D. 19 - Christ's merit as ordered to taking away evil

Division of the text

After the Master has considered Christ’s merit insofar as it is ordered to attaining the good for himself and for us, here he considers his merit insofar as it is ordered to removing the evil that is in us. For in himself he is neither subject to any fault nor does he owe any punishment.

Now, this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows how we are freed from evils through Christ’s Passion.

In the second, he manifests the cause of Christ’s Passion, at but if it is asked. (Sent. III, 20.1(62).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

First, he shows how we are freed from evil through the merit of Christ’s Passion;

second, he considers things that are said of Christ by reason of this liberation, at and so he is truly called the Redeemer of the world. (Sent. III, 19.5(59).1.)

The first of these is divided into two.

First, he shows how through Christ’s Passion we are freed from the evil of fault, and from the power of who he inclines us to fault, namely, the power of the demon;

second, he shows how through the Passion we are freed from the evil of punishment, at he redeemed us . . . from punishment. (Sent. III, 19.2(56).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things:

first, he asserts his intention;

second, he follows through with it, at but how are we released from our sins by his death? (Sent. III, 19.1(55).2.)

As regards the latter, he does two things:

first, he treats the way in which we are freed from sin through Christ’s Passion and death;

second, he treats how we are freed from the power of the devil, at we are so freed from the devil. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).3.)

Regarding the latter, he does three things:

first, he shows in what respect we are freed from the power of the devil;

second, he explains the manner of the liberation, at hence Augustine, conveying the cause and manner of our redemption, says; (Sent. III, 19.1(55).5.)

third, he explains that this could only come to pass through God and a man, at and so he was made a mortal man. (Sent. III, 19.2(56).1.)

And he redeemed us . . . from punishment. (Sent. III, 19.2(56).1.) Here he shows how through Christ’s Passion we were freed from the penalty, as regards which he does two things:

first, he shows from what penalty he freed us;

second, he shows the manner of this liberation, at also, he is said to have borne 'our sins,' that is, the punishment of our sins, 'in his body on the cross.' (Sent. III, 19.4(58).1, quoting 1 Cor 15:26.)

And so he is truly is called Redeemer. (Sent. III, 19.5(59).1; reading redemptor for mediator.) Here he considers things said of Christ by reason of the liberation spoken of. And as regards the first, he does two things:

first, he shows why he is called “Redeemer”;

second, why he is called “mediator,” at he alone is called mediator. (Sent. III, 19.6(60).1.)

As regards the latter he does three things.

First, he manifests the reason why he is called “mediator”;

second, he shows that he alone is the mediator, not the Father or the Holy Spirit, at but since it is not the Son alone, but also the Father and the Holy Spirit, who takes away sins . . . why is the Son alone called mediator? (Sent. III, 19.6(60).4.)

third, he manifests in virtue of which nature he is the mediator, at and so he is called mediator according to his humanity. (Sent. III, 19.7(61).1.)

Question 1

Whether man is freed from evils through Christ’s Passion

Here five things are asked:

first, whether through Christ’s Passion we are freed from sin;

second, whether through him we are freed from the power of the devil;

third, whether through him we are freed from the punishment;

fourth, whether Christ should be called “Redeemer” by reason of that liberation;

fifth, whether he is mediator for the same reason.

Article 1

Whether through Christ’s Passion we are freed from sin

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first let us proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, expos. text; ST III.49.1; 69.1, ad 2 and ad 3; Compendium theol., ch. 239; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 4.) It appears that we are not freed from sin through Christ’s Passion.

Obj. 1: For Christ suffered not in virtue of his divine nature, but in virtue of his human. But to wipe out sin is something that belongs to God alone, as is clear from Isaiah 43:25, because it is of him alone to give the grace through which sins are wiped out. Therefore through Christ’s suffering our sins could not be wiped out.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the bodily cannot act on the spiritual. But Christ’s Passion was something bodily. Therefore it could not act on our souls to wipe out sins.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, liberation from sin is said to be justification. But this is attributed to the Resurrection: who was . . . raised for our justification (Rom 4:25). Therefore the liberation from sin should not be attributed to his Passion, but rather to his Resurrection.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as Christ’s Passion excited charity within us, so do God’s other blessings as well, since he offers us both temporal and spiritual goods. Likewise also the examples of the saints excite us to charity. And yet we are not said to be freed from sin through all of God’s blessings. Therefore neither ought we be said to be freed from sin through the Passion because it excites us to charity, as the Master teaches. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).2.)

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as we have faith about the Passion, so too do we have faith about the creation of the world, and yet it is not said that we are cleansed from sin through the goods of creation, even though faith purifies hearts, as is said in Acts 15:9. Therefore it appears that neither also for that reason should it be said that we are freed from sins through the Passion, as the Master says. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).1.)

On the contrary, he has freed us from our sins by his blood (Rev 1:5). Now, he poured out his blood in the Passion. Therefore we have been freed from sins through the Passion.

Furthermore, a sign corresponds to what it signifies. But the rite of the Old Law was a sign and figure of Christ. Therefore, since in the Old Law forgiveness did not happen without the shedding of blood, as is said in Hebrews 9:22, neither does the forgiveness of sins happen except through the shedding of Christ’s blood.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that not all sins are wiped out through Christ’s death. For no one is damned except on account of sin. But many are damned after Christ’s Passion. Therefore not all fault was wiped out.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is wiped out once cannot be wiped out again. But the sins of the patriarchs were wiped out, both with respect to actual sins, through repentance, and with respect to original sin, through circumcision. Therefore not all sins of the human race were wiped out through Christ’s Passion.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a sin cannot be wiped out before it occurs, since then it would never occur. But many sins have been committed since Christ’s Passion. Therefore not all sins were wiped out by it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, penance and baptism and the other good works were shown to us for the forgiveness of sins. Now, this would not be so if all sins would be wiped out through Christ’s death. Therefore it appears that not all were wiped out [by it].

Obj. 5: Furthermore, when things are equal, the one cannot destroy the other. But Christ’s Passion was as good, on the side of the one suffering, as his murder was evil, on the side of those murdering him; for they murdered God, who was the infinite good. Therefore it appears that that sin could not be expiated through Christ’s death.

On the contrary, you . . . God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses (Col 2:13). But to forgive trespasses is to remit sins. Therefore all sins have been forgiven through Christ.

Furthermore, Christ’s Passion in and of itself is ordered to wiping out all sin equally. Therefore if it did not wipe out certain sins, it wiped out no sins—which is absurd.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that “wiping out sin” is said in two ways: in one way formally, just as whiteness is said to wipe out blackness through the fact that it arrives in the subject—and in this sense grace does wipe out sin—and in another way, it is said efficiently, and this latter happens in three ways, according to the three kinds of efficient cause.

For a cause is called “efficient” in one way if it perfects the effect, and this is the principal agent bringing forth the form. And this way God alone wipes out sin, since he alone infuses grace.

In another way a cause is called “efficient” if it disposes the matter to receiving the form. And in this way he is said to wipe out sin who merits the wiping out of sin, for from merit one is made worthy, as disposed matter, for the receiving of grace, through which sins are wiped out. Now, this happens in two ways: either sufficiently or insufficiently. Matter is sufficiently disposed when the necessity for the form comes about; and likewise, through merit someone is sufficiently disposed to something when that thing becomes owed to him, and this is condign merit. And in this way no one man can merit grace or the wiping out of sin for himself or for another—not for himself, because before he has grace he is not in a state of meriting, as is clear from things said already, and not for others, because one man’s action cannot sufficiently pass to another except inasmuch as he shares something commonly with him. This can be either through a communion in the nature, or through a union of affect, but the first union is essential, whereas the latter is accidental. Now, a mere man has no power over his nature sinc, as was said above, (Above,* d. 18, q. 2, a. 6, resp. 1.)* he is lower than the nature, and therefore his action cannot pass into another man insofar as he is joined to him in nature, but only with respect to the union of affect, which is an accidental union. And on account of this he cannot sufficiently merit for another, but only out of a congruence.

However, Christ alone can merit for others sufficiently, since he has power over the nature, inasmuch as he is God and his charity is in a certain way infinite, as is also his grace, as was said. (Above,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 2.)* Now, in this he merited for the entire nature: in that he who was without sin released the debt of the nature, namely death, that it owed for sin. Therefore in this way he was bound to destroy death, not for himself, but rather to destroy it for the nature. Whence, by making satisfaction for the entire nature, he sufficiently merited the remission of sins for the others, who had sins.

In the third way an instrumental agent is called “efficient,” and in this way the sacraments wipe out sins, since they are instruments of the saving divine mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: The things that were of man Christ did in a way that was above man, insofar as his action had power from the divine consort, as was said above. And therefore, although his Passion occurred insofar as he is a man, still he wiped out sin through the Passion, just as he cleansed the leper through bodily contact.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the Passion occurred in his body, nevertheless his accepting the Passion occurred in his spirit, and therefore through the Passion he merited the cleansing of our spirits.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ is of one nature with us, which is why his action on us is in a certain way univocal—that is, one having a likeness with its effect. However, although sins are wiped out in justification, still “justification” names that change from fault to grace according to the terminus-at-which [it ends], whereas the “wiping out” of sin names it according to the terminus-from-which [it begins]. And therefore the wiping out of sin is attributed to his death, which life capable of suffering, like a sinful life in its punishment, death removed from Christ. But the justification is attributed to his Resurrection, through which the new life is begun in Christ. And this is why the Apostle says that he was put to death for our trespasses and raised for our justification (Rom 4:25).

Reply Obj. 4: Christ is said to be our “head” inasmuch as he influences us through his merit, as was said above. (Above, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1.) Now, influence is not received from the head into members that are divided from it, but in ones joined to it, inasmuch as the head is from itself sufficient to influence them. Whence, although Christ’s merit is sufficient for wiping out sins, still things that join one to the head are required for that wiping out to be effective—and these are faith and charity. And therefore the Master designates the faith in the Passion and charity as the causes of the efficacy of the wiping out of fault, yet he designates the cause of the sufficiency when he says that Christ’s death is the true sacrifice through which sins are wiped out. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).3.) Whence although charity is excited by other divine blessings and the examples of the saints, still it does not join [us to the head] by a merit sufficient for the wiping out of sin, inasmuch as it is excited by those things, but [only] inasmuch as it is excited by Christ’s Passion.

Reply Obj. 5: One should say something similar to the fifth, regarding faith.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that two things are required for something to be able to induce an effect in another: one on the side of the agent—namely, that it have a power sufficient to induce that effect—the other on the side of the recipient—namely, such that it is disposed toward receiving the action. Now, on the side of Christ himself, there is the sufficiency for wiping out all our sin, due to two things: due to the action in which the merit consists, which acts in the divine power, insofar as it is the action of God and man, as was said, and from this it has an infinite efficacy in meriting; and again, from the fact that his Passion takes it away—namely, through his soul united to God, which had an infinite strength from the fact that it was united to God; and from this there is an infinite efficacy in making satisfaction. However, on our side it is required that we prepare for receiving the effect of Christ’s merit in us through the faith of our understanding and the charity of our affect, and through the imitation of work—which does not happen in all men. And therefore with respect to the sufficiency of the making satisfaction and merit, all sins have been wiped away through Christ’s Passion, but not with respect to its efficiency.

Reply Obj. 1: In those who are damned there is a disposition opposed to receiving the effect of Christ’s merit. This is why it happens that their sins are not wiped away, not because of any insufficiency of the merit of Christ’s Passion.

Reply Obj. 2: Even in the saints who were before the Incarnation Christ’s Passion had an effect, insofar as they had faith in his Passion, through which they were justified. Now, because the Passion did not yet exist in the nature of things, but [only] in their faith inasmuch as in their personal action they believed in the Christ, therefore that justification by which they were justified through faith in the Christ’s Passion extended only to the removal of the personal impediment, but not to the removal of the impediment of the nature. And on account of this, they themselves were cleansed from sin, but they did not enter the gates of paradise, since the impediment of our nature had not yet been removed.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion, as regards its sufficiency, is able to wipe out sins even before they occur; but the efficiency of that wiping out is only after someone turns away from a sin committed, just as medicine sufficient for healing is sometimes prepared before someone becomes ill, but he is actually healed by it only after he has become ill.

Reply Obj. 4: Baptism, penance, and the other sacraments are needed to wipe out sins as things acting instrumentally for the wiping out of the fault. Whence they act in the power of the Lord’s Passion, and they in a certain way communicate the very power of the Passion to us.

Reply Obj. 5: Although he who was murdered was God, still his murderers did not know him to be God, since if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8). Whence, their sin is diminished by their ignorance, although it is not wholly excused. And although their sin and Christ’s merit might also have equality in a certain respect—namely, with respect to the object of the act, since the bodily life that Christ lovingly gave they wickedly extinguished—nonetheless, they do not have any equality with respect to the motive. For much greater was the charity on Christ’s side, laying down his soul, than was the wickedness on the side of those who wickedly wrenched out that soul; and further, good is more efficacious than is evil, which acts only by the power of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).)

Article 2

Whether through Christ’s Passion we are freed from the devil

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.48.4; 49.2; Super Heb. 2, lect. 4.) It appears that through Christ’s Passion we are not freed from the devil.

Obj. 1: For the freedom of man consists in the fact that he cannot be forced. But just as now a free decision cannot be forced by the devil, so too neither could it be before Christ’s Passion. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not free us from the power of the demon.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the devil only had power over the things of Job himself and his flesh because he received it from God. But even now by power received from God he can afflict men in their things and in their persons. Therefore we are in no way more free of his power now than before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, before Christ’s Passion the demon did not harm men otherwise than by tempting them with regard to the soul, and by vexing them with regard to their bodies. But he does this even today. So in no respect has his power been diminished.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, those are properly speaking restrained under the servitude of the devil who pay him the service of latria. But even to this day there are many idolaters. Therefore the human race has not been freed from the servitude of the devil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Apostle says that in the last days there will come times of stress. For men will be lovers of self (2 Tim 3:1–2), and also at that time the Anti-Christ will be more powerful than he has ever been. Therefore it appears that the power of the demon has not been extinguished through Christ’s Passion.

On the contrary, referring to his Passion, the Lord said, now shall the ruler of this world be cast out (John 12:31). Therefore through Christ’s Passion he lost his chief dominion.

Furthermore, it belongs to the victor to expel one’s adversary from the power of a dominion. But through his Passion Christ was the victor: the lion of the tribe of Judah . . . has conquered (Rev 5:5). Therefore he removed that power from the demons.

Furthermore, the devil dominates man through sin. But Christ freed men from sin through his Passion. Therefore also he freed men from the power of the demon.

I answer that the power of the demon consists in two things: namely in fighting and in holding onto the conquered. Now, one has not yet been made a slave if he fights, but he is when he is conquered, as is clear from 2 Peter 2:19. However, the devil defeated the entire human race in our first parents, and dominated them, when he led them away according their own wish, such that no one would enter paradise; and he defeated each one individually when he inclined him to sin, since every one who commits sin is a slave to sin (John 8:34).

Therefore the devil’s power by which he holds onto those he has conquered Christ wholly removed through his Passion, with respect to sufficiency, and with respect to efficiency only in those who receive the power of the Passion through faith, charity, and the sacraments. And through this, the dominion of the devil is said to have been emptied. But the power by which he fights us [Christ] did not wholly empty; rather, he weakened it when he conquered the enemy himself, and offers men many helps to resist him, such as the sacraments, more abundant grace, and other things of this sort.

Reply Obj. 1: Although before Christ’s Passion [the devil] was not able to coerce one’s free decision, just as is the case now, still he was more able to incline it, inasmuch as man was weaker in resisting him.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that he afflicts men in their things and persons is either because it is merited by their faults or to test the just and give them the practice of patience. It is not because of any insufficiency of Christ’s Passion.

Reply Obj. 3: Although he tempts us now as he did before, yet he does not so easily overcome us, inasmuch as man now has many remedies.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that idolaters still remain under the servitude of the demon happens because the helps that are due to Christ’s Passion they neglect to accept.

Reply Obj. 5: The multitude of evildoers who will be in the last days will not arise because the power of Christ’s Passion will diminish, but because the armor of God with which they were armored through Christ’s Passion they will reject or despise; for most men’s love will grow cold (Matt 24:12); and therefore it is not a wonder if they be conquered.

Article 3

Whether through Christ’s Passion we are freed from eternal punishment

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.48.6.ad 3; 49.3; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 4.) It appears that through Christ’s Passion we have not been freed from the eternal penalty.

Obj. 1: For the eternal punishment is the punishment of hell. But in hell there is no redemption. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not liberate us from eternal punishment.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if Christ had not suffered, no one would have gone to hell unless he had sinned mortally. But even now, with Christ having suffered, only those sinning mortally go to hell. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not free us from the eternal penalty.

Obj. 3: A penalty that can be finished was never eternal. But the penalty from which Christ freed men is finite. Therefore he did not free us from the eternal penalty.

On the contrary, sin is the cause of eternal death. But Christ freed us from sin. Therefore also from the eternal penalty.

Furthermore, Zachariah 9:11 says, as for you also, because of the blood of my covenant with you, I will set your captives free from the waterless pit.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not free us from temporal punishment. For a temporal penalty is still enjoined on penitents for their sins. Therefore we have not been freed from it by Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps (1 Pet 2:21). However, this happens only by suffering. Therefore Christ through his Passion has bound us to suffering temporal punishment rather than freed us from it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, through the resurrection of the dead we are freed from every temporal punishment. But even if Christ had not suffered, the dead would have risen, since the resurrection of the dead is an article of the faith. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not free us from temporal punishment.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, when a sufficient cause is present, its effect is present. But for those who receive the power of Christ’s Passion within themselves in every way there still remains a temporal punishment. Therefore Christ’s Passion does not free one from temporal punishment.

On the contrary, temporal punishment is forgiven through the keys of the Church. But the keys of the Church have their power from Christ’s Passion. Therefore temporal punishment is taken away by Christ’s Passion.

Furthermore, God does not punish twice for the very same thing (Nah 1:9). But God placed on Christ the iniquities of all of us when he bore our sorrows (Isa 53:4). Therefore he freed us from temporal punishment through his Passion.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that eternal punishment is said by way of opposition to eternal life; whence the punishment through which eternal life is absent is called the “eternal punishment.” Now, a man can give up eternal life in two ways: through the sin of the nature—namely, original sin, the penalty of which is the lack of the divine vision—and through actual personal, that is, mortal sin. Therefore all men incur the eternal punishment insofar as it follows from original sin, yet some do so only according to the debt of punishment, such as those who still live in the flesh, but some do so according to the experience of that punishment, such as those who have already died. Likewise also not all incur the eternal punishment that is owed to actual sin, but some do so either with respect only to the debt of punishment, such as those in a state of mortal sin, or with respect to experience, such as the damned.

Therefore Christ through his Passion absolved us in two ways from the eternal punishment that is owed to original sin, which all contract: namely, by removing the guilt for those who were made participants in his redemption and yet lived, and by removing the punishment for those who had already died—and from all men, as regards its sufficiency, but as regards its efficacy, only from those in whom none was found. But he absolved us from the punishment owed to actual mortal sin in two ways: in one way, by offering aid to prevent one from incurring guilt, and in another way, by also offering the medicine by which the guilt could be removed from those who within themselves receive the power of his Passion. But it cannot be that someone might be freed from a punishment that he has already received, because he is not in the state of the wayfarer, such that he could receive grace and charity, through which the strength of Christ’s Passion is communicated to men.

Reply Obj. 1: “Eternal punishment” does not name only the punishment of hell, in which they are damned, [and] from which there can be no redemption since they have neither grace nor are they capable of grace, such that Christ’s Passion could be joined to them. Rather, “eternal punishment” also names the punishment of limbo, wherein were the holy patriarchs, [and] from which there can be a redemption, on account of the grace and charity that was in those saints, through which Christ’s Passion was joined to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Although those who sin mortally after Christ’s Passion go to hell, nevertheless Christ’s Passion was able to preserve them from sin, and even to heal the wound of sin within them. And therefore in and of himself, he frees from the punishment of hell.

Reply Obj. 3: The punishment of hell is called “eternal” both because in the one punished there is no power for freeing himself from that punishment, and because in him there is no disposition such that a liberating power could have any effect in him. And therefore in no way can it be ended. But the penalty of limbo was eternal inasmuch as the power for liberation fell short in the one so punished. Whence it would have endured forever unless his liberation were accomplished—even though there was the disposition for receiving the effect of the liberator, and therefore it was capable of being ended. But the punishment of purgatory is eternal in neither way, since by the power of grace, which one who is being punished possesses, that punishment purifies and it is ended when the purification is complete.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a punishment is called “temporal” through which some temporal good is taken away, since a temporal good is not naturally apt to remain always. Now, this temporal punishment in man is of two sorts. For some things are found universally in the entirety of human nature—such as the necessity of dying, the ability to suffer, the disobedience of the flesh against the spirit, and the like; and this punishment is owed to human nature due to original sin. But nevertheless such things follow from the principles of the nature if the grace of innocence has been taken away. Therefore Christ—through his own punishment of suffering—removed these punishment from all men sufficiently, although not from all men efficaciously, namely, those who are not partakers of his Passion. Nevertheless, neither was this such that they are removed from all men right away after the Passion, or such that they were removed from those who receive the sacraments of his Passion immediately after receiving the sacrament. Rather, in the end of the world they will be removed from all the saints at once, because such punishments are owed to the nature, in which all men are one; whence at that time not only the nature of men but that of the entire world will be restored through the resurrection. For the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God (Rom 8:21). However, there are other punishments that are inflicted on certain men specifically, and these punishments can be related to them in two ways.

In one way, as punishing a fault, insofar as fault makes one owe this penalty; and in this way Christ carried off all such penalties with his death, as regards sufficiency, by removing their cause. But with respect to someone being freed from these penalties with respect to efficacy, it is necessary that he become a partaker of Christ’s Passion. And this happens in two ways. First, through the sacrament of the Passion—namely, baptism, in which we are buried with Christ in his death, as is said in Rom 6:4, wherein the divine power, which knows no weakness, works salvation; and therefore every such penalty is destroyed in baptism. Second, someone becomes a partaker in Christ through a real conformity to him—namely, inasmuch as we suffer with the suffering Christ, which occurs through penance.

And because this conformation occurs through our activity, therefore it might be imperfect or perfect. When the conformation is perfect in proportion to the debt of the fault, then the penalty is wholly destroyed, whether this is only in the contrition, or is even in the other parts of penitence. However, when the conformation is not perfect, then there still remains a binding to a certain penalty, either here or in purgatory. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that there be a conformation to Christ’s Passion in an experience of a punishment as great as what someone is bound to because of the fault. For the suffering of the head overflows to its members, and this is more so the more one is joined to him through charity; this is why the amount of punishment owed is diminished from the strength of Christ’s Passion. And in this respect he is said to remove these punishments insofar as he diminishes them. In another way, the stated punishments are related to those on whom they are inflicted as medicine, as is said in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b17.)—either to himself, inasmuch as they preserve him from fault, that is, they move him toward virtue, or for others, inasmuch as he is an example to others, so that he might make satisfaction for the others in some way. And in this latter way, through Christ’s Passion temporal punishment is neither totally removed nor diminished, but rather is augmented when charity grows, with respect to the present state in which we are both able to sin and to profit ourselves and others. But in the future state, when there will be an end of our path, the punishment will be wholly taken away through the power of Christ’s Passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Temporal punishment is enjoined on one either to make satisfaction, such that someone might be conformed through an imitation of Christ’s Passion, whence where the conformity is through the sacrament of baptism, no punishment that makes satisfaction is enjoined, or else it is even enjoined as preservative and beneficial medicine, and not as something owed.

Reply Obj. 2: This is clear from the reply to objection 1.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the causality of justification is attributed to the Resurrection as regards the terminus for which [it occurs], but to the Passion as regards the terminus from which [it occurs], so too the causality of the glorification is attributed to the Resurrection as regards the glory that is given, but to the Passion as regards the punishments that are taken away.

Reply Obj. 4: In causes that act from the ordination of wisdom it is not necessary that, when the cause is present, the effect is right away present. But rather, the effect is present when the order of wisdom requires it. And in this way Christ’s Passion acts.

Article 4

Whether Christ should be called “Redeemer” by reason of the aforesaid liberation

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.48.4; 48.6.ad 3; Super Rom. 3, lect. 3.) It appears that by reason of this liberation Christ should not be called “Redeemer.”

Obj. 1: For “redemption” signifies repeated buying. But Christ bought us at no another time. Therefore neither should he be said to redeem us from the fact that he freed us.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one one buys those who are his own, except perhaps by paying a price to him who unjustly held them prisoner. But the devil unjustly held us prisoner, but Christ did not pay him the price of his blood. Therefore in no way did he redeem us.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one need not buy something that is one’s own from him who steals it; rather, he should take it back violently, if he has the ability to do so. But the ability to free us from the power of the devil was not lacking in Christ. Therefore he did not free us by way of buying.

On the contrary, it is said of Christ that by thy blood didst ransom men for God (Rev 5:9). Therefore he is the Redeemer.

Furthermore, wherever there is some exchange there appears to be a buying. But in Christ’s Passion there was a certain exchange, since he received death and bestowed life. Therefore there was buying.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that not only the Son should be called “redeemer.” (Parallels: ST III.48.5.) For to be a redeemer belongs to him who pays the price. But God the Father gave the Son to us as the price of redemption: God sent forth his Son, . . . born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law (Gal 4:4–5). Therefore God the Father redeems us.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, redeeming from the enemy belongs to him to whom it also belongs to conquer the enemy. But Christ conquers the enemy who held us prisoner through the power that he has together with the Father. Therefore the Father [also] redeems us.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every name signifying an effect in something created is common to the entire Trinity. But “redeemer” is such a name. Therefore again.

On the contrary, we have been redeemed through Christ’s Passion: you were ransomed . . . with the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without blemish or spot (1 Pet 1:18–19). But only the Son suffered. Therefore only the Son redeemed us.

Furthermore, he became incarnate so that he might redeem us. Now, only the Son became incarnate. Therefore he is the Redeemer.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that through the sin of the first parents the entire human race was alienated from God, as is said in Ephesians 2:12—not indeed from the power of God, but from the vision of God’s face, to which both sons and members of the household are admitted. And further, we came into the power of the usurping devil, to whom man by his own consent subjected himself, to the degree that he could—although he could not do it by right, because he was not his own, but belonged to another. And therefore through his own Passion Christ did two things. For he freed us from the power of the enemy by conquering him through things contrary to the things by which the enemy conquered man—namely, humility, obedience, and the bitterness of punishment, which are opposed to the delight of the forbidden food. And further, by making satisfaction for the fault, he joined us to God and made us members of the household of God, and even sons. Whence such liberation has two parts of the account of buying: for he is said to have redeemed us inasmuch as he rescued us from the power of the devil, just as when a kingdom has been occupied by an enemy, the king redeems it through the labor of battle; and he is also said to have redeemed us inasmuch as he pleased God on our behalf, as paying on our behalf the price of his satisfaction, so that we might be freed from punishment and from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The repetition that is implied by the preposition [“re-“ in “redemptio”] does not refer to the act of buying, as though we will be bought again, but to the terminus of the act, since we were at another time in a state of innocence. For to buy is to make something one’s own. Or it should be said that it is called “re-demption” [buying back] in reference to that selling by which we sold ourselves to the devil, through the consent of sin, with respect to which selling this is a second buying.

Reply Obj. 2: The price of his blood was not paid to the devil; rather, he offered it to God, so that he might make satisfaction for us. Moreover, through the victory of his Passion he seized us from the devil, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the devil took us unjustly, nonetheless we justly came into his power because we were conquered by him. And therefore it was also necessary that he himself be conquered, through things contrary to the things by which he conquered us; for he did not conquer us violently, but did it by inducing us to sin by fraud.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the effect of redemption can be attributed to both a proximate cause and to a remote cause. If it is attributed to the proximate cause, in this way Christ redeems us through what he did in and endured in his human nature, by which also he made satisfaction to the Father for all men, and by resisting the enemy’s temptations, conquered him. However, if it is referred to the first and remote cause, in this way it is attributed to the entire Trinity, inasmuch as the entire Trinity accepted our redemption and gave the Son to us as the redeemer, insofar as the Passion, through the power of the divinity, had the power to make satisfaction for the entire human race. But because he is properly said to “buy” who pays the price of the purchase more than he who sends the one who does the buying, therefore properly speaking only Christ is called the “Redeemer,” even though the entire Trinity can also be called the “redeemer.”

Reply Obj. 1–3, On the contrary: And thereby, the solution to each part is clear.

Article 5

Whether Christ reconciled us to God

Quaestiuncula 1

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel: Super 1 Tim. 2, lect. 1.) It appears that Christ did not reconcile us to God, which is the office of a mediator.

Obj. 1: For one does not become reconciled to one who already loves him, but to one who hates him. But God the Father loved us, for he loves all things that are and he hates nothing that he has made, according to Wisdom 11:24. Therefore Christ did not reconcile us to him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son (John 3:16). Therefore the Father’s love is more the cause of the Passion than the effect of it, so it appears that we were not reconciled to God through Christ’s death.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in Matthew 22 (See also Matt 21.) it says that the human king whose son the vine cultivators murdered, when he arrives, executes those murderers—and God the Father is being signified by that man whose son was murdered. Therefore through Christ’s death [God’s] enemies increase rather than decrease.

On the contrary, while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son (Rom 5:10).

Furthermore, we are reconciled to God through making satisfaction. But Christ made satisfaction for us through his Passion. Therefore he reconciled us to God.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he is not the mediator through his human nature. (Parallels: ST III.26.2; De veritate, q. 29, a. 5, ad 5; Super 1 Tim. 2, lect. 1.) For an extreme is not the same as the middle. But human nature is an extreme of this reconciliation that occurs between man and God. Therefore insofar as he is a man Christ is not a mediator.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a middle is composed from its extremes. But the only composite of human and divine natures in Christ is the person. Therefore he is the mediator not by reason of the human nature, but by reason of the composite person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, he is our mediator insofar as he joined us to God. But he was able to join us to God only insofar as he is God. Therefore he is the mediator insofar as he is God.

On the contrary, a mediator is not one with those between whom he mediates. But Christ, insofar as he is God, is one with the Father, according to John 11. (See John 10:30.) Therefore he is not the mediator insofar as he is God.

Furthermore, he is a mediator insofar as he is the redeemer. But he redeems us in virtue of his human nature. Therefore he is also the mediator in virtue of this.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it does not belong to Christ alone to be the mediator. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 2; ST III.26.1; Super Gal. 3, lect. 7; Super 1 Tim. 2, lect. 1.) For he who makes peace between God and man is a mediator. Now, this is the Holy Spirit, who is the love by which God loves us, and in whom we love God, in virtue of the gift of charity, in which he is given to us. Therefore it appears that the Holy Spirit should be called a “mediator.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a middle is what fits with its extremes. But the demons fit with God in that they are immortal, but with us in that they are wretched. Therefore the demons are also mediators, not only Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the blessed angels fit both with us and with God, with God insofar as they are immortal and blessed, and with us insofar as they are created. Therefore they too are mediators.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Dionysius shows (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, paras. 2–3 (PG 3:179).) that the divine illuminations are passed on to us by the mediation of angels. Therefore they are mediators.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a priest is a middle between God and the people, as are other saints insofar as they intercede for sinners. Therefore not only Christ is a mediator.

On the contrary, the office of a mediator is to reconcile the discordant. But only Christ resolves the enmity that was between us and God, according to Colossians 1:20–21. Therefore he alone is the mediator.

Furthermore, one is called our mediator from the fact that he has made satisfaction on our behalf. But Christ alone made satisfaction for human nature. Therefore he alone is the mediator.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that God’s love for us is indicated by its effect. For because he in and of himself is related equally to all men, he is said to love certain ones insofar as he makes them partakers of his own goodness. Now, the ultimate and most complete participation of his goodness consists in the vision of his very essence, in virtue of which we live in society with him as his friends, since beatitude consists in that sweetness. Whence he is said to love simply speaking those whom he admits to this vision, either according to reality, or according to its cause, as is clear in those to whom he has given the Holy Spirit as a pledge of that vision.

Therefore man, through sin, was removed from this participation in divine goodness—that is, from the vision of his very essence—and in virtue of this man was said to have been deprived of God’s love. And therefore inasmuch as Christ, making satisfaction on our behalf through his own Passion, obtained the admittance of men to the vision of God, in virtue of this he is said to have reconciled us with God.

Reply Obj. 1: He loves all created things according to the measure in which he communicates his goodness to them, but those to whom he communicates the sight of his very self he is said to love simply speaking: I will love him and manifest myself to him (John 14:21).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is said to love his creatures, when they already exist, inasmuch as he actually communicates his good to them, and he loved things before they existed in virtue of his intention to communicate his goodness to them, so too God is said to have loved men in virtue of his intention of communicating or granting men his vision, from which love he gave his Son. But through the death of his Son he loved us as actually admitting us to his vision, having removed the impediment that impeded us from the vision of God.

Reply Obj. 3: On the side of those who murdered Christ there was nothing that might provoke [God’s] mercy, but rather his wrath, whereas on the side of Christ, who endured the death on our behalf, there was the boundless charity that made the suffering acceptable to God, on the side of the one suffering it. And thus through that Passion we have been reconciled.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that there are two things to consider in a middle: the reason why it is called a middle, and the act of the middle. Now, something is called a middle from the fact that it is between extremes, whereas the act of the middle is to join the extremes. Therefore something is called a “mediator” from the fact that it exercises the act of a middle by joining things that are separate.

However, a thing can exercise the act of a middle only by the nature of a middle in some way being in it, so that it might be between the extremes. Now, to be between the extremes belongs to a thing in two ways: namely, with respect to the middle partaking of each extreme, and according to order, inasmuch as it is under the first and above the last. And this is needed for the notion of a middle, said properly: that it be called a “middle” in reference to a first and a last, which signify an order. However, these three belong to Christ in virtue of his human nature. For by making satisfaction for men in virtue of his human nature, he joined men to God; and he also partook of each of the extremes inasmuch as he is a man—beatitude from God, but weakness from men; and also as a man he was above men through the fullness of the graces and the union, and beneath God on account of his having assumed a created nature. And therefore properly speaking, by reason of his human nature he is a mediator.

Moreover, he can also be called a “mediator” by reason of his being a composite person with respect to two of the stated conditions—namely, insofar as he joined men to God, and insofar as he shares fully in the nature of each extreme, not merely by participation. But in the third condition he falls short, since according to his person he was not less than the Father.

But the notion of being a mediator in no way belongs to him with respect to his divine nature. For in virtue of his divine nature he is not between the extremes by a participation, nor according to an order, nor even does he join them together as a proximate cause, but rather as the first cause, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: Human nature insofar as it is in Christ is not one of the extremes, since it does not need reconciliation, as there is no sin in it.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 3: Although he was able to join us to God only because he was God, since his human nature had a greater efficacy from the divine having been joined to it in his person, nonetheless he offered the satisfaction by which we have been reconciled and joined to God only through his human nature. And therefore he is the proximate cause of this joining in virtue of that nature.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question it should be said that, with respect to the reconciliation by which human nature has been reconciled with God, Christ alone is the mediator. For in him alone is found the earlier mentioned conditions of a mediator.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the Holy Spirit joins us as the first cause, nonetheless he is not a middle between the extremes, nor does he what immediately joins them. Therefore he is not properly speaking a mediator.

Reply Obj. 2: The demons share with God in immortality, and with us in misery, which is why they interpose themselves in between us and immortality, so that they might lead us to eternal misery; and they do this by separating us from God, not by joining us to him. And because by withdrawing from the first one, a multitude is found, therefore they themselves are not one, but are many middles—not mediators, but separators. However, Christ, because he possessed a common beatitude with God and a common mortality with us, therefore he leads us to eternal beatitude by the mortality that he had at the fullness of time. And this what Augustine says in On the City of God, book 9. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 15 (CCSL 47; PL 41:268).)

Reply Obj. 3: The angels are blessed and immortal, which is why they do not befit us in what is to be removed from us by the act of the mediator. For a mediator is not given to make us not be created. And therefore, although they befit us in that they too are created, nonetheless the notion of being a mediator does not belong to them.

Reply Obj. 4: What the angels bear to us from God, as though middles between us and God, is not that through which we are joined to God. For grace is not [given] to us by the angels, and neither is satisfaction; rather, their ministry presupposes the union, or prepares for it. Therefore they are not mediators themselves, but their office follows or disposes us for the office of the mediator. And therefore they are ministers of the mediator.

Reply Obj. 5: None of the saints can be the mediator who joins the entire human nature to God, although one of them could join a specific person to God—not indeed by meriting grace for him in a condign way, as Christ did, but rather by congruity, and by leading him to the good.

Exposition of the text

For by his death, by the one most true sacrifice, Christ extinguished. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 13 (CCSL 50; PL 42:899).) This is the third way in which we are freed from our sins through his Passion. For the prior two noted pertain to the efficacy of justification on our part, whereas this pertains to its sufficiency on his part. For his making satisfaction was sufficient as a certain sacrifice for wiping out all sin, insofar as it is in himself.

The chirographs of all faults. (Sent. III, 19.1(55).4, quoting Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum, bk. 2, ch. 30, para. 49 (CSEL 60:120; PL 44:49).) “Chirograph” is said from “chiros,” which is the hand, and “graphos,” which is writing, so as to mean “writings made by hand”; such a thing makes a record of debts and an obligation for paying them. However, the chirographs of our sins are said to be wiped out through Christ’s death inasmuch as the memory of our iniquities has been removed, insofar as God does not recall them for the sake of punishment, or inasmuch as the obligation of a penalty or guilt has been removed.

All temporal punishment . . . is entirely forgiven to the convert in baptism. (Sent. III, 19.4(58).1.) On the contrary, interior sorrow is required. To this it should be said that it is not required as a penalty, but inasmuch as it arises from regret of one’s former life; if he is not penitent of this life, he cannot begin the new life, but rather he approaches it under deception.

Fulfilled those sacraments. (Sent. III, 19.5(59).1.) Here what is called a “sacrament” is not a sacred sign, like baptism and such, but the sacred secret, like the Passion, the Incarnation, and the like.

And so, O heretics, if Christ, according to you, only had one nature, how shall he be in the middle? (Sent. III, 19.7(61).2, quoting Vigilius Tapsensis, Contra Eutychetem, bk. 5, n. 15 (PL 62:145).) These are the words of Vigilius, who asserts that Christ is the mediator by reason of his being a composite person, as has been said. Nevertheless, we can say that if he had only a human nature, in virtue of it he would not be a sufficient mediator, since he would not have that whereby he could make satisfaction for the entire human nature, just as neither would other mere men.