D. 2 - The nature assumed in the Incarnation

Division of the text

After considering the Incarnation from the side of the one doing the assuming, in this part he considers it from the side of the nature that was assumed.

This is divided into three parts:

in the first, he shows what it is that was assumed;

in the second, he shows the quality of what was assumed, in Distinction 3, at concerning the Word’s flesh, it is also asked whether, before it was conceived, it was in bondage to sin; (Sentences III, 3.1(7).1.)

in the third, he shows what agent formed what was assumed, in Distinction 4, at but since the Incarnation of the Word is truly the operation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it seems to us worthy of investigation why in scripture this work is more often attributed to the Holy Spirit. (Sent. III, 4.1(11).1.)

The first is divided into two parts:

in the first part he shows what it is that was assumed, because integrated human nature consists of its parts, namely of body and soul;

in the second he considers the order of assumption, at and so the Son of God took on flesh and soul. (Sent. III, 2.2(5).1.)

The first of these is divided into two parts:

in the first, that an integrated human nature was assumed he shows by reason of its parts;

in the second, he does the same thing, by reason of its natural properties, at and so God took on the whole human nature. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).1.)

In respect to the first he does three things:

first, he shows that all the parts of human nature were assumed through the fact that a human nature was assumed;

second, he shows that by “human nature” all its parts—that is, the soul and the body—are signified, at Jerome teaches clearly that by the term human nature or humanity are to be understood soul and flesh; (Sent, III, 2.1(4).1.)

third, he excludes the errors of certain thinkers, at and so they are in error who contend that, whenever Christ’s humanity is recalled, it is not the substance that is understood by the term humanity, but some property by which he is called a man. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).2.)

And so the Son of God took on flesh and soul. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).4.) Here he shows how the parts of human nature have been assumed; and he divides this into two parts.

In the first he looks into the order of nature;

in the second, he looks into the order of time, at but if it is asked whether the Word took on flesh and soul at the same time. (Sent. III, 2.3(6).1.)

Regarding the first, he does three things:

first, he manifests the order of nature, showing that the flesh has been assumed with the soul mediating;

second, he shows that the mode of this union is inexplicable, at and that union was so inexplicable that even John [the Baptist], who had been sanctified from the womb, confessed that he was not worthy to untie the strap of Jesus’ shoe; (Sent. III, 2.2(5).2.)

third, he excludes an error of certain thinkers, at and so do not listen to those who say that the Son of God did not take on true humanity. (Sent. III, 2.2(5).3, citing Augustine, De agone christiano, ch. 18, para. 20 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 41:120; PL 40:300).)

Here there are two questions:

the first, regarding what was assumed; (Q. 1.)

the second, regarding the order of the assumption. (Q. 1.)

Question 1

What was assumed

Regarding the first, three things are asked:

first, whether human nature is more assumable than other natures;

second, in whom should it be assumed;

third, what in human nature should be assumed.

Article 1

Whether human nature is more assumable than other natures

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.4.1; SCG IV.53, 55; Super Heb. 2, lect. 4.) It appears that human nature is not more assumable than an non-rational creature.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says to Volusianus, in wondrous things the entire account of the thing done is the power of the one doing it. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 137: Ad Volusianum, para. 8, ch. 2 (CCSL 31B:263; PL 33:519).) But of all wondrous things, the most wondrous is when something created is assumed into the unity of an uncreated person. Therefore, the entire account of assumability comes from the power of the one who causes the assumption. But since that power is infinite, it would be equally capable of assuming a human nature or an irrational nature. Therefore, a human nature should not be said to be more assumable than an irrational nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as there is in human nature a likeness of God by reason of the image, so in the irrational creature there is a likeness of God by reason of the trace. But the likeness and compatibility of things to each other is the cause of their ability to be united. Therefore, an irrational created thing can be united to God just as much as human nature can be.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, something that most represents the properties of another seems to be most like that other. But, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15, para. 2 (PG 3:327–330).) that among all bodily things, the divine properties are represented to a higher degree in fire; and he says the same of the rays of the sun in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 4 (PG 3:698).) Therefore these created things appear to be most like God, and so they are also better able to be united to him than human nature.

On the contrary, a nobler created thing has a capacity for a nobler gift. Therefore an inferior nature does not have the capacity for the gift that is noblest of all the gifts of the nobler nature. But human nature is nobler than any irrational created thing. Therefore, since among all the things that are bestowed upon human nature, the assumption of a human nature into the unity of the divine person is the noblest, it seems that an irrational created thing is not capable of this, and thus will not be assumable.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an angelic nature is not less assumable than a human nature. For God assumed a human nature because of his mercy, to relieve human misery. But there is misery in the angelic nature just as there is in the human nature. Therefore, since the height of mercy is to relieve every misery, it appears that an angelic nature is assumable in the same way as a human nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that are more like each other are more easily united. But the angelic nature is more like the divine than is human nature, because, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 34, para. 7 (CCSL 141:305; PL 76:1250).) a more express image of God is planted in the angel, inasmuch as the nature in it is more subtle. Therefore an angelic nature is more assumable than is human nature.

On the contrary, God’s assumption of human nature was brought about to provide a remedy for man’s sin. But the angel’s sin cannot be redeemed, as was said above in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore the angelic nature is not assumable.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the whole universe is more assumable than human nature. For a universal effect is most like a universal cause. But the universe is a universal effect of God, who is a universal cause. Therefore the universe is more like God than human nature is, since it is a certain particular effect, and thus the universe is more assumable.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the consummation of the whole universe is perfected through its assumption. But the universe would be more perfect if all its parts were assumed. Therefore, the universe is more assumable.

On the contrary, something is assumable by God by the fact that it is in God’s image. But it cannot be said that the whole universe is in his image—unless perhaps it were held that the universe was animated by a rational soul, as some Platonists held, and which is contrary to the faith. Therefore the universe is not assumable.

I answer that, “assumable” is said of what is able to be assumed. Now, when it is said that a created thing is able to be assumed, no active power of the created thing is being signified here, because only an infinite power is able to make two things infinitely distant be joined in the unity of the person. Likewise, also the created thing’s natural passive power is not being signified, because there is no natural passive power in a nature to which there is no corresponding active power of some natural agent. Therefore it remains that it speaks of only a power of obedience in the created thing, according to which God is able to do whatever he wills with the created thing, as a calf can come to be from wood if God is the one acting. However, this power of obedience corresponds to divine power, according to which one can say that what God can make come forth from a created thing can come forth from a created thing.

But the power of God can be considered in two ways: either as absolute, or as ordained. How this should be understood is evident from what was said in Distinction 1. (Above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.) Now, speaking about God’s absolute power, God can assume any created thing he wants. Whence, in this respect, no created thing is more assumable than any another. However, in speaking of his ordained power, he is able to assume the created thing that it is suitable that he assume, given the order of his wisdom. This is why the created thing in which such a suitability is found is said to be assumable. However, this suitability is found in the human nature above others in virtue of three things that are required in the assumption.

First, in virtue of the likeness of the things united. For a more express divine likeness is found in human nature than is found in any irrational created thing. For man, insofar as he has a mind, is said to be made according to the image of God, while in irrational created things there is found only the likeness of a trace. And in certain respects, the divine likeness is even more in human nature than in the angelic nature, as will be said below.

Second, in virtue of the endpoint of the assumption. For the assumption terminates in the unity of the person; but personhood is not found in irrational natures, since a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PG 64:1337).) In the angels there are persons, of course, but not persons distinct according to their origin, since one angel does not draw its origin from another, whereas in human nature the persons are distinct according to their origin. Therefore, human nature is most fittingly assumed into the unity of a divine person—which persons are distinguished according to the relation of origin.

Third, in virtue of the end of the assumption. For if the perfection of the universe is said to be the principal end of the assumption, as some say, then no particular nature could have been assumed through which the universe could be perfected as much as it is perfected through the assumption of a human nature. This is so, first, because man is the last of created things, as though created at the limit, and when his nature is assumed, the last is conjoined to the first beginning in the manner of a circle, which is a perfect figure insofar as it admits no addition. And second, this is so also because in a certain way all natures flow together in man, since he holds something in common with all created things, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 29, para. 2 (CCSL 141:246; PL 76:).) Therefore, by man being united to God, every created thing is in a certain manner also united to God.

But if liberation from sin is set forth as the end of the assumption, then in this way as well human nature alone was able to be suitably assumed. For there was no sin in anything irrational that was created. There was sin, of course, in the angelic nature, but it was irredeemable, as is evident from what was said. (Above, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.) But in man sin was redeemable, and therefore it was fitting to assume human nature alone. And having restored it in this way, so too is restored irrational creation, which is said to have deteriorated in a certain way on account of man’s sin, insofar as it yields to man’s use.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, concerning his absolute power, God was able to assume an irrational created thing. Nor is this impeded by the fact that an irrational created thing has no personhood, because personhood is not owed even to the assumed human nature, by reason of itself, as will be clear below in Distinction 6, (See below, d. 6, q. 1, aa. 1, 2.) but only by reason of the one assuming it; this is why here there is only the uncreated personhood. Furthermore, even though a person is not found in an irrational nature, still a hypostasis, and supposit, is found in it, whereas the union is made not only in the person, but in the hypostasis and supposit as well. But it was not fitting that it be assumed, and especially so because the assumed nature is beatified to the highest degree, as is said in Psalm 65:4, blessed is he whom you have chosen and assumed. (The RSV reads, blessed is he whom thou dost choose and bring near.) But the irrational created thing cannot partake of beatitude, which consists in an act of the mind.

Reply Obj. 1: The response to the first objection is evident, since it proceeds by arguing from absolute power, and not from ordained power.

Reply Obj. 2: A likeness of image is required for the suitableness of the assumability, because through this the rational creature is a partaker of divine beatitude. Whence, the likeness of vestige, which is the kind found in irrational created thing, does not suffice for this suitability.

Reply Obj. 3: A created thing’s likeness to God is of two sorts. One is according to participation in the divine goodness, just as all things partake of life by his living. In this way the rational creature, in whom is found being, living, and understanding, is most like God, and this likeness is required for assumability. Another likeness is according to proportionality, as if one were to speak of a likeness between God and fire because just as fire consumes a body, so God consumes wickedness. And this likeness is needed in figurative speech, and in the appropriations, which Dionysius calls unlike likeness in the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:139).) And the objection is arguing from this sort of likeness.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that when speaking of his absolute power, God was able to assume an angelic nature. But the angelic nature did not have any suitability for being assumed, chiefly for two reasons: first, because its sin was incurable, and second, because it is not becoming that God take away any perfection of a created thing by assuming it, and personhood is a perfection of a created thing. But if the nature assumed were to have its own proper personhodd after its assumption, there could not be a union in the person, because there would be two persons. Whence, it was necessary that what was assumed not have personhood, yet it has a birth. Now, in an angelic nature there is found no potency for personhood without the act, since it does not come into existence through generation. And so it was not suitable that an angelic nature be assumed.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is objected that the angelic nature is more like God than is the human nature, it must be said that this is true if divine nature is considered absolutely in itself. However, if it is considered insofar as it in persons distinct through relations of origin, in this way [the divine nature] agrees more with man, as has been said. Likewise, even if one considers this insofar as God is the exemplar of all creation, for in man there is found a likeness with every creature, as has been said, but it is not so in the angel. Likewise, if one considers this insofar as God governs the universe, for as the whole God is in each part of the universe through his essence, presence, and power, so also is the soul in each part of the body.

Reply Obj. 2: The sin that is the cause of the misery of the angels has no remedy, and therefore one cannot fittingly relieve their misery.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that something can belong to some whole in two ways: either by reason of its part, as a man might be called gray on account of his hair; or by reason of itself—that is, it belongs primarily to the whole itself—and what belongs to the whole also belongs to all its parts, as is proved in the Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231a29–b1; Thomas Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 6, lect. 1, n. 4.) Therefore the universe can be assumed in two ways: either by reason of its part—and in this way it was assumable, and was assumed when human nature was assumed—or by reason of itself—and in this way it could not be assumed, because not all its parts were assumable, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: Although God is a universal cause, he is nevertheless simple to the highest degree. And therefore a united universal effect in which all natures are in a certain manner gathered, namely human nature, belongs with him more than does a universal effect that is not, simply speaking, united—as is the universe, from whose parts together does not arise one thing, simply speaking, since they remain distinct in act.

Reply Obj. 2: It is unbecoming that there be the same perfection in all parts of the universe. And therefore it was more suitable that perfection overflow into the whole universe from the one part that was assumed.

Article 2

Whether the Son of God should have assumed human nature

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.4.5.) It seems that the Son of God should have assumed human nature in all the supposits of human nature.

Obj. 1: For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) what cannot be assumed cannot be cured. But human nature is curable in all its supposits. Therefore it should have been assumed in all its supposits.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the good is diffusive and communicative of itself, as is clear from Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 7 (PG 3:703).) Therefore, since God is the highest good, and would show his goodness to the highest degree in the Incarnation, it seems that he should have assumed the assumable nature communally, in all its supposits.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ came to make satisfaction principally for the sin of nature that entered into the world through the one man. But that which according to itself is owed to a nature is due communally and equally in all its supposits. Therefore the Son of God should have assumed human nature in all its supposits.

On the contrary, the Son of God assumed flesh for this reason: that he might be the principle of human salvation by making satisfaction on our behalf. Therefore, since the principle in each genus is one thing, it seems that he should have assumed human nature in only one supposit.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that [the Son of God] should not have assumed human nature in someone generated from the lineage of Adam. (Parallels: ST III.4.6; 31.1; Compend. theol., ch. 217; Super Isiam 11.) For as the Apostle says in Hebrews 7:26, it was fitting that there should be for us such a high priest, who would be separated from sinners. But he would be better separated from sinners if he had not assumed flesh from the lineage of sinners. Therefore he should not have assumed flesh from the lineage of Adam.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, original sin is the sin of a nature, and not of a person, except accidentally. Therefore, what is required to make satisfaction is only that someone be of human nature. But if some man did not come from the lineage of Adam, he would certainly still belong to human nature. Therefore he could fittingly make satisfaction on behalf of human nature.

On the contrary, medicine should be applied to the location of the wound. But human nature is injured only in those who come from the race of Adam, in whom all die, according to 1 Corinthians 15:22. Therefore human nature should have been assumed in someone belonging to his lineage.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that human nature should have been assumed in Adam himself. (Parallel: ST III.4.6.ad 2.) For the assumption of flesh is ordered to making satisfaction. But it is fitting that the same one who sinned should also make satisfaction. Therefore [the Son of God] should have assumed the human nature in Adam himself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the restoration of human nature ought to have been done in such a way that nothing of man’s dignity would perish. But in his first state Adam possessed this, that he would not need another man’s help for his own salvation. Now, this is not restored to him when human nature was assumed in another man, because he needs the favor of that man for his own salvation. Therefore it was not becoming that human nature be assumed in any but Adam himself.

On the contrary, contraries do not have the same cause. But Adam was the cause of the perdition of human nature. It was not therefore fitting that he himself should be the cause of the salvation of human nature. This, however, would have happened if human nature would have been assumed in Adam himself. This was not therefore fitting.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, to the first question it must be said that it was unbecoming that he assume human nature in all its supposits, and this for four reasons. First, because all the supposits of human nature would be reduced to at least three supposits. For, since the one assuming and what is being assumed are united in the same supposit, there could not be more supposits of the assumed nature than there are of the assuming nature. Second, on account of the end of the assumption, for it is ordered to the restoration of the human race through the mode of a certain mediation between God and man. Now, a mediator who intends to accomplish a unity of peace, in a fitting way ought to be one. Third, on account of the unity of the very one assuming. For just as it was becoming that the divine nature become incarnate only in one supposit, so it was becoming that one individual nature be assumed, for in this way the joining of one to one is done suitably. Fourth, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Son himself, *in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (*Rom 8:29) in spiritual generation, just as he is the first-born of creation in the emanation of things from the one principle. However, this primogeniture would not belong to him if numerically many human natures were assumed.

Reply Obj. 1: Properly, the nature is assumed through the Incarnation, as will be shown below; (Below, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2.) and also even the sin of the nature is properly and primarily cured. Whence, if some nature is not assumable, it is not curable. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that if this individual nature is not assumed, the supposit of this nature would not be cured; because through the fact that the nature has been assumed in some individual, the cure is prepared for all who have a like nature. This is just as, in the contrary case, when one person infects the human nature that is in him, he transmits sin to all men.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the divine goodness, which manifests itself in the creation of things, communicates itself to all things, but not equally, so too insofar as it manifests itself in the Incarnation, especially with respect to its love of the human race, it communicates itself to all—yet not in the same manner and equally, but to one through the grace of union, and to others who do not resist grace, through the grace of adoption.

Reply Obj. 3: Something is owed to human nature in two ways: either as essential to it—and this is found commonly, in all possessing human nature—or as added over and above the essential principles, whether received through grace, or acquired by works. And this is not found communally in all possessing the nature, and therefore the argument does not move follow.

We concede the fourth objection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that it was not becoming that the Son of God assume human nature from any source other than the lineage of Adam, and this chiefly for three reasons. First, to uphold the justice of satisfaction, for if it had not been from the race of Adam, it would not pertain to the Son of God to make satisfaction for the sin of Adam. Second, for the perfect reintegration of the dignity of Adam, who had it such that he himself and his race needed no other creature to save or sustain them. And this would not have returned to his race if he would have been redeemed through someone who did not belong to his race. Third, to preserve the dignity specifically of Adam himself, who in a certain way uniquely possessed the image of God: just as God, as the first being, is the principle of all beings through creation, so too Adam, as the first man, is the principle of all men through generation. If Christ had not become a man from his race, Adam would have lost this.

Reply Obj. 1: To what is objected—that he ought to be separated from sinners—it must be said that this is true inasmuch as they are sinners, but not inasmuch as they are men. For he came to destroy the sin and save the nature. Therefore, he possessed a suitability in the things that pertain to the nature, but an opposition in things that look to sin, because he neither contracted nor committed sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Human nature was infected by original sin only insofar as it is drawn from Adam. Therefore, if God were to form a man anew from the slime of the earth, there would be no original sin in him. And therefore the satisfaction for original sin did not extend indifferently to any man, but to any man from the race of Adam.

We concede the third objection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that it was in no way becoming that the Son of God assume the human nature in Adam himself, and this for two reasons. First, because Adam was complete by his own proper personhood; whence, he could not be assumed into the unity of the divine person unless his own personhood were destroyed—which was not fitting, as was said above of the angels. (Above, a. 1, resp. 2.) Second, because through the assumption a communication of properties arises, such that whatever is said of the man would be said of God, it would follow that one might say, “God sinned,” because Adam sinned—which is absurd.

Reply Obj. 1: There was a personal infection in Adam happened through his sin, an infection of both the nature created in him and of that to be propagated from him. And according to some, by the help of grace he was able to make satisfaction for his personal infection; but someone was still needed who would make satisfaction for the sin of the nature. Therefore, it was not necessary that he be the same as in Adam in person, but only the same in nature.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting that something of Adam’s personal dignity perish because of his own fault, but it is unfitting that anything of the nature should perish, which, although it was good, was corrupted by man using it badly.

We concede the third objection.

Article 3

Whether the Son of God assumed human nature

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 3, a. 3, resp. 2, ad 2; ST III.5.2: III.6.5; III.31.1.ad1; SCG IV.30; Compend. theol., ch. 208; Super Ioan. 2, lect. 1; Super Heb. 8, lect. 1.) It seems that the Son of God did not assume flesh.

Obj. 1: For Galatians 5:17 says, the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit. But in Christ there was no such battle. Therefore, he did not have true flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the flesh there is only the likeness of a trace. But the likeness of a footprint is not enough for assumability, as was said above. (Above, a. 1, qa. 3.) Therefore flesh was not assumable.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the grace of union is greater than the grace of fruition. But flesh can in no way be joined to God through fruition. Therefore, it cannot be joined through union.

On the contrary (4), it says in Hebrews 2:16, for surely it is not with angels that he is concerned but with the seed of Abraham; and in Romans 1:6, who was descended from the seed of David according to the flesh. (In both passages the RSV has “descendants” for “seed.”) But seed does not pertain to the soul, but to the flesh. Therefore, the Son of God assumed not only the soul in human nature, but also flesh.

Furthermore (5), a man is not born of a man unless through the transmission of flesh. But Christ is not only called a man, but even the Son of man, because he was born of the Virgin. Therefore he assumed flesh in human nature.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that he assumed flesh, and not a soul. (Parallels: ST III.5.3, 4; SCG IV.32, 33; De veritate, q. 20, a. 1; Compend. theol., cc. 204, 205; Super Ioan. 1, lect. 7; Super Rom. 1, lect. 2.) For John 1:14 says, the Word was made flesh. Now, this was not done through conversion into flesh, but through an assumption of flesh. Therefore, it seems that he assumed only flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a body needs to be united to a soul only in order to be vivified through it. But for a body to be vivified, it is enough that the principle of life be united to a body that can be alive. Therefore, since God, who is the principle of life, united a body to himself, it seems that the union of the body to a soul would be superfluous.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if a thing possesses a sufficient principle of operation, another principle is not needed for the same operation, just as the light of a candle is not needed to illuminate air that is illuminated by the light of the sun. But Christ was able to know all things sufficiently through the divine intellect united to him. Therefore, a cognitive and intellectual soul was not required for that union.

On the contrary (4), Christ healed our nature through assuming it. But he principally came to heal souls. Therefore, he assumed a soul.

Furthermore (5), bodily death occurs only through the separation of the body from the principle of its life. Therefore, if there were no other principle of life in Christ besides the divinity itself, since his flesh was never separated from the divinity, then Christ would never have died—something that scripture expressly contradicts.

Furthermore (6), it would follow that God would be the immediate mover of Christ’s body. And in this way Christ would never have been tired from a journey, as it says in John 4:6, since fatigue only occurs from the weakness of one’s moving power.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that he would not have assumed the form of the whole resulting from the composition of its parts. For the form of the whole is that in which the particulars come together as in the common nature. But Damascene says, as can be seen in the text, that in the Lord Jesus Christ one cannot find a common species. (Sent. III, 2.1.3, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) Therefore, the form of the whole was not in him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Boethius says, the species is the whole existence of the individuals. (Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 12 (CSEL 48:236; PL 64:115–116).) But there was nothing in Christ on the side of the body and soul that would enclose his whole existence, because he possessed the divine existence neither through the soul nor through the body. Therefore, since the form of the whole is the species in potency, it seems that the form of the whole was not in Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said in the text (Sent. III, 2.1(4).1.) that when one says that Christ assumed a human nature, by the name “human nature” is understood the body and the soul. But it is certain that neither the body nor the soul is the form of the whole, at least according to the more common opinion. Therefore, the form of the whole was not in Christ.

On the contrary (4), the form of the whole in animate things results from the union or joining of the soul to the body. But in Christ the sould was joined to the body; otherwise that body would not have been alive. Therefore, the form of the whole was in Christ.

Furthermore (5), men come together in a species in virtue of coming together in the form of the whole. But Christ was of the same species as other men; otherwise he would not have made satisfaction on behalf of men. Therefore, the form of the whole was in Christ.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b35–1044a1; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 8, lect. 3, n. 1722.) definition agrees with number in that, just as with numbers another number is always made whenever a unit is added or subtracted, so it is in definitions. For another species is always made if some difference is added or subtracted. Therefore, since all differences are taken from essential principles, it is necessary that if something essential were taken away from a thing, it would not remain the same in species.

Therefore, since Christ was of the same species as other men—otherwise he would not have been a true man, but would have been called a “man” equivocally, nor could he have suitably made satisfaction for men—all the things that are essential to man must have been present in Christ: a body, a vegetative, sensible, and rational soul, and ultimately the form of the whole that results from the joining of the body and soul, which is called humanity. And because natural properties are caused by essential principles, all the natural properties consequent on the human species must have been present in Christ.

However, as concerns other properties accidentally consequent on the human species, whether they be defects or perfections, they will be discussed later in their proper place.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that there were two errors about this matter.

One was that of the Manichees, who said that Christ did not have a true body, but only an apparitional one. And the reason for this position seems to have been that they held that the devil was the author of all visible things, and therefore nothing visible was in Christ in truth, over whom the prince of this world had no power. (John 14:30: "for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me.")

Now, it is clear that this position is false, both with respect to the position’s root—because faith holds and reason demonstrates that God is the Creator of all things visible and invisible, since all beings must be from a first being, as is evident in the Metaphysics 2 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a1–b30.)—and also the position is in itself false, because it destroys the truth of his humanity, as is evident from what has been said; for that would be to find some falsity or deceit in the one who says of himself, in John 14:6, I am the way, the truth, and the life.

The other error was that of the Marcionites, who said that Christ had not assumed a body from the Virgin, but that he had brought it from heaven. This perhaps arose from the opinion of Platonists, who said that an earthly body is to be in all ways fled, so that blessedness could be obtained. For they did not believe that it could be the case that a soul could become blessed while united to an earthly body. Nevertheless, they did assert that souls that are united to heavenly bodies, such that the sun, the stars, and the moon, are blessed, as Augustine notes in the City of God; (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 10, ch. 29, n. 2 (CCSL 48; PL 41:308–309); Sermones ad Populum, serm. 241, cc. 7, 8 (PL 38:1137).) therefore they thought that Christ’s soul, which was blessed in the highest degree, was united to a heavenly body, and not to an earthly body.

But this position also takes away the truth of his humanity. For every natural form requires a determinate matter; and therefore the human soul makes a man not by perfecting any matter whatsoever, but inasmuch as it is the form of a body of a certain kind, one made up of the elements and in a duly proportioned combination. Therefore, if Christ did not have an earthly body, he was not a true man. Moreover, the same error takes hold among these thinkers as occurred among the ancient philosophers, who in speaking about the soul said nothing about the body, opining that any given soul can be adapted to any given body, as is said in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.3, 407b21; Thomas Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 1, lect. 8, n. 131.) But this cannot be, since there is a proper matter corresponding to a proper form, and for each agent there are determinate instruments.

And therefore the Catholic faith, which confesses that Christ is a true man, holds firmly that he had a body composed of the four elements, just as we do.

Reply Obj. 1: The lust of the flesh against the spirit is not caused from the very nature of flesh, but from its vicious corruption, which arose from the sin of our first parent, without which sin the Son of God would not have assumed the true nature of flesh.

Reply Obj. 2: Likeness is considered in reference to form. Now, the form of the human body is the rational soul, in which consists the image of God. And therefore there is not only the likeness that is a trace in the human body, but the likeness that is an image as well, inasmuch as it has the soul. For the body does not have some existence that is distinct from the existence that the soul gives it, as if it were another form through which there would be in it only the likeness of a trace, as is the case in inanimate bodies. For then the soul would be a being in a subject, insofar as “subject” names a being subsisting in act, which belongs to the notion of an accident, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a18; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 1, nn. 213–215.)

Reply Obj. 3: The joining of the soul to God through fruition consists in the activity of the intellect and will, in which the body in no way shares, because such an activity is exercised without a bodily organ, as is proved in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a24–25; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 7, nn. 677–680.) and therefore the body can in no way be united to God through enjoyment. But the joining of the union is to the existence in one divine person. Now, the body and the soul share in one existence, because the soul is the the what it was to be of a body of such a sort, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b11–12; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 2, n. 236.) Therefore the body is able to be joined to God through the mode of union in one person.

Reply Sed Contra 4–5: We concede the fourth and fifth arguments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that there were two errors about this matter as well. One was that of Arius and Eunomius, who said that the Son of God assumed flesh without a soul, because they were of the opinion that the divinity gave life to his body without a soul. The other error was that of Appollinarius, who said that in Christ the body had already been animated with a soul, but one lacking sense and intellect. Each error derogates from the truth of his humanity and the dignity of Christ’s body.

For no matter can be perfected in any existence unless it be through something that is its form. Whence, since God could in no way be the form of a body—because he would then have to be a part, and not immaterial to the highest degree—it follows that Christ’s body, if it lacked a soul in all ways, would be as a non-living body. And if it were to lack a sensitive and rational soul, it would be as the body of a plant; whence it would be much less noble than our body. Likewise also, since it is of the notion of a man that he have a rational soul, if Christ had lacked one, he would not have been a true man.

Now, this appears to have seized them because they believed that the soul was not united to the body as a form, but rather as a kind of covering, as Plato says, according to what Gregory of Nyssa relates. (Gregory of Nyssa, Sermone de anima, sermon 1 (PG 45:215); sed critici tenent sermonem hunc nihil aliud esse quam cc. 2–3 operis Nemesius, De natura hominis, ch. 3 (PG 40:594).) If God were united to a body in this way, he would not be called a man, especially if it were asserted, as some have said, that the soul is of the substance of God—all of which contain manifest falsity.

Therefore, the error of these and the others already mentioned is excluded in the book of Gennadius, Of Church Doctrine, chapter 2: the Son of God was born of man, but not through man—that is, through a man’s intercourse, as Ebion says; but drawing flesh from the Virgin, not conveying it from heaven, as Marcion affirms; nor in an apparition—that is, without flesh, as Valentius said; but a true body, not only flesh from flesh, as Martianus says; but true God and true man, in Godhead, the Word of the Father and God, in man, soul and flesh; not without sense and reason, as Appolinarius asserted; nor in flesh without a soul, as Eunomius said; nor was he born of the Virgin in such a way that before he was born of the Virgin he was not God, as Antemon and Marcellus said. (Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, cc. 2, 3 (PL 42:1213–1214).)

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said, the Word was made flesh, the part is being taken for the whole, that is, flesh is being taken for the whole man, just as the soul is sometimes presented for the whole man, as in Genesis 46:27, all the persons of the house of Jacob, that came into Egypt, were seventy. (The RSV has “persons” for “souls.”) Therefore he wished to say “flesh,” which is the inferior part, in order to show, by taking something from the lesser parts of man, that there was nothing in the nature of man that the Son of God did not assume.

Reply Obj. 2: For the body to be vivified, it is required that the principle of life be joined to it through the mode of form, so that from these one common nature can be produced. However, the divinity cannot be the form of a body; for one common nature does not result from the Godhead and the body. And therefore, that the body of Christ might be one, a soul is required, which is its form.

Reply Obj. 3: As is said in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 414a12; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 4, n. 273.) that by which something first acts is its form; whence, since the divine intellect cannot be the form in Christ’s humanity, that by which the man senses and understands must be an sensitive and intellectual soul.

Reply Sed Contra 4–6: We concede the other three arguments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that some have asserted that God assumed a soul and a body, but not in such a way that any humanity resulted from their conjunction. And this opinion similarly takes away the truth of Christ’s humanity and the dignity of Christ’s body. For Christ could not have been a true man, nor could his body be truly alive, unless the soul had been united to the body as its form, in such a way that something one was produced from them. But we will speak about this opinion below. (Below, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2.) Whence it must be said that just as there was a true body and a true soul in Christ, so too there was a true humanity, that is, a true human nature, resulting from their being joined together.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, in respect to this objection, that Damascene intended to say that the union was not made in one nature, as the Eutychians asserted; and therefore he wished to say that some third common nature would not result from the joining of the divinity to the humanity, for then there would be neither divinity nor humanity, just as the humanity is neither the soul nor the body. Whence Christ would be neither God nor man, but only Christ. However, he did not intend to say that the form of the whole would not result from the joining of the soul and body, through which Christ would be in the common species with other men.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of Boethius hold true in each individual that subsists in only one nature. Fore the species comprises all the essential principles of the individual subsisting in the nature of the species; and in this way humanity comprises all the essentials of Christ insofar as he subsists in humanity. But the person of Christ has this singular quality, that he subsists in two natures; and therefore, the human species does not gather up all things that essentially belong to that person.

Reply Obj. 3: When one says that body and soul are to be understood in the name “humanity,” this must be understood materially, as the parts are understood in the name of the whole—and not that the whole is its parts, properly speaking, but rather is something constituted from its parts.

Reply Sed Contra 4–5: We concede the other two arguments.

Question 2

The order of the assumption of human nature

Next, the order of assumption is considered; and about this there are three things to consider:

first, whether he assumed one part of human nature by the mediation of another part;

second, whether he assumed the human nature by the mediation of anything else;

third, whether he assumed all the parts of human nature at the same time.

Article 1

Whether he assumed flesh by the mediation of the soul

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 1, ad 1; ST III. 6.1; 6.4.ad 3; 50.2.ad 2; SCG IV.44; De spiritualibus creatoris, a. 3, ad 5.) It appears that he did not assume flesh by the mediation of the soul.

Obj. 1: For if one removes the middle in virtue of which things are joined together, the extremes are separated, as is clear with planks that are nailed together. But in Christ’s death the soul is separated from the flesh, yet neither is the Godhead thereby separated from the flesh. Therefore the soul is not the middle by which the Godhead is united to the flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one of two extremes that are joined together through a middle is more joined to the middle than to the other extreme. But flesh is not more joined ot the soul than to the Godhead, for the flesh is separated from the soul at death, yet not from the Godhead. Therefore the divinity is not united to the flesh by the mediation of the soul.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God is immediately joined to every created thing through his essence, presence, and power, and likewise, also he is joined to the holy soul immediately through grace. Therefore since the joining of the union is greater than the others mentioned, it appears that whatever is assumed to the unity of the person is immediately joined to the Godhead.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Volusianus, the Son of God assumed the rational soul, and adapted the body to himself through it. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 137: Ad Volusianum, para. 8 (CSEL 31B:262; PL 33:519).) So it appears that the Son of God assumed the flesh by the mediation of the soul.

Furthermore, things that are exceedingly distant are joined only if through an intermediate that is less distant from the extremes than the extremes are from each other. But the body is more distant from the Godhead than the soul is. Therefore the body is united to the Godhead by the mediation of the soul.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not assume the soul by the mediation of spirit. (Parallel: ST III.6.2.) For it is impossible that something is united to a superior and an inferior through the same medium, for that by which it is united to the inferior is beneath it, and that by which it is united to the superior is above it. But the soul is united to the body by the mediation of spirit, which is beneath it, as some say. Therefore it is not united to God, who is above it, by the mediation of spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the middle must differ from its extremes. But the mind, which Augustine calls a “spirit,” (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, bk. 12, para. 24; ch. 18, n. 7 (CSEL 28.1:417; PL 34:460).) is not outside the essence of the soul—indeed, it is what is most sublime in our soul, and that in which God’s image is found, as the same Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1038).) Therefore he did not assume the soul by the mediation of the spirit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the human spirit differs from the angelic spirit in that the former is united to the soul and flesh, which is not so for an angel. But the angelic spirit is not assumable, as was said above. (In III Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 3.) Therefore the fact that the human spirit is assumable is due to the notion of soul or to the notion of flesh. Therefore he more assumed the spirit by the mediation of flesh or soul, rather than the converse.

On the contrary, things that are distant are joined together through something near to each of them. But spirit is near to God through the likeness of image, since God himself is also a spirit, as is said in John 4:24. Likewise also, it belongs with the soul insofar as it is a certain part of the soul. Therefore God assumed the soul by the mediation of spirit.

Furthermore, just as the soul is superior to the body, so too the spirit is superior to the other parts of the soul. But God assumed the body by the mediation of the soul. Therefore for the same reason he assumed the soul by the mediation of the spirit.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not assume the whole by the mediation of its parts. (Parallels: below, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, resp. 1; ST III.6.5.) For what belongs to the whole by reason of its parts belongs not only to the whole but also to the parts. But the Godhead is predicated of the parts of human nature (for we do not say that the soul is God, or that the body is God), but it is predicated of the whole, as when we say that God is a man. Therefore, since through the assumption of the human nature, God is predicated of a man, and conversely, it appears that he assumed the parts only by the mediation of the whole.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the singularity of each part of the man is other than the singularity or incommunicability of the divine person, because the parts are many but the assuming person is one. Now, the singularity of the assuming person is the same as that of the whole man, since the hypostasis of both is the same, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) Therefore it appears that he assumed the parts only by the mediation of the whole.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the honor of latria is owed to the created thing to which divinity has been united, as will be explained below. (Below, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2.) But the honor of latria would not be owed to certain parts of Christ’s body, if they were separated. Therefore the divinity is not united to parts separated from the whole. Therefore he is united to the parts only by the mediation of the whole.

On the contrary (4), in Christ’s death the divinity remains united to the parts of the man, that is, to the body and the soul. But at this time the whole was not composed of the parts, since they were not joined together. Therefore he did not assume the parts by the mediation of the whole.

Furthermore (5), whatever belongs to the part and the whole belongs to the part prior to belonging to the whole. But we say that the human nature was assumed, as was its parts, namely the soul and the flesh. Therefore he assumed the parts prior to the whole, and thus he did not assume the parts by mediation of the whole.

I answer that, there are two sorts of media, a medium of suitability and a medium of necessity.

A medium of suitability is what makes for a becoming joining together of extremes, which nonetheless could be made without this. For example, beauty makes for the becoming joining together of marriage, yet without this the marriage is not thereby destroyed.

However, a medium of necessity is one without which the joining together of the extremes cannot occur, such as light being joined to the air by the mediation of transparency. Yet this happens in two ways, for either it is the cause of the joining together, or it is consequent on the joining together. The cause of the conjoining is a medium the way water and air are in vision, since the visible species is borne through the air to vision itself. But a medium consequent on the conjoining is what is caused by the disposition of the things joined together, the way air or water is a medium in touch; on account of this the extremities of bodies touching each other must be moist, and thus a certain moisture must be intermediate. Now, a medium that is the cause of the joining together is of two sorts: for either it joins them together by effecting it, the way a man who reconciles enemies is called a “medium” between them, or it joins them together as a form, the way that love joins friends together, as a certain “medium” between them. But each of these happens in two ways, since a necessary medium is either the cause of an actual joining together, as is clear in cords by which certain things are bound together, or it is cause of their joinability, as dryness in wood is the cause of its joinability with a fire.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, therefore, having seen these things, it should be said that the soul is in a certain way the medium by which the body is united to the divinity. But it should be notes that if the soul is compared to actual union, it is only a congruent medium. For it is not becoming that the divinity be united to the body unless it has a soul, because it is closer to God; because it is in more ways unitable to God than is the body, since it is even unitable to him through grace and glory; and because it is united to the body for the sake of the soul’s restoration. But if it the soul is compared to unitability, in this way it is a necessary medium, as formally causing the unitability in the body, for the body, while maintaining its order to the end of the union—insofar as the rational creature was said to be more assumable than the other creatures—cannot be united [to God] except through its partaking in God’s image by the mediation of the soul. Whence inanimate bodies are cannot be united [to God].

Reply Obj. 1: If the medium that is the cause of the actual joining together is taken away, it is necessary that the things united be dissolved, just as when love is removed, the hearts of men will no longer be one; for when the cause is removed the effect is always removed. Yet the removal of a medium of fittingness, which made for the suitability of the union, does not necessitate that the things united are dissolved. Likewise, moreover, it is not necessary that, if a medium that causes their ability to be joined together be taken away, then the union is dissolved. For it can be that it would cause the ability to be joined together even after it went away, as long as there remained an ordering to it and the possibility of it; for sometimes it happens that a medium’s actual joining together does not cause the extremes’ ability to be joined together, but rather the medium’s ability to join them. For example, the actual contemplation of principles is the medium by which one acquires possession of the conclusion, yet when one ceases actually to consider the principles one does not lose the habit of the conclusion, because there still remains an aptitude for contemplating the principles. Whence since the soul is a medium of fittingness and the cause of unitability within the body, the soul's departure does not necessitate that the conjunction of the divinity with the flesh be interrupted. For there still remains within the body the aptitude for and ordering to the soul, by reason of which there remains in the flesh the union’s suitability, and the ability to be united to the divinity.

Reply Obj. 2: In two ways can some pairs be joined together better than others. Either because they are joined together in more ways—and in this way the soul is more united to the flesh than is the Godhead, since the soul is its form; and in this way it is the medium formally causing the unitability in it. Or because they are joined together by a stronger bond—and in this way the Godhead is more united to the flesh than is the soul, which is united to it by a natural union, on account of which it is separable, whereas the divinity is united to the flesh through an uncreated grace that is unchangeable, and therefore that union can never be separated.

Reply Obj. 3: A created thing, from its very self, is able to receive the influence of the divine into itself, and therefore it does need a medium that would make it capable of God being in it by his essence, presence, and power. It does not even need a congruent medium, since it is most becoming that a created thing not be abandoned by its Creator. Likewise also, the soul, according to its own nature, is capable of God, whereas the body is not assumable through its nature as body, but insofar as it is perfected by the rational soul. And therefore this is not alike.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, bk. 12, para. 24 (CSEL 28.1:417; PL 34:459)) “spirit” is said in many ways. In one way, it is a subtle body, like air. In another way, a body wholly subject to the soul, as the bodies of the saints in the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:44–49). In a third way, any soul of the beasts: who knows whether . . . the spirit of the beast goes down to the earth? (Eccl 3:21). In a fourth, the imaginary power: I will sing with the spirit and I will sing with the mind also (1 Cor 14:15). In a fifth, the very mind of a man or angel: be renewed in the spirit of your minds (Eph 4:23). Sixth, the divine substance itself: God is spirit (John 4:24). Now, however, we are speaking of spirit insofar as one means the mind. Whence it should be said that the divinity assumed the soul by the mediation of the spirit, just as it assumed the body by the mediation of the soul. For just as the body cannot be assumed except through its having a soul, so the soul cannot be assumed except through there being a mind in it, through which it has the image of God.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument is based on an equivocal use of “spirit,” as is clear from the things said.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the spirit, that is, the mind, does not differ from the soul by its essence—unless “mind” is being used for the power of the soul, which in a certain way differs from the soul by its essence, as a property differs from its subject—still, the soul, because it is a soul, is assumable in the stated way, but because it has a mind. And therefore the mind is the medium causing the assumability in the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a material form cannot be without matter, nevertheless matter does not give existence to form, but rather the converse. And so too, although a spirit not united to flesh is not assumable, yet the spirit more causes the assumability in the body, rather than the converse.

Reply Sed Contra: We concede the other two arguments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that parts are prior in origin to the whole, as what constitute it. However, in completion the whole is prior to the parts, because the notion of the complete nature is found in the whole itself first, and it reaches its parts by the mediation of the whole, (Cf. ST III.6.5.) insofar as they are its parts. This is also why they are in a genus through a reduction. And therefore it should be said that in a certain way he assumed the whole by the mediation of the parts—namely, insofar as the parts constituted the human nature as its origin, to which nature the assumption was owed through itself. However, in a certain way he assumed the parts by the mediation of the whole, insofar as the notion of a human nature, which is assumable through itself, is found in the whole first, and through this, in the parts.

Reply Obj. 1: Although “God” is not predicated of the parts of the human nature, still those parts cause the assumability in the whole as its origin, just as a man is called an “animal,” but the body or the soul is not called an “animal,” even though being an animal is caused in a man by the soul and body.

Reply Obj. 2: Singularity is of two sorts, the singularity of a nature, such as this humanity, and the singularity of a thing subsisting in the nature, such as this man. Now, the union was not made in the singularity of a nature, since the natures were united without alterability. But the union was made in the singularity of a person subsisting in a nature, since the same Christ subsists in each nature. However, the singularity of the parts, insofar as they are parts, pertains to the nature, and therefore there is not the same singularity of the parts of the man and of God, but there is the same person of the man and God. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the parts do not cause the assumability of the whole.

Reply Obj. 3: In all parts that belong to the truth of his human nature, even when separated, there remains an order to the whole nature. And therefore the assumability remains in them, and consequently the union, just as it remained in Christ’s body when the soul was separated. This is why they would also be owed latria. However, if some parts that do not belong to the truth of his human nature were separated, there would not remain in them the order to the human nature, to which the assumption is principally owed. And therefore the union would not remain in them, nor would latria be owed to them.

Reply Sed Contra 4: Just as the body remains united [to the Word] after the soul [was separated], even though it was united to it by the mediation of the soul, and this is because the order to the soul remains in the body, so too the order in the parts to the whole remains. And this is why when the whole was dissolved the parts still remained united.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Although the parts are prior to the whole and cause the whole, still there is something that does not belong to the parts except in their order to the whole; this is just as the fact that they are ordered in the category. Whence the argument proceeds from something false.

Article 2

Whether he assumed a human nature by the mediation of grace

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, d. 13, q. 3, a. 1; ST III.2.10; III.6.6; De veritate, q. 29. a. 2; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; Compend. theol., ch. 214.) It appears that human nature was assumed by the mediation of grace.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 19 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1033); In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tr. 82, n. 4 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1844); see also City of God, bk. 10, ch. 29 (PL 41:307).) in things that arise in time, the highest grace is that God be joined to man in the unity of person without any preceding merits. But in things that happen by grace, grace is the medium. Therefore human nature is united to the divinity by the mediation of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the unity in the person is greater than the unity of the blessed soul with God that happens in fruition. But the soul cannot be united to God by way of fruition except by the mediation of grace. Therefore neither can the human nature be assumed into the unity of the divine person except by the mediation of grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a nature cannot attain what exceeds the nature’s faculty except by the mediation of a grace. But to be assumed into the unity of the divine person most of all exceeds a nature’s faculty. Therefore a nature cannot attain this unless it be elevated by a grace, and so the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, the human body is unable to receive grace, and yet it was assumed just as was also the soul. Therefore the assumption of the human nature was not accomplished by the mediation of grace.

Furthermore, in things that occur miraculously, no disposing medium is required. But the assumption of the human nature was accomplished miraculously. Therefore it was not necessary that there be any grace there as disposing the human nature for the union.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the Son of God assumed [human nature] by the mediation of the Holy Spirit. For a created word is united to a vocal sound by the mediation of breath. But just as a word of the human mind is united to a vocal sound, so it the divine Word united to flesh, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 11 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1072).) Therefore that union was made by the mediation of the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every joining together that arises through a gratuitous will, love falls between them. But the Son of God’s union to human nature was of this sort. Therefore the Holy Spirit, who is love, is the medium in it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine and Hilary, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50; PL 42:921).) among the three divine persons, the Holy Spirit is the closest to us. But what is closer to something is the middle by which that thing is united to the more distant thing. Therefore the Holy Spirit is the medium by which human nature is united to the divine.

On the contrary, the middle is more united to each extreme than are the extremes to each other. But the Holy Spirit is not united to humanity in his person. Therefore he is not the medium of the union.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that no union falls between the human and divine natures. For no accident falls between in any substantial union. But the union, since it is a relation, is a certain accident. Therefore since the union of the divinity with the humanity is not accidental, but is in the substance that is called the “hypostasis,” it appears that no middle can be present in the union.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if that union were a real thing, either it is eternal or temporal. If eternal, since one cannot understand a composition without its components, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Topics 6.13, 150b23–25; Physics 1.4, 187b11–12.) then the man must have been united to God from eternity. But if temporal, since a union is in each extreme, it appears that there is something temporal in God—which is impossible. Therefore the union is not some real thing fall between the human and divine natures.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is temporal, since all temporal things came forth in order in the work of the six days, even this union must have come forth in the sequence of those works—which does not appear to be the case. Therefore the union is not a temporal thing that can be a medium between the divinity and the humanity.

On the contrary, a relation falls as a middle between extremes. But the union is a certain relation by which the humanity and the divinity are said to be united. Therefore by its mediating the union the human nature is united to the divine.

I answer that, one should note, having supposed the distinction presented in the previous article, that in the union of the human nature with the divine nothing can fall in between as formally causing the union, as that to which the human nature is joined prior to [being joined] to the divine person. For just as between matter and form nothing falls as a medium in existence that is in the matter prior to the substantial form—for otherwise there would be an accidental existence prior to substantial existence, which is impossible—so too between the nature and the supposit there is nothing that, in the stated way, falls between them. For the joining together is to substantial existence for both of them. But just as, in the order of coming to be, things disposing the matter formally and materially—by which the matter is rendered suitable to receiving the form—precede the form’s coming to it, so too in the human nature are found certain things added to it, by which it is rendered fit for being assumed by the divine person, such as knowledge and virtues and things of this sort. This is why these things can in a certain be said to be the congruent medium.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, as the Master says in Book II, (Sent. II, 26.8(169).1) “grace” is spoken of in two ways: in one way, as meaning God himself giving gratuitously, or his gratuitous will, and in another way, as that gift that is given gratuitously. Therefore in the first way of taking “grace,” grace is the medium of the union as causing the union as effecting it, for by his gratuitous will, without any preceding merits, he assumed flesh. In the second way of taking “grace,” no habitual gift falls as a medium there, as something formally causing the union; rather, it is only as a medium of congruence, as is also knowledge and the perfection of the body and things of this sort that it is becoming for the nature not to lack. Unless perhaps the union itself is called a “grace,” which is a certain gift given gratuitously. This is a medium in a certain way, as will be explained below.

Reply Obj. 1: As [Augustine] explains himself, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:237).) that assumption pertains to the greatest grace, since the greatest gift has been gathered to man such that he be the Son of God without any preceding merits. Whence the “divine grace” here signifies the divine will making the union gratuitously, and not any habit by the intervention of which the union is completed.

Reply Obj. 2: “Fruition” signifies a certain activity, so the soul is united to God through fruition as the agent of the activity is united to its object. Now, it pertains to the notion of a perfected activity that it be elicited from the power by the mediation of a habit. And therefore the union of fruition must come to be by the mediating of a gratuitous habit. However, the union in the person is to the person existence, but a habit is not a principle of the existence of a subsisting person, but is consequent on the latter’s existence. Therefore grace is not a medium in the personal union as formally causing the union.

Reply Obj. 3: Although to be assumed into the unity of the divine person is above human nature’s faculty, still nothing is required to formally elevate human nature to such an assumption. This is both because, whatever might be added, such a nature would remain infinitely distant from a divine person; and because, since being assumed would befit the nature through itself, while all accidents are outside the nature’s notion, therefore the human nature—insofar as it is assumable—could not be elevated through some accident added so as to make it more assumable. But its being assumed requires the divine liberality gratuitously elevating human nature to so great a dignity.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the Holy Spirit cannot be called the medium in that union, except as one causing the union as effecting it. However, this is the effect of the whole Trinity, though it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit—as will be explained in Distinction 4. (Below, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: Not even a created word is united to the vocal sound by the mediation of breath, except as through a medium that effects the union. For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b27–29.) the striking of the exhaled air against the windpipe is the cause of the vocal sound; and in this way too the effecting of the flesh, to which the uncreated Word is united, is also appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: The things that come to be through the will also come to be by the mediation of love as by the efficient cause. And this is also how it is in this union.

Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Spirit is also said to be closer to us insofar as all gifts are given us through him, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 3.) And in this way it amounts to the same as the things said above.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that, between the human and divine natures it is necessary that there fall a middle union, not as cause, but as an effect following the joining together of the natures. For it is the nature of a relation in other kinds of things that it have a cause, since it holds the minimum of the nature of a being, as the Commentator says in the Metaphysics 12. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, text. 10.) Whence, although a relation is not through itself there terminus of a motion, since there is no motion into being toward-something, as is shown in the Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b11.) still because motion is through itself terminated at some being, some relation follows it of necessity. For example, from a motion of alteration being terminated at whiteness, the relation of likeness toward all white things follows; and likewise, from a motion of generation being terminated at a form, the relation in virtue of which the matter is said to be under the form follows. So too then, from the motion of the assumption of human nature being terminated at the person, this relation called “union” follows. Whence the union is a medium not as something causing the union, but rather as something following on it. This is just as we also said above that water in the medium in touch from the fact that touching things must be moistened.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents an accident from being the medium in substantial conjunction as following upon the conjunction. Yet it is impossible that it be a medium causing the conjunction.

Reply Obj. 2: The union is a certain temporal relation that is really in the very nature that has been assumed, but in the person doing the assumption it is only a relation according to reason. This is the same as with the other relations from time that are said about God, like “Lord” and the like, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 30, a. 3.) And yet just as God is really said to be Lord, not on account of a relation of lordship really existing in him, but on account of the power of coercing the created thing, from which such a relation is caused—so too he is really said to be united, since the divine personhood, at which the union is terminated, is really in it.

Reply Obj. 3: That union was present in the works of the six days, not in a seminal reason, but only in the power of obedience—just as it was Adam’s side that Eve could be formed from him.

Article 3

Whether the flesh was conceived before it was assumed

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.6.3, 4; SCG IV.33, 44.) It appears that the flesh was conceived before it was assumed.

Obj. 1: For what is not cannot be assumed. But flesh becomes a being through its conception. Therefore the flesh was conceived before it was assumed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the motion always precedes in time the motion’s terminus. But the conception of the flesh is terminated at the union, as is a motion at its terminus. Therefore the conception preceded the union.

On the contrary, the sharing of properties—such that what is said of the man is said of the Son of God—is brought about by only the union. But being conceived is properly something of the flesh. Therefore if the conception of the flesh precedes the union, the Son of God would not be conceived from the Virgin—which is against the Creed. Therefore the conception of the flesh did not precede the union.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the flesh was assumed before it was animated, or ensouled. For what is first in a resolution is last in a composition. But when the soul was separated from the flesh, the union of the flesh with the divinity remained. Therefore the flesh was assumed by the divinity before it was animated.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the soul, since it is a form, requires its proper matter, namely the organ-bearing body that it is in. Now, this latter comes to be through the conception of the flesh. Therefore the conception precedes the animation. But the conception of the flesh is simultaneous with its assumption, as was shown. Therefore flesh was assumed prior to its being animated by the rational soul.

On the contrary, the flesh is united to the divinity by the mediation of the soul, as was explained above. But one extreme is not joined to the other before being joined to their intermediary. Therefore the flesh was not united to the divinity before being animated.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the soul was assumed before being joined to the body. For an extreme is joined to the intermediate before being joined to the other extreme. But the divinity is united to the flesh by the mediation of the soul. Therefore it is united to the soul before the flesh. But the divinity and the soul are united to the flesh at the same time. Therefore the divinity is united to the soul before being united to the flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ’s person is said to be composed from three substances: divinity, soul, and flesh. The highest of these is the Godhead, the lowest is flesh, and the soul is the middle. But the divinity would be united to the soul before being united to the flesh. Therefore if a middle communicates with its extremes, it appears that the soul is after the Godhead but before the flesh. But the soul was created and assumed at the same time. Therefore the soul was assumed before it was united to the flesh.

On the contrary, the soul was not assumed before it was created, nor was it created before it was infused into the body. For by being created it is infused into the body, and by being infused it is created. Therefore the soul was not assumed before it was united to the flesh.

I answer that no nature has existence except in its supposit, for humanity can only be in a man. Whence whatever is existing through itself in the genus of substance has the notion of a hypostasis, or supposit. And because the union of the divinity and humanity comes to be in a hypostasis, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PG 94:986).) therefore it cannot be that what was assumed was prior to its being assumed—unless perhaps it were asserted that the assumption takes away the notion of the hypostasis from the thing assumed. But that is a problem, since this could not happen without a corruption of what was assumed.

And therefore none of the following three things are possible: that the flesh be conceived first and assumed after; that the soul was created first and assumed after; and that the man was constituted from his parts first, and assumed after. Now, as is clear from things said, the body has its assumability from the soul, and likewise, essential parts have their assumability from the notion, of which they are the parts of the nature. Whence also both of the following is impossible: that the soul was created and assumed first and joined to the body after; and that the flesh was conceived and assumed first and united to the soul after. Rather, it is necessary that these four happened simultaneously: the conception of the flesh, the creation of the soul, the joining together of both, and the union to the Godhead.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

The response to the first question is clear from this, for it is not possible that the flesh was conceived first and later assumed. For were it to have been conceived before the assumption, it would have its own proper hypostasis, and then after the assumption either that hypostasis would have remained—and thus, there could not have arisen a union in the [divine] hypostasis—or it would not have remained, and this could occur without the prior corruption of the conceived flesh—for the notion of a hypostasis is not accidental to a thing, such that it could be one in number while the other hypostasis still remains.

Reply Obj. 1: Although that which does not exist cannot be assumed, still it is possible that it be assumed in the same instant in which it has existence, such that the existence of the thing assumed does not precede the assumption in time, but it does in its nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Although a motion according to its principle or medium cannot be simultaneous with that at which the motion is terminated, nonetheless the limit of the motion can be simultaneous with it. For example, alteration is terminated at a generation, such that in the same instant in which the alteration is ended a substantial form is introduced; so too in the same instant in which conception is ended, when the flesh is first conceived, then it can be assumed. And because conception is accomplished in an instant, in it there is not difference of first, middle, and last. And therefore simply speaking the conception was simultaneous with the assumption.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, the response is clear, from things said before. For it is not possible that the flesh was assumed first and animated later, for two reasons: first, because it has its assumability from the soul, which the soul cannot confer on it before it is united to it; and second, because parts have their assumability from the whole, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 1: The body is assumable insofar as it has an order to the soul and to the whole, which order it cannot have except after it is united to the soul, and it is made an actual part of a human nature. And yet, when the soul is separated and the whole dissolved, there still remains that order in the body, according to the hope of the resurrection. This is like the way even an acquired habit, such as political virtue, is caused by an actual activity, and yet when the actual activity passes away the habit remains. Whence it is clear that the body cannot be assumed before it is united to the soul, and yet if the soul is separated after the union the flesh will nevertheless remain assumed and united to the divinity.

Reply Obj. 2: A form does not presuppose its proper and disposed matter in the order of time, but in the order of nature. For in the same instant in which the necessity of the matter arises—that is, in the last instant of disposition—the substantial form is induced. And therefore it is not necessary that the flesh was conceived before it was united to the soul.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, the response is clear from the foregoing. For the soul could not have been assumed before it was united to the flesh, since it is assumable through its being a part of human nature.

Reply Obj. 1: An extreme is not always joined to its intermediate prior in time to its being joined to the other extreme. For the air and one’s sight are acted upon by a color simultaneously, although the air is acted upon first in the order of nature, since the air being acted upon causes one’s sight to be acted upon. Likewise too, it is not necessary that the Godhead be united to the soul prior in time to its being united to the flesh.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is of greater dignity than the body, still it is the form of the body. Now, it does not belong to form that it come before matter in time, but only in dignity. Now, the divinity is not united to human nature as its form. Whence the account of the two is not alike.

Exposition of the text

Jerome teaches clearly that by the term human nature or humanity are to be understood soul and flesh. (Sentences III, 1.1(4).1.) One should not understand the soul and the body by “humanity,” as though it could be said properly that humanity is the soul and the body. Rather, it should be understood the way parts are understood in the whole, as the walls and roof are in the house and yet they are not predicated of the whole. This is also why in the authority of Jerome is added, the humanity, which is comprised of the soul and the body. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).1, actually quoting Pelagius the heretic, Libellus fidei ad Innocentium Papam, n. 4.) He does not say, “which is the soul and the body.”

And so they are in error who contend that, whenever Christ’s humanity is recalled, it is not the substance that is understood by the term humanity, but some property by which he is called a man. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).2.) By this property, which they call “humanity,” can be understood the form following the composition of the parts—namely, of the soul and body, in which form all the individuals share as in their common nature.

For perhaps those who asserted this had a taste of Plato’s opinion, who asserted that universal forms have actual existence in nature outside of matter. For in this way, according to him, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b1–988a20.)* the form of man existed without flesh and bones and without its other parts, and they asserted that such a humanity without body and soul was assumed. And against this Damascene says: he did not assume the nature as considered in bare contemplation; for then it would not be an incarnation but a deception and feigning of incarnation. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PG 94:1023).)

Or, as some say, this touches on the opinion of those who said Christ, insofar as he is a man, is not a thing, but one bearing himself a certain way. This will be touched upon below, in Distinction 6.

The same John clearly shows this. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).3.) Note that the Master here is taking up John Damascene’s words, but not their meaning. For Damascene brings in these words to refute the error of those who said that there is only one nature in Christ—one that is, as it were, put together from the divinity and the humanity, as some one nature is put together from soul and body. This is indicated when it is said that all men are of the same nature—not such that in each of them the soul and the body are of one nature compared to each other, but rather, because one nature is put together from these two, in which nature all men agree. But it is not the case in Christ that one common nature results from his humanity and divinity, as though it were a common species that could be predicated of many who might have divinity and humanity together.

However, the Master takes up these words to fight against the position of those who said what was as assumed was a property that is called “humanity.” For humanity, if it is being considered as common, is a species that is found in many, in which way it is said that there is one nature of all men. However, in this way the common species of humanity is not in Christ, for Christ’s humanity is not actually common, but is a single humanity.

For another such was never made, nor is made now, nor ever will be made. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).3.) It appears that this proof is invalid, for there are many species that are predicated of only one individual, such as the soul and the moon. But to this it should be said that it is easy to respond following the Master’s intention. For every species that is participated in by many individuals is predicated of all of them; whence if the human species, insofar as it is common, were something subsisting outside the singulars, it would be predicated of all of them. Whence if Christ had assumed such a humanity, the man who is Christ would be predicated of all men.

But following Damascene’s intention, one should answer differently, saying that every common nature as such can be found in many, but if there is some species that is in only one individual, this is for the sake of something else that is not of the understanding of that nature; this is why it is possible to understand many suns. But a singular has incommunicability through what belongs to its notion—namely, through matter, which is part of its definition, if it were to be defined, as is clear from the Metaphysics 8. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.1, 1042a25; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 8, lect. 1, 2.) Whence it is not possible to understand this man being predicated of many. So it is clear that what neither actually nor in its understanding can be said of many is singular. However, Christ is of this sort; whence the name “Christ” does not signify one common nature resulting from the union of the divinity and humanity, but one hypostasis subsisting in each nature.

The Word of God took on all things which he had planted in our nature. (Sent. III, 2.1(4).4, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) This should be understood of the things that belong to the notion of human nature as its essential principles, or even of the things that follow on the essential principles as natural properties. Whence there is no obstacle of immortality, which was given to the first man gratuitously.

And yet they preach that our visible sun spreads its rays over all manner of offal, but keeps them clean and pure. (Sent. III, 2.2(5).3, quoting Augustine, De agone christiano, ch. 18, para. 20 (CSEL 41:120; PL 40:300).) But why is the sun not infected by the fact that it shines its rays over feces. The answer is that it does not share with other bodies in their matter, such that the agent would suffer at the same time, just as happens in things that share in matter: when they act, they are acted upon, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 324a4–7.) Now, the soul does share in matter with the body, though not as though the body were that from which the soul comes to be, but as that in which it comes to be, and therefore it is infected from its being joined to the body. However, the divinity does not share with the body either as in matter from which it comes to be—since it is wholly immaterial—nor as the matter in which it comes to be—since it is not united to the body as its form.