D. 7 - Interpretation of expressions signifying the union

Division of the text

After the Master has distinguished the three opinions about the mode of the union, here he shows how, according to them, one should understand expressions signifying the union.

And this is divided into two parts:

in the first he explains them according to each opinion;

in the second he leaves the stated opinions to the reader’s judgment, at with sufficient diligence, I have treated the question posed above according to the views of different people, without prejudice or assertion of my own. (Sentences III, 7.3(25).3.)

The first is divided into three parts:

in the first he explains the expressions according to the first opinion;

in the second, according to the second, at but in the second view, the reason for this statement is as follows; (Sent. III, 7.1(23).4.)

in the third, according to the third, at and so, in this view, ‘God was made man’ is said because he took human form. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).16.)

Regarding the first he does two things:

first, he explains the stated propositions according to the first opinion;

second, he objects against it, at the following objection is made to this view. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).2.)

However, in the first part he explains those propositions wherein the mutual predication of “God” and “man” occurs with the mediating participle “made,” which latter he explains first; and then those propositions in which the predication occurs with the mediating participle “predestined,” which he explains second, at this by grace, not by nature. However, he lays out the resolution of the objection at these say that. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).5.)

But in the second view, the reason for this statement is as follows. Here he explains them according to the second opinion.

And first he explains the propositions;

second, he resolves things that appear to be opposed to this opinion, at they also determine the authorities which agree with the first view, and which appear to contradict this one. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).6.)

Regarding the first he does three things:

first, he explains those expressions wherein the predication occurs with the mediating participle “made”;

second, those where it occurs with the mediating word “is,” at but the meaning is changed; (Sent. III, 7.1(23).4.)

third, those where the predication occurs with the mediating participle “predestined,” a these say that Christ is predestined. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).5.)

They also determine the authorities which agree with the first view, and which appear to contradict this one. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).6.) Here he resolves three things that appear to be opposed to the second opinion. And he does three things regarding this:

he responds, first, to the authorities that appear to prove that the man was assumed;

second, to those that appear to prove that Christ is two things, at but these appear to be contradicted by what is contained in the chapters below; (Sent. III, 7.1(23).8.)

and third, those that prove that the person is not composite, at there is also another text which appears to run very much counter to this view. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).13.)

The second part is divided into two parts:

in the first he responds to the authorities that say Christ is one thing and another thing, from which it follows that he is two things;

in the second, he responds to the ones that say Christ is two things, or Christ is each of two things, at and what was said earlier, ‘Christ is both and one person,’ may trouble the reader. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).11.)

Regarding the first he does three things:

first, he states the objection;

second, he resolves it, at and they determine these [arguments] in the following way; (Sent. III, 7.1(23).9.)

third, he confirms his resolution, at for Hilary says clearly. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).10.)

And the second part is divided in the same way,

because first he objects,

and second, he resolves it, at but they hand down that all these things would have been said from the following sense; (Sent. III, 7.1(23).12.)

third, he confirms this answer, at for as Jerome says, ‘the Word is God, not the flesh that was taken.’ (Sent. III, 7.1(23).12, quoting Jerome, Epistola 9, ad Paulam et Eustochium, n. 12 (PL 30:135).)

There is also another text which appears to run very much counter to this view. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).13.) Here he objects against the composition of the person.

First he objects,

and then he resolves it, at: to which also they say. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).14.)

And so, in this view, ‘God was made man’ is said because he took human form. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).16.) Here he explains the stated propositions according to the third opinion, and it is divided into two parts:

in the first he explains the propositions,

and in the second he infers a corollary from the things said, at and because the manner of the Incarnation is to be taken according to habit, therefore they hand down that he is called God made man, not a deified man. (Sent. III, 7.2(24).4.)

Regarding the first, he does three things:

first, he explains how God is said to have been made man;

second, how Christ is said to have been predestined, at according to them, Christ, insofar as he is a man, is said to be predestined to be Son of God; (Sent. III, 7.2(24).1.)

third, how he is said to be less than himself, at: and when Christ is said to be less than the Father according to his being a man, they understand this to be said according to habit. (Sent. III, 7.2(24).3.)

And because the manner of the Incarnation is to be taken according to habit, therefore they hand down that he is called God made man, and not a deified man. (Sent. III, 7.2(24).4.) Here he concludes from the things said that “man” can be denominatively predicated of God in such a way that he can be called the “humanized God,” but “God” cannot be [denominatively predicated] of the man. Regarding this he does two things:

first, he shows that [Christ] cannot be called the “Deified man,”

and second, that he cannot be called a “lordly man,” (Or "the Lord's man.") at and although he is called ‘man God,’ yet he is not fittingly called ‘the Lord’s man.’ (Sent. III, 7.3(25).1.)

Here the question is about statements that express the union.

And first one asks about statements expressing the union simply through the word “is”; (Q. 1.)

second, about ones that express the union with the participle “made”; (Q. 2.)

third, about ones that express the union with the participle “predestined.” (Q. 3.)

Question 1

Expressions of the union using "is"

Regarding the first, two things are asked:

first, about this statement: “God is a man,” and the reverse;

second, about this one: “Christ is the lordly man.”

Article 1

Whether this is true: “God is a man”

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.16.1, 2; De rationibus fidei, ch. 6.) It appears that “God is a man” is false.

Obj. 1: For things that are united in one person and in one nature are more together than are things that are united in the person but not in one nature. But the soul and body are united in one nature and one person, whereas God and man are united in the person but not in the nature. Therefore since “soul” cannot be predicated of the body, nor vice versa, it appears that “God” cannot be predicated of the man, nor vice versa.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the unity of the three persons of the Trinity in the divine nature is greater than the unity of the two natures in the person of Christ. But one person cannot be predicated of another. Therefore neither can “man” be predicated of God, nor vice versa.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing is predicated univocally of the Creator and the created thing. But “man” is predicated univocally of Christ and us. Therefore it is not predicated of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is predicated of God is either absolute or relative. But “man” is not relative, because it not said toward-something; (Ad aliquid is the Latin cognate for Aristotle's logical category of relation, pros ti. For the sake of capturing its concretion, we have translated it with the hyphenated "toward-something.") and furthermore, it predicates something, according to two of the opinions, and this does not happen with relative names, which according to Augustine, (In fact, Alcuinus, De fide sanctae trinitatis et de incarnatione Christi (De fide sanctae et indiuiduae trinitatis), bk. 1, ch. 7 (CCCM 249:41; PL 101:18).) do not predicate something but toward-something. Neither can it be predicated of God as an absolute, since the absolutes that come into divine predication are said of the three persons, which is not the case with this name “man.” Therefore we cannot say that God is a man.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is predicated is predicated either through itself or accidentally. But “man” is not predicated of God through itself, since then it would belong to every supposit of the divine nature. But neither is it predicated accidentally, since nothing is accidental to God. Therefore in no way is “man” predicated of God.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, every predication is either by essence, such as “man is an animal,” or by inherence, such as “man is white,” or by causality, such as “the day is the sun illuminating the earth.” But when one says that “God is a man,” this is not a predication through a cause, so that the sense would be “God is the cause of man”; for then we could also say “God is a lion” or “a star.” Neither is this a predication by inherence, since humanity does not accidentally inhere in God, as was said above. (In III Sent., d. 6, q. 3, a. 2.) And neither is it by essence, because man’s essence is other than God’s essence. Therefore the proposition is false.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher’s craft (Aristotle, Topics 1.4, 101b17–30; ars philosophi seems to be an allusion to logic.) there are four kinds of predicate: namely, the non-convertible but essential, such as a genus; the convertible essential, such as a definition; the non-convertible accidental, such as an accident; and the convertible accidental, such as a property. But in none of these ways does “man” relate to God, as is clear through itself. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of him.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, a proposition is said to be in a remote matter when the forms being signified are diverse. But the forms signified by the name “God” and the name “man” are diverse with the greatest diversity. Therefore this proposition, “God is a man,” is in a remote matter. Therefore it is false, since all affirmatives in remote matter are false.

On the contrary, theirs are the patriarchs, from whom the Christ came, according to the flesh, and who is the blessed God forever (Rom 9:5). But the Christ born according to the flesh is a certain man. Therefore a man is God.

Furthermore, Bernard says, in On Consideration, (Bernard, De consideratione libri V, vol. 3, bk. 5, ch. 9, para. 21 (PL 182:800).) that the person presents in himself so great and express a power of union, by which God and the man are the one Christ, that if you predicate either of the other, you will not err. Therefore God is a man, and vice versa.

Furthermore, whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are also the same as each other. But Christ is God and he is also a man. Therefore God is a man.

Furthermore, whenever things are one in supposit, the one can be predicated of the other. But the supposit of God and the man is the same, as was said above. (Above, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 2.) Therefore God is a man.

I answer that the proposition “God is a man” is granted by everyone, but in diverse ways by diverse people.

For according to the third opinion, it is a predication by inherence, as when one says, “man is white,” since this opinion asserts that the human nature belongs to the divine accidentally. And still this is extremely improper, on two accounts. First, because it calls the parts of human nature, namely the body and the soul, the “man,” which is said improperly; for it is not properly said that the parts are the whole, but rather that the whole is from the parts. So it cannot be said properly that the soul and the body are the man. Second, because even if this were said properly, still because these two things, according to this opinion, belong to the Son of God as his condition, “man” cannot be properly predicated of him except denominatively, just as neither is “clothing” said of a man, but rather the man is called “clothed.”

So too this opinion says that he is called “man” because he has a man, and the parts of the human nature. This is why he would not properly be called a “man,” but “manned,” just as the clothed man is not called “clothing.” This is why this is against the truth of Holy scripture, and the Creed, which says, “God was made man.” And on account of this, this is heretical.

But according to the first opinion, this is a predication by identity, but not by an information. For “God” supposes the eternal supposit, and this is not informed with the form signified by the name “man”; rather, it is informed with the very supposit of the human nature, which is other than the supposit of the divine nature. And because these supposits are the same person, by reason of this identity they can be predicated of each other, so that the meaning of “God is a man” is “[God is] that one, the Christ, who is a man.” And the manner of predicating is like when one says, “the essence is the Father,” since the divine essence is the same in reality as the supposit informed with paternity, even though the essence itself is not informed with paternity.

But this cannot stand. For what this opinion says—that the two supposits are the same person—can be understood only in two ways.

First, such that one person is constituted from the two supposits. And in this way neither of those supposits would be that person, since what is constituted from certain things is not predicated of them, as was said in Distinction 6. (Above, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1.) Whence its interpretation of the statement “God is a man,” as “he who is God is a man,” will be false in reference to both parts, since neither would God be that person, nor would that person be God. But this is not the way to understand it, since it is not asserting a composite person, but a simple one. The other way it can be understood is such that the supposit of the divine nature is that person who is simple according to reality, and that simple person is that supposit of human nature, which latter comes to it by its assumption.

But this latter is wholly impossible, since it would imply a contradiction: namely, that what comes to him is distinct in its own singularity, and is the same as the existing thing to which it comes. For what is one in substance is the same thing, but the one is what is undivided in itself and yet divided from others. Whence the supposit of the human nature that comes to the divine person would be distinct from the divine person, insofar as it is a singular through itself, and also it would not be distinct from it, insofar as it is the same as it. Thus, that person is found to be identical with one of the supposits, namely the supposit of the divine nature, but not with the supposit of the human nature.

And on account of this, the first opinion’s interpretation of the statement “God is a man,” as “he who is God is a man,” is false with regard to the second part. For that person is not a man, even though that person is God. Whence this cannot make the statement true.

And therefore only the second opinion is true, which does make the statement true. For when one says, “God is a man,” it can assert that the predication is by essential information, since the word “God” supposes the supposit of the person of the Son. And this same one is also the supposit of the human nature informed by that nature, according to our mode of understanding, insofar as it subsists in the latter. Whence just as “Peter is a man” is true and proper predication, so also is “God is a man.”

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the soul and the body are not predicated of each other, so neither are the divine and human natures. But “God” and “man” designate not only the nature but also the supposit of the nature, and therefore they can be predicated of each other, just as in that respect “one possessing a soul” and “one possessing a body” can be predicated of each other.

Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as the divine persons are one, they are predicated of each other. For one can say that “the Father’s nature is the Son’s nature.” But because they are not one in person, therefore the personal names are not predicated of each other. And likewise here, since the natures are diverse and the person is the same, the names that signify or suppose persons are predicated of each other, but names that signify the natures only are not.

Reply Obj. 3: “Man” is predicated univocally of God and other men. However, what was said, that “nothing is said univocally of God and created things,” should be understood of those things that are predicated of him insofar as he is God.

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that “God is a man,” the word “man” is absolute with respect to the form its signifies, but with respect to its supposit it has an implicit relation. For it supposes the person of the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 5: When one says that “God is a man,” “God” supposes the person of the Son and signifies his divinity. However, the proposition is not made true by reason of the thing signified, but by reason of the supposit. And since this supposit is subsisting in the human nature, this name “man” is predicated of the person through itself. Whence insofar as it is true, it is predication through itself, the same as “Peter is a man.” This is why it does not follow that it could be predicated of all [persons] in whom is present the form signified by the name “God,” since “man” is not predicated of the [person] through itself on the side of the form signified, but on the side of the supposit.

And this is unique in this matter, since never is it found anywhere else that there is one supposit essentially subsisting in two natures. And therefore one cannot say it is accidental [predication], like “this white thing is a man.” For what is through itself the supposit of “man” is not a part of the signification of the name “white,” for “white” signifies only a quality, since a name signifies one thing, but nothing one, simply speaking, arises from whiteness and its subject. This is why this name “white” is coupled with its subject as something extrinsic to it. However, “God” brings in the supposit of the divine nature that is also the same as that of the human nature, but not as something extrinsic to the signification of the name “man,” but rather as something included within it. And therefore “God is a man” is not accidental [predication], but bears a certain likeness with those predications that are accidental, insofar as the predicate is not in the subject by reason of the form indicated by the subject.

Reply Obj. 6: It is a predication through the essence—but not such that the divinity is the humanity, but because the supposit of the divine nature is essentially the supposit of the human nature. And this is what the expression signifies.

Reply Obj. 7: It traces back to a predicate of the genus, just as “Peter is a man” does. For the reason for its truth is the same in each of them.

Reply Obj. 8: It is not in a remote matter, but in a natural matter. For the proposition is made true not by reason of the nature but by reason of the supposit of the human nature. Nor is this similar to the others examples, since in the others a diversity in supposits follows upon a diversity of the natures. Whence if the forms signified by the subject and the predicate are diverse, the supposits cannot be the same. However, in Christ there are two natures and one supposit.

Article 2

Whether Christ can be called the "lordly man"

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.16.3.) It appears that Christ can be called the “lordly man.”

Obj. 1: For Augustine says in Eighty-three Questions, one should recall that those eternal goods that are hoped for are the ones that were in the lordly man, (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 36 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:26).) and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore he can be called “lordly.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Jesus Christ the man participates more in the divine goodness than do all the other saints. But on account of their participation in the divine goodness the other saints are called “lordly,” as is clear from the Gloss on 1 Sam 1:20: who is such a man but a lordly man? (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Samuel 1:20, 2.319 (PL 113:541). In 1 Samuel 1:15 and 26, Hannah calls Eli “my lord.”) Therefore much more can Christ be called the “lordly man.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as “lordly” is said denominatively from “lord,” so is “divine” said denominatively from “God.” But Dionysius frequently calls Christ the most divine Jesus. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 4, n. 4 (PG 3:478).) Therefore he can also be called “lordly.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as “God is a man” is true, so too is “this man is God.” But we call him the “manned God.” Therefore we can call him the “lordly man.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the condition of servitude is better expressed by the name “servant” than by the name “lordly.” But the Apostle places a name indicating servitude on Christ: taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:7). Therefore we can also call him “lordly.”

On the contrary, what is predicated of something essentially cannot be predicated of it denominatively. But “God” is predicated of Christ the man essentially, since this is true: “this man is God.” Therefore it appears that it should not be predicated denominatively.

Furthermore, the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. III, 7.2(25).1, referring to Augustine, Retractationum libri duo, bk. 1, ch. 19 (CCSL 57; PL 32:616).) supports the same thing.

I answer that this adjective “lordly” can bring in two things: in one way, what has any participation in a lord, and in another way, a thing that is a lord’s as his possession, either as his effect, as his words are called “lordly,” or as his part, as his foot is called “lordly.” Therefore, as far as pertains to the second opinion, in no way can this man be called the “lordly man.” For “man” brings in the eternal supposit to whom the nature of being lord belongs essentially, and not by participation. Nor is he, as it were, a possession or effect or part of the Lord, but he himself is the Lord, because the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord, and the Holy Spirit is Lord. Likewise also, since the third opinion asserts that the man is united to the Son of God as his condition, it cannot assert that the man would be denominated by “God,” but rather God would be denominated by “man,” since a condition denominates the one who has it, but not vice versa. Yet insofar as “lordly” is said possessively, [this opinion] could assert that the man is “lordly,” just as one might say the clothes are “Socratic.” But the first opinion could assert that the man might be called “lordly” even by participation, insofar as the eternal supposit is not being brought in by the name “man,” according to them.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine retracted that, as the Master notes in the text. (Sent. III, 7.2(25).1, citing Augustine, Retractationum libri duo, bk. 1, ch. 19, n. 8 (CCSL 57; PL 32:616).) And when he said it, he did not understand it as though [the man] would be called “lordly” by reason of the supposit, but by reason of the [human] nature, which comes to participate in the Lord, just as it comes to participate in the divinity, insofar as it is assumed into the unity with the person of the Son of God, who is God and Lord.

Reply Obj. 2: That man does not, properly speaking, participate in the divinity and lordship, but is fully Lord. For “man” indicates the eternal supposit, as was said. (Above, and in d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.) And therefore the account of this is not like that of the other men.

Reply Obj. 3: Something can be called “divine” even if it possesses the full notion of the divinity, for we call the essence “divine” and the persons “divine.” And therefore this man, since he is a divine person, can also be called “divine.” But “lordly” is not said of those who possess the full notion of being lord, for we do not call the persons “lordly.”

Reply Obj. 4: Because the human nature in Christ bears a certain likeness to a condition, as was said before, (Above, d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.) therefore things that pertain to the human nature are sometimes found predicated of Christ in the manner of a condition. But they are not properly predicated this way, and therefore Cassiodorus adds, if I might speak this way. Nevertheless, the account is not similar on the other side, since the divine nature bears no likeness to a condition. Or it should be said that when is God called “manned,” “manned” is not being taken with the force of a denominative name, but with the force of a participle; in this way “manned” is valid, inasmuch as he was made man. And this is clear by Damascene’s authority quoted in the text. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).9, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:987).)

Reply Obj. 5: The Apostle does not say that Christ, or the Son of God, is a servant, but that he took the form of a servant, since, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 21 (PG 94:1086).) if Christ’s human nature were separated, in subtle thought, from the Son of God, it is both servile and ignorant. And therefore the adjective “lordly” can indeed be said of that nature, so that it could be called a “lordly nature.”

Question 2

Expressions of the union using "made"

Next, one asks about the statements that express the union by means of the participle “made.” And two things are asked:

first, whether God was made man;

second, whether a man was made God.

Article 1

Whether this is true: “God was made man”

To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that it is false that God was made man.

Obj. 1: For in coming to be there is a change in kind. But in no way can God be said to change. Therefore he cannot be said to be made something.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, having been made is the end-point of coming to be, which is signified as happening to what is said to be “made.” But no coming to be can happen in God, who is said to be “made man.” For he cannot underlie any making. Therefore “God is made man” is false.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the end-point of any making is the perfection of what is coming to be, since it is the goal of the making. But when it is said that “God is made man,” the end-point of the making, indicated by the participle, is the man. Therefore it is being signified that being a man is a perfection of God, who is being said to be “made man.” However, this is impossible. Therefore “God was made man” is false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the name “man” only two things can be understood: namely, the supposit of the nature and the human nature. But the stated proposition cannot be true by reason of the nature, since God never was nor is a human nature. And neither can it be true by reason of the supposit, since this name “man,” insofar as it is predicated of Christ, brings in only the eternal supposit of the Son, and it was always true to say that God is the person of the Son. Therefore in no way can the stated expression be true.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, “man” is not a narrowing modifier of the notion of “making.” Therefore if God is made man, I can also infer that God is made. However, this is false. Therefore so too is the first expression.

On the contrary, the Word was made flesh (John 1:14). However, the Word is God. Therefore God was made flesh, that is, a man.

Furthermore, in the Nicene Creed it is said, concerning the Son, that he is “God from God,” and that he “was made man.” Therefore God is made man.

Furthermore, everything that is, and was not before, is said to have been made. But this is true: “God is a man,” as was said above, and it was not always true. Therefore God was made man.

I answer that when one says that “God was made man,” this participle “made” can mean three things in this expression. In one way, such that it is applied to the entire proposition, so that the sense is: “it was made so that God be a man.” And this is true, although this understanding cannot be held according to what is proper to the expression—both because this interpretation is not one of those statements that carry any determinate composition, as do the necessary and the contingent, and also because, since [“made”] is an adjective of the masculine gender, it requires a [masculine] substantive. Second, the aforesaid participle [“made”] can determine absolutely either extreme of the composition. And in this way—namely, such that it determines the predicate or the subject—the expression is false. For any determination can be predicated of the thing being determined. But this is false: “God is made,” as is likewise, “that man is made,” indicating Christ, unless one add something else, because it supposes the eternal supposit, according to the second opinion. In the third way, this participle can determine the subject in its relation to the predicate. And in this way the expression is true, according to all the opinions.

And it is not an obstacle that this appears to put coming to be in God, since the coming to be that the participle brings in is only a coming to be according to reason. For it was said above (Above, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 3, ad 2.) that the union by which God is said to be a man is in the human nature according to reality, but in God according to reason, as are other relations that are said of God in reference to time. And since he is said to be “made man” only insofar as the relation of union comes to him anew, after it was not, therefore just as that relation does not place some new reality in God, but is said only according to the reason of the one understanding it, so too “made” imports in God only a coming to be of reason. This is like when it is said, Lord, you have been made our refuge (Ps 90:1).

Reply Obj. 1: “Change” properly speaks of the departure from the starting-point, but “coming to be” speaks of the approach to the end-point. Therefore since nothing departs from God, either according to a reality or according to reason, but something does come to him according to reason, though not according to a reality, thus he can be said to “come to be” but not to “change.” This is also the like the way a knower does not, properly speaking, change when he considers something; rather, he is perfected, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b2–30; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 11, nn. 365–370.)

Reply Obj. 2: This coming to be is only one of reason, and therefore it is not a problem that one assert it about God.

Reply Obj. 3: That objection follows when the coming to be is real, for then something must really come to it, and this in a certain way is the perfection of that to which it comes. However, this is not the case in the proposed matter, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: The aforesaid expression is true by reason of both the supposit and the nature at once. For although that supposit always was, nevertheless it was not always the supposit of a human nature, in reference to which he is being signified by the name “man.”

Reply Obj. 5: In Christ the human nature bears a likeness to an accident, insofar as it comes to the divine nature after complete existence. For “Peter was made white, therefore Peter was made” does not follow, since “white” narrows it from the notion of the “made,” simply. For what is made is now and before was not, but “if before he was not white, then before he was not, simply speaking” does not follow, for white comes to him after complete existence. And thus also “God was made man, therefore God was made, simply speaking” does not follow.

Article 2

Whether this is true: “a man was made God”

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.16.7; 33.3; Contra errores Graecorum, ch. 21; Super Rom. 1, lect. 2.) It appears that this is not true: “a man was made God.”

Obj. 1: For Damascene says, and it is noted in the text, (Sent. III, 7.2(24).4, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PG 94:987).) that we do not call the man deified. But it is the same thing to say “deified man” and “made God.” Therefore, man was not made God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when it is said, “a man was made God,” “man” is being taken either as the nature or for the person. If it is taken as the nature, it is false, because the human nature was not made God, since it never is nor was God. If it is taken as the person, then in no way is it true that “a man was made God,” since the person of the Son of God always was God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PG 94:998).) the man and God share their properties with each other, so that whatever is said of the man can be said of the Son of God. But “the Son of God was made God” is false. Therefore “a man was made God” is also false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, because God was made man, I can argue that God is a new man. Therefore if the man was made God, the man will be a new God. But this is opposed to the Psalm: there shall not be among you any new god; you shall not bow down to a foreign god (Ps 81:9).

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is said to come to be something is, in thought, presupposed to what it is said to come to be. But Christ is not understood to be a man before he is God. Therefore it cannot be said that “a man was made God.”

On the contrary (6), Augustine says, such was the union that made a man God and God a man. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 13 (CCSL 50; PL 42:840).)

Furthermore (7), a man is God and he was not always God. Therefore he was made God.

Furthermore (8), the making that is brought in by the participle does not happen according to a reality in God, but in the human nature. But “man” signifies the human nature. Therefore, since this participle asserts its reality in the subject in relation to the predicate, it appears that “a man was made God” is more true than “God was made man.”

I answer that this proposition can be taken in the same three ways as was the preceding.

In the first sense, it is true, just as was the prior proposition—and for the same reason. For just as it was made so that God be a man, so too it was made so that a man be God. But in the second sense, it is false, as with the prior proposition—and for the same reason. For the terms are the same but in opposite positions. However, in the third sense, insofar as it determines the subject in relation to the predicate, this is judged differently by the different opinions.

For the first opinion, since it asserts that “man” supposes a created supposit, says that this is true, as it does with the first statement. For just as the divine person was not always that supposit, and now is that supposit, so too that supposit was not always the divine person, and now is.

However, the second and third opinions assert that “man,” as predicated of Christ, does not have any other supposit than the eternal supposit. But the second says that “man” supposes the eternal supposit, whereas the third says that “man” joins it in the way accidental terms do, and since that supposit never was not God, thus in reference to this, “a man was made God” is false. Still, they grant it in the first sense, which is not the proper sense of it.

Therefore according to these opinions this proposition is more false than the other one, but according to the first, it is simply true.

Nevertheless, since it is granted in some way, one must respond to all of the objections.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is speaking according to the proper sense of the proposition, and in this way it is false.

Reply Obj. 2: The first opinion would say that [“man”] is being taken as the supposit, not the person, but the other two would say that it is taken as the person. Yet the person does not determine the participle, but rather the whole statement. Since it was made so that the divine person existing in humanity would also be God.

Reply Obj. 3: This ought to be understood of things that belong to the nature according to itself, and that are not repugnant to the other nature. However, the saying “being made God” does not belong to the [human] nature according to itself, but by reason of the union. This is why “a man was made God, so the Son of God was made God” does not follow, just as “a man was united to God, so God was united to God” does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: “God was made man, so he is a new man” does not follow from the force of the statement. For if the assumed man, according to the first opinion, or the human nature, was from eternity, it would still be said that “God was made man.” This is why, as is said in the text, (Sent. III, 7.1(23).4.) it does not follow that he is a new God, but that he is now God, that is, newly. And this is not a problem, according to the first opinion.

Reply Obj. 5: With respect to the third understanding of the stated proposition, that argument follows. Whence the first opinion, which grants the proposition according to that understanding, says that “man” is understood in advance to the union, as has been said at the beginning of Distinction 6. (See d. 6, prologue.) However, according to the first sense, according to which the second and third opinions grant the proposition, it does not follow.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Augustine’s assertion should be understood according to the first mode, since that union made it so that God would be a man, and vice versa.

Reply Sed Contra 7: When one says that “the man was not always God,” the denial can deny the entire proposition, so that the sense of “the man was not always God” is “it was not always true to say that a man is God.” And in this way, the truth of this proposition follows, according to the first sense—namely, it was made so that a man would be God. Or the denial can deny the predicate of the subject, and in this way it is false. For in that proposition the eternal supposit is the subject, which was always God.

Reply Sed Contra 8: According to reality, the making happens in the human nature. But this name “man” supposes not the human nature but the eternal supposit, about which no making occurs according to a reality but only according to reason. And this happens not in respect to God, since it was always present to him, but in respect to the man. And therefore it is said that “God was made man,” but not vice versa.

Question 3

Expressions of the union using "predestined"

Next let us ask about statements expressing the union with the participle “predestined.” And about this two things are asked:

first, whether this man was predestined to be the Son of God;

second, whether the Son of God was predestined.

Article 1

Whether Christ the man was predestined to be Son of God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, d. 11, a. 4, ad 4; In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2, a. 1; ST III.24.1; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3.) It appears that Christ was not predestined to be the Son of God.

Obj. 1: Because just as what always was does not come to be, so too what always was is not predestined to be, since predestination signifies coming beforehand. But “Christ the man” supposes the eternal supposit that was always the Son of God. Therefore just as for that very reason one cannot say that the man was made God, so too one cannot say that he was predestined to be the Son of God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “man” brings in only the human nature and the eternal supposit. But the human nature was not predestined to be the Son of God, since it never was nor will be the Son of God. Likewise “the divine person, who is an eternal supposit, is predestined to be the Son of God” is false, because this is true by nature and from eternity. Therefore this too is false: “this man was predestined to be the Son of God.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, predestination precedes what it refers to. But the eternal is not preceded by anything. Therefore there cannot be any predestination in reference to the eternal. But the Son of God is eternal. Therefore the man cannot be predestined to be the Son of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is predestined was predestined from eternity. Therefore if that man was predestined to be the Son of God, or the Christ, insofar as he is a man, it must be that the man was predestined from eternity. Therefore there was a man from eternity, for “predestined” is a past tense participle, and participles or verbs of this sort restrict the substantive name joined to it to supposing things of the past.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, predestination, even according to the name, implies direction to an end. But something cannot be directed to an end unless it be before that end, at least according to understanding. Therefore since, according to the second opinion, and also according to understanding, Christ is not understood to be man before he is the Son of God, it appears that that man cannot be called “predestined to be the Son of God.”

On the contrary, Jesus Christ, . . . who was predestined to be the Son of God in power (Rom 1:4).

Furthermore, Christ is the Son of God through the grace of union, and this was foreseen and decided upon by God from eternity. Therefore Christ was predestined to be the Son of God.

I answer that “predestination,” properly taken, includes three conditions on the side of the one who is being called “predestined.” One is that what he is said to be predestined to would belong to him at a certain time; the second is that it would belong to him by grace; and the third is that he would attain the predestination. For he is said to be predestined due to his being foreseen and preordained to be going to possess something by grace.

Therefore, with regard to the first of these conditions, in Christ predestination manifestly belongs to the supposit, since this man is the Son of God. But it is not found in the human nature, which never was nor is nor will be the Son of God. This is why it cannot be properly said to have been predestined to be the Son of God, but rather [it was predestined] that it be assumed by the Son of God. For this does belong to it.

Moreover, the second condition of predestination, according to the second and third opinions, is found in Christ—but not by reason of the supposit, who is naturally the Son of God, but rather by reason of the assumed nature, which is united to the Son of God through the grace of union. From this union it happens that this is true: “a man is the Son of God.” But according to the first opinion, Christ is predestined even by reason of the supposit. For what is supposed by the name “man” does not through its nature have being the Son of God, but through the grace of the union, since it is not an eternal supposit.

Likewise also the third condition, according to the first opinion, belongs to the man by reason of the human nature’s supposit, which was not always the Son of God. However, according to the second and third opinions, predestination belongs to the man not by reason of the supposit, but by reason of the nature. For that supposit always was the Son of God, but it was not always subsisting in the humanity.

Whence with respect to the two last conditions, the aforesaid expression is more proper according to the first opinion than according to the others. But with respect to the first condition, it is proper according to the other opinions, but not according to the first, according to which, as was said above, (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) “man” cannot properly be predicated of God, or vice versa.

Reply Obj. 1: A diversity of consideration changes nothing about things in reality, but it does change things that pertain to an act of the soul. However, this participle “made” is imposed from an act that is in reality. Therefore since being made God does not belong to the eternal supposit in itself, neither would it belong to it when considered as subsisting in the human nature. However, “predestined” is a participle imposed from an act of the soul, namely foreseeing or preordaining, and therefore although being predestined to be the Son of God does not belong to the eternal supposit in itself, nonetheless it does belong to it insofar as it is the supposit of a human nature. This is just as, if a man becomes white, this is false: “then the white man begins to be a man”; but this can be true: “then the white man begins to be considered as man.”

Reply Obj. 2: As was said, the predestination is not of the nature or of the person in himself, but of the person by reason of the assumed nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Son of God is eternal, still the union to the Son of God is not eternal. And according to this, the man can be predestined to be the Son of God, just as Peter is predestined that he would be joined to the eternal God through grace or glory.

Reply Obj. 4: For two reasons this participle “predestined” does not force “man” to stand for something past. First, because although according to the vocal sound it is past tense, still it includes a future tense participle. For what is predestined is the same as what is foreknown to be a thing one is going to have, by way of grace. Second, because it pertains to an act of the soul, and from this it has the force of embracing any part of time, just as when one says, “the man is praised,” it can be understood to be about the present, the past, or the future. For the soul’s act reaches even to things that are not.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the "man" is not understood before the Son of God by reason of the supposit, yet it is understood before by reason of the nature.

Article 2

Whether the Son of God was predestined to be a man

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second let us proceed as follows. It appears that the Son of God was not predestined to be a man.

Obj. 1: For a predestination precedes the thing predestined. But nothing precedes the Son of God. Therefore he was not predestined to be a man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “man” is not said equivocally of the Son of God and Peter. But Peter was not predestined to be a man. Therefore neither was the Son of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what belongs to someone by a grace is said to be predestined to him. But being a man is not a grace for the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God was not predestined to be a man.

On the contrary, everything that was foreseen and ordained from eternity was predestined. But the Son of God was foreseen from eternity to be the Son of man. Therefore he was predestined to be the Son of man.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it appears that this is true: "the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God." For whatever is predicated of the Son of man is predicated of the Son of God. But this is true: "the Son of man was predestined to be the Son of God," as was said. Therefore "the Son of God was also predestined to be the Son of God."

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Son of God, as a man, was predestined to be the Son of God. But other things that are predicated of the Son of God as a man are predicated of him even without redundancy, such as “the Son of God, as a man, died,” and yet this too is granted: “the Son of God died.” Therefore likewise one should grant this: “the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, for the truth of a statement it is not necessary that the predicate belong to the subject through itself, unless a repetition is being asserted of the subject. But to have been predestined belongs to the Son of God in a certain way, since it belongs to him as a man. Therefore this can be granted simply: “the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God,” even though it is not granted that “the Son of God as the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God.”

On the contrary, whatever is always present in someone is not predestined for him. But being the Son of God belongs to the Son of God from eternity. Therefore it is not predestined for him. Therefore “the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God” is false.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it appears that this is true: “the Son of God was predestined, simply.” For just as “predestined” brings in a temporal effect, so too does “being sent” and “being given.” But it is granted that "the Son of God was sent and given." Therefore it should also be granted that "the Son of God was predestined."

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the case of others who are predestined to eternal life one need not add what they were predestined to; rather, it is enough to say that they are predestined. But the Son of God was predestined to be a man. Therefore the Son of God should be called simply “predestined.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in Christ there is only one supposit. But of that supposit it can be said simply that he was predestined, for it is said that the man was predestined. Therefore it can [be said that] the Son of God was predestined.

On the contrary, the eternal is not predestined. But the Son of God is eternal. Therefore he was not predestined.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I respond to the first question that “predestination” carries an order to an end, since to predestine is to send or order to something. Whence whenever it is asserted simply, it is understood to be a preordination to the ultimate end, which is in one’s being joined with God by grace or glory, or to the union in the person. But when something is added to “predestination,” then it carries only a preordination to what is joined to it; and in this way it is granted that the Son of God was predestined to be a man, since this was preordained from eternity.

Reply Obj. 1: “Predestination” does not bring in coming before the one predestined simply speaking, but in comparison to what it is said to be predestined to. However, although the Son of God is from eternity, yet he was not a man from eternity.

Reply Obj. 2: Peter’s supposit did not exist before Peter the man did, so one cannot say that he was predestined to be a man. But the supposit of the Son of God existed before he was a man, so the account is not the same. And further, Peter in no way is a man by a grace, whereas the Son of God is a man by the grace of union—but not a grace done to him but to the human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Although being a man was not a grace for the Son of God, still he has this through the grace of union, through which grace a human nature has been assumed into the unity of the divine nature.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in Sacred Scripture sometimes something is said “to come to be so” when it is made known. Therefore the expression “to be the Son of God” can be taken either according to reality or according to its evidence, that is, insofar as it is being manifested. If it be taken in the first way, then it is false to say, “the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God,” since in the expression nothing is asserted that the predestination could come before, which the word contains. However, if it is taken in the second way, in this way the Gloss on Romans 1:4, (Oecumenius, Pauli Epistola ad Romanos, ch. 1 (PG 118:326).) who was predestioned to be the Son of God in power, does grant that the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God—that is, that he would appear to be so evidentially. This was what happened in the Resurrection; which is why he also said at that time, all power in heaven and earth has been given to me (Matt 28:18). And according to this sense, the account here is the same as that in the preceding article, since “predestination,” simply speaking, brings in a preordination. Therefore with regard to the first sense, this is false: “the Son of God was predestined to be the Son of God.”

Reply Obj. 1: Of the things that are said of the man, only the ones that are not repugnant in their notions to the Son of God can be said of the Son of God. But being “predestined” bears such a repugnance, since the Son of God is eternal, whereas “predestination” carries with it a coming beforehand, which is not possible relative to the eternal.

Reply Obj. 2: Those things that are predicated of the Son of God insofar as he is a man do not have any repugnance to the Son of God. So the account is not alike.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, one should say something similar to the third.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question it should be said that this is likewise false: “the Son of God was predestined.” For there is nothing that could come before what is being asserted. But “the Son of God was predestined inasmuch as he is a man” is true, since coming before is conveyed relative to the man, according to nature.

Reply Obj. 1: “Sending” does not bring in any temporality in what is being said to be sent, but rather in what it is being said to be sent to, in which it dwells through the new effect. And this is why the divine person is said to have been “sent.” But “predestined” does assert any posteriority relative to the predestination in the one who is predestined. Therefore the account is not alike.

Reply Obj. 2: In other cases of predestination, a coming beforehand can be included, relative to the things being called “predestined.” But this is not so with the Son of God. And therefore the account is not alike.

Reply Obj. 3: Although there is only one supposit, still it is the supposit of two natures, and so, relative to one nature, something can belong to it that does not belong to it absolutely, such as being created.

Exposition of the text

He was made, undoubtedly, that which he was not before. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).2, quoting Origen, In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri, ch. 1 (PG 14:848).) This statement is improper, since it cannot be understood either of the nature, since God was not made a human nature, or of the person or supposit, since that supposit always was, according to the second opinion. Whence “that which he was not before” should be interpreted as “one who has a nature that he did not have before.”

Because God took on man, (Sent. III, 7.1(23).4.) that is, a human nature, as was glossed above in Distinction 5; (Above, d. 5, q. 3, a. 2.) otherwise this would be against the opinion that says, “a man was not assumed, but rather a human nature.”

But the meaning is changed in saying, 'God is man' and 'man is God.' (Sent. III, 7.1(23).4.) The reason for the change is that the divine nature is predicated of the person of Christ, but the human nature is not.

And what was said earlier, ‘Christ is both and one person,’ may trouble the reader. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).11, referring to the citation, in Sent. III, 7.1(23).8, quoting Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis, ch. 12 (PL 42:1165–1166); although included among the works of Augustine, the Patrologia Latina indicates that this should be attributed to Vigilius of Thapse.) This is placed above, under the heading: But these appear to be contradicted. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).8.)

And when Christ is said to be less than the Father according to his being a man, they understand this to be said according to habit. (Sent. III, 7.2(24).3.) He explains this expression according to this [second] opinion, since this opinion cannot accept it. For above Augustine had said in Book I (Sent. I. 16. prologue and exposition of the text.) that the Holy Spirit is not less than himself on account of the dove under which he appeared visibly.

Always holding firmly that . . . ‘God took on man.’ (Sent. III, 7.3(25).3.) This should be explained as was done above, such that “man” is be used for the human nature, as [the Master] himself taught that it should be explained, in Distinction 5. (Sent. III, 5.3(16).1–4.)