the body is not accidental; and therefore although when separated from the body actual suffering is taken away, yet the aptitude for suffering is not taken away. Whence if it be united to the body again, it does not make the body joined to it unable to suffer; rather, in it there would be suffering incidentally, just as before—unless it has been glorified; for then if it be united to the body, it will make the body impassible.

Reply Obj. 3: The impassibility of the soul pertains to the beatitude of the soul as the nature and form of the body. And Christ’s soul did not have this beatitude from the beginning of his conception, but rather the beatitude that consists in the act of fruition.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1100b8‒10.) in happiness something is found that is essential to it—such as the virtues, which make one’s activity perfect—and also something that makes for the well-being of the happiness—such as riches, and friends, and things of this sort. Similarly, I say that there are certain things that are of the substance of beatitude—such as the dowries of the soul and body—and also something that is for the well-being of it—such as the manifestation of this beatitude to others, in which the glory also consists, since glory is luminous knowledge with praise, as the Gloss on the end of Romans says; (source at Romans 16:27 ; this definition is Augustine's in Contra Maximinum, bk. 2, ch. 13, para. 2 (PL 40:770).) and the Philosopher also says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.11, 1101b1‒9.) that it belongs to the well-being of happiness itself that the happy man lives even after death in the memories of men.

Therefore, because in Christ there should be the most complete beatitude, he was beatified not only in his very self, but, for the perfection of his beatitude, his beatitude was also shown to others. And according to this, he is said to have merited exaltation, which exaltation consists in three things: in the knowledge of the heart, in virtue of which he is said to have received the name above every name, since a name makes one know a thing; and in the reverence of his body, with respect to the bending of the knee; and in the confession of the mouth, and thus the Apostle says, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Phil 2:11).

Reply Obj. 1: Although he was exalted from the beginning of his conception, still his exaltation then was not manifest. And in Holy Scripture a thing is said to occur when it is made known.

Reply Obj. 2: That name is said to be above every name either with respect to that from which it is imposed—and in this way it is the name “Jesus” or “Christ,” since both are imposed from the union of the human and divine natures. For someone is said to be “anointed” insofar as he is united to God, and [he is named “Jesus”] insofar as he can save from sins. Or it is above every name with respect to that for the sake of which the name is imposed—and in this way the name “God” is above every name, since it is imposed on him in virtue of his divine nature. And all of these things, although there were truly in him from the beginning of his conception, nonetheless they were not so in the knowledge of men.

Reply Obj. 3: Before the Resurrection the exaltation of Christ was indeed manifested, not to all, but to a few—and to some it was not even with certitude, but through a certain conjecture, such as with the demons and some of the Jews. But after his Resurrection its heights were made known to the entire world with the certitude of faith.

Reply Obj. 4: A merit does not come to be for the sake of the reward, unless it be that toward which it is principally ordered. Now, this is what is of the substance of beatitude. Whence also, although civic honor is the reward of civic virtue, still citizens do not perform the works of virtue for the sake of that honor, but for the sake of the good of the virtue itself.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that the glory of the soul consists in the soul’s being united to God himself through vision and love. And because the posterior union presupposes the prior union, just as God being in the saints through grace presupposes that he is in all things through his essence, presence, and power, therefore for the same reason the union that is in the person, which is the last and most complete, presupposes every other union with God. Whence from the very fact that Christ’s soul was joined to God in his person, the union of fruition was owed to him, and it was not made owed to him through any activity of his. And therefore, because merit consists in an activity that makes something owed to us, Christ did not merit fruition. However, it is different for the glory of his body, since the glory of the body does not consist in union to God; whence, without it the body was able to be united to the divinity, and this was so as a dispensation, for the sake of fulfilling the work of redemption. And on account of this Christ always possessed fruition, in which consists the glory of the soul, and he did not merit it, as he merited the glory of the body.

Reply Obj. 1: The fact that Christ did not merit for himself the beatitude that is in fruition was not due to an insufficiency of his merit, but due to the perfection of the one meriting.

Reply Obj. 2: What Christ had from his very self, due to the union, he had more so than anyone might have whatever he acquires from some activity. For he had it naturally. And therefore he had the fruition even more gloriously than anyone else.

Reply Obj. 3: According to that opinion, the angels did not always have beatitude, nor again was there anything in them whence it would be owed to them. And therefore they were able to merit and receive grace at the same time, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2.) However, this is not so in Christ, who was always blessed in his soul, and to whom glory was owed from that very union.

Article 5

Whether Christ merited for himself through his Passion

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.49,6; De veritate, q. 26, a. 6, ad 4; Compendium theol., ch. 240.) It appears that Christ did not merit for himself through his Passion.

Obj. 1: For to merit is to cause something to be owed to oneself. But he who once causes something to be owed to himself, such as by paying for it, does not pay again. Therefore also he who has merited something once, cannot merit it again. But Christ from the instant of his conception merited for himself the things said. Therefore he merited nothing for himself through his Passion.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, merit causes something to be owed that was not already owed, or to be owed more so than it was already owed. But the things Christ merited were not more owed to him through the Passion than they were before, for they became sufficiently owed to him through his first merit. Therefore he merited nothing for himself through his Passion.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Passion was in Christ’s body. But merit is only in the soul. Therefore Christ merited nothing for himself through his Passion.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the principle of merit is within us, since the voluntary is that whose principle is within, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111a22–23.) But the principle of suffering is not in the one suffering, but in the agent. Therefore Christ did not merit through his Passion.

Obj. 5: Every merit consists in charity. But to endure sufferings in a praiseworthy way is not a work of charity, but of patience or fortitude. Therefore Christ did not merit through his Passion.

On the contrary, it is said in the text (Sent. III, 18.1(50).2.) that the Passion is the merit of brilliance.

Furthermore, we merit by the acts of the virtues. But Christ suffered from the greatest charity: greater love has no man than this (John 15:13). Therefore he merited through his Passion.

Furthermore, his Passion was greater than the sufferings of the other saints, as was said above. (Above,* d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, resp. 3. (sol. 3))* But the other saints merited by their sufferings. Therefore Christ too merited through his own Passion.

I answer that to merit, as was said, is to cause something to be owed to oneself. Now, this happens in three ways. In one way, when someone causes something to be owed that was not owed before, as someone by the first motion of charity merits eternal life, causing to be owed to him what before was not owed to him. In another way, by causing what before was less owed to him now to be more owed to him, which happens in one in whom charity grows. It happens a third way when he causes something that is in one way owed to him now to be owed to him in a different way, as happens with a baptized infant—to whom eternal life is owed from the possession of grace infused in baptism—when he begins to have the use of free decision, causes this to be owed to him from his own actions. In the first way, Christ merited the brilliance of his body in the first instant of his conception; this was not owed to him either from the condition of his nature considered in itself, nor did it follow of necessity from the union, as did the glory of fruition, as was said. In the second way, Christ was not able to merit, since the charity in Christ could not grow. In the third way, he did merit in all his acts after the first instant of his conception, since he, by certain acts, caused to be owed to him what before was not owed to him by other acts. Now, the act by which someone merits is one over which the agent has dominion, and which is proportioned to the wage merited. However, a man has dominion over his acts through his will, which, because charity perfects it in its order to the ultimate end, then makes the act proportioned to the end—namely, beatitude, which is properly speaking the wage for our merits. And therefore every voluntary act informed by charity is meritorious.

Therefore, because Christ endured his Passion voluntarily—for he was offered because he himself willed it (Isa 53:7) (The Vulgate differs significantly from the Hebrew here; following the latter, the RSV reads He was oppressed, and he was afflicted.)—and such a will was informed by charity, there is no doubt that he merited through his Passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Buying is principally for the sake of having the thing that is paid for, and therefore after it has been paid for once, one does not pay for it any further. But the action by which one merits is not principally for the sake of acquiring a reward, but for the sake of the good of charity. Whence a man possessing charity acts even if no repayment would result, which is also why after he has merited he would still do things, and that which was first owed to him in the one way, afterward is owed to him in another way.

Reply Obj. 2: He need not cause it to be more owed to himself, because this is according to the intensity of the charity, which is the root of meriting. Rather, he causes it to be owed to him in more ways.

Reply Obj. 3: Although suffering is in the body, still the will accepting the suffering was in the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: Suffering as suffering is not meritorious, since in this way its principle is outside. But it is meritorious insofar as it is accepted by the will. For in this way it is voluntary, and its principle is within. Now, suffering is accepted by the will in two ways: either as voluntary absolutely speaking—as it was in Christ, who voluntarily offered himself to the suffering so that he might complete the work of our redemption—or as voluntary in a mixed way, as when someone, although he wanted not to suffer, still more wills to endure the suffering that to do anything against God.

Reply Obj. 5: Although merit is in charity as in its root, nevertheless we do not merit only by charity, but also by the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity.

Article 6

Whether Christ was able to merit for us

Quaestiuncula 1

To the sixth we proceed as follow. (Parallels: ST I-II.114.6; III.19.4; 48.1; De veritate, q. 29, a. 7; Compendium theol., ch. 231.) It appears that Christ was not able to merit for us.

Obj. 1: For just as praise requires the voluntary, so too does merit. But because praise requires something voluntary in the one praised, therefore one is not praised on account of someone else’s act. Therefore likewise neither can one merit for someone else, and thus Christ merited nothing for us.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Ezekiel 18:4 says, the soul that sins shall die. Therefore for the same reason the soul that acts will be rewarded. And thus it appears that Christ was not able to merit for us.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ did not merit as God, but as a man possessing charity. But one who possesses charity merits for another only in a congruous way—which is not merit, speaking according to its essential meaning. Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, Christ as man is our head, so he exerts an influence on us. But he does this only by merit. Therefore Christ merits something for us.

Furthermore, no one attains glory without merit. But baptized infants attain glory. Therefore since they do not attain glory through their own merit, they attain it through Christ’s merit. And thus, Christ merited something for us.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not merit for us the opening of the gates. (Parallels: ST III.49.5; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 4.) For Enoch and Elijah entered paradise before Christ’s Incarnation. Therefore the gates were open before Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever merits paradise also merits the opening of the gates of paradise. But the patriarchs merited paradise, since they had charity as perfect as do we, and since they did all things for the sake of paradise. Therefore they merited the opening of the gates of paradise.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, with a sufficient cause posited, nothing else is required for its effect to come about. Therefore if Christ sufficiently merited for us the opening of the gates of paradise, it appears that it would not be necessary that we do anything for the sake of paradise—which is false. Therefore the same as the first.

On the contrary, before Christ no one entered paradise, because the holy patriarchs descended to limbo. But men entered paradise after this, as Luke 23:43 says, today you will be with me in paradise. Therefore Christ merited the opening of paradise.

Furthermore, through the sin of Adam the gates of paradise were closed, as is clear from Genesis 3:23–24. But Christ made satisfaction for the sin of Adam. Therefore he merited the opening of the gates for us.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ did not merit the opening of the gates for us only through his Passion. (Parallels: below, d. 22, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4; In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 6; ST III.39.5, ad 3; 49.5; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 4.) For his charity in the Passion was not greater than before it. Therefore if he merited through the Passion, he also merited beforehand.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in his baptism the heavens were opened over him. But his baptism preceded his Passion. Therefore he merited for us the opening of heaven before his Passion.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, this appears to have happened in his Ascension, for Micah 2:13 says, he who opens the breach will go up before them; they will break through and pass the gate, going out by it. Their king will pass on before them, the Lord at their head.

On the contrary, by making satisfaction, Christ opened the gates for us. But he made satisfaction through his Passion. Therefore he merited the opening of the gates through the Passion.

Furthermore, the closing of the gates was the decree made against us. But Christ this he set aside, nailing it to the cross (Col 2:14). Therefore through his Passion he merited for us the opening of the gates.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1005).) Christ’s flesh and soul were, as it were, the instrument of the Godhead. Whence, although the activities of God and the man were other, still the human activity had within itself the power of the divinity, just as an instrument acts by the power of its principal agent. On account of this, Damascene says that the things that were of man he did in a way that is above man. (Missing citation.) This is why even Christ’s action was meritorious; although it was a human action, still he acted in the divine power. And therefore he had a power over the entire nature, which could not be the case for any activity of a mere man, for an individual man is of less dignity than the common nature, since the good of the nation is more divine than is the good of one man. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b9–10.) And because all men are one man in their common nature, as Porphyry says, (Porphyry, Isagoge, ch. 2, para. 616.) so too Christ’s merit, which extends to the nature, could extend even to the individuals. And thereby he was able to merit for us.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ meriting for another is said in two ways. The first is such that he merits in the place of another, that is, what pertains to the other to merit; and in this way Christ did not merit for others, since it is necessary that merit proceed from the will of the one meriting, as the objection points out. But the other is such that he merits something for another under whose merit it does not fall; and in this way Christ did merit for others what they were not able to merit for themselves.

Reply Obj. 2: The members and the head pertain to the same person. This is why, since Christ was our head on account of his divinity and the fullness of his grace overflowing into others, whereas we are his members, his merit is not external to us. Rather, it redounds to us on account of the unity of the Mystical Body.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ did the things that were of man in an above human way, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that just as the closing of the gates is an obstacle prohibiting entrance to the house, so too by way of likeness the gates of paradise are said to be closed inasmuch as an obstacle prevents entrance to paradise. Now, there can be an obstacle in two ways: one, on the side of the person, which occurs through actual sin, and the other, on the side of the nature, which occurs through original sin. The first obstacle is not common to all, but only to sinners, whereas the second obstacle is common to all, and this latter obstacle could be removed only through one whose activity was capable of [affecting] the entire nature—namely, Christ. And therefore with respect to this he merited for us the opening of the gates, which through the sin of the first man were closed to the entire wounded nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Paradise is of two sorts: the heavenly, which is the very vision of God, and the earthly. Now, through the first man’s sin the gates of the earthly paradise were closed as a sign that the gates of the heavenly paradise were closed to human nature. Therefore Enoch and Elijah, although they entered the earthly paradise before the Passion, yet they did not enter the heavenly paradise, the gates of which we are speaking of here.

Reply Obj. 2: The patriarchs merited entrance to paradise as regards what belongs to their person, as do we; yet they were not able to merit that the impediment be removed, which was on the side of their nature. And therefore the gates always remained closed to them.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the impediment that was on the side of our nature was removed by Christ, yet paradise must be caused to be owed to a man through a meritorious act as regards what belongs to his person. And therefore a man must act so that he might merit entrance into paradise.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the obstacle that closed the gates of paradise was, as was said, the sin infecting the entire nature. And because sin is destroyed through making satisfaction, neither was satisfaction capable of occurring congruently other than through Christ’s Passion, as will be explained below. (In III Sent., d. 19.) Therefore the gates were opened to us only through his Passion, and not through the other things that he did beforehand. Still, through those other things he did before he did merit for us our conversion to him, inasmuch as he merited his being made manifest to us, and through this we profit, but he does not.

Reply Obj. 1: The merit of satisfaction does not consist in charity alone, but also requires Christ’s Passion, as will be explained below. (Below,* d. 19, a. 1.)* However, it was necessary that the gates be opened for us through his satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 2: In his baptism the heavens have been opened because baptism is that whereby we are made participants in Christ’s Passion, and buried with him . . . into death (Rom 6:4). Whence baptism opens the gates only on the supposition of the Passion.

Reply Obj. 3: The Ascension did not open the gates as regards what is the essential paradise—namely, the vision of God, since before the Ascension the saints led from limbo saw God—but as regards the place befitting those who are blessed.

Exposition of the text

So that, with the removal of the flaming sword. (Sent. III, 18.1(50).1.) This was placed in the earthly paradise, and signified the impediment that prevented the entrance into the heavenly paradise.

But the soul was endowed with impassibility either soon after separation from the flesh. (Sent. III, 17.1(50).5.) This is the more probable view, because even the other souls of the saints, which had nothing to be purged, became impassible soon after separation from the body.

The form in which he was crucified was the form in which he was exalted. (Sent. III, 18.3(52).2, quoting Augustine, Contra Maximinum, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 87A:503; PL 42:686).) On the contrary, his exaltation takes him all the way to equality with the Father, which does not belong to him according to his human nature, in which he was crucified. It should be said that his exaltation can be understood in two ways: either with regard to our knowledge, and in this way it is owed to the person by reason of both natures, or with regard to the reality. And in this latter way, since exaltation imports two things, a terminus toward-which and the motion toward it, the terminus belongs to the person insofar as he is said to be exalted to equality with the Father, and to the assumed nature insofar as it is said to be exalted to the more principal goods of the Father—whereas the motion belongs to the nature alone. And therefore the exaltation belongs to the person by reason of the nature.

Among men, none was found through whom this might be fulfilled. (Sent. III, 18.5(54).2) For the merit of one mere man was not capable of [affecting] the entire nature.

Each one’s virtue and humility was scarcely sufficient for himself. (Sent. III, 18.5(54).2.) For our just acts have imperfection mixed into them, and therefore they scarcely avail for personal merit, and in no way are they enough for meriting on behalf of the entire nature.

Much more able was Christ’s humility . . . to open the entrance . . . by the fulfillment of God’s decree. (Sent. III, 18.5(54).2; reading “decree” for “degree.”) By “decree” is meant the precept of God that Adam transgressed, which Christ fulfilled by his obedience. Or the “decree” is meant as the sentence of death that was borne in Adam, and this decree too Christ fulfilled when he endured death. However, the “chirograph” (Sent. III, 18.5(54).2, referring to Colossians 2:14.) indicates the memory of the violation of Adam, or his guilt, which Christ destroyed by making satisfaction for us.

So great was our sin, that we could not be saved, unless the only-begotten Son of God should die for us. (Sent. III, 18.5(54).3, quoting Ambrosiaster (rather, Alcuin), In Hebraeos 9:15.) Concerning this, see below, Distinction 20.