D. 6 - The mode of union

Division of the text

After the Master has studied the Incarnation of God, here he begins to examine the conditions of God incarnate.

Now, this part is divided into two parts:

in the first he considers those things that belong to God incarnate by reason of the union;

in the second, those things that pertain to the assumed nature absolutely, at moreover, it is to be known that. (Sent. III, 13.1(38).1.) For the things that pertain to divine nature in an absolute way were considered in Book I.

However, the first part is divided into two:

first, he considers those things that are said of God incarnate that express the union itself, as when we say, “God is a man,” or “God became man.”

In the second part, he considers those things that apply to him as a result of the union, at after the what has been said, one must inquire whether it should be granted concerning the divine nature that it was born of the Virgin. (Sent. III, 8.1(26).1.)

The first is divided into three parts:

in the first he raises the question about statements expressing the union;

in the second he sets forth different opinions about the mode of union, at for some say; (Sent. III, 6.2(18).1.)

in the third he shows how the statements mentioned are understood in different ways according to the different opinions, at according to the first, God is said to have been made man, and man to have been made God. (Sent. III, 7.1(23).1.)

For some say that, in the very Incarnation of the Word, some man was formed from a rational soul and human flesh. (Sent. III, 5.2(18).1.) Here he lists the opinions, and this is divided into three parts according to the three opinions that he lists.

The second begins at but there are others who in part agree; (Sent. III, 6.3(19).1.)

the third at there are even some others as well who not only deny [the existence] of a person composed of the natures in the Incarnation of the Word, but also deny that there was any man at all, or even any substance, there composed or made from soul and flesh. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).1.)

Then each of the three parts is divided into two parts, the opinion and a confirmation.

The first opinion’s confirmation begins at and lest they be held to speak only from their own understanding, they defend their view with several testimonies. (Sent. III, 6.2(18).2.)

That of the second begins at concerning this, in the book of the Sentences of Prosper, Augustine says. (Sent. III, 6.3(19).2.)

While the confirmation of the third is at lest they appear to be expressing merely their own view, they also confirm what they say by the submission of authorities. (Sent. III, 6.5(21).1.)

Now, to clarify the things that are said one must first see three things.

First, what these three opinions agree on.

Second, how each opinion differs from the others.

Third, what each one holds.

What the three opinions agree on: As to the first, it should be known that those opinions agree in four things.

First, each of them holds that there is one person in Christ, namely, the divine person; by this they depart from the heresy of Nestorius.

Second, they hold that there are two natures in Christ and three substances—divinity, soul, and body—two of which constitute the human nature; and by this they depart from the error of Eutyches, who held that there was one nature in Christ.

Third, they say that these two substances that the human nature consists in were assumed by the Word; by this they depart from the error of the Manichees, who denied the assumption of the flesh.

Fourth, they agree that what was assumed did not preexist before the union in time, but only in nature; by this they avoid the error that Damascene refers to, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 6 (PG 94:1111).) of those who say that first he assumed an intellect, and having been a man from that very moment, he assumed the flesh afterward, in the womb of the Virgin; this seems to be the error of Origin, who held that souls are created before bodies.

How each of these opinions differs from the others: As to the second—that is, the difference between these opinions—it should be known that since there are three substances in Christ, two relationships are found among these substances. One is the relation of the soul and the body to each other, insofar as human nature consists in them. But the other is the relation of these two to the divine person, insofar as it assumed these two. And each of these opinions differs from the others about both relationships.

However, the third opinion differs from the first two in the relation of the soul and body. For the first two opinions assert that there is something composed from the soul and body that is assumed, but the third holds that these two substances are divided from each other and are assumed by the person of the Word without any composition. Therefore when we say a human nature was assumed by the Word, it takes “human nature” materially, that is, the parts of a human nature, just as the house’s parts are called the “house.”

But it differs from the first two opinions in the relation of these two substances to the third, for it holds that these two substances were joined to the Word accidentally, like clothes are joined to a man, and as an angel might assume a body so that he may be seen in it. But the first two opinions say that these two substances were not accidentally joined to the Word, but substantially in personal existence.

Likewise, the second opinion also differs from the first according to these two relationships.

For as regards the relation of the soul and body, they differ this regard, that, although both hold that the soul and body pre-existed the union in understanding, and something one was made out them being joined together, they do not both say that the one thing constituted from these conjoined things was of one kind. For joining the soul and body gives rise to both this man and humanity. And how these two differ can be clearly seen from what was said before in the preceding distinction. For “this man” signifies something subsisting in a human nature, but “humanity” includes in its signification only those things due to which a man is a man. Therefore the first opinion says that the one thing constituted from soul and body, which is understood in advance of the union and is itself assumed, is this man. But the second says that he does not have his humanity and his being this man from his soul and body being joined, but from their being joined with the divine person, who subsists in them.

They also differ as regards the second relationship of each substance to the divine person. For the second opinion says that the two assumed substances are joined to the divine person in such a way that they pertain to his personhood, and therefore that just as the person of the Word before the Incarnation subsisted in the divine nature, so too after the Incarnation he subsists in both the human and divine natures. Therefore before the Incarnation he was simple, but after he is composite. But the first opinion says that the substance composed of soul and body does not belong to the Word’s personhood in such a way that the person of the Word subsists in that substance, but by its assumption the person of the Word is made to be that substance composed of soul and body, and vice versa. Whence just as the person of the Word was simple before the Incarnation, so too he is simple after the Incarnation.

What each of these opinions asserts: However, as regards the third matter—that is, the positions that every opinion asserts—one should know that because the first opinion asserts that the two substances, the soul and the body insofar as they are understood in advance of the union, are joined together to constitute a man, thus it must also assert first, that the man is assumed,

and second, that “man” signifies only what is composed from the two substances, the body and the soul, but not the Godhead.

Also, because this man is a supposit or hypostasis, thus it asserts, third, that in Christ there are two supposits: one created, which is the man, another uncreated, which is the Son of God; and likewise two hypostases.

Also, because a “supposit” is predicated directly, not obliquely, as “nature” is, for Socrates is a supposit of a human nature, therefore it says, fourth, that Christ is “two [things],” in the neuter, but “one [man],” in the masculine, on account of the unity of the person.

And because it says the man is assumed, and the Son of God is a man, therefore it says, fifth, that the one assuming is the one assumed.

And because it says there are two supposits in Christ, therefore it says, sixth, when the Son of God supposed, “this man” is not supposed, even though this man is the Son of God, just as when the divine essence is supposed, the Father is not supposed, even though the essence is the Father.

And because “this man” does not have the eternal supposit as its supposit, therefore he says, seventh, that just as God was made man, so man was made God, which could not be said if it had the eternal supposit as its supposit, since no eternal supposit starts to exist in God.

And since eternal properties are not determinations of a temporal supposit, nor vice versa, therefore he says, eighthly, that no adjectives that signify something eternal can be said of the son of the Virgin, except by implication, as if when one says, “the son of the Virgin is eternal,” he means, “he who is eternal is eternal.” Likewise adjectives that signify something temporal cannot be said properly of the Son of God. However, substantives are predicated this way, on account of the union, just as personal adjectives are not said of the essence even though substantive ones are.

The second opinion, since it asserts that the assumed “human nature” does not signify something subsistent, but rather the divine person subsists in it through the union, therefore it says, first, that the human nature is assumed, not the “man,” which signifies after the manner of subsistence. And because “hypostasis” or “supposit” signifies something subsisting through itself, thus it asserts, second, that in Christ there is only one supposit or hypostasis. Consequently it asserts, third, that Christ is only “one [thing]” and not merely “one [man].” And since the human nature is not so substantial that it subsists, except by its union to the divine person, so too “man,” which signifies while indicating subsistence, signifies not only the soul and the body, but even the divinity. This is its fourth position. And since the divine person, who before the Incarnation subsisted in the one nature, subsequently subsists in the two natures and three substances, therefore it says, fifth, that the person of the Word was simple before the Incarnation, but is composite after the Incarnation. And since it is one supposit that subsists in two natures, therefore it asserts, sixth, that the adjectives signifying the properties of each nature can be said of that supposit, whether it be denominated through the one nature or through the other. Whence in reference to them one can properly say that “this child is eternal,” and “God suffers.”

The third opinion, since it denies the union of the soul and flesh in Christ, therefore asserts, first, that “man” does not predicate something composed of soul and body of Christ, but rather it predicates the parts of his human nature of him. So the meaning of “he is a man” is that he has a soul and a body united to him accidentally. Therefore it asserts, second, that “man” is predicated of Christ accidentally, not terms of what he is, but rather in terms of how he is related to things, as when a man is said to be “clad.” And therefore it asserts, third, that the two substances do not belong to the personhood of the Son of God; rather, they are related to him extrinsically.

And many other things follow from these opinions, if one considers the root of each of them.

However, from what have been stated it is clear that all these [consequences] of the two opinions agree with each other in differing from the third in a certain respect. For the first two opinions agree in asserting that “man” is predicated of Christ essentially, unlike the third opinion, which denies this.

Likewise, the third agrees with the second in asserting that there are not two supposits in Christ, although they do so in different ways, since the second asserts that [the Word] is the supposit of both natures substantially, but the third asserts that he is the supposit of the divine substantially and the human accidentally. For example, “the white” and “the man” are not different supposits, but the very same thing that is the supposit of “man” couples it with “white.” In this they differ from the first, which asserts that there are two supposits in Christ.

Likewise the first and the third also agree that the human nature does not belong to the personhood of the divine person, though they do this in different ways. For the first asserts that it is a substance through itself, but the third asserts that this is not at all the case. Whence both opinions assert that just as the divine person was simple before the Incarnation, so he is simple after the Incarnation. In this respect they differ from the second opinion.

Having seen these things, there are three questions about these opinions:

first, about the things the first opinion asserts; (Q. 1.)

second, about the things the second asserts; (Q. 2.)

and third, about the things the third asserts. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The first opinion

Regarding the first opinion, three things are asked:

first, whether in Christ there are two hypostases;

second, whether a man is assumed;

third, whether “man” signifies a substance composed of only two substances.

Article 1

Whether there are two hypostases in Christ

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III.2.3; SCG IV.38; De unione Verbi, a. 2; Contra errores Graecororum, cc. 20–21; De rationibus fidei, ch. 6; Compend. theol., cc. 210–211; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1; Super Ioan. 1, lect. 7.) It appears that in Christ there are two hypostases.

Obj. 1: For as Boethius says, (Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, de Duabis Naturis, ch. 2 (PL 64:1343).) in the proper sense of the word, every particular substance can be called a “hypostasis,” although in common usage it is said only of nobler substances. But in Christ, as all concede, there are several substances, and they are not universals but particulars. Therefore in Christ there are several substances.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, insofar as Christ is a man he is a certain hypostasis in the genus of substance, since both the species and the genus are predicated of a thing. But the hypostasis of the Word is not in the genus of substance. Therefore in Christ the hypostasis is something other than the hypostasis of the Word, so in Christ there are two hypostases.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as a species is related to its genus so is a hypostasis related to its species. But one species cannot be under diverse genera that are not subordinate to each other. Therefore there cannot be one hypostasis under two species, and therefore even less so under the human and divine natures, which differ more than just in species.

On the contrary, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 5 (PG 94:999).) that the two natures are united in one hypostasis.

Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, de Duabis Naturis, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343).) a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. However, according to him, a hypostasis is an individual substance. Therefore “person” does not add to “hypostasis” anything more than being of a rational nature, and therefore a hypostasis of a rational nature is a person. However, both the human and the divine natures are rational. Therefore if there are two hypostases of these two natures, one must assert that they are different persons. And this would be the error of Nestorius.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Furthermore, it is asked whether there are two supposits in Christ. It appears so. For “supposit” indicates a reference to a common nature. But in Christ there are two natures. Therefore there are two supposits.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “supposit” indicates, as it were, “what is placed under another.” But it is strange to say that the divine person is “placed under” the human nature. Therefore the supposit of the human nature must be different than the divine person. But a divine person is a supposit of the divine nature. Therefore there are two supposits in Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, being united to another does not take away the notion of being a supposit. For even a part, like a hand, underlies some common nature, since it is under the species “hand.” But only the union could prevent the human nature in Christ from having its own proper supposit. Therefore it has its own proper supposit besides the supposit of the divine nature. Thus the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, that which is united to something of a greater dignity does not have the notion of a supposit, otherwise in Christ there would be three supposits, just as there are three substances, or even more than three, because of all the parts of his body. Therefore, if in Christ there are two supposits, there will be no union of the divinity and flesh.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Next, it appears that in Christ there are two individuals. For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PG 94:1023).) the Son of God assumed human nature as something undivided, that is, as an individual. But because the assumed nature is in Christ, we say that the natures are two. Therefore we can also say that in Christ there are two individuals.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that exists is either universal or particular. But a human nature exists in Christ. Therefore, since it is not a universal, it will be a particular. But every particular is an individual. Therefore there are two individuals there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Porphyry, (Porphyry, Isagoge, ch. 2, n. 38.) the collection of the accidents makes the individual. But the accidents of a human nature are not in the divine person, who cannot be the subject of any accident. Therefore there must be another individual there. And thus the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, a person is nothing other than an individual of a rational nature. But there cannot be two persons in Christ. Therefore there are not two individuals in Christ.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Next, it appears that there are two things of nature here. For a thing of a nature is what is constituted by the nature. But the divine person is not constituted by the human nature. Therefore in Christ the person of the Word is not a thing of the human nature. Therefore in Christ there are two things of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a thing of a nature appears to be the same thing as a natural thing. But, as is said in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 192b33; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 2, lect. 1, n. 4.) a natural thing is either a property caused by a nature’s principles or the composite of the natural principles. But neither of these fits the divine person. Therefore the divine person is not a thing of the human nature. And thus the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, a thing of a nature is something complete subsisting in the nature. But such a thing cannot be assumed, although it can assume something else. Therefore if in Christ there were any thing of a nature besides the divine person, it would not be assumed by the divine person, and neither would it be united to the divine person in this way. And it would not be so in Christ.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, since every particular carries a reference to a common nature and to its own properties, it can be named in reference to either, by a name of first imposition and by a name of second intention. For the name “thing of a nature” names a first imposition, one that signifies a particular in reference to its common nature. But this name “supposit” names a second imposition, one signifying the very way the particular relates to its common nature, insofar as it subsists in it, but it is particular insofar as that nature is broader than it.

But because accidents follow upon a nature, every name designating a particular in reference to its properties also designates it in reference to its common nature. This can happen in two ways: either by a name of a first imposition—and in this way “hypostasis” is common to all substances, but “person” to all rational substances—or by a name of a second imposition—and in this way something is an “individual*“* insofar as in itself it is not divided, but a “singular*“* insofar as it is divided from others. This is why the “singular*“* is the same thing as the “divided.”

We should also notice another difference between such words. For some of these words signify the particular commonly, as under any genus at all, such as “particular,” “individual,” and “singular.” But some signify the particular only in the genus of substance, such as a “thing of a nature,” “supposit,” “hypostasis,” and “person.”

But because the notion of substance is of what subsists through itself, these things are said only of a complete thing subsisting through itself. Whence they are said neither of a part nor of an accident, even though the other names found in all genera can be said of them. For although this whiteness or this hand might be called an “individual” or a “singular,” still it cannot be called a “hypostasis,” or a “supposit,” or a “reality of a nature.”

However, if there be present two things, each of which subsists through itself, then it is impossible that the one is the other. For they differ insofar as they are numbered, since difference is the cause of number, and they are not predicated of each other except insofar as they are one.

Whence since a divine person is a thing subsisting through itself, if there is also present one complete thing subsisting through itself composed of soul and flesh, which is a man, or this man, then the one cannot be predicated of the other, as when one says, “the Son of God is this man.” And because the first opinion does assert this, this is why it is not held by anyone now.

But according to this, being composed only of soul and flesh does not indicate that it is something subsisting; rather, it indicates that it is a human nature, in which a divine person subsists. Therefore, following this opinion, it should be said that all names that signify a particular in whatever genus can be said to be two in Christ. For just as this hand is called an “individual,” or “singular,” or “particular,” so too the human nature in Christ is an “individual,” “singular,” or “particular.”

Also, since the human nature is not the divine nature, nor is it the divine person, nothing prevents one from saying, “in Christ there are two individuals,” or “two singulars” or “two particulars,” or even “several,” according to the number of the parts of Christ’s body, each of which can be called an “individual”—unless one is forced to say that names of this sort are not properly found in the divine. Nonetheless these several individuals are not predicated of Christ, since the human nature is not predicated of him, nor are its parts. However, one cannot say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or things of a nature, or supposits. For the human nature in Christ is not a thing of a nature, or a supposit; rather, it is a nature itself. For no composite nature is a thing or supposit of its very self. Likewise, it is not a "hypostasis," but an ousia.

Nonetheless, just as we say the union is accomplished in the person, so too we say it is accomplished in the hypostasis, supposit, thing of the nature, individual, singular, or particular. For although these last three can be said of things that do not subsist through themselves, still they are also said of things that do subsist through themselves. For we do say that a hypostasis is an individual. Whence insofar as the union is accomplished in the hypostasis, it is also accomplished in the individual. And in this way we can say that Christ is one individual, and yet also in him there are two or several individuals, just as also happens with any other man. And the account of the singular and the particular is the same.

Reply Obj. 1: “Substance,” insofar as it is a genus, is not properly predicated of a part. For if a hand were a substance, since it is ensouled, it would be an animal, for whatever is in a genus, as directly contained under it, possesses that nature completely. Yet a hand is said to be a substance just insofar as substance is distinguished from accident; and I call the human nature in Christ a substance in a similar way. Therefore when one says that every particular substance is a hypostasis, it should be understood to be so only about things that directly receive the predication of the genus, and these are what are signified as complete things subsisting through themselves.

Reply Obj. 2: The hypostasis of the Word, although it is not unqualifiedly in the genus “substance” insofar as it is the hypostasis of the Word, nonetheless it is in the genus substance insofar as it is a hypostasis of a human nature, just as it is in the species “man.” For a hypostasis is ordered to a genus or species only through the nature it has.

Reply Obj. 3: A genus is in a certain way a part of its species, like its matter. Whence just as in nature something one does not arise from many sufficient materials without their being put into an order, so too many genera cannot come together to constitute one species. But by nature a hypostasis is not a part, so the account is not similar to this. For a hypostasis is said to be of a certain nature insofar as it subsists in that nature.

Reply Sed Contra: We grant the things objected on the contrary. Yet one should know that the first opinion, although it asserts that there are two hypostases, still does not assert that there are different persons. For because a person is an individual of a rational nature—which is most complete and where the entire breadth of the nature is present—it follows that “person” signifies the most complete thing at a final completion, one beyond which there is no further completion. Whence when it asserts that a man is assumed united to the Word, it was not granting it the notion of being a person, though it did grant it the notion of being a hypostasis, insofar as it was subsistent. Yet neither did it assert that this man was united to the divine person as its accident, since then it would not say that [the word “man”] would predicate what he is, but it would say it is united to it accidentally—as the third opinion says. Rather, it asserted that the person of the Word was that hypostasis. Nevertheless, this is not intelligible, as one of the two distinct things would be predicated of the other, as was said before.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in Christ there is only one supposit, for the reason already stated—unless one means that it is just a supposit of speech, but in this sense anything about which one can speak is a supposit.

Reply Obj. 1: However, although there are two natures there, still it is one thing that has reference to the two natures. And therefore there is one supposit there.

Reply Obj. 2: “Supposit” does not import “being under” as if to mean being of lesser dignity, or potentiality; otherwise the persons would not be called “supposits” of the divine nature. Rather, it indicates only that it is “under” a community, inasmuch as, in predication, the common nature extends to more than the supposit, either actually or potentially.

Reply Obj. 3: A part does not properly have a genus or a species. Whence it does not properly belong to it to be a supposit, simply speaking—except perhaps with some addition, such that “this hand” is said to be a supposit of “hand.” But properly speaking, “hand” is not a genus or a species.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that in Christ there are two individuals, yet not individuals subsisting through themselves; and Christ himself is one subsisting individual, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene intends to say that [the Word] assumed a particular human nature, not a subsisting one, but rather, one that the divine person subsists in.

Reply Obj. 2: The human nature is particular and individual, yet it is not subsistent.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the divine nature is something individual in Christ, yet Christ is also an individual of the human nature. Yet it is not necessary that the accidents of a human nature be present in the divine person, except by the nature mediating them.

Reply Obj. 4: In Christ there is something individual that is not an individual of a rational nature; rather, the rational nature itself is an individual, or his part, as is Christ’s hand.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that in Christ there are not two things of a nature, but rather that he himself is one thing of two natures.

Reply Obj. 1: Although by the human nature the Word is not constituted to be, simply, yet by the human nature it is constituted to be a man.

Reply Obj. 2: Speaking of the essential meaning, a thing of a nature is that which possesses a nature. But the fact that this is composite happens insofar as this very composite of matter and form, which are the principles of the nature, is not joined to some other simple subsisting thing. However, if it were joined to another subsisting thing that is in itself simple, then that thing will be a simple thing subsisting in the composite nature. Yet it will not be composite—except in a way that we will explain below, (Below, a. 3; q. 2, a. 3.) according to which the second opinion asserts that the person of the Word incarnate is composite.

Article 2

Whether the Son of God assumed a man

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.2.6; III.4.3; Contra errores Graecorum, ch. 20; Compend. theol., ch. 210; Super Rom. 1, lect. 3; Super Philip. 2, lect. 2.) It appears that the Son of God assumed a man.

Obj. 1: Psalm 65:4: Blessed is he whom you have chosen and assumed; this is speaking about Christ the man. Therefore the man was assumed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the Son of God is a man, then he is either the man whom he assumed or a man whom he did not assume. If he is a man whom he did not assume, then he can no more be called the man who is Jesus than the man who is Peter. However, if he is the man whom he assumed, then he assumed the man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Son of God assumed the united soul and body, since a body that is not united to a soul is an inanimate body, and this cannot be assumed, as has been said in Distinction 2. (Above,* d. 2, q. 2, a. 1.)* However, the union in Christ the man is not weaker than the union in other men. But in other men it makes not only the humanity but even the man. Therefore in Christ too it makes the man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in Christ there is only the one assuming and the one assumed. But he is not a man on the side of the one assuming, since then he would have been a man from eternity. Therefore it must be on the side of the one assumed, and therefore the man is assumed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) Christ assumed whatever he planted in our nature. But the Word of God has planted in our nature that which, united from soul and body, makes a man when it happens among natural things. Therefore he assumed the man, since when the sufficient cause is present, the effect is also present.

On the contrary, the one assuming is not the one assumed. But God is a man. Therefore he did not assume a man.

Furthermore, if he assumed the man, it is well established that he did not assume the universal man. Therefore he assumed this man. But this man is a person. Therefore he assumed a person—which is false. Therefore so is the first premise.

I answer that what is assumed precedes, in our understanding, the union. Therefore if the man is said to be assumed, it must be that “man” is understood prior to its being understood to be assumed. However, the particular man (since he did not assume the universal, as that does not have existence in the nature of things) is a subsisting thing having a complete existence. But whatever has a complete existence that it subsists in can be united to another only in three ways: either accidentally, as clothing is united to a man, and the third opinion asserts this mode of union, or by way of aggregation, as stone is united to stone in a pile; or by way of some accident, for example, as a man is united to God by love or grace. And none of these is a union simply, but in a certain respect. Dioscorus asserted the first of these, and the Nestorian heretics asserted the second, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) This is why in no way should one grant that the man is assumed.

Nonetheless it should be known that the first opinion did not assert any of the stated modes of union, so it is not heretical. But it did assert that the union was brought about in this respect: that the person of the Word did begin to be that substance. But it is not intelligible that of two things one would become the other unless by one turning into the other. Indeed, this is impossible, as was said before, and therefore it is not upheld.

Reply Obj. 1: All the authorities that say that the man is assumed ought to be interpreted so that they are asserting the concrete name as standing for the abstract, that is, “man” standing for the human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ is a man, but not one that he assumed; rather, he assumed a man’s human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not on account of some weakness of the soul’s union with the body that their coming together, as it is understood prior to union with the divine nature, fails to make a man, though it does make the human nature in Christ. Rather, it is because they did not exist as things that subsist through themselves joined together, but rather as in them the divine person would subsist.

Reply Obj. 4: “Man” signifies the human nature and it supposes a supposit subsisting in that nature. Of these, the former is takes the part of the one assumed, and the latter the part of the one doing the assuming.

Reply Obj. 5: What makes the joining of soul and body be a man is not something positive over and above the soul and body and their union. Rather, from the very fact that the composite of soul and body itself is not joined to something else subsisting in a composite nature, it follows that the thing joined together is a man. This is why, if Christ were to lay aside the human nature he assumed, then from this very fact, that which is joined together of only the two substances would be a man.

Article 3

Whether “man” here signifies the composite of only the two substances

To the third we proceed as follows. It appears that “man” signifies only the composite of the two substances.

Obj. 1: For “man” is predicated of Christ and Peter, and it is not said of them equivocally. But when it is said of Peter, only the composite of the two natures or substances is being predicated. Therefore so too when it is said of Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Creed of Athanasius it is said, just as the rational soul and the flesh is one man, so too God and the man is one Christ. (“Quicumque,” Enchiridion Symbolorum (Sources of Catholic Dogma), H. Denzinger-Banwart, n. 40 (Deferrari trans., p. 15; PG 28:1582).) But “soul” does not include flesh in its signification, nor vice versa. Therefore neither does “man” signify the divinity, nor vice versa.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is nothing in Christ besides the three substances. Therefore if “man” signifies the three substances, then Christ will be only a man—which is false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a whole is not said to be united to its part; rather, the part is united to the whole, or to another part. Therefore if “man” were to signify the three substances, it would appear that the man cannot be said to be united to the Son of God.

On the contrary, a man is one who possesses humanity. But the divine person is one who possesses humanity. Therefore this name “man,” when said of Christ, signifies the divine person along with the humanity, which contains the two substances. And in this way it signifies the three substances.

Furthermore, every substantial predicate in some way contains its own subject. But this name “man” is not predicated of the Son of God accidentally. Therefore it contains the person of the Son of God, and thus does not signify only the composite of the two substances.

I answer that in every name there are two things to consider: what the name is imposed from, which is called the “quality of the name,” and what it is imposed on, which is called the “substance of the name.” And properly speaking, a name is said to signify the form or quality that the name is imposed from, but it is said to suppose for what it is imposed on. Therefore the first opinion says that this name “man,” both with respect to what is signified and with respect to what it supposes, signifies only the thing constituted from the two substances. For what is constituted from the two substances is a subsisting hypostasis that can become what is supposed by the name “man.” But the second opinion says that what is constituted from only the two substances is not a subsisting hypostasis, but a nature that the Word of God subsists in. This is why it cannot hold that the name supposes for what is constituted from only the two substances, on which it is imposed; rather, it is the form, that is, the humanity, from which it is imposed. But what the name is imposed on, which is a thing subsisting in a human nature, is the person of the Word. And therefore this name “man” embraces the three substances, but two on the side of what the name signifies, and the third on the side of what it supposes.

Reply Obj. 1: A difference of things that are supposed does not cause any equivocation. But a difference of signification does.

Reply Obj. 2: Athanasius is taking “man” on the side of the nature being signified.

Reply Obj. 3: Terms asserted in a predicate are taken formally, but those in the subject are taken materially. Whence this name “man” supposes the eternal supposit who subsists in the two natures and three substances, but it predicates only the human nature. Whence if it be said that he is only a man, every other nature would be excluded by the human nature. And on that account it is not granted that he is only a man.

Reply Obj. 4: “Man” properly and simply signifies what has been united to the Son of God. For it signifies what is united or joined—that is, the human nature, which is sort of a part in this union—and that in which the union arises, namely the one supposit.

Question 2

The second opinion

Next, we inquire about things that pertain to the second opinion. Three things are asked:

first, whether Christ is one thing;

second, whether he has one existence;

third, whether the person of Christ after the Incarnation was composite.

Article 1

Whether Christ is two [things], in the neuter

To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ is two [things], taken in the neuter.

Obj. 1: For Isidore says, the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, although he is one [thing] as regards the Father and another [thing] as regards the Virgin, nonetheless he is not another [one]. (Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, bk. 1, ch. 14, n. 4 (PL 83:565).) But wherever a thing is one [thing] and another, they are two [things]. Therefore Christ is two [things].

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ is one [thing] by his uncreated unity, and one [thing] by his created unity. However, the created unity is not the uncreated unity. Therefore Christ is two [things].

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as in the Trinity there are three persons in one essence, so in Christ there are two natures in one person. But the Father and the Son are said to be one [thing] on account of the unity of the nature, but not one. Therefore Christ should also be called one on account of the unity of the person, and not one [thing] but two [things] on account of the two natures.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, insofar as he is God Christ is something that the Father is, and insofar as he is a man he is something that his mother is. But what the Father is is not what his mother is. Therefore Christ is this thing and that thing, so he is two [things].

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ is something that can suffer and something that cannot suffer. But what can suffer is not what cannot suffer. Therefore Christ is this thing and that thing. Therefore he is not one [thing].

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1007).) the whole Christ is everywhere, yet not as a whole. But he is everywhere only insofar as he is God. Therefore Christ is not God as a whole. Therefore he is something besides being God. But in virtue of being God he is something. Therefore he is this thing and that thing. So the same as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Christ is not only a man. But “man” predicates something one of him. Therefore Christ is not only some one thing, and therefore he is two.

On the contrary, whatever is is because it is numerically one. Therefore if Christ is not one [thing], he is nothing—which is false.

Furthermore, in Christ the coming together of the human nature with the divine nature is greater than that of an accident with its subject. But an accident together with its subject does not make a multitude. Therefore neither will Christ be said to be two [things] by reason of the human and divine natures.

Furthermore, things that are not one [thing] cannot be predicated of each other. But “God” is predicated of Christ the man, and vice versa. Therefore Christ is one [thing].

I answer that the neuter gender is formless and indistinct, but the masculine is formed and determinate. Thus, the masculine gender is predicated absolutely only of a complete subsisting thing, but the neuter gender is predicated of both the complete and the incomplete subsisting thing. This is why it cannot be said that Peter’s whiteness or his humanity is “someone,” but only that it is “something,” whereas we can say of Peter both that he is “someone” and that he is “something.” Likewise, in Christ it can be said of the person both that he is someone and something, whereas it can be said of the nature only that it is something, not that it is someone.

Therefore according to the second opinion, which is what we are treating now, the something that is the assumed nature is not predicated of Christ. For it does not have the notion of a man, but of humanity. Therefore when “something” is predicated of Christ, it signifies not only a nature, but also a supposit of the nature. And because a plural multiplies a singular, thus Christ cannot be called “somethings” unless there are in him two supposits of a nature—which the second opinion denies, as does the third. And therefore both opinions say that Christ is one [thing], though the second says that he is one [thing] through himself, but the third says he is one [thing] accidentally, as is a white man. But the first opinion says that the thing assumed has not only the notion of humanity, but also the notion of a man; and yet it cannot be called “someone,” since it is joined to something else of greater dignity, though it is said to be “something” and that something is predicated of the person assuming it.

And therefore it follows that Christ is someone, namely the one doing the assuming, and he is something, namely the thing assumed, and that he is two things taken in the neuter, but not in the masculine.

Reply Obj. 1: “Other [thing]” is a partitive, so there must be something it is divided away from. However, when it is said that “Christ is one [thing] and another [thing],” since “another [thing]” predicates not only the nature but also the supposit of the nature (since the human nature is not predicated of Christ), it is required that there is here something distinct or divided from the supposit of the human nature, and this thing is being predicated of Christ. However, according to the second opinion this cannot be, since the supposit of the divine nature is nothing other than the supposit of the human nature; nor is the divine nature, which is predicated of Christ, anything other than its supposit, and neither consequently is it anything other than the supposit of the human nature. This is why, according to the second opinion, Christ is not properly called “one [thing] and another [thing],” but rather this should be interpreted as meaning “of one nature and another.” But the first opinion, which does distinguish the supposits of the natures, can say that “Christ is one [thing] and another [thing].”

Reply Obj. 2: Numerical terms, as has been said, (In I Sent., d. 24, a. 4.) are related equally to the person and the nature. Whence when speaking of the personal unity, there is only one in Christ, and according to this Christ is called “one,” but when speaking of the natural unity, there is a double unity. Yet it does not follow that Christ is one and one, since the “one” that is predicated of Christ refers not only to the nature but also to the supposit of the nature, which is not multiplied.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine nature is predicated directly of the persons because of their identical reality. But the two natures in Christ are not predicated directly of him, for although the divine nature is predicated directly of him, the human nature is not, just as neither is it so predicated of any other man. However, if the three persons differed from their nature according to a reality, although it would be numerically one in them, nonetheless one could not say that the three persons were one simply. But perhaps it could be said that they would be one God, just as many men are called “one people.”

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that “Christ is something that his mother is,” the word “something” predicates not only a nature, but also a supposit of the nature, as is clear from things said before. However, a relative term refers to its antecedent not thanks to its supposit but thanks to its nature. For mother and son do not belong together in their supposit, but in their nature. However, a relative term does not always refer to the same supposit, but sometimes to things the same in the nature of their species. But when it is said that he “is something that the father is,” “something” is predicating the divine nature. This is why it follows from this that the human nature is not the divine nature, but not that Christ is two [things].

Reply Obj. 5: When it is said that “Christ is something that can suffer,” the word “something” does not predicate the nature, but the supposit of the human nature. For the properties of a nature are predicated denominatively of its supposit, even if the nature itself is not predicated of it; the same is true for the properties of parts, for although Peter is not his hair, still he is curly-haired. And when it is said that “Christ is something that cannot suffer,” the word “something” predicates the supposit of the divine nature, which is not different than the supposit of the human nature. Or it predicates the divine nature also, which is not different than its supposit. For the middle premise, which says that “something that can suffer is not something that cannot suffer,” is false. For the same supposit can suffer in virtue of one nature and cannot suffer in virtue of the other.

Reply Obj. 6: “Whole” refers to a person, but “as a whole thing” to a nature. However, a whole thing, the way it is taken here, is what is missing nothing, and because nothing is missing from the personhood of the Son, which the name “Christ” signifies, insofar as he is everywhere, since he is an eternal person, therefore the whole is said to be everywhere. However, something is missing from that nature insofar as it is not everywhere; but nonetheless that something is not predicated of Christ. Thus it does not follow that Christ is this thing and that thing, but that there is this thing and that thing in him.

Reply Obj. 7: The terms placed in the predicate are being taken formally. Whence it is not being conceded that Christ is only a man, since thereby every other nature would be excluded. However, the word “something” and the phrase “one thing” determine not some form or nature, but a determinate supposit, insofar as they are predicated of Christ. For they determine only what they are being asserted of. Whence if it were said that “Christ is only one thing,” or “only something,” that does not exclude another nature, but another supposit. And this is true: Christ is only something one. And we find the fallacy of the consequent in this line of reasoning, since “something one” is higher [in universality] than “man.” Therefore it argues negatively, going from the lower to the higher and using exclusive speech.

Article 2

Whether in Christ there is not only one existence

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2; below, d. 14, a. 1, resp. 1; ST III.17.2; De unione Verbi, a. 1, ad 10; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2; Compend. theol., ch. 212.) It appears that in Christ there is not only one existence.

Obj. 1: For every substantial form gives existence. But the soul is a substantial form, so it gives existence. But it does not give existence to the divine person, since this is eternal. Therefore it gives another existence. Therefore in Christ there is not only one existence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the existence of the Son of God and the Father is one. Therefore if the existence of this man and the Son of God is one, there will be one existence of both this man and God the Father. But there is no greater union than that of things with one existence. Therefore the humanity is united to God the Father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the divine there is only the essential existence. Therefore if the union of the human nature to the divine happens in the Son of God’s existence, then it happens in the essence—which is impossible.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a definition is an expression signifying what a thing’s existence is. (Aristotle, Topics 1.5, 101b38.) But “man” is predicated of Christ and Peter according to the same definition. Therefore that man’s existing humanity is the same in species as Peter’s existing humanity. But the Son of God’s existence is not the same in species as Peter’s existence. Therefore in Christ there is not only one existence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, anything about which one can answer the question, “does it exist?” has its own proper existence. But this question can be asked not only about a person but even about a nature. Therefore there is an existence not only of a person but even of its nature. However, in Christ there are two natures. Therefore in Christ there are two existences.

On the contrary, everything that has existence through itself is subsistent. Therefore if are two existences in Christ, there will be two subsistences there, and therefore two hypostases—which was disproved above. (Above, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 1.)

Furthermore, whenever things differ in existence, one of them is not predicated of the other. But God is a man, and vice versa. Therefore there is one existence of God and the man.

Furthermore, of one thing there is only one existence. But Christ is one thing, as was said. Therefore he has one existence only.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.7, 1017a31–35; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 9, nn. 895–96.) “to be” is said in two ways. In the first way, it is said as what signifies a proposition’s truth, insofar as it is a copula; and in this way, as the Commentator says, on the same passage, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 7, text. 6.) “being” is an accidental predicate. And this existence is not in a real thing, but in a mind that joins the predicate to the subject, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 6. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25–27; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 6, lect. 4, nn. 1230–31.) So the question here is not about this. In another way, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.7, 1017a22–27; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 9, nn. 889–95.) that is said “to be” which pertains to the nature of a real thing, insofar as it is divided according to the ten genera. This existence is in the thing, and is the act of a being resulting from a thing’s principles, just as lighting up is the act of what is luminous. Nevertheless, sometimes “existence” is taken for the essence according to which a thing exists; for the principles of things are customarily signified through their acts, as is done with a power or a habit.

Therefore, when speaking about existence insofar as it is the act of a being, in this way I say that according to the second opinion one must assert there is only one existence, but according to the others one must assert there are two existences. For a subsisting being is what has existence as of that which exists, although it is of a nature or form as of that by which it exists. Whence neither a thing’s nature nor its parts are properly said “to be,” if “to be” is being taken in the aforesaid mode; likewise, neither are its accidents. But the complete supposit, which exists in virtue of all the others, is [properly said “to be”]. Whence also the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 2, (In fact, see Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.1, 1028a18–28; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 7, lect. 1, n. 1251.) that an accident is more properly of a being than a being.

Therefore the first opinion, which asserts there are two subsistences, asserts two substantial existences; likewise the third opinion, since it claims that the parts of human nature come to the divine person accidentally, asserts two existences: one substantial and the other accidental. But the second opinion, since it asserts that there is one subsistence, and also asserts that the humanity does not come to the divine person accidentally, must assert one existence. For it is impossible that something one have two substantial existences, since the one is founded on being. So if there were many existences, each in virtue of which something is called a “being” simply, it is impossible that he would be called “one.” But it is not a problem that one subsistence’s existence be in reference to many things, just as Peter’s existence is one though it has reference to the diverse principles that make him up. Likewise also, in its own way Christ’s one existence has two references, one to the human nature and the other to the divine.

Reply Obj. 1: Form makes the existence not in such a way that it is the matter’s or the form’s existence, but as the subsistent thing’s existence. Therefore whenever a composite of matter and form is subsistent through itself, the composite acquires absolute existence through itself from the form. However, whenever a composite is not subsistent through itself, it does not acquire existence through its form. Rather, for the subsistent thing to which it is joined a reference in existence acquired to what is added to it. This is just as if a man were to be born without a hand, and a hand come to be through itself separately, and then miraculously it is joined to him. In this case, it is certain that the hand’s form caused the existence of the very hand subsisting through itself, but after it is joined to the man the hand does not acquire any existence from the hand’s form, since a hand does not have its own proper existence. Rather, the man acquires in his own existence a reference to the hand. So too I say that in Christ the soul does not acquire the proper existence of the human nature; rather, there accrues to the Son of God in his own existence a reference to the human nature. Yet this reference is not something real within the divine person, but something following on reason, as was said above about the union, in Distinction 2. (Above, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, resp. 3, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 2: Things are different with God and all other things. For in God the very essence is subsistent, and this is why existence belongs to it in virtue of itself. Indeed, the essence is its own subsistent existence. Whence the essence does not differ from the person in reality, so the existence of the essence is also that of the person, and yet the person and the essence differ in notion. Therefore although there is one existence, still the existence can be considered either as of the essence—and in this way the humanity is not united to the divine in his existence, so it is not united to the Father—or it can be considered as the existence of the person, and in this way it is united to the divine in his existence.

Reply Obj. 3: And through this, the resolution to the third is manifest.

Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher there is taking “being” for the essence, or what the thing is, which the definition signifies.

Reply Obj. 5: That objection is sound for the “to be” that indicates a proposition’s truth. For in that way it can be said not only of things that exist in reality, but even of things that exist in the intellect, about which a statement can be formed.

Article 3

Whether after the Incarnation the person of the Word is composite

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel: ST III.2.4.) It appears that the person of the Word is not composite after the Incarnation.

Obj. 1: For every composite is better than its components. For a good added to a good constitutes a greater good. But nothing can be better than the divinity. Therefore a single composite person cannot arise from the divinity and the humanity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Christ there is only the eternal person. But nothing eternal is composite. Therefore person of Christ is in no way composite.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it pertains to the divine essence’s simplicity that it not be composite, nor even capable of composition with another. But the divine person’s simplicity equals that of the divine essence. Therefore neither can it in itself be called composite, nor is it even capable of composition with another.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207b27; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 3, lect. 11, n. 7.) a part has the notion of matter, and the imperfect. But all imperfection and materiality is foreign to the Godhead. Therefore he cannot have a part. But every composition is from parts. Therefore the Christ’s person cannot be composed from the divinity and the humanity.

On the contrary (5), Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) that the two natures have been united to each other in the one composite hypostasis of the Son of God.

Furthermore (6), commenting on Leviticus 4:20, which speaks of the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a sin offering, the Gloss says, this is Christ’s humanity, for taking the three measures of an ephah signifies the Trinity. (Glossa ordinaria, at Leviticus 6:20, 1.954 (PL 113:313).) Therefore Christ’s humanity is a part of a certain person in the Trinity.

Furthermore (7), Athanasius says in his Creed: just as the rational soul and the flesh is the one man, so God and the man is the one Christ. (“Quicumque,” Enchiridion Symbolorum (Sources of Catholic Dogma), (PG 28:1582).) But the rational soul and the flesh are parts of a man. Therefore God and the man are parts of Christ.

Furthermore (8), every whole is composed of parts. But Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 27 (PG 94:1099).) that the whole Christ was in hell, but not the whole [thing]. And likewise, the whole [thing] is not everywhere, but the whole [person]; for he is not everywhere except in virtue of his other nature. Therefore the two natures are parts of the person of Christ composed from them.

I answer that two things pertain to the notion of “whole.” The one is that the whole composite’s existence belongs to all the parts, since parts do not have their own proper existence, but exist through the existence of the whole, as was said. (Above, a. 2.) The other is that the component parts cause the whole’s existence.

However, according to the third and first opinions, neither of these are found in Christ. For the first opinion says that this man has his own proper existence, so the divine person’s existence does not belong to him. Likewise the third opinion says that there is an existence added accidentally to the divine person’s existence; so the soul and the body are not said to be the person’s parts, just as neither are accidents a subject’s parts. Whence neither asserts that the person of the Word is composite.

But the second opinion asserts that there is one existence in Christ, which is why the divine person’s existence belongs to both natures. Nevertheless, that existence is not caused by the joining of the natures, the way that the existence of a composite is caused by the joining of its components. This is why, according to this opinion, the [person of Christ after the Incarnation can in some way be called “composite,” inasmuch as a certain condition of composites is preserved here; still, the true notion of composition is not here, because the other condition is lacking. This is also why calling the person “composite” is not customary among contemporaries who hold this opinion.

Nor should one say that he is called “composite” only according to the interpretation of the name as meaning, as it were, “placed with another.” For this way the first and third opinions would assert that the person is composite in the same way the second does.

Reply Obj. 1: Although there are more good things in the composite person than in the simple person, since both uncreated and created goods are there, nonetheless the composite person is not a greater good than the simple one. For a created good is related to an uncreated good just as a point is to a line, since there is no proportion of the one to the other. Whence just as a point added to a line does not make it any greater, so in the person neither does the created good added to the uncreated good make it any better. Or this is also because the entire notion of the goodness of all good things is in God; this is also why he is called “all good.” Whence no addition of any good can be made to him that is not already in him.

Reply Obj. 2: The person is not called “composite” as though his existence were constituted from many things (for this is against the notion of the eternal), but rather because he embraces many things that are assumed into that existence.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the notion of the highest simplicity that a thing be neither composed of parts nor capable of composition with another as a part. However, the person is not composite in this way, since he is neither a part nor constituted of parts.

Reply Obj. 4: Although in a certain respect composition is preserved in the Incarnation of the Word, yet in no way is the notion of a part there. For the divinity cannot be a part, on account of the imperfection that is of the notion of a part; moreover, the human nature likewise cannot be a part, since it does not have a fellow part, or even because it does not cause the existence of the person who is being called composite. And this is why the Master, in the following Distinction, (Sent. III, 7.1(23).14.) calls “inexplicable” any composition that is not of parts. However, the reason he is called [composite] by the masters is the union of requirements, since as many things are included in the person as are required for the work of redemption, such as he be God, who is capable of making satisfaction, and he be a man, who owes satisfaction.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Damascene calls the hypostasis “composite” inasmuch as there is something of the notion of composition there; he does not mean that it is simply composite, according to the perfect notion of composition.

Reply Sed Contra 6: This binding-together is taken according to a likeness with number, but not according to a likeness with whole and part.

Reply Sed Contra 7: This likeness is in a certain respect, not in all respects, as is clear from the things said.

Reply Sed Contra 8: A whole has something in its notion over and above being composed of parts: namely, that it is lacking none of the things it should have. And it is being taken by Damascene in reference to this.

Question 3

The third opinion

Next, one asks about those things that pertain to the third opinion, and two things are asked about this:

first, whether there was something composed of Christ’s soul and body;

second, whether the soul and body were united to the divine person accidentally.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there was any composition of soul and body

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; ST III.2.5; SCG IV.37, 41; Compend. theol., ch. 209.) It appears that there was no composition of soul and body in Christ.

Obj. 1: For above in Distinction 2, (Sent. III, 2.1(4).1.) the Master proved that in the expression “human nature” the soul and body are understood, nor is this taken in Christ the way it is in other men. Therefore since in other men “human nature” is taken for what is composed of soul and body, it appears that in Christ it is taken for these parts as uncomposed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) that there is no common species in the Lord Jesus. But the nature of the species arises from the united soul and body. Therefore it appears that they were not united to each other in Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, after final composition there can be no other composition. But the final composition in the nature is that of the rational soul with the body. Therefore if there were such a union in Christ, no union to the divine person could follow on it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the soul is not joined with the flesh except for the purpose of giving it life. But the flesh could be given life from union with life itself, namely the Word. Therefore it was not necessary that it be united with the flesh.

On the contrary, “man” is said univocally of Christ and other men; otherwise he would not be of the same species as them, nor would satisfaction for the sins of the human race be owed by him. But the composition of soul and body is of the notion of “man” insofar as it is predicated of other men. Therefore there was also a union of soul and flesh in Christ.

Furthermore, a body is not ensouled unless a soul is joined to it as form. Therefore if the soul were not united to Christ’s body as form, that body would not be ensouled; and such a thing could not be assumed.

I answer that the soul’s union to the flesh constitutes the notion of man, and that of all his parts; this is why when the soul is removed there is not said to be a man, nor is there an eye, nor flesh, except equivocally, the way a man in a picture is a “man.” Therefore if one takes away the union of Christ’s soul with his flesh, it follows that he is not a true man, nor is his flesh true flesh—which is contrary to an article of the faith. Therefore this third opinion is not only false but heretical, and it was condemned in the Council of Ephesus under Pope Celestine I. (Lateran Council (c. 649), under Pope Martin I (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 261).)

Nonetheless, this opinion appears to have proceeded from the same spring as the first, namely: they believed that every composite of soul and body has the notion of a man, and therefore, since the first opinion asserted that a united soul and body was assumed, it was forced to assert that a man was assumed, and that Christ is two things. However, to deny this, this opinion asserted that the soul and body were assumed without being united. But the second opinion avoids this, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: It was not the Master’s intention to say that in Christ a non-united soul and body is signified by “human nature.” For he does not assign the difference in reference to this, but in reference to the fact that human nature in other men arises from everything that is in them substantially, but this is not so in Christ. Rather, in him it arises only from the soul and body.

Reply Obj. 2: Damascene is speaking in reference to the divinity’s union to the human nature, out of which no third nature of a species arises in reference to the union of the soul and body. (See ST III.2.5.ad 5.)

Reply Obj. 3: The rational soul’s composition with the flesh is the final one among the works of nature. But the humanity’s composition with the person of the Word does not happen by a work of nature, but by the divine power.

Reply Obj. 4: The Word enlivens Christ’s flesh actively, and not formally. And therefore a soul, which enlivens formally, is also required.

Article 2

Whether the human nature is united to the Word accidentally

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.2.6; SCG IV.34, 37, 41, 49; De unione Verbi, a. 1; Compend. theol., cc. 203, 209, 210; Super Rom. 1, lect. 2; Super Philip. 2, lect. 21.) It appears that the human nature is united to the Word accidentally.

Obj. 1: According to Philippians 2:7, having been found in condition as a man. Therefore, since a condition is a kind of accident, it appears that God was a man accidentally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that comes to a thing after complete existence is an accident. But the human nature comes to the Son of God after his complete existence. Therefore it comes to him accidentally.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 2, 1a24.) what is said to be 'in a subject' is in something not the way a part is. But the humanity of Christ is not in him as a part, as was said. Therefore it is in him as in a subject. But to be in a subject is proper to an accident. Therefore it is united to the Word accidentally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, an accident is what is present or absent without the subject being destroyed. But the human nature is related to the person of the Son of God in this way. Therefore it is united to him accidentally.

On the contrary, the decretal of Pope Alexander says: since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, by what temerity do some dare to say that Christ as man is not some thing? (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 393.) But an accidental predicate does not predicate that the subject is some thing, but rather that it is somehow related. Therefore “man” is not an accidental predicate.

Furthermore, Aristotle says in the Physics 1, what truly is, that is, substance, cannot be an accident of anything. (Aristotle, Physics 1.3, 186b41; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 1, lect. 6, n. 8.) But humanity is a substance. Therefore it cannot be something’s accident.

Furthermore, if it is an accident, it must be accidental to something. But it is not accidental to the man, since humanity belongs to him through itself. Therefore it is accidental to the Son of God. But that is contrary to Boethius, who says that in God there are no accidents. (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii (De Trinitate), cc. 4, 5 (PL 64:1247).)

I answer that, although what in itself is an accident can in a certain way be the substance for something, as color is for whiteness, yet what in itself is a substance cannot be something’s accident. However, the joining of one substance to another can be an accident, in such a way that the one substance is said to come to the other accidentally, as clothing comes to a man. But this can happen in only two ways: either such that it is joined to it by contact, as the clothes are joined to a man or a jar to wine, or the way a mobile is joined to its mover, as an angel is joined to a body that it assumes.

And since contact happens only with bodily things, one must say that the human nature can come to the divine person only as what is moved is joined to its mover. So in this way Christ is said to have assumed a human nature, just as an angel assumes a body so that it might be seen by the eyes of mortals, as is said in the text. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).1.) And in this way the Holy Spirit was seen in the dove. However, this assumption does not cause what is assumed to be truly predicated of the one assuming it, nor does it carry the properties of what is assumed into the one assuming it. For an angel assuming a body in the likeness of a man is not truly a man, nor does it truly have any of the properties of a man, and neither can the Holy Spirit be said to be smaller than himself because of the form of the dove in which he appeared, as Augustine says. (In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 3.
)

Whence it is clear that this opinion cannot say that the Son of God is truly a man, or truly suffered. And therefore, since it denies the truth of those articles [of the faith], it has been condemned as heretical. Nonetheless, with respect to this position, it too proceeds from the same spring as the first opinion: namely, from the human nature not being assumed to the divine person’s existence. Whence the first opinion asserted that what was assumed had an existence through itself, in which it subsisted. However, this third opinion asserts that what was assumed does not subsist, nor does the person subsist in it; rather, what was assumed is an added accidental existence.

Reply Obj. 1: The human nature in Christ bears a certain likeness with an accident, and especially with a condition, in three respects: first, because it comes to the divine person after his complete existence, as does a condition and all other accidents. Second, because in itself it is a substance and it comes to another substance, as clothing does to a man. Third, because it is better off due to its union with the Word, and it does not change the Word, just as clothing is formed according to the form of the one wearing it, and it does not change the wearer. Whence the ancients have said that it turns into an accident, and some therefore added that it degenerates into an accident (Find a source for this expression?)—though this is not said properly, since the human nature in Christ does not degenerate, but rather is ennobled.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the human nature comes to it after the complete existence, still it does not come to it accidentally. For it is drawn into a union within that existence, just as the body comes to the soul in the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the human nature cannot properly be called a part, still it has something of the notion of a part—which an accident does not have, as is clear from things said.

Reply Obj. 4: The response is the same as that to the second.

Exposition of the text

It is asked whether by these expressions: ‘God was made man,’ . . . God is said to be made something. (Sent. III, 6.1(17).1.) Here he lists three questions.

The first is whether “man” predicates something of Christ. And according to the first and second opinions, it does predicate something, since it predicates of him what he is, since the union is substantial; but according to the third opinion it does not predicate something, but predicates in what manner he is existing.

He lists the second question at and is it as suitable to say, (Sent. III, 6.1(17).1.) whether man has been made God, just as God has been made man. The first opinion concedes this, but the second and third, properly speaking, do not, as will be clear in the following distinction. (Sent. III. 7.)

The third question is, if in sayings of this sort God is not being said to have been made something, then what understanding will they have? And he asserts this at and if by these expressions God is not said to be made anything or to be anything [else], what is the meaning of these expressions and of others like them. (Sent. III, 6.1(17).1.)

For some say that, in the very Incarnation of the Word, some man was formed from a rational soul and human flesh. (Sent. III, 6.2(18).1.) Here he lists the claims of the first opinion—not all, but those that suffice for understanding it.

And the first claim is the root of the opinion, namely that the soul and the body are assumed as united (which is contrary to the third opinion), for the sake of constituting not only the humanity, but even the man (which is contrary to the second); this is why he says some man, and that such union of soul and flesh, from which a man is constituted, precedes the union to the Word, according to understanding. And this is why he says, and that man began to be God, but not in time, and this is why he says, in the very Incarnation of the Word.

He lists the second claim at they also grant that that man was assumed by the Word and united to the Word; (Sent. III, 6.2(18).1.) and this is to say that a man was assumed, and that one assuming is the one assumed, which is indicated his saying, yet that he was the Word, and that by the assumption God was made man, whence he says, and they hand down that it was for that reason that it is said that ‘God was made man.’

The third is that man was made God, and vice versa, at and so it is truly said that God was made man, and man was made God. (Sent. III, 6.2(18).1.)

The fourth is that “man” signifies the composite of only the two substances, at and although they say that that man subsists from a rational soul and human flesh, yet they do not profess that he was composed from two natures. (Sent. III, 6.2(18).1.)

And lest they be held to speak only from their own understanding, they defend their view with several testimonies. (Sent. III, 6.2(18).2.) Here authorities are introduced to prove the first opinion. And it should be known that they prove four things by the aforesaid authorities.

The first is that Christ is two, which they prove by the first authority, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 19 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1033).) which begins at when we read, from these words: both at once one person; and again by the second, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate, ch. 38, n. 12 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) which begins at Jesus Christ, from these words: either substance, namely the divine and the human. he is the one Son of God the Father almighty; and from these words: (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate, ch. 35, n. 10 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) one on account of the Word, the other on account of the man; and again from the fourth, (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 78, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1836).) which begins at let us acknowledge the twofold substance, from these words: and yet Christ is both at once, not two, but one. However, when it is said, Christ is both, this should not be understood to be speaking properly, but materially, the way a wall and roof are said to be the house. And when one thing and another is said, this should be understood as “of one nature and of another.”

The second thing they prove is that God was made man, and they prove this by the third authority, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate, ch. 36, n. 11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:251).) which begins at what did the human nature in the man Christ deserve?, from these words: that this man should deserve to become one person with God?, and again from the fifth, (Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 15, n. 30 (PL 44:982).) which begins at whence did that man deserve that, having been assumed into the unity by the Word coeternal with the Father, he be the only begotten Son of God?, from these words: from the moment that he began to be; and from the sixth, (Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 15, n. 31 (PL 44:982).) which begins at any man, from these words: that man by grace was made the Christ from the beginning; and from the seventh, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 17, n. 22 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1031).) which begins at the grace of God is commended to us, from these words: the Son of God became one person with him; how one should understand this will be discussed in the following distinction.

The third thing is that the man was assumed, and they prove this by five authorities, which begins at whence did that man merit this: that he be assumed by the Word coeternal with the Father into a unity of person that he might be the only begotten Son of God?—which expressly says this, and this has been resolved in the preceding Distinction, (Above, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3; q. 2, aa. 2, 3.) since the man, that is, the nature of a man, is said to be assumed.

The fourth thing that they prove is that the man is constituted from two substances, by the eighth authority, (Sent. III, 6.2(18).8, referring to Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 57 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:389).) which begins at *we do not doubt that Christ is God the Word—*which expressly says this, although Hilary is speaking in reference to the form signified, not in reference to the supposit.

But there are others. (Sent. III, 6.3(19).1.) In this chapter he lists the claims of the second opinion. Therefore he lists two of its claims in which the whole consists.

The first is that what is assumed is composed from a soul and a body in the manner of human nature, which is clear from this: that the “human nature” from which, along with the divine, Christ is constituted, it explains right away as the soul and body, and a human nature is constituted from them only insofar as they are joined to each other. And that this composite is a man this opinion holds from its union to the divine person, whence it says that this man is constituted not only from the soul and body, but from them and the divinity. However, when he says, who in part agree, he intends this in reference to both opinions asserting that “man” predicates of Christ what he is, and that the soul and body are united to each other.

The second claim is that the person of the Word was simple before the Incarnation, but after is composite.

And after this he removes two problems that appear to follow:

the first is that the person of the Word is other than he was before, which he eliminates at nor is he therefore another person than before; (Sent. III, 6.3(19).1.)

the second is that the person was made, which he eliminates at and yet that person should not be said to have been made a person. (Sent. III, 6.3(19).1.)

Concerning this, Augustine, in the book of the Sentences of Prosper. (Sent. III, 6.3(19).2.) Here he lists authorities proving the second opinion, and they prove two things:

namely, that he is one hypostasis,

and that after the Incarnation the person is composite, which is sufficiently clear in the text.

There are even some others as well who not only deny [the existence of] a person composed of natures in Incarnation of the Word, but also say that there was not any man at all, or even a substance, there composed or made from soul and flesh. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).1.) Here he lists the claims of the third opinion, and he lists the four in which the whole consists.

The first is that there is not something one [composed] of the soul and body, and this is claimed right away in the beginning.

The second is that these two come to the divine person accidentally, like clothing; and this is at they say that these two things, namely soul and flesh, were united to the person or nature of the Word, not in such a way that any substance or person was made or composed from those two or these three things. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).1.)

And then he removes two incongruities.

The one follows from the first claim, that God is not a true man; and this he says at and so he is said to have been made true man because he took the truth of flesh and soul. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).2.) But it is certain that one cannot avoid this, since taking away the union of the soul and body, true flesh is no longer present; and further, if there is still true flesh and true soul, he will not be a true man unless they are united.

The second incongruity follows from the second claim, namely, if the soul and body come to him accidentally, then they would not pertain to the singularity of the divine person; and this he removes at we read that he took these two into the singularity or unity of his person. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).2.)

It is also clear that one cannot avoid this incongruity, since this does not follow: if it does not add to the number of the persons, then it pertains to the singularity of the divine person. For example, the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared also does not augment the number of the persons, yet it does not pertain to the singularity of the person of the Holy Spirit.

The third claim is that the person of the Word is as simple after the Incarnation as it was before. In this it agrees with the first opinion. And he says this at because the very person of the Word, which before was without this clothing, was not divided or changed by the taking on of clothing. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).2.)

The fourth claim is that “man” does not predicate of God what he is, but his condition; and this is at they also say that God was made man according to habit, that is, condition. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).3.) And he proves this by reducing it to something problematic, at they say, if God were understood to be man, or man God, essentially, then, if God had taken human form in the female gender, the woman too would be God essentially, and vice versa. (Sent. III, 6.4(20).3.) Yet this is clearly not a problem.

Lest also they appear to be expressing merely their own view, they also confirm what they say by the submission of authorities. (Sent. III. 6. 5(21).) Here he lists authorities proving this third opinion.

The first thing that they prove is that this person was not changed through the Incarnation, and that the human nature does not increase the number of the divine persons; this is done by the first authority. But this is not opposed to the second opinion, which, although it asserts that the person is composite, still leaves him unchanged; neither is this authority sufficient to prove that the soul and body do not pertain to the singularity of the divine person, since the number of persons is not thereby increased.

The second thing the authorities prove is that “man” is said of God according to condition, and this by the second authority, (Sent. III, 6.6(22).1, quoting Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 73 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:84–85).) at we say ‘habit,’ that is, condition, *in many senses—*which does not appear to say this expressly. Further, he proves it by a third authority, (Sent. III, 6.6(22).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 21 (CCSL 50; PL 42:910).) which begins at if it is asked how was the Incarnation done: I say that the ‘Word’ of God himself ‘was made flesh', (Sent. III, 6.6(22).4.) from the word: clothed. Further, from the fifth, sixth, and seventh authorities, which say God has received the man, or the human nature, so that he might be visible. But it is not necessary that everything that has been received is an accident. Further, from the final authority, (Sent. III, 6.6(22).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 15 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:360).) which begins at how was the Son of God born of Mary?, from these words: *that was not nevertheless a man’s habit—*that is, that of a mere man—but as if a man’s; for he appeared to be a mere man on account of his condition. But all these things are said by way of a likeness, and not with propriety, as is clear from things said before.

The third thing the authorities prove is that Christ is called a man because he had a body and soul united to him, from the fourth authority, (Sent. III, 6.6(22).5, quoting Fulgentius, De Fide, ad Petrum, ch. 2 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:756).) which begins at the Son of God, although he is eternal and true God, was made true and full man for our sake, from these words: full. But this authority does not deny the union of the soul and body—indeed, it rather asserts it, insofar as it speaks of the true nature, for it is not a human nature unless it arise from a composition of soul and body.