D. 5 - The union in the Incarnation

Division of the text

After the Master has considered what is doing the assuming (Above: dist. 1.) and what is being assumed in the divine Incarnation, (Dist. 2–5.) here he examines both of these together with respect to their intentions—namely, whether the one assuming and the thing assumed have the notion of a nature or a person. And this is divided into three parts.

In the first he raises the question.

In the second he considers it at this inquiry or approach to the question, according to the testimonies of the sacred authorities, is partially implicit and difficult, but partially explicit and manifest; (Sentences III, 5.1(14).1.)

and in the third he raises further questions about it, at but it is asked whether the same divine nature ought to be said ‘to have been made flesh,’ just as the Word is said to have been made flesh. (Sent. III, 5.2(15).1.)

The first part is divided into two:

first, he considers the question as to what manifests the truth;

second, as to what is more in doubt in the question, at but as to the fourth article of the question . . . the question is troublesome even among the learned. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).3.)

And the latter part is divided into three parts:

in the first, he cites the authorities on either side of the question;

in the second, he resolves it, at wishing to remove any sign of mendaciousness and contradiction from the sacred pages, we agree with the orthodox fathers; (Sent. III, 5.1(14).10.)

in the third, he confirms this solution by the authority of Damascene at this sense is confirmed by the words of John of Damascus. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).12.)

Concerning the first, he does three things:

first, he cites authorities on the negative side, namely, that a nature did not assume a nature;

second, on the affirmative side, at what Augustine says . . . appears to go against what was said above; (Sent. III, 5.1(14).5.)

third, he musters a question from the authorities cited, at but the words of Augustine . . . appear to indicate that the Word alone was made flesh. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).8.)

But it is asked whether the same divine nature ought to be said ‘to have been made flesh,’ just as the Word is said to have been made flesh. (Sent. III, 5.2(15).1.) Here he raises certain questions concerning the consideration formed:

first, as to calling the divine nature incarnate;

second, as to saying that the person was not assumed, at but [the Word] did not take the person of a man because that flesh and that soul which it would have taken were not united into the one person. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things:

first, he asks whether the divine nature could be said to have been made flesh;

second, whether it could be said to have been made man, at but if the divine nature took a human nature, why is it not said to have been made or to be man? (Sent. III, 5.2(15).2.)

But [the Word] did not take the person of a man. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).1.) Here he raises question about saying the person of a man was not assumed. And concerning this he does two things:

first, he assigns the cause of this statement;

second, he objects to the contrary, at here the objection is made by some. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).2.)

And the latter part is divided into two objections that he brings up;

the second begins at they also strive in another way to prove that the Word of God took a person. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).2.)

And both are divided into objection and resolution:

the first resolution begins at but this does not follow, because the soul is not a person when it is united personally to another thing;

the second one begins at but because it is impious to say or hold this. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).4.)

Here there are three questions.

The first is about the union. (Q. 1.)

The second is about the one who assumed the union. (Q. 2.)

The third is about what was assumed. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The union as regards person and nature

Concerning the first, there are three things to be asked.

first, what the union is;

second, whether the union happened in a nature;

third, whether the union happened in a person.

Article 1

Whether the union was something created

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, resp. 3; below, d. 7, q. 2, aa. 1, 2; ST III.2.7.) It seems that the union was not something created.

Obj. 1: For a union is in the thing that is said to be one because of it. But the divine nature is said to be united to the human nature. Therefore, the union is in the divine nature. But nothing in God is created. Therefore, the union is not something created.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a union is an equal-sided relation. But things relative in this way are related in the same way to both extremes. Therefore either it is in the divine nature and the human—and then the conclusion is the same as above—or else it is in neither—and then it is nothing, and so it would not be anything created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing created is said about God except either insofar as he is its cause, as when he is said to know something because he makes us know it, or else by its assumption, as when he is said to be a man, or else through a likeness, as when he is called a lion or the lamb of God. But when divine nature is said to be united to human nature, this is not merely said as cause, for then the Father would also be said to be united, because he causes the union; nor is it by assumption, because if he assumed the union, God would be united to a union, and so on infinitely; nor is it through a likeness, since then it would not be called a union in virtue of the truth of the thing, but in virtue of a metaphor, and then God would be called a man metaphorically, as he is called a lion or a lamb. Therefore the union is not something created.

On the contrary, everything that exists and is not created is eternal. But the union exists, because through it two natures are really united in one person, and it is not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore, it is created.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is the weakest of unions. (Parallel: ST III.2.9.) Because the more distant the things united are, the weaker the union is. But the divine nature and the human nature that are said to be united are as distant as possible. Therefore, it is the weakest union.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the greater the composition, the weaker the union. But in Christ there is the greatest composition, because after the composition that nature makes in a man, which is the greatest among all natural compositions, there is that union of divinity and humanity. Therefore, it is the weakest union.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is one in every way is more one than what is one in a certain way and not in another way. But some things are united both in the nature and in the person, like the four elements in the human body. Therefore, since in Christ the union happened in his person, and not in his nature, it seems that, at least, there are many unions that are greater than this union.

On the contrary, Bernard says, in On Consideration, (Bernard, De consideratione libri V, vol. 3, bk. 5, ch. 8, para. 19, p. 483 (PL 182:799).) that among all unities, the unity of the Trinity holds the highest place, and after it is the ennobling unity that exists in Christ. Therefore it seems that, after the unity of the divine nature, this union is the greatest.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that union does not differ from assumption. (Parallel: ST III.2.8.) For “assumption” is said, as it were, as “taking to oneself.” But whatever is taken to oneself is united to the one taking it in some way. Therefore, assumption is the same as union.

Obj. 2: One might say that they are different because the one doing the uniting is united, but the one doing the assuming is not assumed.

On the contrary, the one doing the uniting is effecting the union. But not everything effecting the union is united, as is clear with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, that difference is is null.

Obj. 3: One might say that the assumption precedes the union.

On the contrary, before a first there cannot be a prior. But this union existed in Christ at the first instant of his conception. Therefore, assumption does not precede union, and so it seems that they do not differ.

On the contrary, the divine nature is said to be united to the human nature, but it is not said to be assumed. Therefore, assumption and union are different.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that union is a sort of relation. Now, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1020b26–32; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 17, nn. 1001–1005.) every relation is based either on quantity, insofar as it can be traced back to the genus of quantity, or on action and being-acted-upon. Now, one is traced back to the genus of quantity as the principle of discrete quantity, and sameness is founded on it insofar as it is one in substance; equality insofar as it is one in quantity; and likeness insofar as it is one is quality. But uniting is an action or being acted upon by which many things are made one in some way; and the relation that is union follows upon this action. However, of relations as much of the latter as of the former, some arise from the movement of both extremities; and these are the relations that must exist in reality in both extremities, such as fatherhood, and the like. But some arise from the movement of one extremity without a change in the other, which happens among things where one depends on the other, and not vice versa, like knowledge and the thing known. In relations like this, the relation exists according to reality in the one that is dependent on the other, whereas in the other, it exists according to reason alone. Therefore, since in the Incarnation there is no change brought about in the divine nature, but rather in the human nature, which is drawn into unity within the divine person, this relation—namely, union—will exist according to reality in the human nature, but in the divine nature only according to reason. Thus the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a28–29; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 17, nn. 1026–35.) that some things are relative, not because they themselves have a relation, but because other things have a relation to them. This is why the union is a created thing according to reality.

Reply Obj. 1: That union is in God only according to reason, and not according to reality.

Reply Obj. 2: Union is an equal-sided relation in created things, but not between the Creator and the thing created. For they do not stand to the union in the same way, just as also likeness between God and a created thing is not ordered to both sides equally, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, n. 7 (PG 3:915).) although in other things it is an equal-sided relation.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not the case that the union predicated of God is neither the Creator nor a created thing, for as it exists in him, it is not something according to reality, but only according to reason. However, that reasoning is not false, because it is founded on the relation of the created thing to its Creator, as it is also about other relational things that are said about God from reference to time, like Lord and such.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that this union can be considered under two aspects: either as to what the union happens in, or as to the things that are united. If the first way, since the union happens in the divine person, which is the most one and simple, then this is the greatest union after the union of essence in the three divine persons. For, although the person is as simple and one as the essence, nevertheless, any of the three persons is the same thing as the essence itself, in which they are united. However, the two natures in Christ are not the same thing as the divine person, although one of his natures, the divine one, is entirely the same thing as it. Thus the union of persons in one essence is greater than the union of the natures in one person. If we look at it in the second way, then it is not the greatest union. But the first consideration is of the union in itself, because according to this it is one thing, whereas the latter is not the consideration of the union insofar as it is a union. And therefore it should be said that the union is the greatest, simply speaking, although it is not the greatest in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 1–3: And by this, the replies to the objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the first difference between assumption and union is that assumption is either an action or a being-acted-upon, while union is only a relation, although uniting is also an action. The second difference is that “assumption” is said in relation to the terminus from which it is being separated, or it is taken as what is to be united; but “union” is said in relation to the terminus or effect of the uniting, which is being one. And from here we can take a third difference, that the one uniting is also united; for “united” is signified insofar as it has already become one, while “assumed” insofar as it is on its way toward this. And so the one assuming is not the assumed. A fourth difference is that assumption determines what the uniting is done to, just as we say “assumption” as in, “taken to oneself.” But this is not the case with union, and so whoever causes the joining can be said to unite, but he cannot be said to assume unless he joins the thing to himself. Thus, the Father united human nature with the divine nature, but he did not assume human nature. A fifth difference is that union, in itself, has to do with both extremes equally, but assumption does not, but rather it requires something fixed and stationary in the one, which the other is drawn into. And for this reason the divine nature can be said to be united to human nature in the person, but it cannot be said to be assumed.

Reply Obj. 1: Although “assumption” is ordered to union, nevertheless it does not include in its signification the terminus that is becoming one, as is included in the signification of “union.”

Reply Obj. 2: When we say that the one uniting is united, this is understood of what is uniting something to itself, and in itself. However, the Father did not unite anything to himself, nor did the divine nature unite anything in itself, but in the person; nor is human nature indicated as united in the person, but rather man was. And therefore the Father is not man, and the divine nature is not human.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in Christ assumption does not precede union in time, it does precede it in nature, and according to the mode of understanding.

Article 2

Whether the union happened in the nature

To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.2.1; SCG IV.35, 41; De unione Verbi, a. 1; De veritate, q. 20, a. 1; Compend. theol., ch. 206; Super Ioan. 1, lect. 7; Super Rom. 1, lect. 2; Super Philip. 2, lect. 2.) It seems that the union happened in the nature.

Obj. 1: For what is constituted from two natures seems to have one nature intermediate between them, like a blend constituted from the four elements. But Christ is constituted from two natures, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 35/10 (CCSL 46; PL 40:250).) who says that from the two substances, the human and the divine, is the one Son of God and Son of Man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nature, as we are speaking of it here, is what informs each thing with its specific difference, as Boethius says in On the Two Natures. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures,* ch. 1 (PL 64:1342).)* But the Philosopher says that one added difference always changes the species, just as in numbers every added unit makes a new species of number. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b36–1044a3; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 8, lect. 3. n. 1727.) Therefore human nature added to divine makes a nature new in species.

Obj. 3: If it were said that there cannot be one nature constituted from two, because each nature must be preserved in the Incarnation, then

On the contrary: the body and the soul constitute human nature. Yet both body and soul remain unchanged in their own natures. Therefore, out of two natures a third can be constituted, while the other two remain intact.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a property follows the nature of what it is a property of. But properties of divine nature are said of that man; for it is said that that man created the stars, and conversely it is said that the Son of God suffered. Therefore it seems that something of the divine nature is in his human nature, and something of the human nature is in the divine. And thus it seems that a certain joining of the natures was made into one nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, when any two things, one of which far surpasses the other, are joined together, the one surpassed changes into the nature of the surpassing it, as when a drop of wine is dropped into a thousand pitchers of water. But divine nature infinitely surpasses human nature. Therefore, the human nature joined to the divine is completely converted into the divine nature.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, this is seen by the fact that the saints say that Christ’s flesh was deified, as Damascene recounts. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 6 (PG 94:1111).)

On the contrary, sonship requires a likeness in nature. But Christ is called the Son of God the Father and of his mother the Virgin. Therefore he is like in nature to both. But the Virgin and God do not share in any nature. Therefore we must hold that Christ had two natures.

Furthermore, we come to knowledge of a nature through its natural properties. But in Christ we find the properties of two natures, human and divine. Therefore, we must hold that Christ had two natures.

I answer that, for a clear understanding of this question, one must know what the name “nature” means. Now, nature takes its name from “being born,” which is properly said of the generation of living things producing things like in species from thing like them. For this reason, according to its first institution, “nature” signifies the very generation of living things, which is nativity. Then again, the name “nature” is transferred to mean the active principle of that generation, for acting powers are customarily named from their acts. From there, the name “nature” goes on to mean the active principle of any natural motion; and further, to signify also the material principle of any generation; and from there, also to signify the formal principle that is the terminus of generation. But because generation is not only terminated in the form but in the composite substance, it has been transferred to signify any substance, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.4, 1014b16–17; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 5, n. 808.) and to signify even any being at all, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 1 (PL 64:1341).)

However, aside from the significations by which form and matter are called “substance,” “substance” is said in two ways, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.8, 1017b21–26; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 10, nn. 902–903.) In one way, the subject itself that is called a "this-something" and is not predicated of another (like “this man”), insofar as a substance is signified by the word “hypostasis.” And according to this signification, a substance is called a “nature” insofar as a nature is what can act or be acted upon, as Boethius says in the book mentioned. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures (PL 64:1337).) In another way, we call the substance the “what it was to be”—that is, the “what-ness” and essence that the definition of anything whatsoever signifies, as is signified by the name ousia. And this is also how substance is called the “nature,” as when Boethius says that the nature is what informs each thing with its specific difference, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 1 (PL 64:1342).) because the last difference is the one that completes the definition.

Therefore, leaving aside all other meanings of the word “nature,” we are asking whether there is one nature in Christ or several according to this last signification alone. Now, if there is only one, it is either one of the two, or it is a composite of both.

But if there is only one of the two, there are two ways this would be the case. In one way, by no intervening joining of one to the other, and then, if it were in the divine nature, nothing new would happen in the Word becoming flesh, and the Incarnation would be nothing. But if it were in the human nature alone, Christ would not be different from other people, and the Incarnation would be lost. In the other way, one of the natures would pass into the other. And this cannot be, for things that do not share in matter cannot pass into one another. Now, the divine nature is entirely immaterial, and still less could it share in matter with the human nature. Furthermore, if divine nature passed into the human nature, the simplicity and immutability of divine nature would be destroyed. But if the human nature changed into the divine nature, the truth of the Passion and all the things that Christ did physically would be destroyed.

However, if it were one nature composed out of the two, there are two ways that this could be the case. In one way, if the third nature were composed out of two natures that do not remain, like a combination composed out of the four elements. And according to this, the divine nature would be considered material and capable of suffering, because a combination happens only of things that share in matter and are naturally apt to act and be acted upon by each other. And the faith that confesses that Christ is true God and true man would be destroyed. In the other way, it would be composed out of two natures that did remain, and this could happen two ways. One, according to a commensurateness of continuity or contiguity, and following this we would be holding that the divine nature is bodily, because continuity and contact have to do with bodies. In the other way, it could happen as an internal formation, just as one thing is made from the soul and the body. And this also cannot be the case, because in this way one thing is made not from two acts nor from two potencies, but from act and potency, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a9; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 1, n. 215.) but divine and human natures are each a being in act. Furthermore, divine nature does not have anything of potentiality, nor can it be an act entering into the composition of anything, since it is the infinite first existence subsisting through itself. Therefore, it is clear that in any way that one nature is posited in Christ results in an error. And that is why Eutyches, who did hold this, was condemned as a heretic.

Reply Obj. 1: He is something constituted of two natures, but not of two the way a blend of the elements is, for with that kind of thing there also has to be an intermediate nature constituted out of the two that do not remain. But Christ is constituted out of two natures such that he subsists in two natures that are preserved; for he is of a divine and a human nature. And so the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: As Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 6.) the difference names the entire nature of the species, otherwise it would not be predicated of the species. But it does not name it from the whole, but from its part, namely its formal principle; for “rational” is said of what possesses reason. But the genus, on the other hand, names the whole from its material principle. Thus a difference is not added to a difference when a nature is added to a nature, but when a further formal principle is added, for example, intellectual added to sensitive. But there is no addition like this in Christ, for one nature is not added to another as something formal in relation to him, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Soul and body, as parts of a human, properly speaking, are not two natures the way we are speaking about “nature” in this question. But each one is a part of a nature, one as the form and the other as the matter. Therefore it is not an obstacle.

Reply Obj. 4: The properties of human nature are never said of the divine nature, nor vice versa, except by a certain participation. Rather, both are said of what possesses the nature, whether human or divine, which is signified by the noun, “God,” and the noun, “man.” For it is the same one who has both natures.

Reply Obj. 5: This argument follows in things that share in matter, and act and are acted upon by each other. And so it is not relevant in this question.

Reply Obj. 6: His flesh is said to be deified, not because it becomes divinity itself, but because it becomes God’s flesh, and also because it participates in the gifts of divinity more abundantly by the fact that it is united to the divinity, and because it is like the instrument by which the divine power works our salvation. For touching the leper with his flesh, he healed through the power of his divinity, and dying in his flesh, he defeated death through the power of his divinity. But the power of the one acting is in some way in the instrument by means of which he does something.

Article 3

Whether the union happened in the person, and if Christ is one person

To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.2.2; SCG IV.41; De unione Verbi, a. 1; Super Philip. 2, lect. 2.) It seems that in Christ there is not just one person, and thus the union did not happen in the person.

Obj. 1: For no nature is found without those things that through themselves follow on that nature. But personhood through itself follows on human nature, and likewise on divine nature. Therefore both natures retain their own personhood.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, human nature is nobler in Christ than in Peter. But personhood pertains to dignity. This is why in ignoble substances, we do not find a person. Therefore, just as Peter’s humanity has its own personhood, so does Christ’s humanity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a person there does not seem to be anything but its nature and the things that distinguish this supposit of the nature from the other supposits. But the natures in Christ are diverse, and diverse distinctive things, since he is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit by the eternal relations, whereas he is distinguished from other humans by the division of matter and accidents. Therefore there are two personhoods there.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, coming together in a person is greater than coming together in genus or species, for the former is in something that is one according to reality, but the latter are one according to reason. But because of the tremendous distance between divine nature and human nature, they cannot come together in genus or species. Therefore, much less can they come together in a person.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9, 1018a9–11; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 12, n. 913.) that a diversity in species follows on a diversity in genus, and a diversity in number follows on the former. But in Christ there is found a diversity in species, because there are diverse natures, if we take a nature as what informs each thing with its specific difference. Therefore, there is also found a difference in number. But where there is the same person, it is the same according to number. Therefore, in Christ there is not one person.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the relationship of nature to person is not less than that of form to matter. But there is a diversity of matter according to the diversity of forms, for the proper act happens in the proper matter. Therefore, according to the diversity of natures there is also diversity in person—and thus the same as before.

On the contrary, when things differ according to the person and the nature, what is said of the one is not said of the other. But those things that belong to God are attributed to a man in Scripture: this man was born in her, and the highest himself has founded her (Ps 87:5). (RSV reads “this one and that one were born in her; for the Most High himself will establish her.”) And things that are attributed to a man are attributed to God: they never would have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8). Therefore God and man come together in a person.

Furthermore, what is attributed to the Son and not to the Father belongs to him according to that in which he is distinguished from the Father. But the union, passively taken, belongs to the Son, and not to the Father. Therefore it belongs to him according to that in which he is distinguished from the Father. But this is in the person. Therefore, the union happened in the person.

Furthermore, for the redemption of the human race to happen, the one making satisfaction had to be God, who is able, and a man, who owed it, as is clear from things said in Distinction 1. (Above,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.)* But in no way can two persons be one agent. Therefore, if there are two persons, the satisfaction has still not been made, and that would mean we are still in slavery to sin, which is against the Sacred Scripture of the New Testament.

I answer that Nestorius, who held that there were two persons in Christ, was deceived, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 4 (PL 64:1345).) in that he believed a nature and a person are the same thing. Thus he believed that, since there are two natures in Christ, there would be two persons. And from the same source sprang the error of Eutyches, who, when he heard one person in Christ, judged there to be one nature. And the errors of Arius and Sabellius against the Trinity also came from the same origin.

Therefore, it should be known that in certain things the nature and the person differ according to reality, but in other things they differ only according to their notion. For a nature, as we are speaking of it here, is the “whatness” of a thing that its definition designates, while a person is this something that subsists in that nature. Now, in simple things that lack matter, as Avicenna says, (source?) the simple thing itself is its own whatness. But the whatness of a composite thing is not the composite thing itself, for humanity is not a man. The reason for this is that within the signification of “humanity,” either of its whatness or of its nature, are contained only the essential principles of man, in virtue of which he is a man, but not those things that pertain to the determination of the matter, by which the nature is individuated—these are contained only in the signification of “Socrates,” because by these Socrates is this man, and is divided from other men. And so, since humanity does not include in its signification the whole that is in the thing subsisting in the nature, since it is, as it were, just a part, it is not predicated of it. And because only what is composite subsists, and the part is possessed by its whole, therefore the soul does not subsist, but rather Socrates does, and he is the one who has humanity. Now, “man” signifies both the essentials and the individuating principles, but in different ways; for it signifies the essentials determinately, but the individuating principles indeterminately, these ones or those ones. And thus “man,” since it is the whole, can be predicated of Socrates, and can mean “someone having humanity.” But because being indistinct is incomplete, as a being in potency, this is why “man” does not subsist, but only this man, to whom belongs the account of “person.” Therefore the account of “person” is of a distinct subsisting thing and it includes everything that is in the thing, whereas “nature” includes only the essentials. Now, in simple things the nature and the person do not differ in reality, because nature is not received in any matter by which it is individuated; rather, it is subsisting through itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the essentials of the thing are considered, we say there is a nature there; but insofar as is found there something subsisting, we say there is a person there.

Therefore it is evident from the account of “person”—that it comprehends everything that there is in the thing—that if there is something that is beyond what “person” includes, then this is not united to the thing, unless perhaps in virtue of a likeness in genus, or in species, or accidentally. And this is why, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 4 (PL 64:1345).) if there is not one person in Christ, no union was made between divinity and humanity, except according to a likeness of grace, which Nestorius also held. And this is neither something new, nor proper to Christ; nor could our redemption have been accomplished by him, nor would he have been the true God, but only by participation, just like the other saints. Therefore, it should simply be granted that there was one person in Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: The human nature in Christ is not without personhood, but it is in the one person of the Word with the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s nature is the most noble by the fact that it is in the divine person.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the account of “person” that it include simultaneously all the essentials and the individuating properties of the things joined together. Therefore it does not follow that if there two natures and diverse properties, then there are diverse persons. For if there were natures with their own properties separate from the others, there would be the totality on each side that the account of “person” requires. But there is only one totality when they are joined together, and therefore there is one person.

Reply Obj. 4: In things that differ in genus or species, their essences and natures differ in number. However, it is not necessary that their supposits or subjects differ in number, for those things that, considered in themselves, are of diverse genera or species can be brought together into one supposit or subject; for example, flesh and bone are brought together to constitute a body, and whiteness and length are often in the same subject. And in the same way, although the divine nature and the human nature differ even more than in species or genus, they can still be united in one person.

Reply Obj. 5: As Boethius says, (Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 12 (CSEL 48:236; PL 64:115–116).) the species is the whole existence of the individuals, and so is the genus in a certain way, as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Physics, bk. 1, ch. 1.) insofar as it signifies the whole indistinctly. And because his human nature does not include Christ’s whole existence, therefore it does not hold the nature of a species in Christ, and so it does not follow that in Christ there are diverse species. Or it could be said that the Philosopher’s statement should be understood in reference not to when natures of diverse genera are being joined together; for accident and subject, since they are joined together (although they are of diverse genera), do not make a greater number of things.

Reply Obj. 6: Form is united to matter by informing it, and so for different forms, the matter has to be disposed differently. But for the account of a person is only required a uniting, which can happen no matter how diverse the things are; and thus it is not necessary that diverse natures have diverse persons.

Question 2

The divine person assuming the human nature

Next we will ask about the one assuming human nature, and concerning this there are three things to be asked:

first, whether it befits a divine person to assume;

second, whether it befits a divine nature to assume;

third, whether it befits a divine nature to assume without the person.

Article 1

Whether it befits a divine person to assume

To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.1.) It seems that it does not befit a divine person to assume.

Obj. 1: For as was said, “person” signifies something complete and whole. But when the last completion has been completed, no addition can be made. Therefore, a person cannot assume anything to himself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is assumed by a participation of something shares in that thing in some way. But total unshareability is belongs to the account of a person. Therefore a person cannot assume anything into itself in the participation of it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a person, as the supposit of a nature, has a certain resemblance to matter, just as its nature has a certain resemblance to form. But matter is farther away from perfection than a form that is part of a thing. Therefore, if the divine nature cannot be the form of any thing because of its own perfection, much less can a divine person be a person of some other nature. Therefore, a divine person cannot assume a nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the difference between a person and its nature is more opposed to simplicity than the difference between a subject and its accident, because, according to Avicenna, (source? Perhaps Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 2.) in simple created substances the person does not in reality differ from its nature, although the accidents do differ from substance in them. But, because of his own simplicity, the divine person of the Word cannot be distinguished by any property that is not himself, nor can he be the subject of any accident. Therefore, much less can he be the supposit of an alien nature.

On the contrary, the Word became flesh (John 1:14), that is, he became man. But this happens only by an assumption. Therefore, since the “Word” is a personal name, one must say that the person assumes.

Furthermore, assumption has its terminus in union. But the union is in the person, as was proved in the solution to the preceding article. Therefore, the person is the one assuming, since “assumption,” as was said, indicates the terminus in which the union happens.

I answer that, as has been said, “person” requires completion. Now, when things are joined together, sometimes it is such that each is incomplete, as is seen in the union of matter and form, neither of which has complete existence, and in mixtures, when both of the ingredients are partly corrupted. And so in things like this, the completion that a person requires is due to neither one, but to the composite. However, sometimes one thing already exists as complete in itself, and the other is added and completed through the completion of the one, like food that is joined to a man who is already complete; thus the personal completion is not due to the food, but to the man. And something is properly said to be “assumed” that is drawn into the personhood of the other in this way. Therefore, since the divine nature and the human nature that are joined together are not related to perfection equally—rather, the divine nature has the personal completion, in which it differs from a form, and it remains incorrupt in it, in which it differs from things that are mixed—if they are joined together, the human nature must be drawn into the divine person, by the divine power. Otherwise, there would be two persons, and no union. And thus it should be granted that the person assumes.

Reply Obj. 1: The person does not receive an addition of things that distinguish it, or that complete its existence as a person, in virtue of which it is said to be a complete thing. But it is not a problem that it should receive the addition of other things that do not cause personhood; for example, Socrates receives the addition of knowledge, nourishment, and other things like that, yet these things do not individuate him. So too, the human nature that is added to the divine person does not cause personhood in him, but is drawn into the personhood that already exists.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three sorts of unshareability that belong to the account of “person”: namely, that of its part, insofar as a person is a complete thing; that of a universal, insofar as a person is a subsisting thing; and that of what can be assumed, insofar as what is assumed passes into the personhood of the other and does not have its own proper personhood. However, the shareability of the one doing the assuming is not opposed to the account of the “person.”

Reply Obj. 3: The divine person is not a “supposit” to human nature as though “placed under” it, as matter is under form; but rather as though subsisting in it, inasmuch as it has it united to itself. Thus it does not have a resemblance to matter.

Reply Obj. 4: A subject underlies accidents, which can not apply to a divine person, since it does not have any potentiality. But it is not said to be a supposit to human nature as if it were underlying it, as has been said.

Article 2

Whether assuming befits the nature

To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.2.) It seems that assuming does not belong to the nature.

Obj. 1: For what belongs to the divine nature is common to the three persons. But to assume does not belong to the Father and the Holy Spirit; therefore, it does not belong to the divine nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, personal acts, like generating, are not said of the nature, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, aa. 1, 2.) But assuming properly belongs to a person. Therefore the nature did not assume.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, because the Word assumed flesh, the Word is said to have become flesh. But the divine nature is not said to have become flesh. Therefore the divine nature did not assume flesh.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the sharing of idioms occurs by reason of this assuming, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) But those things that belong to human nature are not said of the divine nature, for it is not said to have suffered or died. Therefore, it does not belong to it to assume.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to “assume” is to “take to oneself.” But the divine nature did not draw human nature to itself, for the union was not made in the divine nature. Therefore the divine nature cannot be said to assume.

On the contrary, there are the authorities that are found in the text. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).6–12.)

Furthermore, in Christ, whatever is united can be called either the one assuming or what is assumed. But the divine nature is united to the human nature. Therefore, since it is not assumed, it should be called the one assuming.

I answer that “assuming” is said in three ways. In one way, it is said commonly for “taking,” and in this way the whole Trinity assumed the human nature for the Son. Second, it is properly said as “take to oneself,” as it is united to oneself in any way, and this is the way the divine nature in the person of the Son assumed the human nature. Third, it is said most properly, as “take to oneself and into oneself.” And in this way it belongs only to the person in whom the union is made.

Reply Obj. 1: This is true of those things that belong to the nature in virtue of itself, and not by reason of this person or that person, like assuming.

Reply Obj. 2: To assume, in the third way of speaking, is proper to a person, and thus it does not belong to the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine nature assumes the human nature and it is united to it. However, the supposit is not brought in by the name “nature,” whereas it is by the name “God,” or “Word.” And this is why God or the Word is said to be made flesh, that is, man, not by a transformation of the nature, but by a union in the supposit. However, this cannot be said of the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 4: The sharing of idioms happens by reason of the union in the supposit. And because the supposit is not brought in by the name “nature,” as it is in the name “God” or “Son,” we cannot say that the nature suffered just as we say that God suffered. Nevertheless, we say the nature became incarnate, because by this no property of human nature is being brought in, but only the union with it.

Reply Obj. 5: The divine nature takes the human nature to itself, that is, such that it is united to itself, but not such that the union may happen in it.

Article 3

Whether assuming belongs to the nature, setting aside the persons

To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.3.3.) It seems that, if the persons were set aside, the nature could not assume.

Obj. 1: For a nature without supposits exists only in bare contemplation. But what exists only in contemplation, does not have existence; and what does not exist, does not act. Therefore the nature without the persons could not assume.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a16–17; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 20–21.) actions belong to individuals, or supposits. But assuming is an action. Therefore, since the supposits of the divine nature are the persons themselves, it seems that the nature without the persons could not assume.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Son is said to be sent by the fact that he assumed. But if there were not distinct persons, the notion of sending would not remain, for one who is sent is from another, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:906).) Therefore, without distinct persons there could not be any assumption.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, assumption must have its terminus in a union. But if the persons were set aside, nothing would remain in which the union would happen, since it cannot happen in the nature. Therefore, the nature cannot assume without the persons.

On the contrary, the angel showed the Incarnation through God’s omnipotence, for with God nothing will be impossible (Luke 1:37). But if the persons were set aside, omnipotence would still remain in the essence. Therefore, assumption could still be done in the essence.

Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PG 94:981).) that on account of his philanthropia, that is, his love of human beings, the Son of God took a nature. But if the persons were set aside, it would still belong to God to love his own creation. Therefore, there could still be assumption.

I answer that "setting aside" the persons from divine nature can be understood in two ways. In one way, if every notion of personhood were set aside, and then the nature itself would not be subsisting in itself, nor would it be in any subsisting thing. And then it would not have any existence in reality, but only in the understanding. And thus neither assuming nor any other action would apply to it. In another way, it can be understood such that the distinct persons that our faith holds might be set aside. Now, the divine nature would still remain subsisting if they were set aside, just as those who do not have faith in the Trinity do understand God without understanding that the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit is there. Therefore, some personhood will still remain there. And this is how the question proceeds: about setting aside the distinct persons that the faith supposes. And in this way it could be said that, even with the persons set aside, assuming would still befit the divine nature.

The replies to Obj. 1, 2, & 4 are clear, for they proceed according to the first understanding of this expression.

Reply Obj. 3: The sending is not, simply speaking, necessary to Incarnation, but necessary to the Incarnation of the Son. This is why the Master says above in Distinction 1 (Above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; below, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1.) that the Father could have been incarnate, although he cannot have been sent.

Question 3

The assumption of the human nature

Next we must ask about what was assumed; and concerning this there are three things to ask:

first, whether a human nature was assumed;

second, whether the soul is a person;

third, whether the person of a man was assumed.

Article 1

Whether a human nature was assumed

To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that a human nature was not assumed.

Obj. 1: For according to Boethius, (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium, de Duabus Naturis, ch. 1 (PG 64:1341).) the nature, as we are speaking of it here, is what informs each thing with its specific difference. But a specific difference is what signifies a bare nature, for it does not signify it as it is within something. Therefore, since according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PG 94:1023).) God did not assume the nature that exists in bare contemplation, it seems that he did not assume a nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is assumed must already exist. But the human nature did not exist prior to the union, for at the moment that the flesh existed, it was the flesh of the Word of God. Therefore no nature was assumed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nature is the same thing as the essence. But it cannot be said that he assumed an essence, for the word “essence” (essentia) comes from “existing” (essendo). Now, a the existence of a person is what he did not assume. Therefore, neither did he assume the nature assumed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, human nature is humanity itself. But humanity cannot exist without a man. Therefore, since what is assumed was not a man, as it says in the text, (Sent. III, 5.3(16).4.) it seems that neither was humanity assumed, and thus, neither was human nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, assumption has its terminus in union. But a human nature is not united, because the one uniting is united, and the human nature is not the Son of God. Therefore, a human nature was not assumed.

On the contrary, Augustine says, God took a human nature into the unity of his person. (In fact, Fulgentius, De Fide, ad Petrum, ch. 17 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:772), as noted by the Vivès edition.)

Furthermore, God became a man through an assumption. But there is no man in whom there is not human nature. Therefore, God assumed a human nature.

Furthermore, Philippians 2:7 says, taking the form of a servant, that is, the nature.

I answer that anyone who confesses the Incarnation holds that a human nature was assumed. And although according to every way listed above that the word “nature” can be said, the nature can be said to be assumed, we must not get sidetracked by individual instances, since everyone who says that a human nature was assumed understands “nature” as meaning the whatness.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as a genus is a certain intention that the intellect holds about an understood form, difference is as well, as are all the [names] that signify second intentions. Nevertheless, what corresponds to this intention of the intellect is that nature that is in the particulars—although insofar as it is in particulars it does not have the account of a genus or species. According to this, I say that Boethius does not intend to say that the difference insofar as the intention of difference belongs to it is his nature, but the difference insofar as it is in the reality itself—that is, the thing’s whatness, which the difference completes.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it does not preexist in time, it does preexist in the mode of understanding, and this is enough.

Reply Obj. 3: Essence is not related to existence as following it, but as that through which existence is, just as nature is too. Therefore I likewise grant that he did assume the essence just as he assumed the nature, although he did not assume a supposit.

Reply Obj. 4: Although humanity does not exist without a man, nevertheless it is naturally prior to man, because something is said to be a man through it. Therefore, the reasoning is the same as it was about essence.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the human nature is not united, that is, made into one thing simply speaking, with the divine nature, it is nevertheless united to it in something, that is, in the person.

Article 2

Whether a separated soul is a person

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST I.75.4.) It seems that a separated soul is a person.

Obj. 1: For a person, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium, de Duabus Naturis, ch. 4 (PG 64:1343).) is an individual substance of a rational nature. But this befits a separated soul. Therefore, it is a person.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever makes something the way it is, is that way even more. (See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a29; Aquinas, Post. Anal., bk. 1, lect. 6, n. 3.) But a man is said to be a person because of his soul; this is why anything that lacks a soul is not called a person. Therefore, a separated soul is a person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is granted that the rational soul is a this-something. But a this-something in rational nature is a person. Therefore, the separated soul is a person.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, an angel and a separated soul seem to differ on inasmuch as the soul is uniteable. But unitability does not impede the notion of a person. Therefore, since an angel is a person, a separated soul will also be a person. Here is the proof of the middle term: what can occur by divine power does not change anything that belongs to a thing’s the notion; for example, the fact that God could assume any man, like Peter, does not remove the notion of personhood from Peter. But the separated soul can be united to a body only through resurrection, which will not be natural, but only by divine power. Therefore the soul did not lose the account of person because of its uniteability.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, only a uniteability by which something can be united to something nobler removes the account of being person; otherwise the Word would not have had the account of person from eternity. But the uniteability present in the separated soul is not in relation to anything nobler, but rather something less noble. Therefore, it does not lose the account of person because of this.

On the contrary, no form is a person. But the soul is a form. Therefore, it is not a person.

Furthermore, “person” has the account of something complete and whole. But a soul is a part. Therefore the soul does not have the account of person.

I answer that, concerning the union of the soul and body, there were two opinions among the ancients. One is that the soul is united to the body as a complete being to a complete being, so that it would be in the body like a sailor in a ship. This is why, as Gregory of Nyssa says, (In fact, Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, ch. 3 (PG 40:594).) Plato held that man is not something constituted of a body and soul, but rather he is a soul dressed with a body. And according to this, the whole personhood of a man would consist in his soul, to the extent that a separated soul could be truly called a man, as Hugh of Saint Victor says. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis christianae fidei, bk. 2, part 1, ch. 11 (PL 176:408).) And according to this opinion, what the Master says would be true, that a soul is a person even when it is separated. But this opinion cannot stand: for then the soul would come to the soul incidentally, and thus this word “man”—the understanding of which is a soul and a body—would not signify anything one through itself, but only incidentally; and then it would not be in the genus of substances. The other opinion is that of Aristotle, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 414a18; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 4, n. 275.) which all the moderns follow, which is that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Thus the soul is a part of human nature, but not a nature in itself. And since the notion of a part is contrary to the notion of a person, as has been said, for this reason the separated soul cannot be called a person. For, although when it is separated it is not a part in act, nevertheless, it does have the nature of being a part.

Reply Obj. 1: A separated soul, properly speaking, is not a substance of a certain nature, but a part of a nature.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not only from his soul that a man is a person, but from his soul and body, since he subsists from both.

Reply Obj. 3: A rational soul is called a “this-something” in the way that being subsistent is a “this-something,” even though it has the nature of a part. But for the account of “person” it is further required that it be a whole and complete thing.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the union of the separated soul to flesh cannot happen except by supernatural power, nevertheless, there is in it a natural aptitude for this. And that the union cannot be completed by a natural power is due to a defect of the body, not a defect of the soul.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the soul is of greater dignity than the body, nevertheless it is united to it as a part of a whole man, which is of greater dignity than the soul in a certain way, in that it is more complete.

Article 3

Whether a person is assumed

To the third question we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III.4.2.) It seems that the person of a man is assumed.

Obj. 1: For Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PG 94:1023).) that God assumed human nature “in the undivided,” that is, in an individual. But a human nature in an individual is the nature in a person. Therefore he assumed the nature in a person.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ is like his mother only in what he received from his mother. But he is like his mother as a person. This is why Cassian says (John Cassian, De incarnatione Domini contra Nestorium, bk. 6, ch. 13 (CSEL 17:341; PL 50:171).) that on account of a diversity of the persons Christ bore a resemblance to both his parents, namely, his Father and his mother. Therefore, he assumed a person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, let us suppose that Christ laid aside what he had assumed; then it is clear that Jesus will be a certain man, and a person. But he acquired nothing by separation that he did not have before, nor did he have anything on the part of his humanity that was not assumed. Therefore, he assumed a person.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing can be consumed unless it exists. But Innocent IV said in his decretal (See Pascasius Diaconus, De Spiritu Sancto, bk. 2, ch. 4 (PL 62:29).) that a person consumed a person. Therefore the human nature had its own personhood. But this was not before its assumption, because it did not exist before, so in its very assumption it had its own personhood. Therefore a person was assumed.

On the contrary, Augustine says that the Word did not receive the person of a man, but the nature. (Fulgentius, De Fide, ad Petrum, ch. 17 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:772).)

Furthermore, what is assumed is in some way united. But a person is not united to a person, because then there would be two persons, which cannot be, as was said above. (Above,* d. 5, q. 1, a. 5.)* Or else there would be a composite out of two— which is also impossible, since a person cannot be a part of something else. Therefore, the person was not assumed.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above,* q. 1, a. 1, resp. 3.)* the one doing the assuming is not what is being assumed. Therefore, if a divine person had assumed a human person, the divine person would not be a human person; and thus there would be two persons—which is heretical. This is why it is not granted that a person was assumed. Also, what is assumed is drawn into something more complete, it itself being incomplete (as is clear from what has been said before), and this is against the account of a person, which includes the fullest completeness.

Reply Obj. 1: The human nature did not exist before this union, but after it was united, it did exist in an “undivided thing,” or in the person of the Word.

Reply Obj. 2: The expression, on account of a diversity of the persons, should not be referred to Christ, but to his parents, because the persons of his Father and mother were diverse.

Reply Obj. 3: Separation gives a wholeness to either of the parts, and in continuous things it also gives both being in act. For this reason, if we suppose that he laid aside the man, that man would through himself subsist in a rational nature, and by this very fact he would receive the account of a person.

Reply Obj. 4: To “consume” properly means to destroy what existed. And according to this, a person would have consumed a person if the person of the Word had assumed a man existing at first. But to “be consumed” is also said, improperly, as what is prevented from occurring. And since the divine person who assumed human nature prevented the human nature from having its own proper personhood, therefore it is said to have “consumed” the person, albeit improperly. And so this line of thought should not be extended.

Exposition of the text

The divinity of Christ is not alien to the Father’s nature . . . nor is his humanity alien to his mother’s nature. (Sentences III, 5.1(14).5, quoting Fulgentius, De fide, ad Petrum, ch. 2, n. 14 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:757).) To the contrary: Christ shares with the Father in a nature that is one in number, but this is not the case with his mother, so it is not a direct likeness. To this it must be said that there need not be a likeness in all things; rather, it suffices that it be there in some respect.

When you hear of Christ that he was in the form of God, it is necessary that you acknowledge and hold most firmly that in the term ‘form,’ the fullness of nature is to be understood. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).6, quoting Fulgentius, De fide, ad Petrum, ch. 2, n. 19 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:759).) It should be known that the divine nature is called a “form” not because it is the act of any nature, but because it does not have its nature as a part of itself, nor anything of potentiality in itself. But human nature is called a “form” not because it includes only formal principles (for it does include both form and matter), but by the mode in which the whatness of a composite thing is called the form of the whole.

The Trinity itself made the Word alone flesh. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).8, quoting Fulgentius, De fide, ad Petrum, ch. 2, n. 23 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:760).) Here the part is being taken for the whole, because “flesh” is being taken for the man. And it puts forth the weaker [part], of which it is seen to be the lesser, so that it may be seen that our whole nature was assumed, and even the defects of human nature, which it adorned.

The whole [omnem] and perfect nature of the divinity. (Sent. III, 5.1(14).12, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1003).) To the contrary: "whole/all" is a distributive sign, but the divine nature is undivided. To this it should be said that "whole/all" is used here to mean “whole,” insofar as what lacks nothing is called “whole,” and not in the way that a "all/whole" is compared to its parts, because the divine nature does not have parts.

And so the divine nature is not said to be man or to have been made man, in the same way as the Son of God is. (Sent. III, 5.2(15).2.) To the contrary: anything that the Son of God is predicated of, a man is predicated of; but the divine nature is the Son of God; therefore it is a man. It should be said that there is a difference between substantive nouns and adjectives. For substantives signify not only the form, but also the supposit of the form, and so they can be predicated by reason of either. And when they are predicated by reason of the supposit, it is called a predication by identity; but when it is by reason of the form, it is called a predication by denomination, or informing. And this is the more proper predication, because the termini in the predicate are held as forms. However, adjectives signify only the form, and so they can be predicated only as informing. This is why it is false to say, “the essence is the one generating,” although this is true: “the essence is the Father.” Therefore, when we say, “the Son of God is a man,” it is a predication by informing and identity; but when we say, “the divine essence is a man,” it is a predication by identity, because it is the same thing in reality as a supposit of “man,” but it is not a predication by informing, because the divine nature is not signified as a supposit subsisting in human nature. And this is why the Master said that the one is not as true as the other, but he also does not say that it is simply false.