D. 17 - The will of Christ

Division of the text

After having considered the things that Christ assumed with his human nature, here the Master considers the things that he did through his human nature. Now, the principle of human activity is the will, without which no activity is either meritorious or praiseworthy. And therefore this part is divided into two parts.

First, he considers Christ’s will;

second, his merits, which proceeded from his will, in Distinction 18, at on Christ’s merit, it must not be passed over. (Sent. III, 18.1(50).1.)

The first is divided into two:

first, he considers Christ’s will;

and second, he removes certain doubts that can arise from the things said, at yet we are troubled not a little by the words of Ambrose. (Sent. III, 17.3(49).1.)

The first of these is divided into three:

first, he lays out a doubt about the efficacy of Christ’s will, and about his will, which is a sign of his will;

second, he resolves it by making a distinction about Christ’s will, at in regard to this, it is not to be doubted that in Christ there were different wills; (Sent. III. 17. 2(48).1.)

and in the third, confirms his solution, showing that there are diverse wills in Christ, at and it was from his human disposition, which he received from the Virgin, that he did not want to die. (Sent. III, 17.2(48).4.)

Yet we are troubled not a little by the words of Ambrose. (Sent. III, 17.3(49).1.) Here he removes certain things about which there might be doubts, due to things said.

And first, he removes a doubt that arises from things Ambrose says;

second, a doubt that arises from things Hilary says, at neither are we to pass over Hilary’s assertion that Christ not for himself, but for his own [disciples], when he said: 'Let this cup pass from me.' (Sent. III, 17.3(49).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 29 (CCSL 62; PL 10:368), and Matt 26:39.)

Question 1

The will of Christ

Four things are asked about here:

first, the plurality of Christ’s wills;

second, their conformity or contrariety to each other;

third, his prayer, which expresses his will;

fourth, the doubt that Ambrose asserts in Christ as regards a certain will of Christ.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there was a will other than the divine

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.18.1; SCG IV.36; Compendium theol., ch. 212; Super Matth. 26; Super Ioan. 6, lect. 4.) It appears that in Christ there was but one will, the divine.

Obj. 1: For since to will is to act, it belongs to the person. But in Christ there is only one person, the divine. Therefore also there is only will, the divine.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to lead, not to be led, belongs to the will. But in Christ the human affect was said to be led by the divine will, which used the former as a minister, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1016).) Therefore in Christ the human affect should not be a called a “will.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to the extent that any many is more holy, so much more so is his will united to the divine; for he who is united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him (1 Cor 6:17). But Christ was the holiest man. Therefore his human will was perfectly one with the divine will.

On the contrary, Christ assumed our nature so that he might cure it, for what cannot be assumed cannot be cured, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) But our will, through which sin entered [the world], was most in need of cure. Therefore he assumed it, and therefore in Christ there is a will besides the divine will.

Furthermore, as the unity of will is related to the unity of nature, so too is the plurality of the former to a plurality of the latter. But in the three persons there is one will, because there is one nature. Therefore too in Christ there are many wills, because there are many natures, although he is one person.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that in Christ there is no human will besides his reason’s will. (Parallel: ST III.18.2.) For as Damascene says in On the Orthodox Faith 3, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1034).) the will follows the nature. But in Christ there are only two natures, so there are also only two wills. Therefore there is no third will besides the divine will and reason’s will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as reason is a different apprehensive power than sensitive apprehension, so is an interior sense from an exterior sense. But there is not a different will consequent on the apprehension of an exterior sense than that consequent on the apprehension of an interior sense. Therefore one need not assert that there are different wills that follow on reason’s apprehension and the apprehension of the sensitive part.

Obj. 3: Furthermore the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b5; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 14, nn. 802‒803.) and Damascene too, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:943).) that the will is only in reason, but there is a desire and spirit in the sensitive part, that is, the irascible and the concupiscible. But sensuality is distinct from reason, as is clear in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 24, prol., and q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore there is no will of sensuality.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sensuality is signified by the serpent, in whom was the first motion of sin. But in Christ there is nothing serpentlike, nor any sin. Therefore in him there was no will of sensuality.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the motions of sensuality are unexpected. But in Christ there was nothing unexpected, since the whole was foreseen by him. Therefore in him there was no will of sensuality.

On the contrary, sensuality is an intermediary between the body and reason. But if the extremes are asserted, so is the intermediary. Therefore, since in Christ there was a human body and a rational soul, there must also be sensuality in him.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 414b20‒23; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 5, nn. 295‒98.) that as the triangle is in the quadrilateral, and the quadrilateral in the pentagon, so too is the nutritive in the sensitive, and the sensitive in the intellectual. But in Christ there was an intellectual soul. Therefore the sensitive [soul] was present in Christ, in all of its parts; therefore so was the will of sensuality, which is a part of the sensitive [soul].

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that in Christ there are many wills of reason. (Parallel: ST III.18.3.) For in On the Orthodox Faith, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:943).) Damascene distinguishes two wills of reason, thelesis, which is the natural will, and boulesis, which is the rational will. But Christ was lacking in none of the things that pertain to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in Christ there were two wills of reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin properly is in the will. Now, it is sometimes said to be in higher reason, and sometimes in the lower reason. Therefore to each of these there is a corresponding will, which we must assert in Christ.

Obj. 3: The Philosopher in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1, 1139a11–12.) states that there are diverse apprehensive powers in the intellectual part—namely, the scientific, which knows necessary things, and the reasoning, or opining, powers, through which we comprehend contingent things that we can do. But its appetite follows its apprehension. Therefore in the intellectual part there are many wills.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every human power is in the reason, in virtue of which a man has it that he is a man. But the masters say that there are certain human irascible and concupiscible powers. Therefore one must place them in reason. But these things pertain to the will. Therefore there are many wills in reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the intellectual part there is free decision, which can choose among things that are for the sake of the end, and will, which is of the end itself, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b26‒30.) Now, neither of these is missing from Christ. Therefore the same thing as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Hugh of Saint Victor asserts that in Christ, besides a will of sensuality, and one of reason, and the divine will, there is a will of piety. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo libellus (PL 176:841).) Now, piety is in the reason. Therefore it appears that there are many wills in reason.

On the contrary, the Philosopher in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b5; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 14, nn. 802‒803.) does not make distinctions within the will of reason, whereas he does in the appetite of the sensitive power.

Furthermore, man is said to be a microcosm, for he becomes like the universe. But in the universe there is only one first mover. Therefore so too in man. But the first mover is the will of reason, which moves all the other powers, according to Anselm. (Anselm, De casu diaboli, ch. 1 (PL 158:325)) Therefore one must lay it down that there is only one will of reason in Christ, as is the case with all other men.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that will follows on human nature. Damascene proves this with three arguments in On the Orthodox Faith. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1038).) First, because every nature has its own proper motion, but the proper motion of a rational nature is that it freely reach toward things, and this belongs to will. Second, because no one learns to will things, as with other natural powers. Third, because nature does not lead in man, the way it does in other animals, but rather is led; whence it must be that there is a freedom present in man in his own motion, and this belongs to will. Fourth, because man in virtue of his own nature was made to the image of God, but the image consists in memory, understanding, and will. Fifth, because it is found in all those having a human nature; whence, since Christ assumed our whole nature (otherwise he would not be a true man), it is certain that he assumed a will. And thus in Christ there is both a human will and a divine will—not that they compose one will, as Eutyches said, since then neither would be in him—but rather, each remains distinct in him. And thus in Christ there are two wills.

Reply Obj. 1: Although to will belongs to the person, nonetheless this is so through a natural power that is the principle of that act. And therefore because in Christ there are two natures, there are two wills—yet one willing, on account of the unity of the divine person.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine will does not lead the human afffect by forcing it, but by directing it, and this does not exclude the notion of will.

Reply Obj. 3: “Will” is said in three ways. Sometimes the very power of willing is meant, sometimes the very act of willing, and moreover, sometimes the very thing willed. And the will of the holy man is united to the will of God in the last sense, but not in the first two.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in Christ there were all the things that belong to the perfection of human nature. Now, just the will of reason belongs to the perfection of human nature inasmuch as a man is man, so too a sensitive appetite belongs to the perfection of man as animal; thus one must posit the appetite of the sensitive part in Christ. But this appetite in the other animals does not have the notion of will, since by the instinct of their nature they are more acted upon than acting, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1038).) and so they do not have the free motion that a will requires. Nevertheless, the sensitive appetite in man can be called a “will” insofar as it is obedient to reason, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b30.) Therefore it participates in a way in the freedom of the will just it participates in a way in the rectitude of reason, such that it can be called “will” by participation just as it is called “reason” by participation. And in this way we say that in Christ, with respect to his human nature, there are two wills: that of sensuality and that of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: In Christ there are two complete natures, no one of which is a part of the other, and from which the person is immediately compounded. But nevertheless one of the natures, the human, is divided into many partial natures, such as the nature of the body and that of the soul, and it into the sensitive and the rational. And in reference to this even the human will is divided into two wills.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as reason’s appetite does not follow just any apprehension of reason, but when something is apprehended as a good, so too the sense appetite does not rise up except when something is apprehended as suitable to it. Now, this does not happen through an exterior sense, which apprehends sensible forms, but through an estimation that apprehends the notion of the suitable or harmful, which the exterior sense does not apprehend. And therefore in the sensitive part there is only one appetite in its genus, yet it is divided as to species into the irascible and the concupiscible, each of which is counted under sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: What is essentially the will is in what is essentially the reason, but a will by participation is in reason by participation.

Reply Obj. 4: Sensuality is called a “serpent,” and the principle of sin, not with respect to the power’s nature, which Christ assumed, but with respect to the corruption of tinder, which was not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 5: In Christ certain things happened that were not foreseen by the interior or exterior senses, although they were foreseen by him through his reason, or through his divine knowledge. And therefore the motion of sensuality in him was unexpected in reference to sensation, but not with respect to his reason or divinity.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the distinction of powers pertains to diverse notions of their object. Now, the will’s object is the good according to the notion of the good. Whence, since that notion is common to all things, it cannot be that reason’s appetite is divided according to diverse powers; and therefore in Christ and in other men there is only one power of will. However, the relations of that will can be diverse, and in virtue of this sometimes the will of reason is distinguished. But the Master, attending to the power’s nature, does not make a distinction in the will of reason in Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Damascene, thelesis is the natural will, which moves in the mode of a nature toward something according to the absolute goodness contemplated in it, whereas boulesis is the rational appetite, which moves toward some good from its order to another. And these two the masters call by other names: “will as nature” and “will as reason.” Nonetheless, the power of the will is not divided according to them, since that diversity comes from the fact that we move toward something without making a synthesis or with a synthesis. However, to synthesize does not belong to the will through itself, but to reason. This is why that division of the will is not through things essential to it, but through incidentals; and on account of this, they are not diverse powers, but one power differing according to its relation to the preceding apprehension, which can happen with a synthesis or without one. Yet both of these—will as nature, which is thelesis, and will as reason, which is boulesis—were in Christ.

Reply Obj. 2: A sin is said to be in reason not because it is completed in it, but because it is completed in the will, which follows reason. Now, higher reason and lower reason are not diverse powers, because they are not distinguished according to the notion of their object, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2.) Rather, that distinction of reason is made insofar as it proceeds from diverse middle terms—namely, temporal notions and eternal notions—to the same thing. Now, the middle term from which one proceeds to something pertains to reason, not to will, so although in reason it causes a certain diversity or distinction, at least in offices, it causes no distinction in the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect’s object is the true, the differences of which are the necessary and the contingent. Now, these are not differences of the good as such, which is the object of the appetite, and therefore the necessary and the contingent are more able to divide the intellect than the will.

Reply Obj. 4: The sensitive appetite’s object is not the good simply speaking, but a particular good. And because the pleasant and the arduous have different notions of the particular good, therefore the sensitive appetite is divided according to these two notions of the good, and not the rational appetite, which has as its object the good simply. Whence the irascible and the concupiscible appetites are not human by their essence, but by participation.

Reply Obj. 5: The will that is for the end and free decision are not diverse powers, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.) Rather, boulesis and thelesis differ because choosing something in its order to the end pertains to free decision, but willing is of the end absolutely speaking. From the things said, it can be seen how the will in Christ is distinguished. For one will is attributed to him either by reason of his own person, or by reason of his members, to whose person he transfers himself. Now, if it is attributed to him by reason of his own person, then this is either in virtue of his divine nature, or in virtue of his human nature—and if in virtue of his human nature, either it is [the will] of sensuality or that of reason, and if of reason, either according to absolute reason or according to synthetic reason.

Reply Obj. 6: The will of piety is the will as nature, insofar as it flees things that are harmful to it or others, not considering the order of things to their end.

Article 2

Whether the human will in Christ was always conformed to the divine will in what it willed

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.18.5; 21.4; SCG IV.36.) It appears that the human will in Christ was always conformed to the divine will in what it willed.

Obj. 1: For to the degree that the conformity of the human to the divine is greater, so much greater is the rectitude of the will, which consists in this, as is clear from the Gloss on Psalm 33:1: praise befits the upright. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 33:1, 3.650 (PL 113:888); taken from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 32, sermon 1, para. 3 (CCSL 38; PL 36:277).) But Christ had the most rectified will. Therefore it was conformed to the divine will even with respect to the things willed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the will of the blessed is conformed to God with respect the things willed, since they have all that they will. But Christ was a true comprehensor. Therefore his will was conformed to what the divine will willed.

Obj. 3: It is possible for us to will something other than God wills because we do not know what God wills in some things. But Christ knew what God willed in all things. Therefore he conformed his human will to the divine with respect to all that he willed.

On the contrary, Christ wept over the destruction of Jerusalem. Therefore he did not want it to be destroyed. But God wanted it to be destroyed. Therefore he willed something that God did not will.

Furthermore, he himself said, not my will, but thine, be done (Luke 22:42). Therefore in virtue of his human will he willed something that he did not will in virtue of his divine.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that in Christ the will of sensuality was contrary to the will of reason. (Parallels: ST III.18.6; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) For as Augustine says in On the Trinity, (This assertion is not found in On the Trinity, but see Augustine, De Haeresibus, ch. 66 (CCSL 46; PL 42:34).) the contrariety of the wills is due to a contrariety of the things willed, not due to a contrariety of the natures, as the Manichees say. But in Christ the things willed by the sensuality and by the reason were contrary, since the sensuality abhorred the death that the reason chose. Therefore in Christ his sensuality’s will was contrary to his reason’s will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1059).) in Christ each power was allowed to do what was proper and natural to it. But it is natural to the appetite of sensuality to desire what is delightful as regards sensation. Therefore in Christ it did desire this. But sensuality’s fight against reason in us is due to the fact that sensuality desires things delightful as regards sensation. Therefore in Christ there was a fight of this sort.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever is afflicted in what delights another has a will contrary to his. But the will of Christ’s reason delighted in fasting as in a work of virtue, yet this afflicted his sensuality, because he was hungry, as is said in Matthew 4:2. Therefore in Christ his sensuality was contrary to his reason.

On the contrary, in the rebellion of sensuality against reason consists a first motion that is a venial sin. But in Christ there was no sin. Therefore in Christ there was no contrariety between his sensuality and his reason.

Furthermore, Augustine, in Genesis to the Letter, (According to Moos, this claim not found in Augustine.) says that every animal was in Noah’s ark, for in Christ all his motions were peaceful. But this does not happen in those in whom sensuality fights against reason. Therefore in Christ there was no such fight.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the will of reason was contrary to itself. (Parallels: ST III.18.6; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) For an intermediate communicates with each of the extremes. But the will of reason was an intermediate between the divine will and sensuality. Therefore it was conformed to both. But sensuality willed the contrary of what God willed. Therefore the will of reason willed contrary things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the will as nature wills what is for the preservation of that nature. But the will as reason in Christ willed his death and other things of this sort that pertained to the corruption of the nature. Therefore in Christ, within the will of reason there was contrariety.

On the contrary (3), contrary things cannot be in the same thing at the same time. But the will of reason is only one power, as was said in the preceding article. Therefore there cannot be any contrariety in it.

Furthermore (4), the will follows the apprehension of reason. But in Christ’s reason there was no contrariety; rather, it was determined to one. Therefore neither was there in his will.

Furthermore (5), as Augustine says in the Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 8, ch. 9 (CCSL 27; PL 32:758).) a contrariety of wills is caused by an imperfection of the will, for the will of this man or that man is not perfect. But in Christ there was no imperfect will. Therefore the will of reason was not contrary to itself.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, because the will follows reason, the progress of the will is proportioned to the progress of reason.

Now, reason has a principle that is known through itself, to which it traces back, in resolving, whatever it seeks to know. And when it is able to trace it back, it has certitude about that thing, and it judges that it is so. But before it is able to trace it back to that principle, it moves by means of certain verisimilitudes, and if it is held by those reasons as though they were certain, it is deceived and errs sometimes. However, if it is not held by them, then it has an opinion on one side with a fear of the other. Now, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8. 1151a16.) in the voluntary, the end stands as does the principle in contemplative matters, so when the will traces some matter of deliberation to an end in which it is wholly at rest, it accepts it in its judgment. However, if it traces it back to an end in which it is not wholly at rest, it wavers about both [options]. But if what is for the sake of the end is considered without its order to the end, the will moves toward it in virtue of the good or evil that it finds in it absolutely. But because the will does not remain in the motion it has regarding something of this sort, since it is not borne toward it as toward an end, therefore the will does not make a final judgment about that thing in reference to its own motion, as long as it does not consider the end toward which it orders it. Whence the will does not will it, simply speaking, but it would will it if nothing is found to be repugnant to it.

Now, the will as a nature moves toward something absolutely, as was said before. (Art. praeced, sol. 3.) Whence, if it is not ordered toward something else by reason, it will accept that thing absolutely, and it will be as its end. However, if it does order it to its end, it will not accept that thing absolutely, until it reaches the consideration of the end, which the will as reason makes.

Therefore it is clear that the will as a nature wills something imperfectly, under a condition—unless it is borne to it as to an end. But of the things that are ordered to the end, the will as reason has the last and complete judgment. Having seen these things, it can become clear how, in Christ, the will of reason is conformed to the divine will in what is willed. For the will as nature in Christ never moved to something as to an end unless God willed it. And since the will as reason moves to something only from the notion of the end, it is clear that even the will as reason was conformed to the divine will in what was willed.

But his will as nature, when moved toward something not as an end—which is not related in the same way in goodness and evil considered in themselves, and in their order to the end—was not conformed to the divine will in what was willed. For Christ did not want to suffer, whereas God wanted him to die, and moreover, his death in itself was evil, but as related to the end, it was good. However, as was said, this is not to will something perfectly, but under a condition. Whence, the masters call this “velleity.”

Therefore it is evident that, according to his will of reason, his will was conformed to the divine will in what was willed relative to everything that he willed perfectly and absolutely, but not relative to what he willed imperfectly.

Likewise also, neither was the will of sensuality conformed to the divine will in what was willed in the things that were harmful to his nature. For it does not belong to sensuality to order things to the end, from which those things have it that they be good, and acceptable to God. Yet the will of sensuality and that of reason is conformed to the divine will in the act of willing, although not in the thing willed. For although God did not will what the sensuality or will as nature willed in Christ, still it willed that act of both, insofar as, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3. ch. 15 (PG 94:1059).) he allowed each part of the soul to suffer and to do what was natural and proper to it, insofar as it was expedient to the end of redemption, and to showing the truth of his nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The conformity that is in volition does not make the rectitude of the will, since someone can will what God wills while sinning, and merit in not willing it, as was said at the end of Book I. (In I Sent., d. 48, a. 2.) But the will’s rectitude is caused by a conformity in the mode of willing: namely, such that it wills from charity, as God does; and in its final cause, such that it wills it for the sake of the same thing; and in its efficient cause, such that God wills the willing itself, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: In the blessed, who are comprehensors only, because they will be given the dowry of impassibility, nothing injurious to the sensitive part will occur. And therefore there will be nothing in which their sensuality might be discordant with the divine will. But it was otherwise in Christ, who was at once blessed and able to suffer. And likewise, neither for their wills as nature, with respect to things that pertain to them, since they will have been freed from every evil. But the evils of the damned they want not to be, but imperfectly, in the earlier explained way, that is, with a conditioned will. And in this will too, although as regards what is willed, they are not conformed to the consequent divine will, nevertheless they are conformed to the antecedent divine will, which wills that all men be saved. And in this respect there is a likeness between the will of Christ the man and the will of the blessed.

Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ knew what God willed in all things whatsoever, still he did not apprehend the divine will in every one of his powers. Nor did he apprehend the reason why God willed it according to its order toward a certain end. And therefore it was not necessary that his every power be conformed to the divine will in what was willed.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, in us, sensuality’s fight or contrariety toward reason is caused by three things: first, the diversity of the things willed; second, because sensuality is borne to what it wills violently and without the rule of reason; and third, because sensuality, tending violently toward what it wills, retards or impedes the motion of reason, either as a whole or in part. And these two last were not in Christ, since the motion of sensuality was borne into something only when it was preordained by reason. And in this way, although the will of reason would not will what his sensuality tended toward, nonetheless it was willing that the sensuality would tend toward that, as was said of the divine and human wills. Likewise, neither did the motion of sensuality impede the motion of reason, since in Christ there was no violent rejection of one power against another.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries are naturally apt to occur relative to the same thing. Whence, although the motions of sensuality and reason tend to contrary things, still they are themselves contrary only insofar as some impediment overflows from sensuality into reason—either with respect to an act by which it rules the other powers, and this is when sensuality is borne violently into its object, or with respect to the proper act of reason, and this is when sensuality extinguishes or retards reason’s motion. And these two things were not present in Christ, as they are in us. And therefore in Christ there was no fight or contrariety of sensuality against reason.

Reply Obj. 2: It is natural to sensuality that it be borne to what is delightful according to sensation following the rule of reason. But the corruption of the tinder causes it to be immoderately so borne, and thereby there is a venial sin in the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument proves only that the things they will are different.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that according to reason’s will, Christ willed diverse things, yet not in one way—rather, in one way absolutely, but in another under a condition and imperfectly. And therefore there was no contrariety within his will, because contrariety in a habit or act is due to a contrary notion of the object. Now, reason, according to which the will as reason willed one contrary—and as nature it willed the other, has no contrariety. For what has its goodness from its order to the end, which without that order would be in itself evil, does not have any repugnance in virtue of which, as was said, the will as reason and the will as nature would be borne into diverse things.

Reply Obj. 1–2: From this the reply to the first two arguments is clear, since they conclude to a diversity of the things willed.

Reply Sed Contra 3: And likewise for the third, which is toward the opposite, since it concludes about the contrariety of the will.

Reply Sed Contra 4: Just as in Christ reason is determined to one, with respect to his ultimate judgment, so too his will was determined to one, with respect to his ultimate and absolute consent. Yet in his reason there was an apprehension of diverse and contrary notions about the same thing considered in diverse ways. And so also was this as regards the motion of the will.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Augustine is speaking about when the will tends toward two things as to one’s ultimate and absolute consent, which did not happen in Christ.

Article 3

Whether prayer befits Christ

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.21.1.) It appears that prayer was not something that befit Christ.

Obj. 1: For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 94:1090).) prayer is the ascent of the intellect to God. But to ascend to God, when one is distant from God, is not appropriate to Christ’s intellect, which was always joined to God. Therefore it is not appropriate for Christ to pray.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one asks himself for something. But, as Damascene says, prayer is the request of appropriate things from God. Therefore since Christ is God, and God is no one other than he, it is not fitting that he pray to himself.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, prayer is an expression of the will, since it is about what one wills absolutely; otherwise it would be a fiction. But whatever Christ willed absolutely, God knew he willed. Therefore he did not need to beseech him about it.

On the contrary, prayer belongs to him who cannot do all things by himself. But Christ as man cannot do all things, as was said above, Distinction 14. (Above,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 4.)* Therefore prayer belongs to him as man.

Furthermore, the office of the high priest is to lay prayers before God. But Christ is the high priest, as is said in Hebrews 2:17. Therefore it belongs to him to pray.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it does not befit him to pray for himself, but only for others. (Parallel: ST III.21.3.) For the office of a priest is both to pray and to offer victims. But Christ offered the victim not for himself, but for others, as is said in Hebrews 7:27. Therefore neither did he pray for himself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every genus of movers one can find a first mover that does not move according to that motion, just as things that alter others are traced back to a first thing that alters but is not altered. But among those who pray, Christ is the first. Therefore he prays and is not prayed for.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no wise man prays for the contrary of what he wills. But in Christ only what he himself willed ever happened. Therefore he did not pray for himself.

On the contrary, prayer is made not only against the infirmity of a fault, but even against the infirmity of a punishment. But Christ was enclosed within the infirmity of penalty, though not the infirmity of fault. Therefore he was able to pray for himself.

Furthermore, by prayer one merits something for himself. But Christ merited for himself the brilliance of his body. Therefore Christ was able to pray for himself.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the prayer that he prayed for himself was an act of sensuality. (Parallels: ST III.21.2; Compendium theol., ch. 233.) For a prayer belongs to the one who wills it. But in Christ only the sensuality willed absolutely that he not die. Therefore the prayer by which he sought to be rescued from death was an act of sensuality.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master says in the text (Sent. III, 17.2(48).4.) that he prayed that the cup pass from him due to the human affect that he drew from the Virgin. But he did not draw the affect of reason from the Virgin, since the rational soul comes to be through creation, not through transmission. Therefore he prayed this through the affect of sensuality.

Obj. 3: Lion cubs ask for their food from God, and the raven chicks call upon him, as is said in Psalms 104:21 and 147:9. But in them there is only the affect of sensuality. Therefore also Christ was not able to pray only through his sensuality.

On the contrary, prayer belongs to what knows God. But this happens only in reason. Therefore in Christ prayer belongs only to his reason.

Furthermore, prayer pertains to the contemplative life. But the contemplative life has nothing in common with sensuality. Therefore Christ’s prayer was not an act of sensuality.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that not all of Christ’s prayers were heard. (Parallels: ST III.21.4; Compendium theol., ch. 233; In Psalmos 21: Super Ioan. 11, lect. 6; 12, lect. 5; Super Heb. 5, lect. 1.) For it is said in the psalm, I cry by day, but thou dost not answer (Ps 22:2), which the Gloss interprets as being about Christ. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 22:2, 3.572–73 (PL 113:873).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, he prayed that his disciples be preserved from evil, as is clear in John 17:9, (Latin and English differ in the verse number. Moos says 17:15.) and for all who would believe in him through their words. Now, this was fulfilled neither with the apostles themselves, nor with other believers, and neither about the evil of fault nor about the evil of penalty. Therefore not every prayer of Christ was head.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said in Luke 23:34, he prayed for those crucifying him that the sin would not be imputed to them, but that it might be forgiven. But not all of them were forgiven that sin, since not all of them were converted to the faith, without which sins are not forgiven. Therefore his prayer was not heard.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, he prayed that the cup would pass from him, as is clear in Matthew 26:39. Now, this was not done. Therefore the same follows.

On the contrary, Hebrews 5:7 says, he was heard for his godly fear.

Furthermore, his prayer was not less efficacious than was that of the other saints. But he told the other saints, ask, and you will receive (John 16:24). Therefore he too asked and received.

Furthermore, John 11:42 says, I knew that thou hearest me always.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I respond to the first question that neither praying nor obeying belong to Christ insofar as he is God, nor does anything that rings of diminution or that pertains to a diversity of will. But insofar as he is a man, prayer does belong to him, for three reasons, as Damascenes says: (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 24 (PG 94:1090‒94).) first, to indicate his truly human nature, in virtue of which he is less than the Father, he is obedient to him and prays to him; second, to present to us an example of one praying, since his every action is our instruction, for he was given to us as an example of virtue; and third, to show that he came from God, and was not opposed to him, when [God] acknowledged him as his principle when he prayed to him.

Reply Obj. 1: To ascend is properly to stretch toward what is above oneself. Now, Christ’s intellect does not stretch toward what is above him in contemplation, since whatever he ever contemplated about God he contemplated from the first instant of his conception. In virtue of this Damascene says that Christ’s intellect did not need an ascension to God, but nonetheless the divine power, which he implored in his prayer, was above him, and ascending to God in this way, he prayed.

Reply Obj. 2: In other men there is one intellectual will, to which prayer belongs, and which also has command over the other powers in it. And therefore it does not pray, but rather commands, in reference to the things that they are capable of bringing about through themselves. But not all things that were in Christ were subject to his reason and the will of reason; some were above it, namely, the Godhead. Whence, just as in other men reason and will command the other powers, so in Christ they prayed to the Godhead.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ prayed for a thing that he wanted to occur absolutely by the will of reason, although not for all things, as will be said. (Below, in resp. 2 and resp. 4.) And although he knew this was in God’s will, still he prayed because he knew God wanted this to be fulfilled through his prayer, just as God might also wish to save someone by the prayers of some saint, which is why it is not superfluous that that saint pray for him.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that prayer is always to supply for some defect. Now, Christ did not suffer any defect as regards spiritual goods, since he was blessed, but he did suffer a defect inasmuch as he was able to suffer in both soul and body.

Whence, Christ’s every prayer that was for spiritual goods was not for himself, but for others, for example, that they may be one even as we are one (John 17:22). But his prayer for things that pertain to the body was even for himself, as is clear from the psalm: raise me up, that I may requite them (Ps 41:10); for this prayer is also for himself—that is, that he might be raised—yet it is also for others insofar as it aims at their salvation—since he was raised for our justification (Rom 4:25)—and our instruction, since by his example they learn from God himself how to pray.

Reply Obj. 1: Prayer is poured forth for the sake of removing any defect whatsoever, but a victim is offered chiefly on account of sin, so that God, being pleased by it, might grant something. Now, although Christ had a certain defect of penalty, still he did not have the defect of a fault. Thus, he prayed for himself, but not did not offer the victim for himself.

Reply Obj. 2: The one praying who is not prayed for is indeed Christ himself, insofar as he is blessed, but not with respect to the things that pertain to his state of being a wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was nothing that, by the will of reason, he absolutely and simply did not will to then be in himself. Nonetheless, in him there was the ability to suffer, which he did want to remove from himself through the glory of the Resurrection, when the work of redemption was accomplished. And in him there was something—namely, the imminent Passion—that he willed even then not to be, by the will of sensuality and by the will of reason as nature.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the act of sensuality is spoken of in two ways. In one way, the act of sensuality is taken as the principle eliciting the act, and in this way in Christ his prayer could not be an act of sensuality, as the arguments in the second question brought up show. In another way, it is an act of sensuality as that of an object, that is, of what sensuality willed; and in this way something of his prayer was an act of sensuality. For his reason praying was, as it were, the advocate of his sensuality, proposing to God his sensuality’s desire. Now, it did this not as though reason itself willed what it sought on behalf of sensuality, but so that it might teach man’s every will to be subject to God, and to run to him in all necessities. Whence he adds, not my will, but thine, be done (Luke 22:42).

Reply Obj. 1: When someone prays for his own benefit, reason pleads only for what it wills, and therefore then that for which he is praying is his will. But Christ pleaded not for his own benefit, that is, such that he himself would acquire the effect of his plea, but for the benefit of others, as was said. And therefore his reason did not plead for that which it itself willed, but according to what his sensuality desired.

Reply Obj. 2: He prayed due to his sensuality, although his sensuality did not pray. For the appetite of the sensuality was the reason why he put forward the prayer.

Reply Obj. 3: To ask and call for something does not designate a prayer, properly speaking, but an ordination that is in these, as also in all other created things, toward receiving from God things that pertain to one’s preservation.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that every prayer that Christ offered with the intention of obtaining was heard. But since someone cannot intend to obtain what he does not will absolutely, only Christ’s prayer concerning what he willed absolutely was heard. Now, someone is said to will simply or absolutely that on which his ultimate judgment stands firm. However, in a man the ultimate judgment is made in virtue of the highest part of the appetite, whereas reason’s appetite is above sense’s appetite, and in reason’s appetite is the highest thing that inclines toward the end or toward what is connected to the end. And therefore Christ willed absolutely only this: what according to reason he willed as the end, and what was ordered to the end; and every such prayer of his was heard.

Now, according to his sensuality he willed what he did not will absolutely, and therefore in prayer his reason did not propose this such that it might obtain it. Nevertheless, this was not a sham, since it did express the appetite of sensuality for the reason already stated; and likewise, what reason as nature willed, if it did not rest in it as in an end, it did not will simply speaking, as was said before. And therefore also, in praying, it did not propose this so that it might obtain it, and on account of this, prayers of this sort were not heard.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ said this in the person of the Church, as the Gloss says. Or it is speaking of a prayer expressing the will of sensuality, or the velleity of reason as nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The will of reason as nature is about what has goodness in itself, without considering its order toward something else; this is why such a will in Christ concerned the salvation of all men, as does the antecedent will in God; but one is not said to will something simply and absolutely according to this. Now, Hugh of Saint Victor calls this will the “will of piety.” (Hugh of Saint Victor, De 4 volunt., in Christo (PL 176:841).) But the will of reason as reason is about what has goodness even in its order toward something else; and according to this, Christ did not will that all men be saved, just as neither does God with his consequent will, and according to this someone is said to will something simply and absolutely speaking. And therefore Christ’s prayer according to this will was heard, but that which was according to the first was not. This is why Jerome says (source) that Christ was heard for those who were predestined, but not for those who were not predestined.

Reply Obj. 3: One should say the same thing to the third objection.

Reply Obj. 4: In that prayer reason expresses the motion of sensuality, and not its own. This is why what he prayed for he does not will simply speaking.

Article 4

Whether Christ, insofar as he was a man, doubted

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ, insofar as he was a man, doubted.

Obj. 1: For Ambrose says, in the text, that the man doubted. (Sent. III, 17.3(49).1, referring to Ambrose, De fide libri V, ad Gratianum Augustum, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CSEL 78; PL 16:568).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever does not know all things, can doubt. But Christ, in virtue of some of his knowledge, did not know all things, as was said above. (Above,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 3.)* Therefore in virtue of that he could doubt.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever there is fear, there is doubt. But in Christ there was true fear, as was said above. (Above,* d. 15, q. 2, a. 2.)* Therefore there was doubt in Christ.

Obj. 4: One might say that he doubted in virtue of his sensuality, and not in virtue of his reason.

On the contrary, sensuality follows the apprehension of the sensitive part. But the sense did not foreknow the future danger, which the emotion was about. Therefore the sensuality did not have doubt about it, reason did.

Obj. 5: One might say that sensuality doubted because of the apprehension of reason or from the knowledge of the Godhead.

On the contrary, Christ did not foreknow the future Passion more then than from the beginning. But from the beginning the sensuality in him did not waver. Therefore neither did it then.

On the contrary (6), to doubt belongs to one who is ignorant. But there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said above. Therefore neither was there doubt.

Furthermore (7), doubt binds reason, such that it cannot progress, as is said in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.1, 995a31; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 3, lect. 1, n. 339.) But in Christ reason was not bound. Therefore there was no doubt of reason in him.

Furthermore (8), where there is the highest security, there is no doubt. But in Christ there was the highest security: though a host encamp against me, my heart shall not fear (Ps 27:3). Therefore there was no doubt in him.

I answer that “doubt” can be said in two ways. For primarily and principally it signifies the motion of reason with respect to two sides of a contradiction, with a dread about making a determination. And second, the name has been extended to signify the affect’s dread in approaching or enduring something fearful.

Now, in the first way of speaking doubt arises due to a defect of a middle term sufficient for discovering the truth. And therefore it happens because of a defect of knowledge, and on account of this it was not present in Christ. However, in the second of way of speaking, it happens due to a weakness of one who does not see an easy way of evading something harmful that is imminent. And since Christ had weakness in his flesh, as was said above, and the harm of death was imminent, his sensuality wavered; therefore there was this doubt in Christ, as regards his sensuality, although there was the greatest security, as regards his reason, which saw that the divine help was imminent, which his sensuality could not apprehend.

Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose is speaking in reference to the fear of his sensuality. While he showed this, to men this appeared to be doubt, even with respect to reason.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every ignorance causes doubt, but only when someone cannot see the reason for what he seeks, and about which contrary things appear to be so. And therefore in Christ there was no doubt of this sort.

Reply Obj. 3: Doubt, is insofar as it is taken as a fear, was present in Christ with regard to his sensuality.

Reply Obj. 4: Sensuality is moved even by those things that reason apprehends, since particular forms are formed within the imagination, due to which the sensuality is naturally apt to be moved.

Reply Obj. 5: Although his death was foreseen by him even from the beginning of his conception, still it was not foreseenas imminent then. And thefore it did not make him doubt, but only when it was already imminent.

Reply Sed Contra 6–8: The others we concede. For they proceed with regard to the doubt of reason.

Exposition of the text

The soul hears through the ear; (Sent. III, 17.2(48).2, quoting Augustine, The Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 12 (CSEL 28.1:310; PL 34:416).) that is, for man, the beginning of listening is through the ear.

The same is true in holy men. (Sent. III, 17.2(48).3.) It appears that this was more the case in wicked men, since they kill themselves when afflicted by the weight of their sins, as is said in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166b12.) To this it should be said that the will of sensuality always flees death, and likewise does the will of reason as nature. But the will of reason as reason sometimes desires death, and this in two ways: either on account of the love of a future life, and this is the case in the saints, or on account of the remorse of a wounded conscience, and this occurs in sinners.

A pious person, by reason of his mind, desires to be dissolved. (Sent. III, 17.2(48).3, quoting Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 140: ad Honoratum, para. 29, (CSEL 44:216; PL 33:544).) Against this is 2 Corinthians 5:4, which says, not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed. To this it should be said that the pious man loving good things flees the clothing of the body as regards its corruption, but loves it as regards its nature. Or it should be said that he does not wish to be dissolved in itself, but so that he might be with Christ; if he could be with him without being dissolved, but further clothed, he would want even more so.

But that he took on the manner of a doubter. (Sent. III, 17.3(49).1.) Against this is what Augustine said, in Distinction 15, (Sent. III, 15.2(42).4, referring to Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos (CCSL 39), Ps 93, para. 19 (CCSL 39; PL 36:167).) that for the same reason, none of the things that are said about Christ [in the gospel] would be true. To this it should be said that there was a true doubt in virtue of his sensuality, which made the doubt appear to be in his reason, in which latter there was no doubt.

Reader, understand these words with pious diligence. (Sent. III, 17.3(49).2.) Hilary’s words should be interpreted insofar as reason proposed these things on behalf of itself, not on behalf of his sensuality. For in this way he was not praying for itself, but for his own. However, insofar as it proposed it on behalf of his sensuality, in this way he was praying for himself, as was already said.