D. 4 - Agencies in the conception of Christ

Division of the text

After having considered the Incarnation on the part of what was assumed [Distinction 2], showing what was assumed and what its condition was before it was assumed [Distinction 3], in this part he considers what brought about the very thing assumed. And this is divided into two parts:

In the first, he shows why bringing about the assumed nature is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

In the second, he raises certain questions consequent on the things said, at but we must not dwell on this too long. (Sentences III, 4.2(12).1, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).)

Concerning the first matter, he does three things.

First, he raises the question;

second, he investigates it at for the work of the Incarnation is more often attributed to the Holy Spirit, not because he did it alone; (Sent. III, 4.1(11).1.)

third, he confirms it by an authority, at that creature which the Virgin conceived and bore, although it pertained to the person of the Son alone, was nevertheless the work of the whole Trinity. Since this is so . . . why is the Holy Spirit alone named in making them? (Sent. III, 4.1(11).2, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).)

But we must not dwell on this too long. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).1, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) Here he examines certain doubts arising from the foregoing. For if Christ as man was conceived by the Holy Spirit, it seems that he was the son of the Holy Spirit as man. Concerning this he does two things:

first, he raises the question;

second, he considers it, at and so . . . since we profess that Christ was born of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, it is difficult to explain how he is not the son of the Holy Spirit, but is the son of the Virgin. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).1, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:252).)

Concerning the latter, he does two things:

first, he shows that Christ is not said to be born of the Holy Spirit as of a father;

second, he explains the reason he is said to be born of the Holy Spirit, at it is clear that this manner in which Christ is born, of Mary as son and of the Holy Spirit not as son, indicates to us the grace of God. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).3, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 40/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:252).)

Concerning this latter, he does two things:

first, he shows that this is said in order to signify the reason for that birth, since it is by grace, as the “of” denotes, as it were, a reason for the work.

Second, he shows another reason that it can be said, namely, because the Holy Spirit made Christ as man, so that the “of” denotes relationship of an efficient cause, at Christ can also be said to have been born of the Holy Spirit in respect to his humanity ‘because he made him.’ (Sent. III, 4.2(12).4, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).)

Concerning this he again does two things:

first, he lays out the argument assigned second;

second, he raises a certain question about the words quoted from the Apostle, at but it can be asked, 'Since we profess that the Savior was born, why does the Apostle say that he was made from the seed of David, and in another place, made from a woman, even though to be made is one thing, and to be born another?' (Sent. III, 4.3(13).1; Silano cites Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones Ueteris et Noui testamenti, q. 44, para. 13 (CSEL 50:79; PL 35:2240), although this does not seem to be an exact quotation.)

Here we have three questions:

first, about Christ’s conception in relation to the agency of the Holy Spirit; (Q. 1.)

second, about his conception in relation to his mother’s conceiving him; (Q. 2.)

third, about his conception in relation to grace, through which this conception is said to have been brought about. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The agency of the Holy Spirit in the conception of Christ

Concerning the firs,t there are two things to ask:

first, whether the agency of Christ’s conception should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit;

second, whether by reason of this agency the Holy Spirit can be called the father of Christ as man.

Article 1

Whether the agency of Christ’s conception should be appropriated to certain divine person

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: In I Sent., d. 11, a. 1, ad 4; above, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 6; d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 2; ST III.32.1, 3; SCG IV.46; Compend. theol., ch. 209; Super Matth. 1.) It seems that this agency should not be appropriated to any of the three divine persons.

Obj. 1: For God’s operation is his own essence. But the essence is common to the three persons, and cannot be appropriated to any of them. Therefore neither should the divine operation by which Christ’s conception as man was completed be appropriated to a particular person.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene says, in On the Orthodox Faith, that in the Incarnation, the goodness, power, justice, and wisdom of God were all manifest together. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PG 94:983).) But just as goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, so is power to the Father, and wisdom to the Son. Therefore, the causing the flesh to be assumed should not be appropriated to one person more than to another.

On the contrary, every divine activity comes from God according to the notion of a certain attribute, just as the action of a created thing comes from it according to its own form. But every divine attribute can be appropriated to some divine person. Therefore also any divine work should be appropriated to a certain person as its efficient cause; and so it is in the work of the Incarnation.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should be appropriated to the Father. For power is appropriated to him. Now, the active power that is in God alone is the principle of bringing things about. Therefore every agency should be especially appropriated to the Father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Master says above, (Sent. III. 1. prol.) the sending of the Son is his Incarnation. But the eternal sending of the Son is properly attributed to the Father. Therefore bringing about the Incarnation should also be attributed to the Father.

On the contrary, according to Origen, (Moos notes that an editor had cited Book 3 of Origen's commentary on Matthew, but no such passage is found therein.) just as the eternal begetting of the Son is from the Father without a mother, so his temporal begetting is by a mother without a father. Now, this would not happen if the agency of the Incarnation were attributed to the Father. Therefore its being attributed to him is not fitting.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should be attributed to the Son. For, as we have from the words of Damascene in Distinction 3, (Sent. III, 3.1(7).3, referring to John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PG 94:982).) divine wisdom, like a divine seed, united flesh from the most pure blood of the Virgin to itself. But as the Philosopher says in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a21–23; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 2, lect. 5, n. 10.) a seed is an active principle. Therefore the agency of the Incarnation should be appropriated to the Son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Bernard says in On Consideration, (Bernard, De consideratione libri V, vol. 3, bk. 5, para. 22–23 (Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq et H.M. Rochais, 1963; PL 182:801).) that God’s wisdom is that evangelical woman who mixed three things sprung from the yeast of the glorious Virgin’s faith—namely, the new, the old, and the eternal: the new in the creation of the soul from nothing; the old in the assumption of a body from Adam’s nature; the eternal in the union of the Godhead. But wisdom is attributed to the Son. Therefore the agency of the Incarnation should be attributed to the Son.

On the contrary, it seems unfitting that something should make itself or beget itself, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:820).) But appropriations are made according to the notion of fittingness. Therefore, since Son himself was made man, the effecting of the Incarnation should not be appropriated to him, but to another person.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it should also not be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, such that we would say, conceived of the Holy Spirit. (Parallels: ST III.32.2; Super Matth. 1.) For the Holy Spirit is charity, and the gift of God, as we said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 2, prol.; d. 18, q. 1, a. 1.) But it is not fitting to say that Christ was conceived by charity or by the gift of God. Therefore, neither should it be said that he was conceived by the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as can be gathered from Augustine’s words in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 36, prol.) this preposition “of” denotes consubstantiality, or a shared substance. This is why we do not say that something is made of something else, unless it is of its substance. For we do say that the Son is of the Father, but not that the heavens and the earth are of God. But Christ as man is not consubstantial with the Holy Spirit. Therefore he should not be said to be conceived of the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, it says in Matthew 1:20, that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer the first question that, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, n. 1 (PG 3:635).) every name of God that designates his activity in creation belongs to the whole Trinity. Therefore in any divine activity are displayed things appropriated to the three persons, like wisdom, power, and goodness. And these were also displayed in the activity of the Incarnation, as Damascene says: (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PG 94:983).) goodness, since he did not despise the weakness of his own creations; power, since he united things that were most distant; and wisdom, as he found the fitting manner for what seemed impossible; and even his justice, in that he restored the health of the human race by the way of making satisfaction.

However, each divine activity is can be appropriated to one person more than another insofar as the attribute that is appropriated to that person is more manifest in him. Now, divine goodness is manifest in God’s activity when, without any need of his own, he communicates what is his to his creation; and to the degree that those are communicated, the less they are owed to the creature; and to the degree that they are proper to God, the more God’s goodness is displayed thereby. For example, there are things that are gratuitously added to nature, and because of this graces are attributed to the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.

Therefore, since it is especially above the condition of human nature that it be assumed into the unity of a divine person, this work should particularly be appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: Attributes appropriated to the persons presuppose the notion of the essence, but divine actions presuppose the attributes, according to [our] understanding. Therefore, because of the appropriation of the attributes, the essence is not appropriated to any one person, but the operation is, for the judgment of what comes after depends on what went before, and not vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2: Although those four things are displayed in the Incarnation, nevertheless divine goodness is particularly manifest, as is clear from what has been said.

We grant the third objection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that what should be appropriated to the Father are those divine activities that especially manifest power; this is why the work of creation is appropriated to the Father. For the Father’s power is found at work in the production of an effect, but goodness is in the generous bestowal of it. Therefore, in the work of creation, things are produced in existence, but nothing is bestowed on them at that time beyond what the account of their nature requires, as it is in the work of re-creation, in which things are not entirely produced out of non-existence, but something is bestowed on them above their condition. And thus the things that pertain to re-creation are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and not the Father.

Reply Obj. 1: It should be said against this objection that although “power” through itself names the active principle, nevertheless in things that act by will, the will commands what the power executes. Now, the object of the will is the good, and thus goodness is ruling principle in the operation of one who acts through his will, and the executing power is, as it were, secondary. This is especially so when the whole notion of the effect is the goodness of the agent. And that is why works of this kind are appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: In the Incarnation there are two things: the person doing the assuming and the nature being assumed. Therefore “sending” names the Incarnation especially on the part of the person assuming; and because only the Father has authority over the person of the Son who assumes, the active sending is attributed to the Father. Now, the temporal “conception” or “birth” name the Incarnation on the part of the nature that was assumed, on which it was freely bestowed, such that it would be assumed into the unity of such a person. And thus the agency of this conception is not appropriated to the Father, but to the Holy Spirit.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a17–18; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 42.) it belongs to wisdom to order things. For this reason, those divine actions that pertain to God’s ordering, such as governance and the like, are attributed to the Son, to whom wisdom is appropriated. However, in the work of the Incarnation we find a certain gratuitous bestowal by which to be assumed into the unity of a divine person was given to a human nature, both to be filled with every grace, as the first thing, and even the carrying out of that gift, as the second—which pertain to God’s ordering. And this is why it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be the one who brings about the Incarnation, but to carry out the mystery of the Incarnation belongs to the Son.

Reply Obj. 1: In the natural conception of a man, the seed bears the notion of an active principle, and even the notion of a terminus, inasmuch as the power in the seed draws to itself what will nourish it and bring it to its complete size. Therefore as to the first, a seed’s activity is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, but as to the second, the notion of a seed is appropriated to the Son, because his conception had its terminus in the hypostasis of the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: That mixture of those three things signifies the ordering of their union, for there is not, properly speaking, a mixture here. Now, this ordering presupposes the divine acceptance by which he willed to give the creature this gift, so that by its union with an eternal person, it might be ordered with him. Thus, although the mixture could be attributed to wisdom, nevertheless the Incarnation itself should be appropriated principally to the Holy Spirit.

We grant the third objection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that, by the reason already mentioned the effecting of the Incarnation is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and therefore it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit, whether this preposition “of” names the relationship of an efficient cause, or even designates the reason for doing it; for the very reason for accomplishing the Incarnation is the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the Holy Spirit is charity and gift, still by the names “charity” and “gift” he is not signified as a subsistent person capable of acting. Therefore it cannot be said that Christ was conceived of charity or of gift, if the “of” describes the bearing of an efficient cause—although pershaps it could be granted insofar as the “of” indicates the notion of doing.

Reply Obj. 2: “Of” can be taken broadly for “from.”

We grant the third objection.

Article 2

Whether Christ as man could be called the son of the Holy Spirit

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 4, expos. text.; ST III.32.3; SCG IV.47; Compend. theol., ch. 223; Super Matth. 1.) It seems that Christ as man could be called the son of the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For the human nature that Christ assumed was the work of the whole Trinity without differentiation. But the man Christ Jesus is fittingly called the Son of the Father. Therefore he can also be called the son of the Holy Spirit, or of the whole Trinity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Generation of Animals 15, (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 1.20, 729a9–11.) in human generation the mother supplies the matter, while the activity is from the father’s seed. But all the acting that a human father’s seed does, the Holy Spirit does in Christ’s conception, and much more efficaciously. Therefore if one man is called the father of another by reason of those activities, it seems that the Holy Spirit is called the father of Christ according to his human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a man is called a man’s father because he made from his mother one like himself in nature. But it can be said, as it seems, that the Holy Spirit begot Christ from the Virgin Mary just as it also says, in the Gloss on Matthew 3, (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 3:9, 5.74 (PL 114:80).) that God brought forth a son from Sarah. Therefore, since Christ and the Holy Spirit are of the same nature, it seems that the Holy Spirit could be called the "father of Christ."

On the contrary (4), there is the authority of Augustine in the text. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).1, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).)

Furthermore (5), as the Master said above in Distinction 1, (Sent. III, 1.1.4.) the Son, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, assumed flesh so that the name “son” would not be transferred to another divine person. But if the name “father” should be transferred another person, it is no less unfitting than if the name “son” should. Therefore the name “father” should not be transferred to the person of the Holy Spirit, so that he would be called the “father of Christ.”

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that Christ could be called the son of the Trinity. For Christ as man is something created. But we are called the Trinity’s sons through our creation: is he not your father? (Deut 32:6). Therefore Christ can also be called the son of the Trinity, insofar as he is a man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a Gloss on Romans 8:29, so that he might be the first-born among many brethren, adds, in his human nature, according to which he has brethren; but in his divine nature he does not have any. But those who are born of the same father are said to be “brethren.” Therefore, since the whole Trinity is the father of those who are said to be Christ’s brothers, it seems that it is the father of Christ too, in his human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the whole Trinity is said to be the father of anyone who has grace: he gave power to become children of God (John 1:12). But Christ had grace most fully. Therefore, as man, he can be called the son of the whole Trinity.

On the contrary (4), as was shown below in Distinction 10, (Se below, d. 10, esp. q. 2, a. 2, resp. 1, 2.) Christ is not but the natural son. But he is not the natural son of the Trinity, but only of the Father. Therefore Christ cannot be called the son of the Trinity.

Furthermore (5), according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:818).) sonship does not determine the [divine] nature, but the person. But although in Christ there are two natures, there is only one eternal person there. Therefore, since he cannot be called the son of the Trinity in virtue of his eternal person, he cannot be called the son of the Trinity in any way.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that according to Augustine in the text, (Sent. III. 4. 2(12).1–4.) Christ is the son neither of the Holy Spirit nor of the Trinity, but of God the Father alone. But this is denied by different people for different reasons.

For some deny this not as simply false, but as unfittingly said, inasmuch as it presents an occasion for error—both about the Son’s eternal generation, in which a certain confusion of the relations would result if the Son were said to be his own son, and the Holy Spirit’s—and about his generation in time, lest the Holy Spirit would seem to have generated Christ as man out of his own substance if he were called his father. And just as he cannot be called the son of the Trinity simply speaking, neither can he be called that through his creation, in order to avoid the error of Arius, who said that Christ was merely something created; nor through his grace, in order to avoid the error of Nestorius, who said that there were two persons in Christ, and that the union of divinity to Christ the man was only by grace, not at the level of the person.

Yet some grant that it can be said, “this man is the son of the Trinity through his creation,” if the “this man” refers to the supposit or individual of the man, not the person of the Son of God. Nonetheless, the Son of God can in no way be called the son of the Trinity because of the repugnance of the relations.

They also grant that, in reference to the habitual grace by which the whole Trinity dwells in Christ’s soul, it can be said, “this man is the Son of God,” even insofar as he is a man. But he cannot be called the son of the Trinity, for in virtue of this [grace] he does not have the relationship to the relations by which the Trinity is distinguished. But in reference to the grace of the union, [they grant that] he is called the natural Son only of the Father.

But this opinion does not fit with the things said by Augustine, who simply denies that Christ can be said to be son of the Trinity, or of the Holy Spirit. For this cannot be for the sake of avoiding a confusion of the relations. For, since confusion is from an inordinate mixing of things, no confusion would follow if, in virtue of the different natures, we were to attribute opposed relations to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit by reason of different things. For without any unfittingness even contraries may be predicated of the Son, by reason of his different natures, such as that he is able to suffer and also unable to suffer, and even opposite relations, such as that he is less than and equal to the Father, and even greater and less than himself. Nor do they even deny this in order to avoid an error that could follow; for it does not support the error of Arius more if it be said that he is the son of the Trinity through his creation, than when it is said that insofar as he is a man he is created, which is granted anyway. And it is similar with the other errors.

Furthermore, conceding that this man is the son of the Trinity through his creation, insofar as it refers to the supposit or individual of the man, and not the person of the Son of God, does not fit with the second opinion, which is explained below in Distinction 6. (Sent. III, d. 6, prologue.) For “that man” can only stand for the eternal supposit.

Likewise too, that Christ is not related, through his habitual grace, to the relations distinguishing the divine persons does not seem to be a reason that he could not be called the son of the Trinity. For we are called sons of the Trinity through grace, and yet the grace that is in us is an effect of the divine essence, not something having reference to the distinction of the persons.

And therefore it should be said instead, with others, that Augustine denies this as simply false and impossible. For sonship is the relation consequent upon generation, while generation is the way to existence. Now, existence is something the supposit has from its form or nature. For this reason, since sonship, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:818).) is determinative of the supposit, or hypostasis, someone cannot be said to be someone’s son unless he receives existence from him. However, Christ’s existence is one—at least according to the second opinion, as will be said later. (Below,* d. 6, q. 2, a. 2.)* But Christ does not have this existence from any divine person other than the Father. Therefore he can only be called the Son of the Father.

In a similar way also, it cannot be said that he is the son of the Trinity, whether through creation or grace, because when the perfect account of any name is found in someone, in no way is that name received by him with a determination that diminishes it, as is clear from Augustine’s words in the text. For instance, a plant is called an imperfect living thing, on account of its vegetative soul, since it does not have existence with a sensitive soul, whereas although an animal has the same soul, it is not called an imperfect living thing, because it possesses it with a sensitive soul. Now, Christ has the true account of sonship toward God. Therefore he is not to be called “son” through his creation or through grace, for by this is meant an imperfect sonship toward God, which only is sonship in a certain respect, and not simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 1: It should not be said that Christ the man is the Son of the Father through his creation, or by reason of the formation of Christ’s body, except to the extent that that formation has its terminus in the personal union by which this man is the natural Son of God the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit causes those activities not by means of seed drawn out of himself, which pertains to a father, but like a craftsman working in external matter.

Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Spirit did not beget Christ of the Blessed Virgin, for according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:811).) to beget is to produce something out of one’s own substance. And this is how that Gloss should be explained: he begot, that is, he caused to be born. Nor again is the Holy Spirit like Christ in that nature that he formed in the womb of the Virgin. For this reason the Holy Spirit cannot be called the father of Christ according to his humanity.

Reply Sed Contra 4–5: We grant the fourth and fifth arguments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, the response is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: “Created” has to do with the nature and the supposit in common, but “sonship” has to do with only the supposit. This is why the human nature in Christ is said to be created, but it is not said to be a child. Therefore, insofar as he is a man he cannot be called “son” through his creation, but he can be called “created.”

Reply Obj. 2: Christ is called the “first-born among many brothers” in virtue of his human nature, not as though he were a “son” univocally with others, but by analogy. For he is the natural Son on account of his union in the divine person, while others are adoptive sons by their becoming like God, which is through grace—just as he is also called the “first-born of creation” inasmuch as, according to Basil, (Basil the Great, Adversus Eunomium, bk. 4 (PG 29:702).) he has receiving in common with creation. For this reason, it is not necessary that they be are being referred to altogether the same father.

Reply Obj. 3: The others are called “adoptive sons,” whereas Christ is called the “natural Son” through the grace of union. Now, he cannot be called an adoptive son, or even the natural son, through his habitual grace; this will be explained further on at Distinction 10. (Below, d. 10, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore he cannot in any way be called son through [habitual] grace.

Reply Sed Contra 4–5: We grant the other objections.

Question 2

The Blessed Virgin's motherhood of Christ

Next we will inquire into Christ’s conception in relation to the mother who conceived him; and concerning this there are two things to ask:

first, whether the Blessed Virgin could be called the "mother of the man Jesus Christ";

second, whether she should be called the "Mother of God."

Article 1

Whether the Blessed Virgin could be called the mother of the man Jesus Christ

To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1; ST III.35.3; SCG IV.34, 45; Super Gal. 4, lect. 2.) It seems that the Blessed Virgin could not be called the mother of that man.

Obj. 1: For in Christ’s conception the Blessed Virgin supplied only the matter, because the Holy Spirit did the whole act. But something cannot be called a mother on account of being its matter, as a tree is not the mother of a stool. Therefore the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the "mother" of that man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it belongs to a mother to produce a seed for the fetus. But the matter of Christ’s conception was separated from the rest of the Virgin’s flesh by the working of the Holy Spirit. Therefore she cannot be called his mother.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as Christ’s flesh was formed by the operation of the Holy Spirit from matter taken from the Blessed Virgin, Eve was formed by a divine operation from matter taken from Adam. But Adam is not said to be Eve’s father, nor her mother. Therefore the Blessed Virgin can also not be said to be Christ’s mother.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Holy Spirit brought much more to Christ’s conception than did the Blessed Virgin, for an agent is more present in its action than is the matter. Therefore if the Holy Spirit cannot be called the father of Christ, neither can the Blessed Virgin be called his mother.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sonship, as was said, has to do with the hypostasis. But there is only one hypostasis in Christ, which is eternal, and according to it, Christ is not from the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, in no way can he be said to be the son of the Blessed Virgin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in Christ there is only one existence, from the side of the hypostasis, and sonship is consequent upon it. But Christ did not have that existence from his mother. Therefore he cannot be called her son.

On the contrary, there is the authority of the Gospel: when Mary, the mother of Jesus, had been betrothed to Joseph (Matt 1:18), and the like in many other places.

Furthermore, as was said above in Distinction 3, (Above, d. 3, q. 2, aa. 1, 2.) in Christ’s begetting, the Blessed Virgin contributed whatever another woman should contribute at the begetting of her own son. Therefore, if other women are truly called mothers, then the Blessed Virgin should be truly called "Mother of Christ."

I answer that the Blessed Virgin can truly be called the mother of Christ, since whatever is necessary for generation on the part of a mother is found in the Blessed Virgin. Certainly according to the opinion of Aristotle, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b30; 2.4, 738a24.) who holds that the formation and organization of bodies does not happen through the woman’s active power but only by the man’s active power, and that the woman’s seed is not necessary for conception, since sometimes it happens that a woman becomes pregnant without the release of her seed, by the fact that she supplies menstrual blood that is the matter for the embryo. And this agrees with what Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PG 94:986).)—that Christ’s body was formed from the most pure blood of the Virgin, not as though from a seed, but by divine power. But this true motherhood is disparaged by two errors. One of these holds that Christ did not assume true flesh but only the appearance of flesh, and that the Blessed Virgin was not a woman, but an angel—and thus she was also not a true mother. However, the other holds that Christ did not assume flesh of our nature, but carried a heavenly nature with himself—and according to this the Blessed Virgin would not truly be his mother, for although he was conceived in her, nevertheless he was not conceived of her. Now, these errors deny the true humanity of Christ, and so they are foreign to the Catholic faith.

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin did not just provide matter for Christ’s conception, but matter suited to producing something alike in species, as well as a suitable place and nourishment suited to the conception of a fetus. And this is enough for the notion of a mother.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, the woman’s seed is not necessary to begetting, but the blood that the woman supplies for the conception is, which indeed in other mothers is separated by the woman’s power when moved by the man. But in the Blessed Virgin this was done by the power of the Holy Spirit. Nor does this diminish the notion of being a mother, for this action is the preamble to conception.

Reply Obj. 3: The father is the active principle in begetting, and that is why supplying the matter does not suffice for being a father, as it does suffice for being a mother.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the Holy Spirit did more actively than did the Blessed Virgin in Christ’s conception, nevertheless he cannot be called “father,” for the conditions are not found in him that are required for the condition of a father, like that he produce the son out of his own substance, and like himself in species, and other things like that.

Reply Obj. 5: Sonship has to do with the hypostasis resulting from generation. Therefore although the hypostasis of the Son of God, according to his eternal generation, was not from the Virgin, nevertheless according to his generation in time, he was from her.

Reply Obj. 6: The existence of one who is begotten is from his agent. However, the mother is not the agent in begetting; rather, the father is. Therefore it is not necessary that the existence of the son be from his mother, but from his father. And this is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.20, 729a9–11.) that in generation the mother gives the body, and the father gives the form from which it is to be.

Article 2

Whether she should be called the Mother of God

To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God.

Obj. 1: For she is only his mother to the extent he received existence from her. But he did not receive his divinity from her, but only his humanity. Therefore she should not be called the Mother of God, but the mother of the man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in God there is no difference between God and Godhead. But she cannot be called the mother of the Godhead. Therefore she can also not be called the Mother of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, “God” is common to the three persons. But the Blessed Virgin is the mother of neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit. Therefore, she should not be called the “Mother of God.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Virgin produced the nature assumed by begetting it, God produced it by creating it. But we do not call the Trinity the “Creator of God” by reason of the assumed nature. Therefore, neither should we call the Virgin the “Mother of God.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is true essentially should be granted more than what is true incidentally. But in the name “Christ” is included the human nature that the Virgin produced essentially by begetting it, and this is not included in the name “God.” Therefore, we should say the “Mother of Christ” rather than the “Mother of God.”

On the contrary, John Damascene says, we declare the Virgin truly and principally Theotokos, that is, God-begetter. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 12 (PG 94:1031).)

Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 13, ln. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:840).) that union was such that it made God man, and man God. But the Virgin begot the man. Therefore, she also begot God, and therefore she is the Mother of God.

Furthermore, because of the union of natures in one person, we can truly say God suffered, although this was according to his human nature. And this is how God can be said to have been truly born of the Virgin. Therefore, she can also be called the Mother of God.

I answer that Christ’s humanity and the Virgin’s motherhood were so connected to each other that anyone who erred about one also had to err about the other. Thus, since Nestorius fell into error about the humanity by asserting that in Christ there was a different person for his humanity than for his divinity, he had to say that the Virgin was not the Mother of God but of the man; for, according to him, God and the man are not one Christ. But some modern people fall into error by saying that the Virgin cannot be called the Mother of God, lest she be understood to be mother of the Father and the Holy Spirit; although they do grant that she is the mother of the Son of God. But these people tremble in fear where there is nothing to fear, for although this name “God” is common to the three persons, nevertheless it can render a statement true about [just] one divine person; for example, we say, “God generates,” just as we say, “man runs,” when only Peter is running. Therefore it should simply be granted that the Virgin is the Mother of God, just as we confess Jesus is true God.

Reply Obj. 1: Since there is one person who subsists in the humanity and the divinity, the natures share with each other their “idioms,” that is, their properties, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PG 94:998).) Therefore, just as the Jews are said to have crucified the “Lord of glory” (cf. 1 Cor 2:8), although they did not do it insofar as he is the Lord of glory, so too it should be said that the Virgin is the “Mother of God,” although she did not beget him in his divinity.

Reply Obj. 2: Although Godhead and God do not differ in reality, nevertheless they do differ according to the mode of signifying, for “Godhead” signifies the divine nature in the abstract, which is why it cannot stand for a person, whereas “God” signifies the divine nature in the manner of the concrete—that is, something having divinity—so it can render a true statement for its supposit. And therefore, since the Blessed Virgin is the mother of the Son of God, she can be called Mother of God, but not mother of the divinity.

Reply Obj. 3: Although “God” is common to the Three, it can still make a true statement for one of them, as was said. For example, when we say, “God generates,” it makes a true statement for the Father.

Reply Obj. 4: We do not call Christ a “creature," (Or "created.") simply speaking, as will become clear further on. (See below, d. 11, q. 1, a. 2.) However, we do say that he was “born,” simply speaking, and therefore “birth” can be applied to God, but not “creation.” And furthermore, being born is not against the nature of the Godhead the way being created is.

Reply Obj. 5: The Blessed Virgin is truly the mother of Christ, yet we do not call her the “Christokos,” or the “Christ-begetter.” This is because this name was invented by Nestorius in order to do away with the name “Theotokos.” However, we should not use names in common with the heretics, as Jerome comments on Hosea 2. (Jerome, Commentarii in prophetas: In Osee, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 76; PL 22:), as the sense of Hosea 2:17: for I will remove the names of the Ba'als from her mouth, and they shall be mentioned by name no more.)

Question 3

The role of grace in the conception of Christ

Next we must ask about Christ’s conception in relation to Christ’s grace by which his conception was accomplished. And concerning this there are two things to ask:

first, whether any merits preceded that conception; or union;

second, whether the grace was natural to that man.

Article 1

Whether any merits among the ancient patriarchs preceded that conception

To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II.98.4; III.2.11; Super Heb. 1, lect. 4.) It seems that the ancient patriarchs merited the Incarnation.

Obj. 1: For Isaiah 26:8 says: in the path of thy judgments, O Lord, we wait for thee. But it pertains to judgment to return something for one’s merits. Therefore, the coming of the Son of God in the flesh, which the holy patriarchs were awaiting, had to be granted to them for their merits.

`Obj. 2: Furthermore, Psalm 33:22 says, let thy steadfast love, O Lord, be upon us, and the Gloss says: the desire for the Incarnation is implanted in the prophet, as well as the merit of its fulfillment. (This is not explicitly stated in the text, but St.Thomas is referring to Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 32:22, 3.658 (PL 113:890): Incarnationem compleri desiderat, ut perfectus possit esse.)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, anyone who merits something, merits also what he needs in order to have it, otherwise, the merit would be hollow. But the holy fathers merited eternal life, which they could not attain except by the Son of God coming. Therefore, they merited his Incarnation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a prayer that someone makes purely and perseveringly for himself, and pertaining to his salvation, merits its fulfillment. But the holy fathers prayed in this way for the Incarnation, as is evident from Isaiah 64:1: O, that you would rend the heavens, and come down. Therefore, they merited it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, through faith working through the love, which faith we have about the eternal life for which we wait, we merit it. (Gal 5:6.) But the ancient fathers also had faith working through love, a faith about the Incarnation. Therefore they merited it.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, this seems at least to be true of the Blessed Virgin, about whom we sing, you who merited to bear the Lord of all.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Bernard says (Bernard, De consideratione libri V, vol. 3, bk. 5, para. 22, p. 485 (PL 182:801); Sermones in nativitate Domini, serm. 2, n. 4 (PL 183:121).) that the yeast that the woman hid under three measures of flour is the Blessed Virgin’s faith, which joined together the three substances in the one divine person. But she could not do this except by the way of merit. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin merited the Incarnation to happen through her.

On the contrary, when the goodness and loving kindness of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in righteousness (Tit 3:4–5). But the Apostle refers to the goodness shown in Christ’s Incarnation. Therefore it is not according to merit.

Furthermore, this is what Augustine says in the text. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).3, referring to Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 40/11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:252).)

Furthermore, Christ’s Incarnation is a blessing toward our whole nature. But apart from Christ’s merit, no man’s merit extends to the whole nature. Therefore the holy patriarchs did not merit the Incarnation.

I answer that in the text Augustine seems to mean that there was no preexisting merit of that man such that he would be united with the Son of God in person. Nevertheless, it is also true that no one else’s merit merited the Incarnation of the Son of God, properly speaking. This is for three reasons. The first is that the merit of a mere human does not extend to the whole nature, as was said above in Distinction 1. (Above, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9.) For this reason, since the Incarnation was a kind of medicine for our whole nature, it cannot fall under anyone’s merits. Moreover, the second reason is that the principle of merit is not something that can fall under merit, but the Incarnation is in some way the principle of all human merits, for all our merits have efficacy from Christ, through whom truth and grace were brought about. The third reason is that human merits do not extend beyond the human condition, which consists in someone meriting a certain participation in divinity and blessedness. But for the whole fullness of divinity to dwell in a man exceeds both the human condition and human merit. This is why in no way can it fall under merit—unless we were to say “merit” in a broad sense, for all the preparation for having something that preceded in the human race.

Reply Obj. 1: By a judgment something is rendered to someone that is due him. Now, the Incarnation of the Son was not due to us as though from our merit, but from the divine promise, and this preserves the character of judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: That Gloss is speaking of a merit of congruence, and not of condign merit, which is merit properly speaking. Or it could be said that the completion of the Incarnation consists in its ultimate effect, that is, in the final restoration of the human race, which in a certain way did fall under merit, especially insofar as the goal of its restoration consists in the attainment of eternal life.

Reply Obj. 3: There are some things without which eternal life cannot be had and which are concomitant with it, like the vision of God, and impassibility. Regarding these things, it is true that anyone who merits eternal life merits them. But there are some things that lead to eternal life as principles of meriting, such as grace and the like, and such things do not fall under merit; and the Incarnation of the Son can be counted among these things. Or it could be said that without the Incarnation, eternal life could have been attained, because there was another possible mode of our salvation, as the saints say.

Reply Obj. 4: They were not praying for the Incarnation, which they believed would come without a doubt; rather, they were praying for its hastening. Or it could be said that they were not praying for it for themselves, for they were not asking anything to happen among the ones themselves who were asking.

Reply Obj. 5: Although we merit eternal life by faith working through charity, nevertheless, it is not necessary to say this about the Incarnation. For eternal life is a benefit bestowed only on the person who merits it, while the Incarnation was a benefit bestowed on all human nature.

Reply Obj. 6: The Blessed Virgin did not merit the Incarnation, but presupposing the Incarnation, she did merit that it happen through her—not by a condign merit, but by a congruent merit, inasmuch as it was becoming that the Mother of God should be the most pure and perfect virgin.

And by this the answers to the others are evident.

Article 2

Whether grace was natural to that man

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second question we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.2.12; 34.3.ad 2.) It seems that grace was not natural to that man.

Obj. 1: For grace and nature are divided as opposites. But one opposite does not name the other. Therefore, a grace should not be called natural.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is natural is what is caused by the principles of a nature, as it belongs to fire to be borne upward. But grace is not caused by human nature. Therefore it should not be called natural.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ is of the same nature with other people. But grace is not natural to other people. Therefore, neither is it to him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, we do not merit by natural things. But Christ merited by the grace that he had, as will be said further on. (See below, d. 18, aa. 2–4, 6.) Therefore it was not natural to him.

On the contrary, the proximate causes of natural things are themselves natural. But Christ was the natural Son by grace. Therefore, grace is natural to him.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that Christ was not filled bodily with divine grace or divinity, which it says in the text. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).3. Parallels: ST III.2.10.ad 2; Super Col. 2, lect. 2.) For everything that is in someone physically is in him by circumscription. But divinity cannot be circumscribed. Therefore, it cannot dwell in Christ physically.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more distant from physicality than an angel, which is physical in relation to God, as John Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:867).) But an angel is not in any place, whether in a body or in a bodily way. Therefore, much less would divinity be.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Godhead does not dwell in a man except by grace. But grace is not in the body. Therefore Godhead cannot dwell in anyone bodily.

On the contrary, divinity was united to the whole of [Christ’s] human nature. But the body is part of human nature. Therefore, it was united to the body; therefore it also dwelt in Christ bodily.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that we can speak about grace in Christ in two ways: either the grace of union, or the habitual grace by which his soul was perfected. Now, the grace of union is said to be natural to Christ because it is ordered to the union in the divine person, in virtue of which that man is said to be the natural Son of the Father.

But habitual grace can also be said to be natural in Christ in two ways. In one way, because it is stands according to the mode of natural properties, which are inseparably consequent on their subject. In the other way, because it is caused by one of his natures—that is, the divine nature, not the human one.

Reply Obj. 1: The grace of union is indeed called a “grace” with respect to its cause, for no merits preceded it. But it is called “natural” with reference to its effect, which is to be a natural son, as was said. However, his habitual grace is called “grace” by reason of his human nature, but it is called “natural” by reason of his divine nature, or by reason of the human nature inasmuch as it is inseparably in it.

Reply Obj. 2–4: And by this, the answers to the other objections are clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what is further asked about, it should be said that there are three ways the fullness of divinity is said to dwell in Christ bodily.

In the first way, because the Godhead was united not only to his soul, but also to his flesh.

Second, by a likeness to the three dimensions of his body, because the divinity is in Christ in three ways. One way is in general, as it exists in all created things: by its essence, presence, and power; and in this it subsists like length. Another way is specific, as it exists in the saints by grace, by which the wideness of charity exists. The third way is proper to the Son, namely, by union; in him, there is sublimity and depth.

Third, something is said to dwell bodily from a likeness to a body as opposed to a [mere] shadow. For in the sacraments of the Old Law it existed as though in shadows and signs: the law had but a shadow of the good things to come (Heb 10:1), whereas in Christ it existed according to the reality and the truth—and this is how Christ is related to those figures as a body is to a shadow.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the first explanation, “bodily” does not indicate the mode of the divinity’s existing in Christ, but rather, what the divinity is joined to; according to the other modes it is said by a likeness.

Reply Obj. 2: From this the reply is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: In other holy people God exists through the grace of his acceptance, whether habitual grace, which is only in the soul, while God exists in Christ through the grace of union, which is with respect to the soul and body.

Exposition of the text

When one of the three is named . . . the Trinity is understood. (Sentences III, 4.1(11).2, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 38/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) Against this: we say the Son of God was incarnate, which is not understood of the Father and the Holy Spirit. It should be said to this that this statement should be understood as being about things that pertain to the [divine] essence, wherein if something is said about only one person, it must be understood of the others.

But it is not to be granted that whatever is born of some thing is necessarily to be called the son of that thing. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).2, citing Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 39/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) Therefore, it must be noted that this preposition “of” or “from” denotes efficient or material cause. Now, for something born from something else materially to receive the name “sonship,” it must be produced in a likeness of species with what it was born from, just as a son is born from a mother. And this is why hair and stomach worms are not called the “sons” of the person they materially arise from. Also, for someone actively born from another to be called his “son,” he must be produced from the substance of the agent, and also in a likeness of the same species, and it must not be an instrumental agent, but a principal one. However, the first two conditions are lacking in the Holy Spirit, which is why Christ cannot be called his “son.” Moreover, the second and third conditions are lacking in the case of water, since someone spiritually reborn does not assume the likeness of water, but the likeness of God; and water is the instrument of divine power working in him. Nevertheless, in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius calls the water of baptism the “mother of filiality”; (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2, n. 7 (PG 3:395).) but he is not speaking properly.

Some are even called sons of hell. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).2, citing Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 39/12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:252).) Notice that this is said according to the customary mode of speaking in Scripture, where what has a great affinity for another may be called its son, as Isaiah 5:1 says: on a hill, son of oil, (RSV has “on a very fertile hill.”) that is, on a mountain top where oil was abundant; and similarly, David said of Abner that he would be the “son of death,” because he greatly deserved death (1 Sam 26:16).

Conceived and born of the Holy Spirit. (Sent. III, 4.2(12).4.) Although either of these could be said of both the Holy Spirit and of his mother, nevertheless, “conceived” is said more properly of the Holy Spirit because conception was brought about in an instant by the Holy Spirit; while “born” is said more properly of the mother, who brought him forth from her womb. This is why we say in the Creed, conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary.

Made from the seed of David (Rom 1:3). (Sent. III, 4.3(13).1, citing Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones Ueteris et Noui testamenti, q. 44, para. 13 (CSEL 50:79; PL 35:2240).) To the contrary: Damascene says, not as by seed, but as by something made by the Holy Spirit. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PG 94:986).) To this it should be said that Damascene is speaking about the proximate generation of Christ from the Virgin, while the words of the Apostle should be understood as about his remote ancestors, from whom Christ’s mother proceeded by seed.

Even though to be made is one thing, and to be born another. (Sent. III, 4.3(13).1, citing Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones Ueteris et Noui testamenti, q. 44, para. 13 (CSEL 50:79; PL 35:2240).) To the contrary: being made seems to be common to every act of producing in which something begins to exist. It should be said to this that this is true of “making” as it is taken commonly, but if “to make” is taken properly, it is to exercise any action in outward matter; in this way the Philosopher says, in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a21.) that an art is the right account of things that can be made. Therefore, the Apostle says “made” to show that Christ’s conception is from an external acting principle, not one acting naturally, as it is in our conception—although he can also be said to be born and conceived on the part of his mother.