D. 10 - What belongs to the divine person on account of the union
Division of the text
After the Master has considered what belongs or does not belong to one nature from its being associated with the other in Christ’s person, here he considers what belongs to Christ’s very person by reason of his human nature. For what belongs to him by reason of his divine nature has already been discussed, in Book I.
Now, this is divided into two parts.
First, he asks whether things that appear to pertain to human nature’s dignity belong to Christ by reason of his human nature.
Second, he asks the same thing about the things that pertain to its defect, at it also usual to ask whether it ought simply to be said and granted that Christ was made, or created, or is a creature. (Sent. III, 11.1(32).1.)
The first is divided into two:
first, he asks about the things that pertain to the natural dignity of human nature, such as his personhood;
second, he inquires about the things that pertain to the dignity of grace, at but if it is asked whether Christ is an adoptive son according to his being a man or in another manner, we answer that Christ is not an adoptive son in any manner. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).1.)
Regarding the first, he does two things:
first, he proposes the question;
second, he objects on either side and then resolves it, at that he is a person, they argue with the following reasons. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).2.)
And this latter part is divided into two, following the two paths on which the one argues about the proposed question;
the second begins at but they strive to prove in yet another way that Christ, according to his being man, is a person. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).5.)
Regarding the first, he does two things:
first he proposes the objection,
and second, he resolves it, at because of these and other unsuitable conclusions. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).3.)
As regards the first, he does two things:
first, he objects on the affirmative side;
second, on the negative side, at but conversely, if, according to his being man, he is a person, then either he is the third person of the Trinity or some other person. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).2.)
Because of these and other unsuitable conclusions, some say that Christ, according to his being man, is not a person. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).3.) He resolves this here, and regarding this he does two things:
first, he answers the question,
and second, the objections, at and yet, what was adduced in the above argumentation does not follow. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).4.)
But they strive to prove in yet another way that Christ, according to his being man, is a person. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).5.) Here he states another objection.
And first, he makes the objection,
and second, he answers it, at to which it can be said. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).5.)
But if is is asked whether Christ is an adoptive son according to his being man or in another manner, we answer that Christ is not an adoptive son in any manner. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).1.) Here he inquires about the things that pertain to the dignity of grace,
and first, about filiation according to adoption,
and second, about his predestination, at if it is then asked. (Sent. III. 10. 3(31).)
Regarding the first, he does two things:
first, he shows that Christ is not an adoptive son;
second, he objects to the contrary, at but the following objection is made. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).3.)
And regarding this latter, he does three things:
first, he states the objection;
second, he answers it, at to which it can be said; (Sent. III, 10.2(30).2.)
third, he presents a confirmation of the resolution with respect to two things:
first, with respect to the fact that Christ is the natural son of the Virgin, at Augustine, in the book On Faith to Peter*, shows that he is naturally Son of man*; (Sent. III, 10.2(30).4.)
second, with respect to the fact that he is not a son by adoption, at but that he is not an adoptive son, and yet is a son by grace, is proved by the following testimonies. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).5.)
There are three questions here.
First, what belongs to Christ insofar as he is a man. (Q. 1.)
Second, about his adoption. (Q. 2.)
Third, about his predestination. (Q. 3.)
Question 1
What belongs to Christ as man
About the first, two things are asked:
first, whether Christ, according as he is man, is God;
second, whether Christ, according as he is man, is a person.
Article 1
Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is God
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first, we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.16.2.) It appears that Christ is God insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 1: For Philippians 2:9 says, he bestowed on him the name that is above every name. A Gloss says: insofar as he is man, he assumed the name of God without usurpation, but in truth. (Cf. Glossa ordinaria, at Philippians 2:11, 5.586.) But a name that one has truly is truly said of him. Therefore it is truly said that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is God.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ is God by the grace of the union. But the grace of the union belongs to him only as man. Therefore he is God insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 3: Fur2thermore, Christ forgives sins insofar as he is a man: but that you may know that the Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins (Matt 9:6). But this belongs only to God: I, I am He who blots out your transgressions for my own sake (Isa 43:25). Therefore insofar as he is a man he is God.
On the contrary, Christ was from eternity insofar as he is God. Therefore, if he is God insofar as he is a man, then he existed from eternity as a man—which is false.
Furthermore, “God” and “man” signify disparate natures. But in such things, one of the things relative to the one [nature] cannot belong to the other. Therefore Christ is not God insofar as he is a man.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he is not God insofar as he is that man. For everything that is predicated of another insofar as it is that thing must be its definition, or a part of its definition, or an accident belonging through itself to what it is predicated of. For example, Peter, insofar as he is a man, is a rational mortal animal, or insofar as he is a man, he is risible. But God is related to this man in none of the stated ways. Therefore “Christ insofar as he is this man is God” is false.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ lacks a mother insofar as he is God. Therefore if Christ is God insofar as he is a man, then insofar as he is this man he lacks a mother—which is false.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if one removes that in virtue of which something belongs to someone, then it no longer belongs to him. But if being a man is removed from Christ, being God still belongs to him. For he was God from eternity, but he was not this man from eternity. Therefore Christ is not God insofar as he is this man.
On the contrary, as was said above, (Above,* d. 7, q. 1, a. 1.)* the proposition, “this man is God,” is not an accidental predication, but an essential one. But an essential predicate can be predicated of any subject as a repetition, such as “Socrates insofar as he is a man is an animal,” since through itself “animal” is predicated of “man.” Therefore this is true: “Christ insofar as he is this man is God.”
Furthermore, “this man” indicates the eternal supposit. But this is true: "Christ insofar as he is an eternal supposit is God." Therefore this also is true: "Christ insofar as he is this man is God."
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Chirst was not predestined insofar as he is a man. For what belongs to Peter as man must belong to every man. But to have been predestined does not belong to every man. Therefore neither does it belong to Christ insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the effect of predestination conforms to the predestination, otherwise the predestination would be false. But since Christ was predestined to be the Son of God, the effect of this predestination is his being the Son of God. Therefore if Christ is not the Son of God insofar as he is a man, then neither insofar as he is a man was he predestined.
On the contrary, Christ was predestined, as the Apostle says in Romans 1:4. But this was not insofar as he is God, as is clear from things said in Distinction 7. (Above,* d. 7, q. 3, a. 1.)* Therefore it was insofar as he is a man.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that in any proposition what is repeated along with the expression “insofar as” is that through which the predicate belongs to the subject. Whence in some way it must be the same as the subject, or in some way the same as the predicate. This is just as, in an affirmative syllogism, the middle term holds its relation to the predicate as to that which follows it through itself. For nothing belongs to something insofar as it is an animal except what through itself belongs to an animal (according to whichever manner of saying “through itself”). However, [the middle term] is related to the subject as to that which is in some way included in the subject. Now, the subject’s very substance is included in the subject, as are its antecedents, such as its causes, and its consequences, such as an accident of it. However, the substance of the subject is the both the subject itself and its nature.
And something can be attributed to Christ, and to any man, by reason of all of these. For if something is attributed to the man by reason of the preceding principles, then in this way we say, in reference to the material cause, that “man is corruptible insofar as he is composed from contraries”; and we say, in reference to the formal cause, that “man is according to the image of God insofar as he has a rational soul”; and we say, in reference to the efficient cause, that “Peter is his heir insofar as he was born from that father.” However, we say, in reference to the final cause, that “man, insofar as he is ordered toward beatitude, must be immortal in soul.” Now, if something is attributed to some man by reason of his accidents, then in this way we say that “man is colored insofar as he is visible,” but if something is attributed to him by reason of the supposit, then in this way we say that “Socrates, insofar as he is Socrates, is an individual,” but if by reason of his nature, then in this way we say that “man, insofar as he is man, is an animal.”
Therefore, according to this, one should say to the first question that when one says, “Christ is God insofar as he is a man,” the word “man” can be repeated by reason of the nature; and then it is false, since it does not belong to human nature in itself that it be united to the divine. However, if it be repeated by reason of its supposit, then it will be true, since in Christ the supposit of the human nature is the eternal supposit to which being God belongs through itself. Yet because the name “man” does not bring in any determinate supposit of the human nature except with an added demonstrative, and only for a certain determinate supposit of human nature does being God belong through itself, therefore unless something else is added or understood, it should simply speaking not be granted that "Christ is God insofar as he is man."
Reply Obj. 1: As was said above, (Above,* d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.)* “taking up” signifies by way of motion. Now, being a thing does not belong to something to that is through itself moving toward that thing. For example, to move toward whiteness belongs through itself to what is black, yet it does not belong through itself to what is white. Likewise, to take up the name “God” can belong to Christ insofar as he is a man, and yet to be God does not belong to him insofar as he is a man.
Reply Obj. 2: The name “Christ” signifies the person in the two natures, so the fact that he is God does not belong to him through a grace, but from eternity, yet the fact that he is at once God and man is through the grace of the union. Or it should be said that, although the grace of the union makes the man God, still the grace of the union and being God do not refer to the same thing. For to be God belongs to this man by reason of the person, but the grace arises for him by reason of the nature. Whence insofar as he is man he has the grace of the union, if the repetition occurs by reason of the human nature, but he is not God insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he is this person.
Reply Obj. 3: To forgive sins happens in two ways: either by authority—and in this way, since it belongs to God alone, it does not belong to Christ insofar as he is a man—or by ministry—and in this way, it does belong to Christ even by reason of his human nature.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that for a predication to be “through itself” it is not necessary that the predicate belong to the subject through itself with respect to everything that is implied in the subject’s name. Rather, it is enough if it does so with respect to some of the things that belong to the subject through itself. For example, to reason belongs to man through itself, not insofar as he has a body, but insofar as he has a soul, and this is why “man reasons” is through itself. However, when one says “this man,” meaning Christ, there is included, by the power of the demonstrative adjective, a determinate supposit of human nature, which is the eternal supposit, according to the second opinion, to which supposit being God belongs through itself. This is why, according to the second opinion, “this man is God” is predication through itself. And because for the truth of an expression of this sort one needs only that the predicate belongs through itself to what it is repeated, therefore this is true: Christ is God insofar as he is this man.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as something can be of the definition of the species that is not of the definition of the genus, so too something might be of the definition of the individual—if it were to be defined—that is not of the definition of the species, such as part of its matter, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3, 1029a2; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 7, lect. 2, nn. 1276–79.) Whence although “God” is not part of the definition of man, yet he would be part of the definition of “this man Christ,” if he could be defined, by reason of the person of the Word. Whence it is clear that it is through itself.
Reply Obj. 2: When one says “this man,” the supposit of the two natures is being indicated, each of which would fall in his definition, if he could be defined. And therefore the things that belong to each nature belong to him through himself, and therefore Christ is God insofar as he is this man, and he is man insofar as he is this man. And the account of other things that follow on either nature would be similar. This is why insofar as he is this man he both possesses a mother and lacks a mother. Nor does the one exclude the other, since they are not opposed, as they do not come together in reference to the same thing.
Reply Obj. 3: If what is brought in when one says “this man” were removed from the whole Christ, then being God would not belong to him, since the divine and human natures are included there, as has been said. But if one of them, namely the human nature, were removed, it follows that the Son of God could not be called “this man.” Yet the above stated expression [that “Christ is God insofar as he is that man”] does not become true by reason of the human nature. And it is like if one were to say, “Peter senses insofar as he is a man,” since if “rational” were removed in understanding, he will not be a man, and yet he will remain sensitive, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 1.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that because “predestination” indicates something that comes beforehand, therefore consequently it includes a making. For everything that exists after it did not exist is said to be “made.” Whence someone is said to be predestined insofar as he was foreseen to become blessed. However, all things that bring in action and motion fit, through themselves, with an approach to a terminus, yet being at the terminus does not fit with it, through itself. For example, moving toward whiteness fits, through itself, something that is non-white, but being white does not. However, the predestination that is said of Christ is has to do with the grace of union, according to which it was made to happen that a man would be God, [and] being God is the terminus of this making. Now, the one approaching the terminus is what is assumed to union, namely the human nature, and therefore, by reason of the human nature, to be predestined does belong to Christ, but not to be God. Whence “Christ insofar as he is a man was predestined” is true, but “Christ insofar as he is a man is God” is false.
Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows for the things that belong to someone by reason of the human nature according to the notion of its species. But to be predestined belongs to Christ by reason of the particular human nature in him. Whence the objection is not relevant.
Reply Obj. 2: The effect of a predestination corresponds and conforms to the predestination with respect to the one about whom the predestination was made, but not with respect to the conditions of the predestination. For the predestination itself is eternal, but its effect is temporal. And this is how it is in this case, since Christ was not predestined so that he might be, as man, the Son of God; rather, the predestination itself belongs to him as man. Whence it is clear that expressions of this sort are ambiguous, because the implication can be referred either to being predestined or to being the Son of God who is being predestined.
Article 2
Whether Christ is a person insofar as he is a man
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.16.12; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3.) It appears that Christ is a person insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 1: For a person, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343).) is an individual substance of the rational nature. But Christ is such insofar as he is a man. Therefore he is a person insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what belongs to someone insofar as he is a man belongs to every man insofar as he is a man. But Peter is a person insofar as he is a man. Therefore so too Christ.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, we say that Christ does something insofar as he is a man: for example, he eats, and likewise something insofar as he is God: for example, that he raises the dead. Nor does it follow, because of this, that he is two things. Therefore it appears that, if we likewise say that Christ is a person insofar as he is a man and likewise insofar as he is God, it does not follow that he is two things. And so too no other problem follows.
On the contrary, whatever belongs to Christ insofar as he is a man is assumed. But being a person was not assumed, as is clear from Distinction 5. (Above, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore Christ is not a person insofar as he is a man.
Furthermore, it is impossible that numerically the same thing belongs to something in virtue of two diverse natures. But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore, since being a person belongs to him in virtue of his divine nature, it does not belong to him in virtue of his human nature. And thus, he will not be a person insofar as he is a man.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he is an individual insofar as he is a man. For Christ is something insofar as he is a man. But he is not a universal. Therefore he is some particular. And therefore he is an individual insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in an individual there is only the nature of the species and the accidents individuating it. But Christ has a human nature and accidents individuating him insofar as he is a man. Therefore he is an individual insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever belongs to human nature belongs to Christ insofar as he is a man, such as being capable of suffering and being mortal. But the human nature in Christ is a certain individual. Therefore Christ is an individual insofar as he is a man.
On the contrary, an individual in the genus of rational nature is nothing other than a person. But Christ is not a person insofar as he is a man. Therefore neither is he an individual.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ is a supposit, or thing of a nature, insofar as he is a man. For something is called a “supposit” or “thing of a nature” from the fact that it has a human nature. But Christ has a human nature insofar as he is a man. Therefore he is a supposit or thing of a nature insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a human nature is as truly present in Christ as are the accidents of human nature. But Christ is subject to the accidents of human nature insofar as he is a man. Therefore also he is a supposit or thing of a nature insofar as he is a man.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ is a certain thing insofar as he is a man. But he is not a thing of no nature. Therefore he is a thing of a nature insofar as he is a man.
On the contrary, a supposit of a human nature is the same thing as a hypostasis or person. But Christ is not a hypostasis or person insofar as he is a man. Therefore neither is he a supposit or thing of a nature [insofar as he is a man].
Furthermore, in Christ there is only one supposit. But Christ is a supposit insofar as he is God. Therefore he is not a supposit insofar as he is a man.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that in Christ there is only one person, the one who is from eternity. Now, nothing eternal belongs to Christ insofar as he is a man, properly speaking, as is clear from things said before. (Above, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) Whence “Christ is a person insofar as he is a man” is not true, unless [“man”] is replaced with by “supposit of man,” as if to say, “Christ is a person insofar as he is this man,” for this is true.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is a substance of the rational nature insofar as he is a man, but he is an individual substance of the rational nature insofar as he is this man. Whence he is a person insofar as he is this man, just as he is God insofar as he is this man.
Reply Obj. 2: Not even Peter is a person insofar as he is a man, but insofar he is this man. For “man is a person” is not [true] through itself, but “this man is a person” is.
Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that Christ does things insofar as he is a man and insofar as he is God it follows that there are two activities in Christ. So too if Christ were a person insofar as he is a man and insofar as he is God, it would follow that there were two persons in him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as was said above, (Above, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1.) the individual is found in both substances and accidents. Now, insofar as it is in substances it has it that it subsist from its notion, but this is not so insofar as it is found in accidents; and it is found in Christ in both ways, though it is predicated only in the first way. For the human nature in Christ is a certain individual, but Christ is not that individual; rather, he is the subsistent individual. And in this way of taking “individual”—insofar as it is predicated of Christ—in Christ there is only one individual, as also there is one person. This is why, just as Christ is not a person insofar as he is a man, so neither is he an individual.
Reply Obj. 1: Chris is something insofar as he is a man. But it does not follow that therefore he is something universal or particular insofar as he is a man. For being universal or particular is accidental to “man,” so “man is something particular” is by accident, whereas “this man is something particular” is through itself. Whence Christ is not something particular insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he is this man.
Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as it is predicated of Christ, it belongs to the notion of “individual” that it be subsistent through itself. And this does not belong to Christ insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he is this man. Whence it is not necessary that he be an individual insofar as he is a man.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that the things that belong to human nature be predicated of Christ in the same way that they are predicated of the nature. For the nature itself is not predicated of him directly and abstractly, but obliquely and concretely. Whence it does not follow that, if the human nature is individual, then Christ is an individual insofar as he is a man, but merely that he has an individual nature.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that some propositions are “through themselves” on account of the subject and some are so on account of the predicate. For the ones that are through themselves on account of the subject, it is enough that the predicate belongs through itself to the subject in virtue of only one of those things that are contained in the subject; but with the ones that are through themselves on account of the predicate, whatever is in the predicate must belong through itself to the subject. Thus, “the man is a white animal” is not through itself, but “the white man is an animal” is through itself. In this way, I say that two elements are borne by the words “supposit” or “thing of a nature”: namely, a reference to a common nature, and something subsisting in which that reference is present. Of these, one is present in Christ insofar as he is a man, namely the reference to the common nature, but not the other, as is clear from things said earlier. And therefore “Christ insofar as he is a man is a supposit, or a thing of a nature” is false, though it approaches closer to the truth than other things said earlier, inasmuch as these names are imposed through a reference to a common nature. Whence if “supposit” be taken as an adjective, it is true, for Christ insofar as he is a man is supposed to a human nature, or is something supposing a human nature. And this is also valid for the things that are said about “person” and “individual.”
Reply Obj. 1: And thereby, the solution to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Because accidents do not pertain to a thing’s existence as does the common nature, the name “subject” includes only reference to an accident. However, it does not include the notion of what exists through itself as what it signifies, but as what it presupposes. Therefore the account of “subject” and “supposit” is not alike.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ insofar as he is a man is a certain thing, and even insofar as he is a man he is of a nature. Yet it does not follow that he is a thing of a nature insofar as he is a man. For there is more in the signification of the composite than in the significations of its components—namely, their composition, just as not anyone bearing a shield is a shield-bearer.
Question 2
Christ's adoption
Next, it is asked about sonship through adoption, and about this two things are asked.
first, a question is asked about this on the side of the one who adopts;
second, on the side of the one adopted.
Article 1
Whether it is fitting for God to adopt anyone as a son
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that adopting anyone as a son does not befit God.
Obj. 1: For adoption is the legal taking to oneself some person, who is an outsider, as a son, or grandson, or successor. But to God no person is an outsider, because he established all things. Therefore adopting does not befit God.
Obj. 2: Among us, the one adopting is not the principle of the adopted one’s existence. But God is the principle of existence of all things. Therefore it is not suitable for him to adopt anyone.
Obj. 3: He who has natural sons adopts someone in such a way that the latter would divide the inheritance with the natural sons. But the inheritance of God the Father is indivisible, for it is he himself. Therefore, since he has a natural Son, it does not befit him to adopt someone.
On the contrary, adoption occurs on account of the generosity of the one adopting toward the one being adopted. But God is the most generous and greatest lover of men. Therefore adoption most of all belongs to him.
Furthermore, whoever makes certain ones sons by grace adopts them. But this does belong to God: he gave power to become children of God (John 1:12). Therefore he adopts.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that only God the Father adopts. For according to the laws, adoption is done by those to who beget sons. But in the Trinity, only the Father begets a natural Son. Therefore only he adopts sons.
Obj. 2: Further, by adoption we are made Christ’s brothers: in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom 8:29). But Christ is the Son only of God the Father, as was said above. (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore by adoption we too are sons only of the Father.
Obj. 3: As was said above, (Above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.) the only Son became incarnate so that the name “son” might not be transferred to another [divine person]. But it is not more problematic that the name “son” be transferred to another divine person than the name “father” might be. Therefore only God the Father should be said to adopt, so that the name “father” not be transferred to another person.
On the contrary, every name said of God signifying an effect in a created thing is common to the entire Trinity. But “to adopt” indicates an effect in a created thing. Therefore it belongs to the entire Trinity.
Furthermore, insofar as we are adopted as sons of God, God is called our Father. But the entire Trinity is called “our Father,” as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.) Therefore the entire Trinity adopts.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that adoption occurs only through the Son, because of what is said in Galatians 4:4: for God sent forth his Son, born of a woman . . . so that we might receive adoption as sons.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24–26; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 2, lect. 2, nn. 292–93.) what is first in any genus is the cause of the things after it. But sonship is first found in the Son. Therefore all are made sons through him, just as all are made good through the goodness of the Son of God, and in this way from the heavenly Father all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named (Eph 3:15). (RSV says “every family”; this follows the Greek. The Vulgate says “paternitas” (“fatherhood”).)
On the contrary, it appears that it occurs through the Holy Spirit, because of what is said in Romans 8:15: you have received the spirit of the adoption of sons. (The RSV says “spirit of sonship”; both the Greek and the Vulgate, however, do say “adoption.”) When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God.
Furthermore, by charity we are made sons of God: see what love the Father has given us, that we should be called children of God; and so we are (1 John 3:1). But charity is the Holy Spirit. Therefore we are adopted through him.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that “adoption” is extended to divine things from a likeness with human things. For a man is said to adopt someone as a son insofar as, as a grace, he gives the right of receiving his own inheritance to someone to whom it does not belong by nature. Now, whatever makes a man rich is said to be his “inheritance,” whereas God is rich by his own perfect enjoyment of his very self, since he is blessed because of this and thus it is his “inheritance.” Whence, to the degree that to men, who from their natural powers cannot reach this enjoyment, he gives the grace through which a man might merit that beatitude, so that in this way a right to that inheritance might belong to him, in this respect he is said to “adopt someone as a son.”
Reply Obj. 1: Although no person is an outsider to God as regards existence, which he participates in from him, nonetheless a person is an outsider as regards the right of receiving the inheritance.
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man is born of another, he has a right to his paternal inheritance; this is why he is not an outsider, such that he could be adopted. But not because someone has existence from God does he have a right to the heavenly inheritance. And therefore someone who has existence from God, through creation, can be adopted as a son, through grace.
Reply Obj. 3: It happens in the adoption among us that the inheritance is divided by it, insofar as the entirety of it cannot be possessed by many simultaneously. But the entire heavenly inheritance is possessed simultaneously by the adopting Father and by all his adopted sons. Whence, there is neither division no succession there.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that adopting belongs to the whole Trinity. For whole Trinity’s activity is one, as is also its essence. Nevertheless, it can be appropriated to the Father, insofar it has a likeness with his property [of paternity].
Reply Obj. 1: Although only the Father generates the Son who is God, nevertheless the whole Trinity produces sons through creation. And therefore also the whole Trinity adopts sons through grace.
Reply Obj. 2: From the adoption that happens through grace we are made Christ’s brothers, inasmuch as by it we are made sons of God the Father. However, we are not made sons of Christ, or of the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 3: Sonship is the relation of one who is from a principle, but fatherhood is the relation of that principle. However, the whole Trinity is the principle of the created thing. Whence the name “fatherhood” can be better applied to the different persons, in reference to what is created, than can the name “sonship.”
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that this preposition “through” one can indicate two causes: namely, a middle agent—and in this way we are adopted by God the Father through the Son, insofar as we are speaking by appropriation; for through him God the Father led many sons into glory (Heb 2:10), insofar he sent him into the world as its savior. But it can also indicate a formal cause, and this is in two ways: either an inhering formal cause or an exemplar. If it is an inhering formal cause, in this way we are adopted through the Holy Spirit, to whom charity is appropriated, in virtue of which we formally merit. And therefore it is said: you . . . were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit, who is the guarantee of our inheritance (Eph 1:13–14). But if it designates the exemplar formal cause, in this way we are adopted through the Son; hence, for those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom 8:29).
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this, the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
Whether being adopted belongs to all created things, and whether God adopts men from their very creation
Quaestiuncula 1
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.23.3.) It appears that being adopted belongs to all created things.
Obj. 1: For God is called “our Father” because he created us, as it is said in Deuteronomy 32:6: is he not your father, who created you? But he is not the father of created things by nature, since in this way he is the father of Christ alone. Therefore he is their father by adoption, and therefore being adopted belongs to all created things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, from the fact that God creates something he takes it up into a communion of his goods out of his own pure goodness. But adoption appears to be nothing other than this. Therefore being adopted belongs to every created thing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, from creation itself God impresses his own image on the rational creature, in virtue of which he is called a “son of God.” But he adopts us only insofar he makes us his sons. Therefore from creation itself he adopts at least men.
On the contrary, as is clear from things said, (Above, a. 1, resp. 3.) the adoption of sons occurs through the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit is not given by reason of creation. Therefore neither is there adoption by reason of mere creation.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that being adopted does not belong to the angels. (Parallel: ST III.23.3.ad 2.) For being adopted belongs to one who is not in the house of the paterfamilias, and is brought into it. But the angels always were in the house of God, since they were created in the empyrean heaven. Therefore being adopted does not belong to them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is said in the text, (Sent. III, 10.2(30).2, referring to Ephesians 2:3 and John 1:12.) we are called 'adoptive sons of God' because, while we were born sons of wrath, by grace we were made to be sons of God. But the angels were never sons of wrath. Therefore they were never not sons, at least according to those who say that the angels were created in grace. Therefore being adopted does not belong to the angels.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Galatians 4:4–5 says: God sent forth his Son . . . so that we might receive adoption as sons. But the Son of God was not sent to the angels, since he was not made an angel, the way he was made a man, in virtue of which he is said said to have been “sent to men.” Therefore adopting does not befit the angels.
On the contrary, men are said to be adopted through the Holy Spirit, who is given to men, as is clear from things said. But the Holy Spirit abides in the angels just as he does in men. Therefore the angels are said to be adopted even as men are.
Furthermore, the angels are said to be our brothers and consorts. But this can be only insofar as they are adopted with us by the same Father and for the same inheritance. Therefore being adopted belongs to them.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it also appears that Christ is an adopted son. (Parallels: above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2; below, d. 11, a. 3, ad 2; ST III.23.4; SCG IV.4; De veritate, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1.) For Hilary says, the dignity of his power is not given up when the humility of flesh is adopted, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:68).) and he is speaking about Christ’s humanity. Therefore Christ, as man, is an adopted son.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing problematic appears to follow if we call Christ an “adoptive son.” For it neither follows that he was a son of wrath nor that at some time he was not a son, for the angels were never sons of wrath and yet they are called “adoptive sons.” Therefore nothing prevents us from calling Christ an “adoptive son.”
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the dignity of an adopted son is greater than that of a servant. But Christ, as man, is called a “servant,” as is clear in Philippians 2:7. Therefore much more so can he be called an “adoptive son.”
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man is made an adoptive son through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit rested upon Christ, as is said in Isaiah 11:2. Therefore he ought to be called an “adoptive son.”
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says, from the beginning of his faith, any man becomes a Christian by that same grace as that by which this man, from his own beginning, was made the Christ. (Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 16, n. 31 (PL 44:982).) But any man who becomes a Christian does so from the beginning through the grace of adoption. Therefore also that man was made the Christ through the grace of adoption, and so is an adoptive son.
On the contrary, Ambrose comments on Romans 1:4: designated Son of God in power, saying that: I have gone through the Scriptures again and again, and I have never found Christ called an adoptive son. (This passage is not found in Ambrose; but see his De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, ch. 8, para. 87 (PL 16:817): “we do not call one who is a son by nature an ‘adoptive son’; rather, on who we call a ‘son by nature’ is a the one who is the true son.” (Adoptivum filium non dicimus filium esse natura, sed eum dicimus natura esse, qui verus est filius.)) Therefore he should not be called a adoptive son.
Furthermore, adopting belongs to the whole Trinity. Therefore if Christ were an adoptive son, he would be a son of the Trinity. And this cannot be, as was said above, in Distinction 4. (Above,* d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 1.)*
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, as was said above, (Above, d. 8, a. 1, ad 5.) it is of the notion of sonship, or filiation, that a son is produced in the likeness of the begetter’s very species. However, insofar as man is produced, by his creation, in a participation of intellect, he is produced, as it were, in a likeness of God’s very species. For intellectuality is the greatest of the things in virtue of which a created nature might participate in the likeness of the uncreated nature. This is why only the rational creature is said to be “according to the image,” as was said in Book II, (In II Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.) and whence only the rational creature by its creation receives the name of “sonship.” But adoption, as was said, (Above, a. 1, resp. 1.) requires that the one adopted acquires the right to the inheritance of the one adopting. Now, the inheritance of God himself is his own beatitude, for which only the rational creature has the capacity, and neither does it acquire this from its very creation, but rather from the gift of the Holy Spirit, as was said. (Above, a. 1, resp. 3.) Therefore it is clear that creation gives irrational creatures neither adoption nor sonship, whereas it indeed gives sonship to the rational creature, but not adoption.
Reply Obj. 1: Sonship through adoption adds something over and above sonship through creation the way the perfect adds something over and above the lesser, and as grace does over and above nature. This is why a man is made neither a natural son nor an adoptive son through creation, but is called only a “son by creation,” whereas irrational created things are sons in no way at all.
Reply Obj. 2: The communication of just any goods is not enough for adoption, only a communication of the inheritance. Whence neither is just any created thing said to be adopted from the fact that some good things are communicated to him by God, unless the inheritance that is divine beatitude is also communicated to him.
Reply Obj. 3: This is like that to the first.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that just as blessed enjoyment exceeds human nature, so too does it exceed the angelic nature. Whence, just as this is given to man from grace, and not from a debt owed his nature, so too to the angel. And on account of this, just as being adopted belongs to man, so does it belong to the angel.
Reply Obj. 1: The Empyrean heaven is not called “God’s house” insofar as adoptive sons are brought into it, but insofar as it is the divine beatitude itself in virtue of which God rests in his very self, and causes others to rest in him. And they were not always in this house, since they were not created blessed.
Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to adoption that the one adopted was a son of wrath, or that he was not a son at a prior time. Whence that is pointed out in the text (Sent. III, 10.2(30).2.) more for the sake of making the adoption evident than by any necessity. But it is necessary for adoption that one is not by nature a son before he is made a son, such that the sonship does not belong to him from his own nature, but from some grace given to him. And this is indeed found in the angel.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the sending of the Son into flesh was not brought about for the sake of the angels, nonetheless a sending that occurs in the mind was brought about for them, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 15, q. 5, a. 1, resp. 3.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that Christ in no way should be called a “son of adoption,” since having the right to the paternal inheritance belongs to him from his own nature, insofar as he is eternally born from the Father. For all things the Father has are his own, as is said in John 16:15. This is why he does not acquire this right through any grace coming to him, such that he could be called an “adoptive son.”
Reply Obj. 1: Humanity is not adopted in the Head himself, but in his members, and this is how Hilary’s word’s should be taken. Or it could be said that although “adoption” can in a certain way be said of his created nature, which through a grace is drawn into participation of the divine goodness in the unity of the divine person, still this need not belong to the supposit, to whom being blessed belongs naturally.
Reply Obj. 2: The problematic conclusion that Christ, at least by nature or in understanding, would not be a son before he is a son, as is the case with the angels, does follow. But this can in no way stand for the second opinion, which asserts that no supposit is understood before the union, and sonship can belong only to a complete supposit.
Reply Obj. 3: When Christ is called a “servant,” this indicates only subjection. This is why Christ is called a “servant” insofar as he is a man, just as he is said to be “less than the Father.” However, it does not indicate any acquisition through grace of what belongs to him by nature, as does “adoptive son,” and therefore a name implying servitude is granted in Christ in a certain way, but no name implying adoption.
Reply Obj. 4: For other men a right to the heavenly inheritance is acquired anew through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which right does not belong to them by nature, as it does belong to the Son of God. This is why he is not said to be adopted through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 5: There is a likeness here with respect to the notion of grace because both are without preceding merits, but not with respect to the effect. For the former is the grace of the union in virtue of which he is made the natural Son, but the grace by which a man becomes a Christian does not make one a natural son, but only an adoptive son.
Question 3
Christ's predestination
Article 1
Whether the predestination of Christ is of the nature or the person
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: Next we ask about Christ’s predestination. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 40, a. 2; below, d. 11, a. 4, ad 4; ST III.24.1; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3.) And it appears that it is not a predestination of the person. For Christ’s predestination is to his sonship, since he was predestined Son of God in power (Rom 1:4). (For “predestined” the RSV has “designated.”) But sonship does not belong to the [divine] nature, so the predestination is not of his nature.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it appears that his being predestined belongs to what can act, since becoming happy also belongs to this. But to act belongs to a supposit, not to a nature. Therefore predestination is not something of the nature.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, human nature in Christ and in other men is of a single notion. But predestination is not of the nature in other men. Therefore neither in Christ.
On the contrary, a Gloss on Romans 1:4 says that his predestination is in the one aspect in which he did not always exist. But the only thing in Christ himself that did not always exist is his human nature. Therefore, his predestination is of his nature.
Furthermore, something is predestined from the fact that it is foreseen to be united with God through the grace of union. But the human nature was foreseen from eternity to be united to God through the grace of union. Therefore the human nature in Christ was predestined.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s predestination is not of the same form as our predestination. (Parallels: ST III.24.3; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3.) For according to Augustine, (Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cc. 3, 17 (PL 44:965, 985–86); also, Ad Simplicianum, bk. 2, q. 2 (PL 40:138); Contra duas Epist. Pelag., bk. 2, cc. 9–10 (PL 44:586).) the predestination by which we are predestined is given to those who are wretched. But this does not befit Christ’s predestination, since he was never wretched. Therefore his predestination and ours are not of one notion.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace is the effect of predestination. But Christ’s grace is of a different notion than ours, since our grace is not one of union in a person, as is his. Therefore neither is his predestination and ours of the same notion.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, activities differ according to their termini. But natural sonship, at which Christ’s predestination reaches its terminus, is not the same notion as the sonship of adoption, at which our predestination reaches its terminus. Therefore these predestinations are not of the same notion.
On the contrary, one definition belongs to both predestinations, namely: predestination is the preparation for grace in the present, and for glory in the future. Therefore they are of one notion.
Furthermore, the Gloss on Romans 1:4 says that the most luminous exemplar of our predestination came first in Christ. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 1:4, 6.17 (PL 114:470), which refers to Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 15 (PL 44:981).) Therefore it is of one notion, since an exemplar and what is modeled on it are of one notion.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that his predestination is the efficient cause of our predestination. (Parallel: ST III.24.4.) For Ephesians 1:5 says: he destined us . . . to be his sons through Jesus Christ. But “through” denotes an efficient cause when the Father is said to work through the Son. Therefore his predestination is the efficient cause of our predestination.
Obj. 2: In addition, it appears that it is the exemplar cause, because of what is said in Romans 8:29: those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son. But an image pertains to exemplarity. Therefore he is the exemplar cause of our predestination, just as also his Resurrection is of our resurrection.
Obj. 3: It also appears that it is the final cause. For our predestination appears to be ordered to the filling up of the body of Christ, as is clear in Ephesians 4:12. Whence he himself appears to be the end of our salvation. Therefore also his predestination is the end of our predestination.
On the contrary, the eternal does not have a cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore it does not have as a cause Christ’s predestination.
Furthermore, Christ was predestined only insofar as he is a man. But as a man he is not our cause, but as God. Therefore his predestination is not the cause of our predestination.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
To the first question, I answer that “predestination” can be taken commonly or properly. Commonly it is taken for the foreknowledge and preordination of anyone, and in this way it is clear that predestination can be of a nature. However, insofar as it is taken properly, it bears the order of the one predestined with respect to grace. Now, the grace of a created thing establishes a union with God, which is twofold: through an activity, according to which we are united to God by knowing and loving him, or in the person, and according to this a human nature was united to God. And therefore, since Christ’s predestination is ordered to the grace of union in the person, it can be said either that the nature was predestined or that the person was by reason of the nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s predestination has as its first effect the union itself. This is why, since the union is of the nature, it too can be said to be predestined, even though sonship does not belong to it. For sonship is not the first effect of the predestination, but is consequent on the union.
Reply Obj. 2: That argument follows insofar as it is about the happiness of a created thing due to its being united with God through its activity. But the nature itself is beatified from its being united with God in the person.
Reply Obj. 3: And thereby also the response is clear. For the predestination of other men is not according to a union in the person, but according to a union through activity.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that many things are required in predestination, both on the side of the predestination and on the side of the side of the one being predestined, and with respect to the terminus from which and with respect to the terminus to which, insofar as one can notice a difference between Christ’s predestination and ours. Now, on the side of the one who predestines, who is God, there is no difference between Christ’s predestination and ours. However, there is a difference on the side of the one being predestined, since in us it is of the person, but in Christ it is of the nature, as was said. Likewise, there is a difference on the side of the terminus from which, since in us it is for the sake of us being freed from sin, as it says in a Gloss on Romans 8:30: those whom he predestined he also called, but this is not the case in Christ, since he neither contracted nor committed sin. But neither of these differences causes a diverse notion of predestination, but only a difference that is essential and specific [can do this]. However, the specific difference of any motion or activity is seen in relation to the terminus to which. Now, that to which the predestination is made is not of the same notion in Christ and in us. For Christ’s predestination is to union in the person, but our predestination is to union through an activity or assimilating habit. And these two unions are not of one notion; rather, they are related as prior and posterior, and perfect and diminished. And therefore Christ’s predestination and ours are not univocally of one notion, but analogically.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And thereby, it is easy to respond to the objections.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are two elements in a predestination itself: one eternal, which is the very operation of God, and the other temporal, which is the effect of the predestination. Therefore, with respect to what is eternal in it, our predestination does not have a cause, but with respect to its effect it can have a cause, insofar as its effect is produced by the mediation of certain created causes. And in this way, the efficient cause of our predestination is Christ’s predestination, inasmuch as he is the mediator of our salvation, and it is the formal cause, inasmuch as we are predestined as sons of God according to his image, and it is the final, inasmuch as our salvation redounds to his glory.
Reply Obj. 1–3: And thereby, the resolution of the objections is clear.
Exposition of the text
Christ, according to his being a man, is a person, or even is anything. (Sentences III.10. 1(29). 1.) The first of these is granted by every opinion, but the second is not, but only by the third opinion. For the first two opinions say that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is something. But to deny this is an error.
For 'according' has a manifold function. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).3.) This division is taken from a comparison of the repetition of the proposition’s subject. For the repetition can be made of what precedes the subject, and thus it points to a cause, or of what follows it, and thus it points to a habit or any whatever accident—but it specifically names a habit for the account of the third opinion, or of the subject itself, and this would be either with respect to the nature, and thus it expresses the condition of the nature, or with respect to the supposit, and thus it indicates the unity of the person in Christ.
But that description of person is not given for those three persons [of the Trinity]. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).4.) This is against what Boethius directly states about this matter in On the Two Natures. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 4 (PL 64:1345–47).) It should be said that what the Master says is true, if the things that are asserted in the division are taken strictly. But Boethius takes them more broadly; this is clear in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1.)
But he is not called son by nature. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).1.) For he is called “God” by nature formally, but he is called “son” by nature, not formally, but according to his mode of origin, since he proceeds through the mode of nature.
Christ was never not a son, (Sent. III, 10.2(30).2.) not before in time, as with us, nor prior by nature or understanding, as with the angels, if they were created in grace.
Christ is the son of the Virgin by nature or naturally and by grace. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).3.) Against this, nature and grace are divided as opposites, so what is by grace is not by nature. Further, Christ is the son of his mother, as is any other man, but other men are not sons of their mothers by grace, so neither is Christ. It should be said, to the first, that the grace of union is not opposed to nature. For through it one person comes to be of two natures, and thus what is in him though the grace of union is in him through one of the natures naturally. To the second, it should be said that Christ as man being born of his mother was not by grace, but being born at once God and man was. And this was through the grace of union.
Not as he is a son. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).5, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 10:82).) Therefore it appears that “sonship” is said equivocally here. It should be said that it is said neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, as are the other things that are said of God and creatures.
By origin, not adoption. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).5, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 10:82).) This is said against Nestorius, who, because he asserted that there are two persons in Christ, could not assert any union but one through grace. And thus it would follow that the person of the man would be a son of God only through the habitual grace of adoption, as we are.
In truth, not in name only. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).5, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 10:82).) This is said against Sabellius, who asserted that the persons are distinct only in name.
By birth, not by creation. (Sent. III, 10.2(30).5, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 10:82).) This is said against Arius, who said the Son of God was a created thing.
Chapter 105 of 186