D. 11 - Christ as a creature

Division of the text

After the Master has considered how things that pertain to the dignity of human nature can or cannot be said of Christ, here he considers how those things that pertain to a defect of human nature can be said about him. And it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he asks whether the name “created thing,” which is said of the human nature, can also be said of Christ;

in the second, he asks whether the defects that follow upon it, insofar as it is a created thing or in any other manner, can belong to him, at after the above, it is asked whether that man began to be, or always was. (Sent. III, 12.1(34).1.)

The first is divided into three.

First, he proposes the question;

second, he answers it, at to which it can be said; (Sent. III, 11.1(32).1.)

third, he refutes the objections that can arise against the resolution, at and so, although Christ is called a creature according to his humanity, yet Christ is not simply to be called a creature. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).4.)

As regards the second he does two things:

first, he answers the proposed question;

second, he confirms his answer.

And he does the latter first with respect to the fact that Christ cannot be called a “created thing” simply speaking, at: in On the Trinity, book 1, he also shows that Christ or the Son of God was not made; (Sent. III, 11.1(32).2.)

and second, with respect to the fact he can be called a “created thing” [if this is said] with a determination, namely, “insofar as he is a man,” at but this may be rightly said with the addition of a determination. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).2.)

Question 1

Whether the name “created thing" can be said of Christ

Here four things are asked:

first, whether the Son of God is a created thing;

second, whether Christ, or this man, can be called a “created thing”;

third, whether he is a created thing insofar as he is a man;

fourth, whether all things that belong to human nature can be predicated of Christ.

Article 1

Whether the Son of God is a created thing

To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that the Son of God is a created thing.

Obj. 1: For Sirach 24:9 says, from eternity, in the beginning, he created me; and this is speaking of the divine wisdom. But the Son of God is the wisdom of God. Therefore he is a created thing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything subject to God or less than him is a created thing. But the Son of God is of this sort, as is clear in John 14:28: the Father is greater than I, and 1 Corinthians 15:28 says, the Son himself will also be subjected to the Father, who subjected all things to him. Therefore the Son of God is a created thing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, actions are related to each other in the same way that the termini of the actions are related. But existence, which is the terminus of creation, is prior to any other form at which other actions might be terminated. Therefore creation is prior to all other actions and productions. But the posterior always presupposes the prior. Therefore, since generation belongs to the Son of God, in virtue of which he is said to be “born,” it appears that creation also belongs to him, such that he would be called a “created thing.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics, (find source) that whose essence is its own existence exists through itself necessarily. But whatever is of this sort does not have its existence from another, since what exists absolutely necessarily is not on account of something else, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015b11–15; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 6, n. 840.) Therefore that whose essence is its own existence does not have existence from another. But the Son has existence from another. Therefore he does not exists necessarily, nor is his essence his existence. Therefore he is a created thing.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that has a cause of its own existence is a created thing. But the Son has a cause of his existence, since the Father is the cause of the Son, as Chrysostomus says, (source) and all the Greek doctors grant. Therefore the Son is a created thing.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that is brought forth is brought forth so that it might exist. But what exists is not brought forth so that it might exist, since it already exists. Therefore everything that is brought forth does not exist before it is brought forth. But everything that did not exist and later does exist is created. Therefore the Son, since he was begotten, was created.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, everything that has something from something else, does not have it, if considered in itself, and if it were taken away from him, he would lack it. But the Son has existence from another. Therefore, considered in himself, he does not have existence, and if it were taken from him, he would not exist. But this is the condition of a created thing, in virtue of which it is said to able to revert to nothingness, since all things would revert to nothing unless the hand of their Maker holds them fast. Therefore the Son is a created thing.

On the contrary, no created thing is consubstantial with the Creator. But the Son is consubstantial with the Father, as is said in John 10:30: I and the Father are one. Therefore the Son is not a created thing.

Furthermore, every created thing is upheld by the power of the Creator. But what upholds all things is not itself upheld. Therefore what upholds all things is not a created thing. But the Son is this: upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3). Therefore the Son is not a created thing.

Furthermore, nothing in God is a created thing. But the Son is in God the Father, since he is his Word, and every word is in its speaker. Therefore the Son is not a created thing.

Furthermore, everything said through a likeness traces back to what is said properly. But men are called “sons of God” through becoming like the only Son: for those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom 8:29). Therefore he is properly called “Son.” But someone is properly called someone’s “son” only if he has specifically and truly the same nature as the father. Therefore the Son is truly God. But no created thing is like this. Therefore the Son is not a created thing.

I answer that the Son naturally proceeds from the Father. For the very name “sonship,” or “filiation,” demonstrates this, if it is a true filiation—which must be so most of all in this filiation and paternity, from which every paternity and filiation in heaven and on earth is named, according to Eph 3:15. For those things are the most true that are the cause of the existence and the truth in others, as is said in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b25; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 2, lect. 2, n. 294.) However, everything that proceeds from another naturally has two elements.

One is that it be made equal to that from which it proceeds. For nature postpones doing its work only due to a failure of the agent, and that failure is in an agent that either does not yet have a perfect power for acting, such as children as regards the power to generate, or it acts through a transformation of external matter in such a way that the effect follows only at the end of the transformation. And in this way it must occur that, in duration, it would come after its agent cause. And these things are a long ways from God, whose power does not grow and who does not require anything on which he must act. Therefore it remains that everything that naturally proceeds from God is coeternal with him, and thus the Son is from eternity.

The other element is that what naturally proceeds from another must be like that from which it proceeds. For a nature intends to make a thing like itself to the extent that it can. This is why if something proceeding naturally does not have a perfect likeness with that from which it proceeds, this happens either due to a defect in the power of the agent, as in seed wherein the natural heat is weakened, whereby it is not sufficient to generate a male, but a female, or due to a defect in matter that cannot receive the entire power of the agent, as happens in deformed births.

Now, these two elements are a long ways from God, as was said, and this is why what proceeds from God naturally must bear a perfect likeness to him. Now, a perfect likeness cannot be where there is not the same nature in species. However, the divine nature can be specifically the same only if it is the same numerically, since it is wholly immaterial. Whence the Son, who proceeds from God the Father naturally, must have numerically the same nature with him, and consequently the same existence, and thus in all ways he will be equal to him. And because the nature and existence of God the Father in no way hangs over nothingness or non-existence, namely, such that non-existence would precede it in time or by nature, therefore neither the Son’s nature nor his existence in any way hangs over nothingness.

From this it is clear that the Son can in no way be a created thing, neither with respect to what the faith says about creation, according to which we assert that a non-existence in duration preceded the created world, nor with respect to what certain philosophers thought about creation, saying that what is created is what has existence after non-existence, but not a non-existence in time but by its nature. And this is what has existence that hangs over non-existence, since considered in itself, it cannot be left to itself, since it has existence only from another. But we have discussed this more fully in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, aa. 2–5.)

Reply Obj. 1: Those words should be understood either to be about a created wisdom, that is, an angelic nature, which is before the temporal ages, although not before in duration, but in the order of nature, or it should be understood to be about the Son of God with reference to his assumed nature, which, although it was not before all created ages, was nonetheless foreseen from eternity to be created.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine teaches in On the Trinity 1, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, cc. 7–8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:828–830).) all things that appear to assert diminution or subjection in the Son of God should be referred either to the assumed nature—in virtue of which he is less than the Father, while remaining in the form of God equal to the Father, as is said in Phil 2:6—or it should be referred to a praise of the principle, insofar as the Father is called the “principle of the Son”; and in virtue of this he is said to be "greater," even though the Son is not lesser, as Hilary says. (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, para. 54–56 (CCSL 52A; PL 10:324–326).)

Reply Obj. 3: According to Basil, the Son has the fact that he receives from the Father in common with every created thing, but to have this by his nature is something proper to him. (Basil the Great, Homiliae et Sermones,, homily 15, "De fide," para. 2 (PG 31:467).) Whence the Son’s procession from the Father agrees in a certain respect with the procession in created things by a community of analogy, but in another respect they differ. They agree in reference to their origin, which is to be from something, but they differ insofar as the procession of the Son from the Father is by his nature, but of the others it is by his will. Three differences follow from this, as is clear from things said. First, the Son is consubstantial with the Father; second, he is coeternal with him; third, his existence in no way hangs over nothingness, which follows from the first.

Whence one should consider that all names or words that carry a reference to an origin absolutely are admitted in divine procession, such as “he proceeds,” “he goes forth,” and “he is from another.” However, names that carry something contrary to the three differences mentioned earlier are in no way said, for example, “made,” which is opposed to consubstantiality, since “making” is said properly in reference to an activity that an agent exercises in something outside itself. Likewise, the word “beginning” is repugnant to coeternity, and likewise the word “creating” carries the hanging over non-existence.

But “birth” adds to a reference of origin absolutely speaking something that more pertains to consubstantiality than to a difference in substance. For, as was said above in Distinction 8, (Above, d. 8, a. 1.) that is properly said to be “born” which proceeds as joined to that from which it proceeds. And therefore all things that pertain to the generation of living things, to which being born belongs, are said of the Son’s procession, such as arising, being born, being brought forth, and being begotten. This is the reason why the procesion of the Son could have a proper name, whereas the procession of the Holy Spirit, who does not proceed through the mode of being born, could not. Whence “generation” or “birth” is not transmitted to divine things insofar as it presupposes creation, but insofar as it indicates substantiality.

Reply Obj. 4: That argument follows for what is from another and possesses a different nature from it. For in this way the nature of what is from another is not owed existence from its very self; whence it is not its own existence, such that it would have the necessity of existing from itself. But the Son is from the Father and possesses numerically the same nature as he. This is why just as the Father’s nature is his own existence, and thereby necessarily exists, so too the Son’s nature. Nor does his existence in any way hang over nothingness, just as neither does the Father’s existence.

Reply Obj. 5: The Son’s existence is not created, so the Son does not have a cause of his existence, nor does his existence have a principle. For although, according to us, the Son himself has a principle he is from, still he does not have a cause, for, according to us, the name “principle” carries a relation of origin absolutely speaking, whereas the name “cause” carries a reference to an origin in connection to the existence of a thing that proceeds from the cause. This is why a terminus-from-which is called a motion’s “principle,” not its “cause.” But according to the Greeks, the name “cause” imports the simple origin of a form, as does the name “principle” among us. And although we call the Father “the principle of the Son,” nonetheless we do not call the Son “the one derived from the Father,” for we use the name “derived” only in things that are constituted in existence through a principle. Whence a line is not said to be “derived from a point,” as neither is a motion the terminus from which it began, but still it is said to be from a principle.

Reply Obj. 6: The Son did not have existence before he was generated. But because his generation is eternal, his existence is also eternal.

Reply Obj. 7: Just as a created thing has its existence only from God, so too the Son has existence only from the Father. But there is a difference in this: the created thing is not the relation according to which it is said to be from God, through which it has existence. And therefore it can be considered in itself, without its reference to God, and in this way it is found not to possess existence. But the Son of God is the very relation according to which he has existence from the Father, and the very relation is his very existence. And therefore the Son cannot be considered without reference to the Father, such that he could be found in himself not to possess his existence, or capable of falling into nothingness.

Article 2

Whether Christ is a created thing

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ is a created thing.

Obj. 1: For Pope Leo says, this coming together was new and unheard of: the God who was and who is becomes a created thing. (This does not seem to be in the letters of Pope St. Leo the Great. It is found in the appendix to the Opera Augustini, serm. 128, de Natali Domini, n. 2 (PL 39:1998).) But that which God becomes can be predicated of Christ. Therefore Christ is a created thing. Damascene too says of Christ that he will not be scandalized by the name 'created thing.' (This expression was not found in John Damascene, though he speaks of Christ as created in On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PG 94:998).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever the lower is predicated of, so too is the higher. But “created” is higher than “man.” Therefore, since “man” is predicated of Christ, so too will “created” be predicated of him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is, is either created or uncreated. Therefore if Christ is a man, either he will be a created man or an uncreated man. But he is not an uncreated man, just as he is not an eternal man, since everything uncreated is eternal. Therefore he is a created man, and a created thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what belongs to a part is extended to the predication of the whole, just as a man is called “curly-haired” on account of his hair. But the human nature is, as it were, a part of the composite person, which this name “Christ” stands for. Therefore, since the human nature is a created thing, Christ can be called a “created thing.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more principal part of Christ the man is his soul rather than his body. But by reason of his body, which he drew from the Virgin, he is simply said to be “born of the Virgin.” Therefore by reason of his soul, which is created by God, he should be called a “created thing.”

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as the name “created thing” is repugnant to the uncreated Son, so too being born in time is repugnant to what is born eternally. But still we say Christ was born in time. Therefore also we can say simply that he is a created thing.

On the contrary, “created thing” cannot be predicated of something eternal. But “Christ” supposes the eternal supposit. Therefore he cannot be called a “created thing.”

Furthermore, there is nothing created in Christ other than his human nature. But his human nature is not predicated of Christ. Therefore Christ cannot be called a “created thing.”

Furthermore, every rational creature is a son of the Trinity through its creation. But Christ, if he is a created thing, he is a rational creature. Therefore he is a son of the Trinity through his creation—which was disproved above in Distinction 4. (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 2, ad 1.)

I answer that creation properly speaking has to do with a thing’s existence; this is why in the Book of Causes (Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 18.) it says that existence is through creation, and anything else is through information. Now, to exist, simply speaking and through itself, belongs to the subsisting supposit, whereas other things are said to exist insofar as the supposit subsists in them, whether essentially, such as matter and form, and in this way the nature itself is said to exist, or accidentally, as accidents are said to exist. Therefore “existence,” when said simply of the supposit, signifies its personal existence, whereas the “existence” that belongs to a part or an accident is not said simply of the supposit, but rather the supposit is said to exist in it. Whence, when I say, “Christ is,” his existence is being signified, but not the existence of his very nature or that of an accident or a part. However, since the union of the two natures occurs in the existence of the supposit, according to the second opinion, this existence, insofar as Christ is said to exist simply, is an uncreated existence. This is why he cannot be called a “created thing,” not only to avoid the error of Arius, as some say, but even to avoid falsity. Nevertheless, it can be said that something created is in Christ, namely, his human nature, since his existence, although it is one thing, nonetheless has a relation to the nature, and to the parts in virtue of which a human nature, or its parts or accidents, is said to be in Christ, as was said above in Distinction 6. (Above, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2.) This is why, just as existence in a certain way pertains to a nature, its parts, and accidents, so too does creation.

Reply Obj. 1: Those words should be understood with a determination, as the Master says in the text, (Sent. III, 11.2(33).2.) although that determination is sometimes omitted, for the sake of brevity.

Reply Obj. 2: “Created thing” is not higher than “man,” since creation more refers to existence than to a nature. Now, existence is not a genus, nor is it found within the signification of any genus, as Avicenna says, (source) since things that are in one genus do not agree in one existence, but in a common nature. Or it could be said that “created thing” is not higher than “man” when signifying what man is. For creation refers to a nature or an essence only by the mediation of an act of existing, which is the first terminus of creation. However, the human nature in Christ does not have any complete existence, which is the existence of a hypostasis, other than the existence of the divine person. And therefore simply speaking, he cannot be called a “created thing,” since it would be thought that the complete existence of Christ’s hypostasis would be acquired through his creation.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that “Christ is a created man,” the expression has two aspects, because the participle “created” can determine the predicate in relation to the subject—and in this way it can be true, just as is “Christ was made man.” However, if it determines the predicate absolutely, then it is false, since in the man there is understood not only the nature but also the eternal supposit, to which a created existence does not belong. For what determines a predicate in its order to its subject is a determination of it as predicate; this is why it must look to the predicate formally, since the termini are asserted in a predicate formally. However, a determination that determines it absolutely is asserted about the predicate as about some subject, so it more relates to a supposit than to a form. Likewise too, “Christ is an uncreated man” is false, since the lack of creation is being asserted of the predicate by reason of both [“man” and its supposit], and therefore both are false, nor do they contradict themselves. But this is true: “Christ is a man who is not created but is eternal on the side of the Godhead.” Yet he is not an eternal man, such that eternity would determine the predicate in its order to the subject.

Reply Obj. 4: A whole is denominated from a property of its part when that property is naturally apt to belong only to that part, just as curliness to hair, and limping to feet. But creation is naturally apt to belong not only to a nature but also to a person, and even to a person and supposit more properly. Therefore “being created” cannot be said of the supposit because the nature is created.

Reply Obj. 5: And thereby this solution is clear, since being born of a mother is naturally apt to belong to the supposit of a man only inasmuch as he draws his body from his mother. This is why being born in time has no repugnance to being born eternally, since the one looks to the human nature, and the other to the divine, the latter of which Christ has from the Father eternally, and the former from his mother in time. But both “created” and “uncreated” can both refer to the supposit by reason of the supposit’s existence.

Reply Obj. 6: This is clear.

Article 3

Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a created thing

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 2; ST III.16.10.) It appears that Christ cannot be called a “created thing” insofar as he is a man.

Obj. 1: For whatever is predicated of another as it itself is, is predicated of it simply. But what is predicated of Christ insofar as he is a man is predicated of him as he is, since he is a man essentially. Therefore since “being a created thing” is not predicated simply, it cannot be predicated of him insofar as he is a man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is greater to be an adoptive son than to be a created thing. But it cannot be said that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is an adoptive son. Therefore much less can it be said that insofar as he is a man he is a created thing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to what the Master says in the text, (Sent. III, 11.2(33).4.) the expression “Christ is a created thing” is a tropological expression. Therefore if Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a created thing, this too will be improper: “Christ is a man”—which is false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing in Christ is created except his human nature. But this is false: "Christ insofar as he is a man is a human nature." Therefore so is this: "Christ insofar as he is a man is a created thing."

Obj. 5: Furthermore, these things are compatible with each other: “Christ is a man,” and “Christ is God.” Therefore what is not compatible with being God, cannot be predicated of Christ as man—for example, lacking divinity. But to be a created thing is not compatible with being God. Therefore Christ, as man, is not a created thing.

On the contrary, everything that is not eternal is created. But Christ insofar as he is a man is not eternal, nor is he God. Therefore insofar as he is a man he is a created thing.

Furthermore, everything that is made is created. But Christ insofar as he is a man was made. Therefore he was created insofar as he is a man.

Furthermore, every condition of any nature can be predicated of a thing according to a name signifying that nature. But “man” signifies the human nature, a condition of which is that it is created. Therefore Christ can be called “created thing” insofar as he is a man.

I answer that the human nature is related to the composite person of Christ as a part, although properly it cannot be called “part,” nor is he properly a “composite person,” as was said earlier. (Above, d. 6, q. 2, a. 3.) Now, a part sometimes has one disposition that is naturally apt to belong to the whole, but sometimes another that is not naturally apt to belong to the whole; for example, the whiteness that is in the hair can also belong to the whole, but curliness belongs to the hair such that in no way does it belong to the whole, or to any other part. Therefore according to those dispositions that are only in the part, the whole is denominated simply and properly by the disposition of the part, with nothing more added, as when the man is called “shaggy”; but with respect to those dispositions that are naturally apt to belong to the part and the whole, the whole is not denominated by the part simply, but by the addition of the part, as when a man is called “white of hair.” And this is not done properly, but figuratively, through synecdoche. Whence it is clear that since creation, like existence, is naturally apt to belong to the nature and the person, it belongs to each of them in a certain way. Yet it cannot be said of Christ that he is a created thing because his human nature is created, unless something more were added, such as “as man” or “according as he is a man.” And then it is also tropological and figurative, as the Master says, (Sent. III, 11.2(33).4.) the way this is: the Ethiopian is white in virtue of his teeth.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows for things that are predicated properly and through themselves, but this here is not proper predication, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: To be an adoptive son is only naturally apt to belong to a person, and therefore he cannot be called an “adoptive son” with respect to his human nature, as he is called a “created thing.” For the name “created thing” is apt for both a person and a nature.

Reply Obj. 3: When there is proper predication with this repetition, then the predicate through itself belongs to what is doubled. For example, “Christ, insofar as he is a man, is an animal,” for “man is an animal” is said properly and through itself, and therefore in the same way the predicate and repetition is predicated of the subject. However, this repetition is not a characteristic of predication through itself, for “this man, Christ, is a created thing” is not proper, nor is it through itself, since “created thing” is not something higher than “man” signifying what man is, as was said. Therefore it is not necessary that, if “created thing” is said of Christ improperly, he would also be called a “man” improperly.

Reply Obj. 4: Human nature in the abstract is not predicated of Christ insofar as he is a man, but its conditions in the concrete can be predicated of Christ insofar as he is a man, either improperly or properly. But “creature” is said in the concrete, since everything created is a creature.

Reply Obj. 5: Although what belongs to a part in some way can be said of the whole, nonetheless it is not necessary that if it is removed from a part it would be removed from the whole. Whence although the Ethipian has whiteness, in virtue of his teeth, nonetheless it cannot be said that he [as a whole] lacks blackness; for what does not belong to him in virtue of one part can belong to him in virtue of another. And likewise, Christ is a created thing insofar as he is a man, yet it cannot be said that, insofar as he is a man, he would lack the divinity that belongs to him through his other nature.

Article 4

Whether things belonging to human nature can be said of the Son of God

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; Super 1 Cor. 2, lect. 2; ST III.10.1.ad 3; 16.4; Contra errores Graecorum, ch. 6.) It appears that things that belong to human nature cannot be said of the Son of God.

Obj. 1: For every property or accident of human nature is something created. But the Son of God is not formed by anything created. Therefore no accident of human nature can be predicated of the Son of God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the properties of the divine nature are said of the Son of God because the Son of God is the divine nature. But the Son of God is not the human nature. Therefore the properties of human nature are not predicated of the Son of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, being assumed by the Son of God belongs to the human nature, and being united to him belongs to the man. But the latter does not belong to the Son of God. Therefore the things that belong to the human nature need not be said of the Son of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the following is true: "this man was predestined." But the following is false: "the Son of God was predestined." Therefore the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every property of human nature is something created. But “created” is not predicated of the Son of God. Therefore neither is any property of human nature.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the things predicated of Christ insofar as he is a man are not predicted of him insofar as he is the Son of God. Therefore for the same reason it appears that the things said of a man are not predicated of the Son of God.

On the contrary (7), whatever something is predicated of, all the consequences of that thing are also predicated of. This is so even if it is an accidental predication; for example, if a man is white, it follows that he is colored. But “man” is predicated of God. Therefore whatever is predicated of man is also predicated of the Son of God.

Furthermore (8), whatever things follow on a nature are predicated of the supposits of that nature. But the Son of God is a supposit of the human nature. Therefore things following on human nature can be predicated of the Son of God.

Furthermore (9), Christ is a person subsisting in two natures, the divine and the human. But all things that belong to the divine nature can be predicated of Christ. Therefore for a like reason all things that belong to the human nature.

Furthermore (10), nothing is more repugnant to the divine nature than death. But we do say that the Son of God died. Therefore also all the other things that belong to human nature can be said of the Son of God.

I answer that the nature and the supposit of the nature in some things differ both in reality and in notion, as in composite things, but in others they differ in notion and not in reality, as in the divine.

But a difference that is according to notion is a difference of opposition, for “nature” and “supposit” have opposite intentions. Therefore things that pertain to the notion of a nature are in no way predicated of the supposit, whether abstractly or concretely, in both the divine and the human. For example, the Father is not called “common to the three [persons],” nor is Peter called “the form of the whole.” However, a difference that is according to reality is not one of opposition, but is one of a formal principle to what is formed by it. And therefore things that pertain to a nature according to reality can be predicated of its supposit; for example, when the nature is predicated in the concrete.

However, because the union takes place in the supposit—namely, such that there is one and the same supposit of the divine nature and the human—therefore of that supposit can be predicated things that follow on each nature according to reality, just as the natures themselves are also predicated of it. For because the divine nature is predicated of the Son of God in both the concrete and the abstract, therefore its properties can be predicated of him in both ways. But because the human nature is predicated of him in only the concrete, therefore the properties of human nature are predicated of him in only the concrete.

Nor does it make a difference whether the predication of the supposit occurs in reference to a name that signifies the divine nature, such as “Word,” or the human, such as “Jesus,” or both, such as “Christ.” For all of these stand for the same supposit. Nevertheless, this supposit is not constituted by the human nature; rather, the human nature comes to it already preexisting from eternity in the other nature.

Whence two things are uniquely found in the composition of the human nature with that supposit: namely, that the former is united to the latter, and that it is related to it in the manner of a part, in virtue of which the supposit subsists in the two natures. And therefore the things that indicate the union are excluded from the generality stated above, as likewise are the things that are naturally apt of themselves to belong to both the person and the nature. Such things can be predicated of the supposit only with an addition, as is the case with things that are parts of a whole.

Reply Obj. 1: Created properties are said of the Son of God not as though the eternal person himself is formed by them, but because the assumed nature is formed by them, just as properties by which parts are informed are predicated of the whole.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument concludes that the properties of human nature are not predicated abstractly of Christ, which is true.

Reply Obj. 3: “Being assumed” is among the things that indicate the union, and therefore it is not necessary that it be said of the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ’s predestination is in reference to the union, whence “predestined” includes the union as the predestination’s terminus. Therefore just as the man is called “united,” so also “predestined to be united,” but the Son of God is not. And furthermore, “predestined” includes a making, as is clear from things said earlier, so just as “to be made” is not said of the Son of absolutely, neither is “to be predestined.”

Reply Obj. 5: The human nature is a created thing, yet when it is predicated of Christ concretely, it does not follow that Christ is a created thing. Thus, neither does it follow that Christ is a created thing just because the properties of the human nature are predicated of Christ in the concrete.

Reply Obj. 6: For the truth of a proposition it is enough that the predicate belong to the subject in some way. But for a proposition to be through itself, it must be that it belongs to it by reason of the form borne by the subject. This is why “God suffered” is true, yet it is not through itself. And because the repetition requires a statement that is true through itself, therefore the account of repetition propositions is not like that of ones lacking the repetition.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Some things do not follow upon the human nature insofar as it is predicated of the Son of God, and those things need not be predicated of Christ.

Reply Sed Contra 8–10: And from this, the solution to the things that follow is clear.

Exposition of the text

All things were made through him. (Sent. III, 11.1(32).2, quoting John 1:3.) It appears that this is not relevant, since Augustine understands this to be about the Son of God as the Son of God. But it should be said that because in Christ there is no other supposit than the person of the Son of God, therefore just as the Son of God cannot be called a “created thing,” so neither can Christ.

For if he were a creature, he would be commanding that the Gospel be preached to himself. (Sent. III, 11.1(32).3, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, ad Gratianum, bk. 1, ch. 14, n. 86 (CSEL 78; PL 16:549).) It appears that this would not follow, since the angels and stones are created things, to which the Gospel need not be preached. It should be said that this should be taken as being about the created things that are men, to whom the Gospel should be preached, either so that they might be cleansed, or perfected, or preserved. However, Christ is a man.

Subject to vanity. (Sent. III, 11.1(32).3, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, ad Gratianum, bk. 1, ch. 14, n. 86 (CSEL 78; PL 16:549), quoting Romans 8:20.) This is understood as being about the vanity with respect to which all things tend into nothingness unless they be upheld by the omnipotent hand.

Not one out of many. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).2.) Romans 8:29 is against this: in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren. And it should be said that he is one among the many with regard to a likeness of sonship, in virtue of which he is also called “first-born.” But he is not one among many by the property of birth, in virtue of which he is called the “only begotten.”

For in God there cannot be a creature. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).3.) Romans 11:36 is against this: in him are all things. (RSV says “to him.”) It should be said that created things are in him not by essence, but as in a cause, through their ideal likenesses, which are not created things insofar as they are in God.

But there is no right way for an argument to proceed from figurative speech. (Sent. III, 11.2(33).4.) The reason for this is that such are not true simply speaking, but in a certain respect. Whence even Dionysius says, in the Letter to Titus, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistola 9, Ad Titum, para. 1 (PG 3:1103–07).) that symbolic theology does not proceed by argument.